Vladimir Putin tours Sochi’s Olympic venues with local governor Alexander Tkachyov in January.
Sochi, a city whose flag features palm trees, the sun and rain drops, was far from a traditional choice for 2014 Winter Olympics. Yet there is an even more troubling geographical concern than why a country literally cold enough to freeze invading armies to death would choose a subtropical beach resort catering to aging apparatchiks to embody its winter spirit. Sochi, as a cursory Google Map search will show, is a relatively short drive from the recently seceded Abkhazian Republic, and not too far—at least from a Russian perspective—from Chechnya, a region notorious for its now forcefully quelled violent separatist movement.
The Federal Security Service is undoubtedly aware of the danger posed by Sochi’s proximity to these violent discontents. Under this pretext, the FSB has invested heavily not just in conventional security, but also in cyber security. The Guardian reports that Russia’s System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM), nicknamed “PRISM on steroids,” is being expanded and updated in the Black Sea region. As part of SORM, internet service providers in Russia are required by law to install Omega, a little “black box” that gives government agencies unmitigated access to any and all communications without having to display a warrant. Furthermore, since 2012 the Russian government has employed deep packet inspection, a form of network packet filtering that allows the FSB to examine not merely metadata, but the actual content of communications, on a nationwide scale. The FSB’s aggressive cyber security tactics at the 2014 Olympics have even prompted the U.S. State Department to issue a formal warning to travelers that “trade secrets, negotiating positions, and other sensitive information” may be endangered or compromised on local internet services, especially on free Olympic wi–fi provided by the government.
That the spawn of the KGB should be heavy-handed with surveillance is hardly breaking news. Nevertheless, privacy vigilantes can take solace in the fact that Russia’s SORM and the U.S.’s PRISM are only effective when used to access websites with domestically based servers. Because much of the world’s internet traffic flows through the U.S., PRISM’s revelations were alarming not just to U.S. citizens but to the entire world. Hence, Russia, and China for that matter, now encourages the spread of local alternatives to Facebook and Twitter, such as Weibo (China) and VK (Russia). This thereby restrains the U.S.’s access and extends their own.
Russian forays into advanced political cyber surveillance thus far appear to have been largely domestically focused. Economic and technological espionage, however, is certainly nothing new for a land that once practically stole the atomic bomb. Russia has been suspected of hacking and stealing trade secrets multiple times in the past several years from U.S. companies like Apple and Google.
Given Edward Snowden’s allegations of the U.S. government’s surveillance of Hong Kong and Chinese individuals, the idea that a pointedly more proactive security state would not keep tabs on foreigners is not so farfetched. Russia may, for instance, be trying to keep ideologically disruptive Westerners out of the country. Although a seemingly absurd notion, the LA Times reports that American pop star Selena Gomez was denied a visa for being reportedly too LGBT friendly earlier this fall. Perhaps it would want to acquire a technology from a citizen, such as in the case of Apple and Google. In other cases the purpose of keeping tabs is not always clear. Take, for instance, the ten Russian sleeper agents apprehended in 2010, whose exact motive and grand strategy is still shrouded in mystery. No matter the reason for cyber sleuthing, mass surveillance technology is only getting cheaper, according to ARS Technica. It may be the case that the benefits of information mining, however sparse, would significantly outweigh the costs.
So what do the increasingly sophisticated cyber surveillance efforts of countries like Russia mean to Americans concerned about their privacy at home and abroad? On one hand, idealists concerned about the effect of data mining on longstanding democratic principles in the U.S. may seek to reform American surveillance technology, but Russia and China still lie outside their democratic jurisdiction. For them, though, this may be enough. On the other hand, realists, who are more concerned about the practical implications of privacy violations than the ideological implications, may have to face the fact that in one way or another, their privacy may eventually be compromised, whether by the U.S., Russia or another country.
These examples are not meant to invoke some kind of McCarthyist terror. They serve only to remind us that online privacy is fragile at best. Its protection is not solely the domain of the U.S. government, but rather subject to the prying eyes of every other agent with enough money, skill, and motive to for mass surveillance. Countries like Russia have demonstrated their technological and financial prowess for executing grand domestic surveillance efforts in the Sochi Olympics. The will for massive foreign surveillance has yet to be determined. However, even if the U.S. discontinues programs like PRISM, the future of internet privacy, if it ever even existed, is surely uncertain.
For commentary on the Guardian’s article by Voice of Russia, the Russian government’s international radio broadcasting station, click here.
