President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif of Iran (Photo: backchannel.al-monitor.com)
As readers already know, the P5+1 and Iran concluded an interim agreement regarding Iran’s nuclear program. This was accomplished in remarkably little time despite some reporters’ harried declarations that the talks were on the verge of collapse. (Reporters sometimes accept at face value “confidences” from diplomats that are really part of the bargaining process. It will always be difficult to distinguish.)
We now also know that the formal negotiations had been preceded by months of secret talks between Iran and the United States, which helps explain how the agreement could be brought about so quickly. The meetings began in March, when Ahmadinejad was still president, mostly to see if such talks could be held at all. The Iranian side was represented by career diplomats, national security aides, and technical experts, the sort of people who continue in place from one administration to the next. The first meeting touched upon a number of topics, including Syria, threats regarding the Strait of Hormuz, and the status of a missing former FBI agent.
The process picked up after Rouhani’s inauguration in August. More meetings were held, and the focus narrowed on Iran’s nuclear program and the international sanctions imposed because of it. It had already been revealed in September that Obama and Rouhani exchanged letters during this period, confirming a mutual interest in discussing the nuclear issue and possibly in improving relations more generally. A possible planned “chance” meeting at the United Nations failed to materialize in September because of Iranian political sensitivities, but the two conversed by telephone shortly afterward.
As Jeffrey Lewis of the Monterey Institute of International Studies points out, these tentative feelers toward a new relationship were coming together as the chemical-weapons crisis broke out in August and September in Iran’s protégé Syria. Lewis suggests that this might explain why Obama was so reluctant to use force and why Syria was so willing to give up its chemical arsenal, even as the international coalition for air strikes was breaking up. This is an interesting interpretation, although I personally believe that Obama’s reluctance to use force was overdetermined. Air strikes were never his preferred option; the strikes under consideration were unlikely to achieve the desired goals with regard to chemical weapons (the strikes’ advocates had other goals); key allies, particularly Britain, were turning away; the U.S. public was dead set against it in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan; Congress seemed to be in the process of turning against it; and Russia offered a better deal. Syria’s agreement to give up its chemical weapons achieved the announced goal far better than unilateral military action would have and did it virtually without cost. The only cost came among that set of pundits who consider it an unconscionable act of inconsistency to propose a counterproductive line of action and not follow through on it. The desire to seek a nuclear agreement with Iran may well have been part of the calculation, but many factors were already pointing that way.
On the other hand, the secret talks may have had a bigger impact on Syria’s calculations. Previously, I saw Syria as standing almost alone between the United States and Russia and reluctant to alienate its Russian patron by turning the disarmament proposal down.* Now, I see Syria standing entirely alone, for that moment at least, against the United States, Russia and Iran. The possibility even arises that the Iranians could have quietly mentioned to Russia that this would be an appropriate moment for a diplomatic initiative. If so, then the vague, nascent, potential U.S.-Iranian rapprochement has already had a positive spin-off. In addition to that, Iran joined the United States, Russia and Saudi Arabia in separate secret talks regarding the provision of humanitarian aid to distressed Syrians. While the fate of the humanitarian is still indeterminate, this could be yet another plus.
Since we are speculating already, let’s go all the way. Several observers have asserted that because of its desire for a deal with Iran, the Obama administration will abandon Syria—and Iraq—to Iranian hegemony. (We shall leave aside the intriguing question of just when and how Syria became ours to abandon.) Yet the fact is that Iran desires a deal, too. Perhaps Iran could be drawn into a different sort of arrangement on Syria. If the war continues to go well for Assad, a diplomatic settlement is unlikely to occur (a subject for a future post), but if the war were to turn against Assad again, Iran might be interested in saving what it can short of hegemony. A settlement that restores peace and stability, prevents the wholesale slaughter of Alawites, allows some limited role for Iran, and gets Syria off Iran’s budget might have some appeal for Iran even if it leaves no place for Assad. Naturally, many Americans would prefer a solution that leaves no room for Iran either, but the horse is already out of the barn on that one.
Okay, maybe it is not likely. Iran might not be interested in partial solutions in Syria; Iranian factions may not be able to agree on conciliatory policies in two areas—nuclear energy and Syria—at the same time; and Syria is not really ripe for resolution right now anyway. Yet it is not impossible either. It is simplistic to assume that Iran is an unchanging and unadulterated evil that will oppose anything and everything that the United States favors. And it is shortsighted to assume that the only possible repercussions from U.S.-Iranian negotiations will be U.S. losses and Iranian victories. Such arguments are simply excuses for doing nothing. The administration should at least give some consideration to positive spin-offs that could come from an improved U.S.-Iranian relationship.
*Many people are puzzled that Russia intervened with its diplomatic offer just as the U.S. plan for air strikes seemed to be coming apart anyhow (although that outcome was not yet inevitable), thus rescuing the Obama administration. It may well be that the Russians had their own reasons for preferring to rid Syria of chemical weapons. For instance, they may have feared that the stockpiles could fall into the hands of radical Islamist rebels, some of whom are reportedly Chechens. If so, then the possibility that the United States might not act could have been seen as a problem for them. Or, the fact that Washington was having difficulty bringing its air-strike plans to fruition may have encouraged the Russians to believe that the Americans might react favorably to a diplomatic offer instead of bombing yet another Russian client state. In that case, Obama’s political difficulties made the Russian suggestion more inviting for both sides. On a related subject, it is also interesting to note that even though the Russians had made several public assertions that the rebels, not the Syrian state, were responsible for chemical attacks, when the time came for serious negotiations there was no talk of disarming—or even investigating—anyone but the regime.
