The Egyptian government is quite busy these days dealing with continued unrest, instability, and economic woes. Yet it has somehow found both the will and the resources to flood some of the smuggling tunnels between Egypt and Gaza.

Former president Hosni Mubarak’s regime attempted on a few occasions to destroy the tunnels, but this policy has actually escalated under new Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s government, and has accelerated in recent weeks. The question is, why is this happening now and what does it mean?

There aren’t any immediate answers, but the superficial explanation is that Mr. Morsi’s government is stepping up security measures to prevent weapons smuggling into Gaza. However this likely isn’t the entire story, and there seems to be some missing context.

There has been very little news recently about the Sinai Peninsula, despite the fact that significant events have occurred there since the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak.

There have been numerous attacks on gas pipelines in the Sinai Peninsula that deliver natural gas from Egypt to Israel. And last August 35 masked gunmen killed 16 Egyptian soldiers there, commandeered an Egyptian military vehicle, and then entered Israeli territory, after which Israeli airstrikes bombed the vehicle and killed those in it.

The Morsi government closed the Gaza border after the August attack, claiming that some of the perpetrators and weapons used came through the tunnels from Gaza into the Sinai Peninsula. The tunnels are used for weapons smuggling into Gaza, however Palestinians denied the claim that they were involved in the attack. Many of the weapons flooding the Sinai Peninsula now are actually coming from Libya.

There is no doubt that Mr. Morsi is under immense pressure from both the U.S. and Israel to address security issues in the Sinai Peninsula. However there is also a strong bond, both ideological and emotional, between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Mr. Morsi is attempting to navigate these geopolitical forces while solidifying the Muslim Brotherhood’s power in Egypt, and asserting Egypt’s power regionally.

It could be that Mr. Morsi wants to broker a reconciliation deal between Fatah and Hamas. Flooding the tunnels could be a way to put pressure on Hamas to show more flexibility toward Fatah. Mr. Morsi could also be sending a message to Israel that Egypt won’t take responsibility for Gaza.

However, the U.S. and Israel are also likely pressuring Mr. Morsi to shut down the Palestinian resistance in Gaza. And Mr. Morsi has every reason to comply. Egypt’s economy is languishing in the wake of the revolution and the continued instability in the country. The Morsi government probably feels it can’t afford to risk loosing aid money provided by the U.S., nor that it can risk nearly $5 billion in loans from the International Monetary Fund. It also wants to consolidate and preserve its power.

Interestingly, Hamas has been largely quiet about the recent flooding of the tunnels, and a few news reports have hinted that Egypt is helping Israel and Hamas negotiate a deal that could end the blockade of Gaza in exchange for a halt in weapons smuggling to Hamas.

This remains to be seen, as do the details of any such deal. The question for Palestinians is whether or not this deal, if it is in fact being negotiated, will be a fair one for them. Even if Israel and Egypt lift the blockade of Gaza, the larger issues – land, water, and Jerusalem – will remain, as will Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation.

Protesters demonstrate at Tahrir Square in Cairo. Photo credit: Reuters, Asmaa Waguih.

One political earthquake after another is rumbling through Egypt. Things here seem to change on a daily basis, sometimes even on an hourly basis, as has been the case in the recent week. In fact as of late, Cairo feels a bit like the Twilight Zone, particularly in light of conflicting reports about whether or not Hosni Mubarak is dead or alive. Yet despite the oddity of it all , one thing has become clear. The SCAF has recently attempted a major power grab, effectively stalling Egypt’s so-called transitional process and leaving Egyptians with something that looks a lot like a military dictatorship for the time being.

As such, it is highly unlikely that the SCAF will hand over power to a civilian-led government by the end of the month. One of the big looming questions pertains to what the next phase of Egypt’s revolution will look like. The current view from Tahrir Square after five straight days of renewed protests indicates that protests are regaining momentum. However, the efforts are being led by the Muslim Brotherhood this time around. Egyptians opposed to a Muslim Brotherhood dominated government, and there are many, might actually prefer to see the military in charge for now.

Indeed, the changes in the last few weeks will certainly challenge the Muslim Brotherhood’s political power, and perhaps were meant to. In one short week, Egypt’s justice ministry granted the military police and intelligence officers the power to arrest civilians, restoring some aspects of the hated emergency law. The next day, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) ruled that the electoral law was unconstitutional. This ruling addressed the law that governed how the Parliament was elected. Two-thirds of the seats were initially designated for political parties while the remaining third were to be reserved for independents.

However, the Muslim Brotherhood pressured the military to open those seats for political parties prior to the parliamentary election, presumably to ensure a maximum amount of political power for its own party. This is part of the reason why the Muslim Brotherhood won so many seats in the Parliamentary elections. Although the SCC ruling pertained only to one-third of the parliament, the SCAF seized the moment by ordering the entire parliament to be dissolved just hours later.

This move has set the stage for a certain conflict between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood, who after decades of political repression under Mubarak, are not likely to easily relinquish their newfound political power. In light of this, another looming question is whether or not the power struggle between the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood will turn violent. The potential for the struggle to take this turn certainly exists.

The SCC also recently ruled against the Political Isolation Law. The law was initiated by the recently elected and Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Parliament to prevent anyone who served in a top position under Mubarak from running for public office for the next 10 years. If upheld, the law would have disqualified Mubarak-era foreign minister and military strongman Ahmed Shafiq from running for office. However, the court’s ruling instead legitimized Shafiq’s bid for the Egyptian presidency. The presidential elections, as we know, have gone ahead as scheduled with no new constitution in place. As of now, no official winner has been announced, although Morsy claimed an early victory the day after the polls closed, while the Shafiq campaign responded with allegations of voter fraud by the Muslim Brotherhood. A recent piece by Ahram Online says that the Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission will soon announce a Shafiq victory. If this is the case, tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood and the SCAF could escalate further.

Perhaps the most brazen display of the SCAF’s power grab came on the second day of the presidential election just before the polls closed. As early vote counts pointed toward a Morsy victory, the SCAF made some amendments to the Constitutional Declaration that would limit the powers of the new president as well as further strengthen and entrench its own executive and legislative powers for the time being.

The Constitutional Declaration was initially drafted in March of last year, and was vague in terms of defining the powers and responsibilities of the new president. The SCAF amendments will prevent the new president from appointing cabinet ministers, acting independently in shaping foreign policy, dealing with national security matters, and declaring war. Moreover, the SCAF will have complete control over the budget and the army, and will retain all legislative powers in light of the dissolved parliament. The SCAF will also have the ability to appoint a new Constituent Assembly, which will be tasked with writing the new constitution.

The SCAF power grab has caught many Egyptians off guard. Numerous people I’ve spoken to say they did not see it coming. However, many Egyptians also seem to be growing weary of the instability and the heavy toll the revolution has taken on Egypt’s economy. There seems to be a thirst by many for a sense of stability and a return to normalcy.  Yet, there is certainly no consensus about the best way forward and who should lead it. What is clear, however, is that the revolution has entered a new phase.

On June 22 as I entered Tahrir Square, I was thoroughly searched by Islamists guarding the square, and I soon found myself lost amid tens of thousands of Muslim Brotherhood supporters and Salafis. These are not the original revolutionaries, and this is not the usual cast of characters in Tahrir Square. The recent protests are demanding that the SCAF nullify the amendments to the Constitutional Declaration and hand over power to a civilian-led government immediately. They are also demanding that the SCAF reinstate the dissolved parliament. Those opposed to a Muslim Brotherhood dominated government, however, might not be so thrilled about reinstating the parliament. They might also not be so thrilled to have the Muslim Brotherhood taking over Tahrir. Whatever the case may be, there is no turning back for Egypt. The big question now is what will happen next.