This Wall Street Journal story by Siobhan Gorman details the influential position of a CIA chief inside of the Karzai administration in Kabul. The piece is worthwhile reading for its insight into the Obama administration’s Afghan teams layout and method for working with the at times, volatile, President Karzai. President Obama’s administration’s relationship with Karzai has seen its ups and downs as the two sides attempt various tactics to get the most out of the other side. At first, the administration in DC tried to keep Karzai at arms length believing that a ‘get tough’ approach would spur the Afghan president to get to work building up his government and providing services to the country’s people. This strategy was scrapped a few months ago after Karzai’s recalcitrance only increased and the Obama administration appeared to open its arms to the man during his last trip to DC at the beginning of the summer. Gorman’s article through the telling of the unnamed CIA chief’s role, brings further light to the administration’s current method for working with President Karzai:
The relationship with Mr. Karzai isn’t handled on a daily basis by the station chief; rather, he is called on at critical times. With the administration trying to get all of its leaders in Afghanistan on the same page following Gen. McChrystal’s dismissal, others including Mr. Eikenberry and new Allied commander Gen. David Petraeus, as well as senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization officials, also are working to build closer relations with Mr. Karzai.
The article also stated that only Gen. McChrystal had a closer personal relationship with Karzai than this CIA chief. These relations are vital, especially with Ambassador Eikenberry’s reportedly lukewarm feelings toward Karzai, and both sides are lucky to have the affable Gen. Petraeus, who’s shown himself to be a great communicator, replace McChyrstal. This being said, good personal relations do not guarantee policy success:
Some officials worry the U.S. dependence on personal relationships to deal with Kabul is insufficient. It’s “becoming a substitute for a political approach to the Afghan government that is really missing,” said one former military official.
According to the article, the Obama administration is aware of this:
The Obama administration said that it isn’t overly reliant on personal relationships, and that its focus is on establishing broad shared policy goals. “If we have agreement about the strategic direction and the goals we’re trying to achieve, we can weather those periods of tension,” a senior administration official said.
The Obama administration said that it isn’t overly reliant on personal relationships, and that its focus is on establishing broad shared policy goals. “If we have agreement about the strategic direction and the goals we’re trying to achieve, we can weather those periods of tension,” a senior administration official said.
That quote is the almighty ‘if only’, as the United States and the Karzai government will need to move in the same strategic direction during the good times, and mostly bad, if any semblance of success can come about in this troubled situation. If both sides truly desire to head in the same direction, the same finish line, than the bumps and bruises along the way can be weathered more easily, but if there are splits and cracks in this ‘strategic direction’ the inevitable pitfalls along the way my turn into quicksand. Now about Pakistan and United States ‘strategic direction’ cohesion…..
