Now that I’m back from Latin America, I’m catching up on my Central Asia reading, and I found a new great article in the American Political Science Association's Perspectives on Politics.
Tucker, J. (2007, September). Enough! Electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-communist colored revolutions. Perspective on Politics 5 (3), 535-550. This article has a sizable bibliography and some interesting ideas relevant to — for our purposes — Kyrgyzstan and a little concerning Uzbekistan.
A. Professor Tucker first examines the phenomenon of the colored revolution (hereinafter CR) as discussed in most analyses. He notes that most scholarship on the CR tends to privilege the decision-making abilities and choices of elites–that “geostratic politics, CIA-organized plots, elite-based modular learning, and the inability of government elites to successfully consolidate authoritarian rule” are the usual explanations for the phenomenon.
He then turns to a look at the street-level participants (i.e., the masses who braved the weather in places such as Serbia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and Georgia) to discuss their reading of events. In particular, he notes that demonstration participants have to overcome the risks and costs of collective action in order to demonstrate. People dissatisfied with government most frequently do not protest–just look at your own state, wherever you are–but the colored revolutions overcame the individual perceptions of risk into collective action.
Now that this is set up as an economic evaluation–and Professor Tucker maintains that at elections, with sizable numbers of international observers, a clear chance at making a change, and a large participation, more people perceive the risk/benefit of collective action as markedly different. While this takes the passion out of the motivations for demonstration, it does seem to show why, at least, there isn't more demonstrating out there. With numbers of observers, there is more chance at publicizing grievance and less chance at state-initiated violence; with numbers of participants, there is less chance at being singled out and punished by law enforcement officials; and with corrupt elections and high passions, there seems to be a likelihood at success in actually changing matters somewhat.
However, Professor Tucker's paper is most valuable in saying that there is no clear correspondence between the CR and “heading West”, contrary to the views of those who favor and those who denigrate the CR. Every state that has undergone a CR still views Russia as a powerful ally and useful friend. Furthermore, a colored revolution is less a mandate to the new government than a warning to all government that change is desired: in general, the change seems to be against high-level and low-level corruption. This seems quite clear in Kyrgyzstan, where Mr. Bakiev continues to have problems and the legislature has not had the same protests that the president has had.
His last point, that elites contemplating election fraud or further corruption might well learn from the colored revolution: first, less observers and second, more violence, or, more threat of violence–in order to change the individual's assessment of cost-benefit analysis. A higher cost will keep him or her on the couch and off the curb with a colorful flag and a shouted slogan. And this recalled, for Professor Tucker, the government conduct at Andijan . . . minus the election part, of course.
Thanks to Professor Tucker for a very readable article.
