The two biggest developments in U.S. foreign policy this year were the Obama Administration’s efforts to lower the American profile in the greater Middle East and initiate a strategic refocus on the Pacific region. Regarding the former, this trend was most evident through the administration’s decisions to step back from the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, defer to European political leadership on Libya, forgo an aggressive campaign to push for an extension of the U.S. presence in Iraq, and refrain from providing more robust support to the transitional Arab Spring governments, especially in Egypt. Examples of the latter trend are equally abundant, but it was most recently and clearly on display during President Obama’s recent Asia-Oceania trip.
It’s possible to look at these events as connected – the beginning of a reallocation of resources from a region where the U.S. has been heavily invested to another area where a greater investment over a longer haul might be required. However, as the U.S. deliberately allows its influence to wane in certain areas going forward, other players will eventually and naturally try to step in to fill the void – especially when we are talking about the critical yet volatile Middle East-North African (MENA) region. The Obama Administration may have theorized that some Europeans leaders might have been willing to step up their commitments in the region given their keenness to intervene in Libya, but the impending Eurozone financial collapse strongly suggests this won’t be the case.
Credit Navy Times
Thus, a key bilateral relationship to watch over the coming year will be that of the U.S. and Turkey. Turkey is local, a NATO ally and a strong player with a complex role and history in the region. It can also be expected to serve as a long-run counterweight to Iran. If the U.S. wants to pull back its commitments in the MENA region, Turkey will almost inevitably have to play a stronger role; consequently, it behooves the Obama Administration to devote some real time and energy to further strengthening this relationship in 2012.
As for the prioritization of the Pacific, this recalibration was a reaction to the rise of China, the anxieties of its neighbors, and continued unpredictability from North Korea, among other things. There is also a comfort factor in play: the Obama Administration seems to prefer Big Power politics to dealing with the systemic problems of the developing (and non-developing) world. However, the Eurasian landmass is not built for compartmentalization, and dealing with China (the obvious main object of the Pacific focus) is very much a multi-dimensional, multi-directional challenge. So what will be the rest of the policy?
A big part of that answer may involve Russia. I’m speculating here, but it is possible that the Obama Administration initiated the Russia Reset policy back in 2009 at least in part to cultivate better U.S.-Russian relations as a hedge against a more assertive China – this would be a near-exact flip of the Nixon/Kissenger China policy. Russia is important enough in its own right to be a priority, but given China’s interest in increasing its global influence and the administration’s goal of ensuring a balance of power in the Pacific, it will be especially interesting to watch U.S.-Russian relations in 2012 as well as U.S. relations with the countries of Central Asia, whose natural resources are coveted by Russia, China and Europe. I don’t see a “Second Cold War” with either China or Russia in the future as some do, but both of those countries will be delicate challenges for U.S. policymakers going forward.
Oh, and the most important thing to watch in 2012 by far will be the unfolding Eurozone crisis.
