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Defending Europe

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Full-throated defenses of the European Union (EU) are rare these days. Roger Cohen offered one in his April 23 The New York Times column. To counter “Europe-bashing,” Cohen focused on the stubborn fact that the EU has delivered on its primary goal: no Europe-wide wars have broken out on its watch. Other organizations, principally NATO, have contributed significantly to European security during the EU’s tenure. The fact remains that announcement of EU’s goal of “even closer union” has coincided with one of the most extended stretches of stability in Europe’s history.

The paradox is that while there are strong arguments in the EU’s defense, the EU remains unready – and according to some poll data, unwilling – to defend itself.

EU-bashers have some reasons to bash. The EU is a system of government facing challenges. Varying debt levels across the union’s member states, some chronically high, and the recent financial crisis highlighted the need for a common banking regulation system. The EU is currently in panic mode developing a plan to address the flood of refugees from violence and economic hardship, on top of its ongoing challenge to assimilate legal immigrants. The EU’s role in global diplomacy and security is an ongoing debate, with America’s expectations for its contribution often outweighing the commitment it is willing to make.

These are serious issues, as is often remarked. Less often noted is that fact that they are serious issues for America as well. Debates over raising the U.S. debt ceiling have been kept in reserve for political leverage in place of genuine debt reduction debates, and financial reform is ongoing. How to handle legal and illegal immigration remains a divisive issue with no easy answer. America’s geographic isolation means refugees have a harder time landing on its borders, but the U.S. still has a role in assimilating them. America may still be the lone military superpower, but where it projects power and why, as well as where it focuses its diplomatic efforts, are policy debates that are as intractable as they have ever been. Scan the horizon, and the EU is not currently suffering from a policy malady that the U.S. does not currently confront or has dealt with in the past. Take financial reform: the Federal Reserve Act was passed in 1913, well into America’s second decade, in response to a history of frequent and repetitive banking crises and a realization that the U.S. lacked institutions to establish a common monetary policy for the nation. On a direct timeline comparison the EU is forging a common monetary policy earlier in its history than America did.

Next, compare the development of an outward-looking security policy. War in the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century brought America into the great power colonialism game; still, America retained a strong tendency towards isolationism and a level of military power that was very slight in proportion to its economic power. A direct comparison with the EU is difficult because a.) the EU was born out of the aftermath of global war with a passive mandate, and b.) Europe lived under NATO’s nuclear umbrella through the Cold War. However, the disparity of EU opinion regarding an appropriate foreign policy has echoes in America’s past and present. As the EU’s economic power has grown, so has the pressure for it to assert itself more to address global security needs. America found itself under the same pressure until World War II made it a superpower.

America, in turn, has put that pressure on Europe. In the May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard recount former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ fears about “the demilitarization of Europe” and its consequences for global security. Gates cited the declining defense budgets of EU nations; Krastev and Leonard cite a “willingness to fight for their country” index:

“A 2014 WIN/Gallup International survey only reinforced U.S. doubts about European publics; just 29 percent of French citizens polled, 27 percent of British citizens, and 18 percent of German citizens said they were willing to fight for their country (Sixty-eight percent of Italians said they would outright refuse.)”

Europe’s violent past plays a role in these views. And, if this week’s news of France’s move toward tighter surveillance laws is any indication, events can change opinions quickly. Historically, “fighting for ones country” in Europe has largely meant fighting with one’s neighbors; how much willingness a common EU fighting force would have to fight outside the region is another open question.

Cohen’s core message is correct. For all its faults, the EU is a success story. As time goes on, however, the number of the EU’s defenders will depend increasingly on its developing greater willingness to defend itself and others.

 

Author

Michael Crowley

Mike Crowley received his MA with distinction from The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in American Foreign Policy and European Studies in 2003 and his MFA in Classical Acting from The Shakespeare Theatre Company/George Washington University in 2016. He has worked at the Center for Strategic International Studies, Akin Gump, and The Pew Charitable Trusts. He's an actor working in Washington, DC and a volunteer at the National Gallery of Art, and he looks for ways to work both into his blog occasionally.