India’s Afghanistan policy is a classic case displaying the pros and cons of soft power approach in international relations. Soft power is fruitful as a continuum of the smart power strategy where hard power is purposefully used. Soft power is helpful in creating space for and sustaining hard power options. A strategy that rests only on soft power resources to achieve national interests is flawed.
Unfortunately, the Government of India assumed that by providing development assistance, educational scholarships to young Afghans and leveraging the Bollywood connection, India could achieve its strategic objectives in Afghanistan. Indian diplomats boast of the country’s $ 1.5 billion development aid to Afghanistan. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh offered additional $ 5 million during his visit to Kabul in May 2011. India has over-played its soft power option and as a result, emerged as a marginal player in deliberations on Afghanistan’s future. According to Harsh V. Pant,
By failing to craft its own narrative on Af-Pak ever since the US troops went into Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, New Delhi has allowed the West, and increasingly Pakistan, to dictate the contours of Indian policy towards the region.
India should give up its over-dependence on the soft power approach and make some difficult choices in order to be a relevant player in the Afghan endgame.
India’s projects in Afghanistan -the Delaram-Zaranj Road, transmission line providing Uzbek electricity to Kabul, hydro-electric Salma Dan and construction of new Parliament building – are showcased as emblems of India’s good neighbourly approach. There is hardly any mention of the delays and cost overruns of the projects in addition to some ruffling of local sensitivities. India’s design of the Parliament inspired by Gandhara motifs did not curry favour with the Afghans, who demanded that the structure reflect Islamic heritage. The Delaram-Zaranj highway project was not only delayed by 2 years but the costs also doubled. The reason, according to Border Roads Organization chief Lieutenant-General K. S. Rao, is the security situation. India miscalculated in assuming that security and reconstruction in a conflict zone can be strictly segregated. India hoped to win laurels by undertaking development work while the U.S. shouldered the dirty job of dealing with violence and working on political solutions. India may make lofty declarations about contributing to Afghanistan’s reconstruction but there are not many construction companies and engineers in India willing to undertake the challenge. New Delhi’s Central Public Works Department had not received a single response for the multi-million-dollar Parliament project in Kabul for over a year.
The problems encountered by India in implementing development projects in Afghanistan strengthen the case for deploying hard power resources; a clue continually overlooked by Indian policy-makers. No major construction projects have started in the past 2 years. Indian charity Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), which promoted economic independence for Afghan women, has pulled all staff from Afghanistan. India’s medical mission has operated sporadically due to security threats. Targeted kidnappings and bomb blasts are huge disincentives for Indian NGOs, medical personnel and construction workers from undertaking assignments in Afghanistan even if the Indian Government offers lucrative incentives.
India needs to stake its claim to the endgame in Afghanistan by employing hard power resources. The alternative is to loose ground to the extent that it becomes impossible exercise soft power. Given India’s aversion to overtly interventionist approach, two options for deeper engagement appear feasible. These options are not part of India’s traditional choice spectrum and would require some skilful diplomacy and poignant change. Recent change in India’s approach to initiating negotiations with Taliban indicates the willingness to make necessary policy transitions.
First, India should contribute in every way possible for strengthening the Afghan National Army (ANA). General Abdul Rahim Wardak, Minister of National Defence of Afghanistan, during his visit to India in June 2011 welcomed defence cooperation from India to train its security forces. India is currently training about 100 Afghanistan officers and non commissioned officers in India but there is much more that can be offered. Experts say that Afghanistan has been very keen to establish Security relationship with India but India has been very shy of establishing any sustained relationship given the presence of international forces in Afghanistan. Military expert on Afghanistan, Brigadier (Retired) Arun Sahgal is of the opinion that
India should take advantage of this opportunity and supply whatever military equipment communication equipment, vehicles and other non lethal equipment to the Afghanistan National Army.
The ANA is poorly trained and would be largely responsible for Afghanistan security after the withdrawal of ISAF. India’s involvement through providing resources and training facilities and conducting joint exercises with ANA will substantially contribute to Afghanistan’s security and make India a main player in discussions on Afghan security without getting militarily involved.
Second, a close observer of geopolitical interests in Afghanistan can recognize two camps: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China on one side and U.S. India, Iran and Russia on the other. It augurs well for India to create a stronger network among the countries that share its geostrategic concerns in the region. India shares good working relations with Iran, U.S. and Russia and is uniquely positioned to create a network. Nitin Pai, founder and fellow for geopolitics at Takshashila Institution has made some astute observations in this context:
Imagine how profoundly the geopolitics of Asia will change should Iran and the United States were to co-operate, even if it is in the limited context of Afghanistan. Remember, the Iranians collaborated with their “Great Satan” ten years ago, in the aftermath of 9/11, to get rid of the nearer Satan to their east. Since improved ties between Iran and the United States are in India’s interest, we should wonder why New Delhi doesn’t do anything to lubricate a rapprochement.
Instability in Afghanistan would be national security nightmare for India. Rather than retrospectively blaming U.S. policies and Pakistan’s opportunism it makes sense for India to project its power and use the available opportunities strategically. India can make a stronger case for its regional leadership by more directly contributing to Afghanistan’s security and investing in networks that help to sustain these gains. India’s soft power in Afghanistan will bear fruit only when India makes some hard choices.
