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Medvedev's Non-Announcement: A Case of Virtual Politics?

President Medvedev’s  much anticipated news conference delivered nothing of substance (Putin’s random interview with a US nature magazine contained more meat), but that may  have been exactly the point: to obscure the real news happening behind the scenes.

On the day Medvedev demurred from announcing his candidature in the next elections, St Petersburg’s duma recalled Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov from serving in the upper house of parliament.
Mironov had been the leader of Just Russia, a Kremlin created vehicle to appeal to the patriotic centre-left vote.  But when he announced that the party would no longer be supporting Putin’s candidacy, its own members turned against him.
The event is very important because, as Russia’s third largest party, Just Russia was Medvedev’s big hope for backing in any race against Putin. What’s more, as Ben Aris writes, an independent Just Russia party led by a Medvedev ally could have prevented Putin’s United Russia from amassing the super-majority needed to be able to alter the constitution.
But now that Mironov, Just Russia’s charismatic leader, has been defused,  the party is no longer likely to make the 7% threshold to win seats in the Duma: paving the way for a Putin supermajority.
However, just as he was abandoned by JR, Medvedev ostensibly got another chance at a backer, in the shape of oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov. The secretive NJ Jets owner, who became Russia’s third richest man from an aluminium empire acquired during the shady 90s,  has just agreed to head the only party publicly backing Medvedev: the Right Cause. Right Cause is a small amalgamation of Nemtsov’s old Union of Right Forces and a few other tiny liberal-right grouping. However, Prokhorov’s prodigious wealth could potentially increase its political impact.
Why only potentially? Prokhorov is no liberal firebrand. The  elusive man with an international reputation as a playboy would have been more likely to throw a party than head one.
Moreover, as the first oligarch since Khodorkovsky to formally join politics, Prokhorov knows perfectly well how that can turn out: Prudently keeping his head well below the parapet is what allowed him to remain one of the last of the ‘first generation oligarchs’ still standing. His loyalty to Putin was rewarded with a state medal, and he is said to be much more interested in women than politics.
True, he has supported liberal causes, such as financing a highbrow literary-political magazine called Snob, which targets wealthy international Russians. But while it sometimes publishes viewpoints critical of the government (including a controversial interview with Gorbachev), the $10 an issue magazine remains unknown among ordinary Russians. He is friends with the publisher of the liberal business newspaper Kommersant; but the paper, which while being politically independent, is no Novaya Gazeta.
In short, Prokhorov is the perfect partner to Medvedev as he is now: the safe liberal, modernising, cosmopolitan and middle-class foil to the more populist Putin. This Medvedev has different priorities but the same outlooks as Putin, and is bolstered by the same interest groups: oligarchs like Prokhorov and Abramovich are also Putin’s backbone.
Likewise, Prokhorov would be extremely unlikely to support a Medvedev who might seek a genuine rupture of the tandem and advance an agenda independent of Putin and the cozy web of domestic industrialists and foreign big business. Short of being a secret revolutionary, Prokhorov would  never have risked his billions and possibly even his freedom, if that was even a remote possibility.
Therefore, the fact that Prokhorov has decided to back Medvedev suggests that Medvedev is not actually in conflict with Putin, and is not seeking a truly independent agenda.  Despite some rifts round the edges, the ‘crisis of the tandem’ may well be another case of Russia’s well-worn ‘virtual politics’.
Increasingly, we are seeing the realisation of Vladimir Frolov’s scenario: supermajority in his pocket, Putin remains in charge even if an eviscerated Medvedev, supported by a loyal oligarch like Prohorov, remains President for another term.
Will Medvedev run in 2012? It doesn’t matter.

     
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    Comments (1)

    1. Mark Friday - 20 / 05 / 2011 Reply
      As long as Putin himself did not get rich by acquiring some kind of empire in "the shady 90's" - and he did not - I don't see that he has much to fear politically from someone who did. The memory of the plundering of state industry that took place during that period is still fairly fresh in the minds of the Russian people, and it probably would not be too difficult to portray Prokhorov as a corporate raider who got in, got rich and got out. Got out of Russia, that is, whereupon he ceased to be involved in Russia's affairs and intrigues...until now. It therefore would also not be difficult to sell the concept that Prokhorov's arrival on the political scene was just a little too exquisitely timed to be coincidence. Because it is. As he appears right now to a casual viewing, Prokhorov looks more of a liability to Medvedev than an asset. However, there might well be something I'm not seeing, which you would be in a better position to know.

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    Vadim Nikitin
    Vadim Nikitin

    Vadim Nikitin was born in Murmansk, Russia and grew up there and in Britain. He graduated from Harvard University with a thesis on American democracy promotion in Russia. Vadim's articles about Russia have appeared in The Nation, Dissent Magazine, and The Moscow Times. He is currently researching a comparative study of post-Soviet and post-Apartheid nostalgia.
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