MC3 Ian Carver/U.S. Navy
This is the first in a series of blogs I’ll write on the annual maritime related conference I recently attended co-sponsored by AFCEA International and the U.S. Naval Institute. Both organizations are dedicated to providing forums for exchange of information on national security topics. The conferences they put on feature speakers who are key leaders and thinkers from government, academia, and industry.
Acting Secretary of Defense Christine Fox opened up the proceedings. Her talk didn’t have a title but I think a quote attributed to both Winston Churchill and New Zealand physicist Ernest Rutherford that I’ve heard several times at conferences recently sums it up best: “Gentlemen, we have run out of money; now we have to think.”
Right up front Ms. Fox said she was there to talk about not just maritime strategy but also “how to make it affordable.” She says there’s a great deal of uncertainty on two interrelated fronts:
“First, the strategic environment – in particular the emerging challenges to U.S. air-sea dominance and the implications for how we think about Navy modernization priorities.
Second, the fiscal uncertainty and continued budget austerity which…require that we make tough and far-sighted choices now in order to achieve a ready and modern force in the future.”
Ms. Fox continued by reminding the audience of the guidance President Obama issued two years ago in the document Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership Priorities for 21st Century Defense. She stated of all of the priorities: “None was more relevant to America’s overall national interests –security, economic, political – than what’s been called the ‘re-balance’ to Asia.”
She explained that it was a “whole-of-government concept, not just a military one, and it is unfortunate that it’s been interpreted as such in many quarters.” Some of her other key points:
She made two main points on what the maritime forces should look like. First, she remarked, “We need a flexible portfolio of capabilities that can operate along the full spectrum of conflict and military operations.” Second, “when defense budgets decline there is a natural tendency to hang on to combat forces at the expense of enablers. Yet we all know that enablers can be decisive force multipliers. With the U.S. Navy able to out-gun any and all comers, potential adversaries will look to take away our inherent military advantages – to include the use of electronic warfare and other countermeasures. Capabilities that can overcome these threats represent critical enablers that we neglect at our peril.”
The last part of her talk she spent laying the ground work for the upcoming defense budget. She said she couldn’t talk details but wanted to “provide the fiscal and budgetary context that shaped our recommendations.” I took that to mean she was saying stand by for ugly ops but first let me help understand why. I think Ms. Fox made some excellent points reminding the audience that over the last 70 years the military has experienced five draw downs, and each one led to a loss of readiness and force capability. When a crisis came, we had to put in a large amount of money to bring the forces back up to needed capability.
She provided no details, but said we would probably be looking a smaller force. She also said personnel costs “broadly defined as all pay and benefits, military and civilian, current and retirees, direct and in-kind (such as DoD schools and the commissaries)” would be “difficult” to sustain.
I thought overall it was a good speech but thought she left out one major defense budget issue: the dysfunctional acquisition process. Case in point, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, as has been widely reported is 7 years behind schedule and $160 Billion over budget. 60 Minutes did an excellent piece on that last week. One of the panels for the conference was titled: Joint Strike Fighter: What Do the Pilots Who Are Flying It Today Have to Say?
The panel had quite a line up to include the senior F-35 test pilots for the Navy and Lockheed Martin. If I were married to any of those guys, I would have been jealous. The men loved the aircraft and had much praise for its capabilities. Comments included the aircraft was easy to fly, it had more communications bandwidth, and it was stealthy. There were raves for its vertical take off and land capability.
That’s all well and good but why did it take so long? This problem is not unique to the F-35 program. Can the defense department acquisition program say you won a contract to build such in such for a finite amount of dollars? Unless increased costs are caused by us changing the requirements we will not pay you extra. Increased costs will be borne by the company(ies) that won the contract. Shouldn’t you address cost overruns before you start attacking military benefits and pay? Could an unintended consequence mean you might suffer not only a talent drain but also have problem getting the best and brightest to choose a military or government career?
I’ve heard both government and industry people say for years the acquisition system is broken, and although there have been some efforts to fix it, overall it’s still broken. A few years ago, I was asked to give a speech to some senior industry folks. I talked about the acquisition issue and gave them some examples from World War II to show what was possible. By the end of first year in the war, our country had raised its arms production to the total of all three enemy powers put together, and by 1944 had doubled it again.
One reason the Americans won the Battle of Midway was by reducing a three month repair job on the Carrier Yorktown to 48 hours. The first Liberty ship took 196 days to deliver. Time was soon cut to 27 days and by 1943 one was turned out every 10.3 hours.
Think I’ll end here. Here’s what I’ve learned is called a tease. I got to ask the Pacific Fleet Commander, Admiral Harry Harris (no relation) what was the Navy response to the Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone, were we still conducting operations in those areas? More to follow on that and other topics. As always my views are my own.
