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Comment: Syria – the Murder of Tolerance

syria

A young boy waves the Syrian opposition flag in March 2012. Source: AFP/Getty Images

The following piece was originally published in
YOUR MIDDLE EASTReprinted with Permission

by Eliot Benman

I was standing in the kitchen of an old Damascene house in the Christian quarter of Bab Touma when a figure burst through the door, brandishing a gun and crying “Kill the Islamists, kill the Islamists!”

He pointed the gun at my face and pulled the trigger. “Bam, bam!” he cried, and “pop, pop!” went the plastic gun. The boisterous ten-year-old son of the Christian family with whom I shared the house had apparently chosen me to be the bad guy in this Syrian version of cops and robbers.

This was more than a year before the current conflict in Syria began to unfold. Looking back, it seems to have been a sign of things to come. The Al-Assad regime has always sought to portray the country over which it rules as a shining example of religious tolerance. The mantra is repeated ad nauseum by the state news agency: “Syria constitutes a unique example of religious tolerance and coexistence.”

It was easy enough to believe, walking through the old city of Damascus and seeing churches and mosques side by side in the ancient, winding streets. But there was an underlying tension that became more apparent the longer I stayed in the country, from a young boy playing an Islamist killer, to a Muslim friend who had to take on a Christian alias to attend an acquaintance’s birthday party.

Likewise, the Al-Assad regime has attempted to portray the current conflict as a struggle between its secular Pan-Arab ideology and the forces of Islamism.

Secular here, of course, must be taken with a grain of salt. The Al-Assads have chosen to ally themselves with the Islamist regime in Iran and Shi’a Islamist militia Hezbollah in Lebanon. Meanwhile, the Syrian regime is dominated by figures from the president’s own religious sect, the Allawis.

It may all seem very Machiavellian rather than a matter of principal, but the Al-Assads take their ideology very seriously. These are, after all, the Western-educated elite who, a government supporter once put it, “are trying to lift the Syrian people up to their level”.

The Syrian leadership’s desire to improve the state of the ignorant Syrian masses was illustrated by cartoons circulated among Al-Assad’s inner circle. The snide jabs at Arabs, and particularly conservative Muslims, were found amid a large cache of emails provided to the media by activists who had hacked into Al-Assad’s account.

One such cartoon shows a picture of a kitten urinating in a toilet, and then moves to an image of a man in a traditional Arab headscarf urinating against a wall. Another is entitled ‘Why God sends rain to Mexico and not to the Middle East’. It shows photographs of scantily clad weather women and ends with an image of a covered Muslim woman in front of a weather map holding an umbrella.

The irony is bitter; indeed, not much rain has come Syria’s way in recent years. The cruel drought and the government’s absolute failure to respond have resulted in an unprecedented internal displacement of the rural population. Though rains have returned to Syria in the last two years, by 2010 the drought had already pushed two to three million Syrians into extreme poverty, according to the United Nations. In 2010, around 50,000 families fled from drought hit areas to live in squalor around the outskirts of urban areas.

Syria “constitutes a unique example” of the link between extremism and a lack of inclusive and effective governance.

In the decades before the Al-Assads’ rise to power, Syrians twice elected a Christian prime minister. In the 1960s only a small minority of Syrian women wore the hijab. Then, in 1970 Hafez Al-Assad, the father of the current president came to power in a military coup. As his secular military regime solidified its autocratic grip, Syria witnessed a wave of conservatism and accompanying Islamist ideologies among the majority Sunni population.

Analysts point to numerous factors behind Syria and the Middle East’s turn to conservatism and the spread of radicalism, among them defeat at the hands of Israel, domination by Western powers, and Middle Eastern culture itself. Some even pinpoint sexual frustration as an incentive for radicalization.

Various explanations are valid and all are linked, but an obvious element of this volatile mix was too easily ignored previous to the Arab Spring: draconian limits on freedom of expression, a culture of corruption, a lack of economic rights and development, non-existent rule of law, a deplorable education system, countless atrocities against civilian populations in the name of fighting Islamists, domination by a minority religious sect…the list goes on. The champions of secularism and religious tolerance transformed Syrian society into what it is now – sedated and suffocated, the comfort of the mosque is the only source of relief.

The Al-Assad regime chooses to hold the highest contempt for a society that they themselves created, rather than trying genuinely to better that society. They willfully ignore the correlation between political, economic, and cultural oppression and the development of religious conservatism and radicalism, to their own benefit – or downfall.

The current slaughter, largely carried out by members of the president’s minority religious sect, may prove the final nail in the coffin of tolerance. As the Syrian leviathan continues its savage crackdown, Al-Assads’ Islamist boogeyman is becoming a reality.

While the revolution’s liberal activists are being slaughtered and imprisoned by the regime, they also complain of being sidelined by increasingly aggressive Sunni Islamist elements of the uprising. In the two biggest urban centers, Damascus and Aleppo, car bombs are exploding in scenes reminiscent of Iraq. Reports of Islamist militants slipping into Syria from neighboring countries are on the rise. Among my Syrian acquaintances, clean-shaved faces are giving way to beards.

According to a report recently published in the Washington Post, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is playing an increasingly prominent role in moving humanitarian aid and weapons into Syria. Statements from activists calling for human rights and dignity have given way to quotes from the Qur’an promising victory to the believers.

In a video posted on Youtube in December 2011, a man with a microphone asks a massive crowd in the rebellious city of Homs:

“Does victory come from Obama?”

The crowd: “No!”

“Does victory come from Erdogan?”

“No!”

“Victory comes from where?”

“Allah!”

It’s an impressive sight, a crowd of thousands declaring their commitment to continue struggling for freedom even as the world turns its back. Government supporters watch this same video and see fanatics declaring Jihad. Their point of view may be a dangerous oversimplification, but a sense of abandonment among the opposition has made Syria fertile ground for extremist ideologies.

Meanwhile, after egging on protesters and militants with empty rhetoric and sanctions, the so-called Friends of Syria continue pursuing flawed diplomatic solutions while trying to determine the merits of international intervention in its various potential forms. Policymakers must realize that in the time it takes them to ponder – the length of an electoral season perhaps – the Syrian regime’s brutality is creating a whole new generation of religious extremists.

When Syria becomes a hotbed of Islamist terrorism and radicals begin pouring from this once beautiful country into the rest of the region and beyond, Westerners will stand morally outraged at the ensuing atrocities and ask the inane question “why do they hate us?”

The answer on many lips will be “because they hate our freedom,” but the correct answer is: we failed to uphold theirs.

 


 
  • Kathleen Millar

    Very interesting. Question-how should the US, or the West, uphold the principles of ‘freedom’ in Syria?

  • Eliot Benman

    The international community can uphold the freedom of Syrians by having a consistent, coherent and sincere policy. So far, the international community has failed to do so. For example, the US encouraged the Syrian regime to abide by Kofi Anan’s peace plan, but at the same time they were supplying the the rebels with non-lethal equipment and vetting militant groups for Gulf weapons suppliers. Perhaps Kofi Anan’s latest plan offers real hope, and a transition that excludes the Al-Assad family can be carried out. But most importantly, all powers have to commit to it 100%.

    • Kathleen Millar

      “Perhaps Kofi Anan’s latest plan offers real hope, and a transition that excludes the Al-Assad family can be carried out. But most importantly, all powers have to commit to it 100%.”

      I agree. This would be an ideal solution. What do you think its chances are? Zero? The Gulf states and the US, their ally, are funneling support (money, arms via State’s Direct Commercial Sales program) to the Syrian opposition–whose most radical members, al Qaeda and the Salafists, harbor not only animus toward the Shiites and Alawites, but the US as well. The Russians are realists and would let Assad go by the wayside to avoid a chaotic Islamic alternative, but my question is–has the US really thought this thing out? Is a Sunni takeover, with the resulting purge of Shia and other minorities, in our own best interests? Or are we involved in a short-term effort to appease the Gulf states, who have been leaning on the US for quite a while to do something about Iran? The US is sending lethal weapons to the Syrian opposition via the Saudis, our proxies, and other anti-Shiite states. The CIA, on the Turkish border, is trying to steer these weapons to groups that do not fall into the category of ‘anti-American extremists,’ a task akin to herding cats. In short, we can deal with the Russians and opt for ‘stability’ with an Assad replacement or yield to pressure from the Gulf states to back Sunni/Muslim Brotherhood forces and deal with the blowback when it comes. We saw what happened in Afghanistan–where the Islamic forces we enabled to defeat the Russians eventually provided haven and support for anti-American efforts. How is the money and the support (weapons) we’re sending to the Syrian opposition going to impact the US?

      • Eliot Benman

        If we take only US concerns into account, the best strategy would have been for the US to support Al Assad and ignore the suffering of the Syrian people. Yes, Al Assad was a thorn in America’s side but he kept Jihadists at bay with his police state and brutality and kept the border with Israel quiet. If we make a list of all the possible solutions, the only one that still carries merit in my mind is to work with the high level defectors to organize the FSA into a disciplined fighting force that can both topple the regime and maintain order. It’s not a simple task and is fraught with danger, but it’s the only solution that has a chance of succeeding. Annan’s plan is dead. It is also clear now that Al Assad cannot defeat the uprising. The FSA will continue to make gains. If it is not organized and taking orders from an established hierarchy, Syria will descend into chaos, with different groups, including Salafists, Al-Qaeda affiliate groups and Al Assad loyalists, fighting it out in a permanent state of conflict that will produce endless atrocities. Yes, I agree, we have to ask if the US has really thought this out, if they have any clear intentions, or if they are using the situation in Syria for alternative foreign policy motives.

        • Kathleen Millar

          Agreed. Key phrases: organized, established hierarchy, alternative foreign policy motives. Many thanks…

        • Kathleen Millar

          Second thought–it’s interesting that you suggest the best solution, and I assume you mean the best solution for the US, as well as supporters of the Syrian opposition and its allies, ‘is to work with high level defectors that can both topple the regime and maintain order.’ Of course, this would be a fortunate outcome, especially if those high level defectors from Assad’s military (and many are now crossing into Turkey where US intelligenge is trying to coordinate support to the FSA) prove amenable to working with the US during the struggle to topple Assad and afterwards. So the key to securing US interests in Syria rests with our ability to install a pro-US leadership within the FSA or SNC or whatever coalition emerges post-Assad. We’ve not been able to do this in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, where militant Muslim factions continue to destabilize rival pro-western entities-what does this tell us? If the high level defectors you mention end up constituting an alternate ‘ shadow’ military reign, secular and US-friendly, that exercises control similar to the kind we’ve seen used to support Assad, then there is some promise of stability even as Syria’s loyalties shift from Russia to the US. But this seems like a long shot–as you say, ‘fraught with danger.’ The Gulf states support the FSA a nd the US supports Saudi Arabia–is the Royal Family assuring the US that a Sunni regime in Syria will do business (and exclude al Qaeda?) with the US if we support the FSA? I agree that the US is committed to unseating Assad–now the showdown appears to be with Russia, which is committed to keeping Syria as a client state, for the money if nothing else.If you have time, please take a look at
          http://narco.ucanblog.org/author/kathleen-millar/ — it’s a no-punches-pulled opinion piece (purely mine) on the FSA and the US involvement in Syria –and sure to raise hackles–but I’d appreciate your thoughts. Thanks.

  • Eliot Benman

    I read your piece. Very thorough with lots to consider. I’d first like to point out that Spiegel online published a report that contradicted the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung report, it didn’t corroborate it. Perhaps I was looking at a different report than you did. The report I saw was based on interviews with the victims by journalists on the ground. The claims by the German newspaper are ludicrous, although I wouldn’t be surprised if elements of the FSA do carry out massacres of Allawites in the future. If I’m distilling the message of your piece correctly, it seems we reach the same conclusion, that the West must find the optimal elements of the armed opposition, namely defected officers and officials, and help them organize. I greatly appreciate that, unlike much of Western media cheerleaders, you took a critical look at the opposition. That’s important. At the same time, I think the extremist nature of the FSA is exaggerated; but it is heading in the direction you describe every day the West drags its feet. And remember that in Libya, a main figure in the uprising was a former member of Al Qaeda who went on to form a political party and respect the results of the parliamentary elections. We have to ask ourselves the questions, do we want Syria to be taken over by an opposition with strong Islamist elements that have relationships with and dependence on foreign governments and defected officers and officials; or would we prefer the same opposition but left isolated to pursue their own narrow ideological aims while feeling abandoned by the world? And if American geopolitical interests intersects with the aspirations of Syrian democrats, so be it.

Author

Reza Akhlaghi
Reza Akhlaghi

Born in Tehran Iran and based in Toronto, Canada, Reza Akhlaghi is a senior blogger at the FPA Blogs and editor of its Middle East page. Reza also produces FPA's 'Candid Discussion Series'; interviews with influential policy makers, writers, and media personalities in the field of foreign policy.

Reza holds a Double Major BA Honors in English Literature and Communication Studies from York University in Toronto; an MA degree in Communication Studies from University of Calgary in Alberta; and an MBA from Schulich School of Business at York University.

Reza is fluent in Persian, Turkish, and English, and has working knowledge of Korean.
Follow Reza on Twitter: @RezaAkhlaghi

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