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Blacklists Exchange: A Weaker Side of ‘Reset’?

Blacklists Exchange: A Weaker Side of ‘Reset’?  U.S. – Russia political interactions often resemble a swinging pendulum that goes from hardly negotiated consensus to deepening disagreement and swooping across to ‘tit for tat‘ tactics. The Recent Russian response to U.S. ‘Magnitsky list’ is a good example of that.

The story began with the accidental death of Sergey Magnitsky, a 37-year old lawyer, in Moscow pre-trial detention center in November 2009. Prior to his arrest, Magnitsky worked for a British-based investment fund when he uncovered a multi-million dollar corruption scheme and made accusations against Russian Interior Ministry officials. Sergey Magnitsky spent 12 months in detention in conditions of physical and emotional torture.

Magnitsky’s death created a major public outrage in both Russia and abroad and in July 2011, the U.S. State Department issued a blacklist of several Russian officials banning them from entering the U.S. The list is open for public review via media and Internet sources and included officials believed to be responsible for the Magnitsky’s death.

Russian leadership did not leave the matter without attention and President Medvedev pledged to conduct a diligent investigation. However, Russian political leadership found the U.S. list offensive and threatened to respond with its own analogue. The latter appeared in October of this year and, according to Russia’s Foreign Ministry, included the names of U.S. officials complicit in ‘legalization and torture of terrorism suspects, detention of people… in Guantanamo’ and also those ‘responsible for the kidnapping and torture of Russian nationals in the US.”

Although Russia intended to create a mirror response to the U.S. blacklist, the goals and effects of the two actions are not mere copies and should be considered in different contexts: political and that of human rights.

To begin, the U.S. sanctions were narrowly targeted at 60 officials, believed to be linked to the Magnitsky’s death. Therefore, accusations in possible general discrimination against the country do not seem well-grounded. The list targets certain people and its goal is to demand fair and just investigation of human rights abuses.

The Russian response aims at 11 U.S. officials, without publicly disclosing their names. Although the Russian list is shorter, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov warned that it could be expanded anytime. Clearly, Russian response mirrored to U.S. ‘Magnitsky list’ focuses primarily on limiting American interference in Russian internal affairs.

In terms of the effects, U.S. restrictions mainly applied to Russian officials and their family members, refusing them an opportunity to travel or study in the U.S. The decision perturbed and even angered a few officials, prompting some to call and ask to eliminate their names from the list. Although the direct effect of U.S. blacklist is evident, whether it will act as a deterrence or influence future records of human rights in Russia is unclear.

As to the Russian response, it seems that American officials might be slightly less disappointed with a punitive travel ban to Russia. But that would not sadden their sanctioneers, whose goal was to send a warning message against continuous interference in Russia’s domestic affairs.

In these events, some would see signs of a weak ‘reset’ policy between Russia and the U.S. However, as Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has mentioned several times, such provocations ‘will not affect Russia’s strong partnership with the Obama administration.’ ‘Reset’ created the framework for communication and opportunities for partnership for both countries, but such partnership comes with conditions for both sides. For that, the U.S. will have to prioritize the areas where they need Russia’s cooperation most, such as on Iran, North Korea, and nuclear disarmament, while, possibly, sacrificing in others.

On a final note, a Russian Court has recently charged two former doctors from the detention center with negligence leading to accidental death in regards to Magnitsky case. For now.

While a country’s desire to decide on internal matters on its own and limit outside interference seems legitimate, one would hope that Russian political leadership will continue its independent pursuit of justice being served on this and similar cases.

 

Author

Ania Viver

Ania Viver is an editorial/research assistant at WorldAffairsJournal.org. She recently graduated with a masters degree from the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall, where she focused on Foreign Policy and the South Caucasus region. Prior to moving to the US from her native Russia, Ania worked for six years as a trilingual assistant to the regional coordinator on international programs.