Foreign Policy Blogs

Do's and Don'ts for India After Osama bin Laden's Death

The U.S. operation that led to the killing of Al-Qadea leader Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad earlier this week has stirred a hornet’s nest. While details of the operation continue to pour in each day, the sentiment that “Pakistan has some explaining to do” is gaining force. Pakistan’s Ambassador to U.S. Husain Haqqani, has appeared on more television shows that I can count and attempted to defend Pakistan. Though I may disagree with his analysis, I am much impressed by his diplomatic abilities. After all diplomacy, even in the age of nuclear weapons, is the best tool to defend a country’s interests. This led me to explore India’s diplomatic response to Operation Osama and the larger issue of fighting terrorism in the region. While there is much discussion within the country on how should India deal with the situation, here is a list of diplomatic do’s and don’ts for India.

Don’ts

1.  Avoid using “we told you so” phrase. India is not going to gain any points for telling the Americans something that their intelligence agencies know better than the Indians. Moreover, India’s insistence will not lead to political acceptance of this fact to a degree that can turn around U.S. policy with regard to Pakistan. If U.S. chooses to change its Pakistan policy, it will be simply because U.S. wants to do so rather than on India insistence.

2. Don’t attempt to appear saintly by saying “we understand Pakistan’s challenges.” This could be a huge domestic public diplomacy mistake.

3. Don’t expect that Pakistan will hunt down, put on trail or hand to India the people on India’s most wanted list. You can subscribe either the unwillingness or inability theories but it’s not going to happen.

4. Don’t expect that increased trade, cultural and sporting links will stimulate pro-India feelings in Pakistan. Pakistan’s liberal community may genuinely desire friendly relations with India but the political influence of this community is unfortunately limited.

Do’s

1.  Do justice in 26/11 case by punishing Ajmal Kasab. There is no point in asking Pakistan to hand over Hafiz Saeed and Dawood Ibrahim or speculating on possibility of special operations to access them when ‘a terrorist caught during an act of terror’ is being used as a poster boy for Indian democracy and justice system. India should have got all intel from Kasab within a few months and sentenced him through a speedy trail. The political leadership needs to show some backbone in punishing terrorists before claiming to deal with the phenomenon of terrorism.

2.  Explicitly and publicly distinguish between conflict resolution and peace. India is currently engaged in a process of addressing contentious issues with Pakistan and peaceful relations may or may not follow. India-Pakistan talks are not a reflection of peaceful relations but a necessity imposed by geo-strategic realpolitik; avoid inflating hopes. India and Pakistan are talking not because they believe in the peace dividend but have no other option.

3. Make clear that the challenge of terrorism facing the country is not coterminous with the problem of Kashmir. Pakistan’s low intensity conflict in J&K in the late 1980s was referred to as Pakistan sponsored terrorism by India but the threat of terrorism has expanded much beyond. Resolution of Kashmir and countering Pakistan supported terrorism are two different (though broadly related) issues.  Solution of J&K will not automatically defuse the terrorist threat for India.

4. Get certain priorities straight. Comprehend and absorb the fact that combating terrorism is not merely about threatening Pakistan but is also about convincing Indian citizens that they shall be protected. Though India’s relations with regional states and global powers are determining factors in policy responses to acts of terrorism, Indian state should consider citizens’ safety the top priority. Don’t over-work the structural variables in designing responses simply because terrorism is not an electoral issue in India.

5. Work towards evolving a policy that combines open dialogue with sufficient diplomatic pressure. India needs to realize that simply interacting, much like annulment of dialogue, is not a solution. Talks to improve trade relations and open road links are not the mechanisms to address the threat of terrorism from Pakistan. India should not stop working on exposing Pakistan’s involvement in terrorism (bilaterally and on international forums) simply because it may jeopardize trade talks or cultural interactions.

6. Warn, don’t just expect. Statements like “Pakistan should stop harbouring terrorists” are open ended demands having only rhetorical value. India should delineate a time frame with specific demands and spell out viable consequences (which are implemented on the policy level) if demands are not met. Misadventures like Operation Parakaram have created a massive credibility crisis for India. Put out some credible warnings; don’t just expect Pakistan to oblige.

7. Expand the intelligence system (especially the HUMINT dimension) to gather information on the Pakistan supported terrorist network for the purposes of sharing with other countries and foiling attacks on Indian soil. If India can sneak under-cover agents into Pakistan with the same frequency with terrorists cross over into India, there is a good chance of frustrating the terror plans.

Hopefully, even if India ignores the above do’s and don’ts, the Osama episode should stir India into crafting a long-term Pakistan policy taking national security needs and systemic constrains into consideration. This may not be an occasion to make demands on Pakistan but is a good opportunity to make amends in India’s regional diplomacy.  The idea is not be aggressive but to be smart.

     
    Add a comment

    Comments (8)

    1. uc59 Thursday - 05 / 05 / 2011 Reply
      enjoyed reading the article. Though i sense it being a bit too pessimistic about good relationship between India and Pakistan. However, I have a few scatter brained themes - and I am writing them down at the risk of being called naive. The general theme being smother with love ( ha ha, I know), and most of these are UNILATERAL steps. 1. Initiate, unilaterally, visitor's visa for family trip ( PARENTS and Children under 15) traveling together AND for people above 55. Use biometrics to track and ensure that even one violation results from being banned from entyr to India for 10 years. 2. Lower ALL trade barriers, and compensate the states adjacent to Pakistan for revenue loss - I think even if there is no reciprocal steps from Pakistan, in 10 years, Pakistan will be more dependent than on Chiina 3. Take a hard look at Kashmir and find a solution that integrates Kashimiri people without redrawing borders of either Pakistan or India - it know this is not original , and perhaps nor are the above two. If I have more silly ideas, I will write to you again
      • Madhavi Bhasin
        madhavibhasin Friday - 06 / 05 / 2011 Reply
        If my article was pessimistic (I prefer to call it realist) your comments swing to the other extreme of optimism:-) There is no theory to refute the positive implications of your suggestions. My question is: "how far can India go with these initiatives if Pakistan supported terrorism continues to cause loss of lives on the Indian side." Your suggestions should be pursued but these should not be viewed as part of India's counter-terrorism strategy.
    2. Shrinath Friday - 06 / 05 / 2011 Reply
      I agree to some points. Especially vapid statements by politicos who will come out with gems like, 'we demand from Pakistan' and 'cross border terrorism must stop'. As for proceeding further, it is in the interest of the Pak military establishment to never solve Kashmir issue. On you last point, it is HumInt, HUMIT. And what made you come to the conclusion that we do not have undercover operatives inside Pakistan?
      • Madhavi Bhasin
        madhavibhasin Friday - 06 / 05 / 2011 Reply
        Thanks for you comment Shrinath. And you are right, its a typo, should have been HUMINT, missed out N. Thanks for pointing that out. I agree that India already has Pak specific intelligence gathering mechanisms in place, but I guess we need to expand those and get more credible information. How many times have you heard the GOI disclosing intel on location and activities of rogue elements. I understand that such intel cannot always be publicly discussed but there should be some information, even of failed intelligence ops, in the public domain. Do you think if India had intel on where Hafiz or Dawood are they would not share this with the Americans and get Pakistan to act accordingly.
    3. Shrinath Friday - 06 / 05 / 2011 Reply
      @uc59 - re: integrating Kashmir without redrawing borders. Under Musharraf, it almost happened. Do not have all the details about why it could not completed. That was the reason India talked with him. GoI support him to stay in power, by accepting him as a legitimate leader and not allude to him as a military dictator. Quid pro quo was that he accepts the Line of Acutal Control the border.
    4. Siln Wednesday - 11 / 05 / 2011 Reply
      May 11, 2011 madhavibhasin's post is judicious and thought provoking. It is on this latter quality of her piece that I am prompted to proffer the following comments. It seems to me that OBL "nidhan" is a stage in the US foreign policy engagements since the last decade of the 19th century somewhat resembling a holocaust (of varying size and gravity) of Asians: Hawaii, Philippines, Japan (especially Nagasaki), Korea (North), Vietnam (North), Iraq (twice), Afghanistan, and then...South Asia! The point is US military needs business and markets for its products of mass destruction. Global peace means Pengaton and the military-industrial complex are out of business and that means economic ruin and political impotence, unacceptable to an imperial democracy. By hunting down a defanged and de-clawed quarry the avenging angels of freedom have helped the current government first, boost its declining morale and credibility in the eyes of its citizens, and second, create contexts or pretexts for a fuller and longer military engagements in South Asia (post OBL Afghanistan is longer a military choice), this time via Pakistan, which, I fear, may serve as the postern gate (back door) to a much greater prize, the rising Asian sun, India! Dr. N.P. Sil
    5. victor edet Tuesday - 23 / 08 / 2011 Reply
      why did the us army kill bin laden?

    Trackbacks/Pingbacks

    Add a comment