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The Syrian Presidential Election is Washington’s Problem

The Syrian Presidential Election is Washington's Problem

Syrians lined up today to vote in what was billed by government and allied media outlets as the first multi-candidate election under the Assad family rule. In the run up to the June 3 polls the regime of Bashar al-Assad undertook a savvy public relations campaign to present the incumbent as the sole guarantor of stability and the only individual capable of bringing Syria out of a nearly four-year civil war. A number of election commercials played on a simple slogan, “Together,” depicting a pluralistic society rebuilt on the ashes of a bloody civil war, for which Assad, as the head of state, is ultimately responsible. The leader who made the conscious decision to shoot his way out of an Arab Spring-inspired uprising in March 2011 is now attempting to steal the momentum through a plan in which the presidential election is only the beginning.

Previously, seven-year presidential terms were decided by a referendum in which the incumbent member of the Assad family was the only candidate. This helped ensure the continuation of dynastic rule since 1971. These referendums, a simple yes or no voting process, resulted in the head of state receiving upwards of 97 percent of the vote, roughly the number obtained by Bashar al-Assad in 2007. Breaking with the past, today’s election, based on a set of cosmetic reforms made in 2012, saw Assad face off against two challengers. The catch, the other candidates, Maher Hajjar and Hassan al-Nouri are little-known figures, approved to run by an Assad-appointed legislature and are viewed widely as window dressing to present a “free and fair” election. Campaign posters and rallies in favor of the challengers were largely absent and pro-Assad events, paraphernalia and media spectacles have dominated the campaign. Al-Nouri even went so far as to voice his support for Assad and the president’s counter-terrorism strategy in an interview with The Telegraph, stating that he is sure to come in second place when the votes are counted. While the election lacked the competitive spirit usually associated with democratic a process, it is the farcical circumstances in which it has been held that underline Assad’s true motives.

To begin, all meaningful candidates for the country’s top position were barred, thanks to a new electoral law that disqualified those who have not lived continually in the country for the past 10 years. This legislative act covered the vast majority of the external opposition coalesced under the banner of the National Coalition, a Western- and regionally-backed organization which would presumably play a significant role in any transitional process. While the Interior Ministry touted the eligibility of 15.8 million Syrians to vote for one of these three approved candidates–21 other candidates were disqualified–the reality is grimmer than it sounds. Syria’s civil war has divided the country, geographically, politically and through the regime’s divide-and-rule tactics, along sectarian lines; with voting only taking place in government-held areas. The country essentially lays in ruins with 160,000 dead, tens, if not hundreds, of thousands injured and roughly 9.3 million in need of assistance, including three million refugees and  6.5 million internally displaced.  Furthermore, those forced to flee to neighboring countries, including Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, were restricted in their participation, whether through regime policy or by host governments’ unwillingness to allow sham elections to take place on their soil. Given this reality, these official estimates would be laughable; though, only if the situation was not so dire.

Today’s election was not about achieving the initial demands of the Syrian revolution: respect and dignity, an end to corruption and the creation of a pluralistic and democratic political system. Rather, it was an exercise by the Assad regime to highlight its support among the population and present it as the legitimate government of Syria, engaged in a protracted war against a radical Islamist insurgency. In doing so, the regime looks to build upon the tacit acceptance it achieved by agreeing to dismantle its chemical weapons infrastructure, after the horrific August 21 attack on the Eastern Ghouta region of Damascus. Electoral results, in which Assad wins with a significant majority, will also be touted by his backers in Tehran and Moscow as a carte blanche to continue supplying the regime with money, spare parts, munitions, trainers and fighters.

Regardless of the legality and conditions in which the election was held, June 3 will be marked as a victory for Assad and his foreign backers. While official numbers will be manipulated in attempt to showcase widespread support, many in regime-held areas have voted in favor of Assad. At the core of this pro-Assad electorate are those individuals and social classes that directly benefit from the Assad rule, both economically and politically. They are joined by Syrians, who, due to the increasingly sectarian nature of the conflict, will vote for Assad out of fear of persecution for their religious beliefs. Others will vote due to social pressure — the directives of community leaders and bosses — still more will vote out of fatigue, caused by a conflict that has entered its fourth year with no end in sight and for which the devil they know is better than a myriad of opposition figures and rebel groups.

Washington’s attempt to steer the conflict by a slow drip supply of intelligence, training and weaponry to opposition groups and its willingness to do so by proxy — through Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Jordan — has helped lead the uprising to this point. Squabbling among rebel backers to gain influence over the course of the uprising and the lack of continual and robust U.S. guidance provided Assad with the maneuverability to crawl his way back and recover swaths of crucial territory, with coordinated help of his state backers and the Lebanese Shiite militia, Hezbollah. Furthermore, Assad will use the results of this election as “proof” that his counter-insurgency plan has worked and had the support of the Syrian population, making a stalemate under current conditions impossible in the near future and leading to continued indiscriminate violence against civilians.

The Obama administration must now vigorously pursue a two-pronged approach to the Syrian conflict in a serious, calculated and all-encompassing manner. Last week’s West Point speech, in which the U.S. president promised to increase aid to rebels, is a good start. Though, expanded support to rebels must be undertaken in coordination with U.S. allies, particularly Gulf states that have supplied the lion’s share of rebel hardware. It must also be made clear that Washington wishes to see its allies work together and that the backing of extremist groups by individuals in the Gulf will not be tolerated.

While an increase in the prowess and coordination of moderate rebel groups may eventually help bring the regime to the negotiation table, any transition would require a clear political platform on behalf of the external and rebel opposition. The opposition’s inability to present a strong, cross-sectarian and unified message allowed Assad to frame the conflict in regime-held areas, deny legitimacy to opposition demands and attract those disenchanted by the revolution to vote for a leader who has shot, gassed and barrel bombed his own population. This will again require U.S. leadership, coordination at the political level among rebel backers, pressure on the National Coalition and the increasing involvement of moderate rebel leaders in political decision making. Today’s election should not be seen as a defeat for the uprising but rather a further indication that the U.S. needs to play a stronger role, short of direct intervention, in this conflict.

 

Author

Alexander Corbeil

Alexander Corbeil is a Substantive Analyst with The SecDev Group focusing on conflict and instability in the developing world. He has written on the topics of radicalization, sectarianism and terrorism in the Levant and Iraq for a number of publications and is also a contributor to Sada: Middle East Analysis. You can follow Alexander @alex_corbeil