Closing the meeting in Kiruna. Photo: U.S. Government Work.

Asia in, EU not yet

China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, India and Italy have all been admitted as permanent observer states to the Arctic Council, while the EU will have to wait. Though technically admitted, it still must work out its differences with Canada. Countries are admitted as permanent observer states by consensus between the eight member states and six permanent participants. A consensus was not yet completely reached on the EU’s application because of Canada’s objection to the organization’s ban on the import of seal furs, which has disproportionately harmed indigenous livelihoods in northern Canada. The Arctic Council’s Kiruna Declaration (PDF) welcome the new permanent observer states under the section, “Strengthening the Arctic Council.”

In a joint statement issued by HR/VP Catherine Ashton and EU Commissioner Maria Damanaki, the representatives stated, “The EU welcomes the Arctic Council’s decision on the EU’s application for permanent observership. The EU considers the Arctic Council a primary international forum for Arctic cooperation and looks forward to stepping up its engagement with the Arctic partners in tackling the challenges faced by this region of increasing importance. Further to previous exchanges with the Canadian authorities the EU will now work expeditiously with them to address the outstanding issue of their concern.”

Greenland’s boycott

The controversy demonstrates that indigenous affairs can and do have a real impact on international relations. The new chairperson of the Arctic Council, Leona Agglukaq, is of indigenous heritage herself — a first for someone in this position. Yet a major indigenous voice was missing from the ministerial meeting in Kiruna: that of Greenland, which boycotted the summit.

Nunatsiaq News stated that Denmark used to have three chairs at meetings until Sweden took over the chairmanship. Now, Greenland and the Faroe Islands are forced to sit behind, which newly elected Greenlandic Premier Aleqa Hammond finds unfair.

In a May 14 interview in Danish with the Greenlandic newspaper Sermitsiaq, Hammond expressed: “We believe it is of great importance for the population of Greenland and Greenlandic society that we are directly involved in the negotiations on conditions in Greenland. The work of the Arctic Council is very important to us, and we will not settle for being on the sidelines.”

Danish Foreign Minister Villy Søvndal noted, “We hope that there will soon be basis for Greenland to fully resume its place in the Arctic Council’s work and we will be working actively to achieve that.” Denmark was successful in its request for two chairs in Kiruna. The second went to the Faroe Islands as Greenland sat out the meetings, a decision which former Premier Kuupik Kleist called “unwise.” “You must be present if you want to be heard in a case,” he opined to Sermitsiaq. It is ironic that whereas countries like China, Japan, and Korea were angling for so long to merely be granted permanent observer status – and therefore ensure their presence at meetings and discussions — Greenland has willingly turned its back on the chance to be heard. But maybe the boycott — and the lack of presence — speaks more loudly than anything Hammond could have said. After all, when the Kremlin shut down RAIPON, the Russian indigenous peoples’ organization and permanent participant in the Arctic Council, the media paid it more attention than at any other time I can remember. Absence, then, is just as notable as presence, but in a different way. So now, the debate turns from the question of which countries will obtain permanent observer status to whether Greenland and the Faroe Islands should be according representation on an equal level as the other Arctic states, or at the very least, get back their individual chairs during meetings.

No such thing as a free lunch

The chairmanship has now passed to Canada, marking a new era for the Arctic Council, and for Arctic affairs more broadly construed. The chairmanship has now rotated through all eight member states, and Canada will hold the position it held at the start of the Arctic Council from 1996-1998. With all of the Asian applicants admitted, plus Italy, to permanent observer status, it will be interesting to see what types of projects the Arctic Council will pursue. China, Japan, and Korea are already quite involved in climate change research, so perhaps the Arctic Council will do even more in this area (though keeping in mind that funding from an observer state can never outstrip that of a permanent member). As Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide stated, “There’s no such thing as a free lunch…By becoming an observer you’re also signing up to the principles embodied by this organization, and that is why we have been working hard to make that happen.”

The Kiruna Declaration made note of the new Observer Manual adopted by the Senior Arctic Officials, which I haven’t seen yet but hopefully will be posted soon. The manual will outline the logistics and roles to be played by permanent observer states.

North American absence and presence

The other notable absence from the Arctic Council was that of the Canadian Foreign Minister, John Baird. As the Globe and Mail somewhat humorously points out, it seems there might be a bit of confusion in Ottawa as to who really is in charge of foreign affairs: John Baird or the Minister for Citizenship and Immigration, Jason Kenney. Possibly, it was ultimately decided that Health Minister and Arctic Council chairperson Leona Agglukaq might be the clearest choice to represent Canadian interests in the Arctic.

Meanwhile, for the second time, the United States sent its secretary of state to the Arctic Council. In a speech that was more notably focused on climate change than any other representative’s, John Kerry gravely called attention to record-high carbon dioxide levels, melting sea ice caps, and Arctic wildfires. The BBC notes that he held one of the first Senate hearings on climate change in the 1980s with then-Senator Al Gore. Will Kerry be able to turn his interest and rhetoric on the urgency of climate change into real action?

I don’t have an exact transcript of Kerry’s speech, but he did argue that the Arctic is shared not just by the nations that touch it. Instead, the Arctic states have a responsibility to execute stewardship in the region, which “touches every person around the world and our way of life.” Whereas Canada tends to emphasize a more proprietary Arctic, with development benefiting northern peoples and residents, Kerry’s geopolitical framing of the Arctic reflected a vision more often promoted by Chinese officials, who occasionally talk about the region as a global commons. Both the U.S. and China, with their massive economies and reliance on shipping, have an interest in maintaing freedom of the seas. So while they might disagree on strategic issues in the Pacific, they might be able to agree on commercial and transportation issues in the Arctic. In that case, so much for talk of conflict in the Arctic. The circumpolar north might actually be able to cool tensions in other parts of the globe.

The iron mine in Kiruna, Sweden. © James Losey/Flickr

Every two years, the Arctic Council (AC) Ministerial Meeting convenes in a city in the host country. The last meeting was in Nuuk, Greenland, and tomorrow morning, the AC will meet in Kiruna, Sweden. After the short two-hour meeting, the chairmanship will rotate to Canada. The entire meeting will be webcast on the Arctic Council’s website.

The foreign ministers who are expected are:

Canada: Arctic Council Minister Leona Agglukaq @leonaagglukaq

Denmark: Minister for Foreign Affairs Villy Søvndal @villysoevndal (in Danish)

Finland: Minister for Foreign Affairs Erkki Tuomioja

Iceland: Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade @MFAIceland

Norway: Minister of Foreign Affairs Espen Barth Eide @EspenBarthEide

Russia: Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov @MFA_Russia (in Russian) and @MID_RF

Sweden: Minister of Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt @carlbildt & Minister of Environment Lena Ek @Miljodep

United States: Secretary of State John Kerry @johnkerry

As you can tell from the number of foreign ministers who use Twitter, social media will be an important force at the AC. Various non-profit organizations will attend the meeting, including the WWF, which has released a set of technical recommendations for what it hopes to see achieved in Kiruna. The WWF will be tweeting from @WWF_Arctic and will use the hashtag #ArcticCouncil, as will most organizations and news outlets covering the meeting. The Arctic Institute (@ArcticInstitute) will also be covering the events using the hashtag #ACKiruna.

A pre-Kiruna press briefing with Senior Arctic Official Gustaf Lind took place a week ago on May 6. You can watch a replay of the broadcast online on the Swedish Government’s website. Lind highlighted the program of the meeting, which is also available as a PDF here.

At the ministerial meeting, the Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Agreement will be signed. This follows in the footsteps of the 2011 Search and Rescue Agreement, the first such agreement signed under the auspices of the Arctic Council.

Three assessments will also be presented:

• Arctic Biodiversity Assessment
• Arctic Ocean Review
• Arctic Ocean Acidification Assessment
• The Arctic Resilience report will also be released. The study will examine how communities in the Arctic are coping with major transformations in the region brought on not only by climate chang, but also economic and social developments.

Additionally, the ministers will also adopt the Kiruna Statement. At the last meeting in 2011, Sweden suggested that the AC work to create statement that would “call for action and to demonstrate that the Arctic states are responding and reacting to the pressing needs of the region.” The statement will likely highlight the cooperative nature of the Arctic Council, showcasing how both Arctic states and Permanent Participants (the six indigenous peoples’ organizations represented in the AC) working together.

The AC will also adopt the Vision for the Arctic Region, which will likely outline how member states and Permanent Participants hope to see develop in the circumpolar north in the coming years.

The applications of countries to become permanent observer states will likely be the hottest topic in Kiruna. Today, the AC has 26 observers. Fourteen countries have applied to become permanent observer states, including China, Japan, South Korea, India, Singapore, and the EU. A decision on some, if not all, of these applications should be made tomorrow. The decisions were supposed to be made in Nuuk in 2011, but they were postponed to the next ministerial meeting. Everyone will be watching the meeting closely for the outcome of the applications. I’m not going to speculate on what will happen, but if the bids of China, the EU, or any other applicant for that matter are rejected, look to see what will happen with the recently proposed Arctic Circle forum, whose first meeting will be in October. 

Another rendezvous to watch out for in Kiruna will be the side meeting between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, although they’re more likely to discuss Syria rather than Arctic affairs. Kerry and Lavrov already met just the other day in Moscow.

Finally, for some additional backgrounders on what will happen at the AC, check out Nunatsiaq News’ article and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt’s op-ed on why the AC matters in the New York Times. Nunatsiaq News, Alaska Dispatch, Barents Observer, and Sermitsiaq (in Danish) all are good local outlets to follow tomorrow. The mainstream media will be reporting, too – witness the Wall Street Journal’s article, “Arctic Body Comes In From the Cold.” Its claim that the region is gaining in geopolitical weight is affirmation that the AC is finally coming into its own. In his op-ed, Bildt suggested, “What we are doing in the Arctic Council is unique, and it might well be that this model could be used for other maritime areas of the world in the future.”

President Obama in April 2013. © U.S. Gov’t Work/Flickr

“We in the lower forty-eight and Hawaii join Alaska’s residents in recognizing one simple truth that the Arctic is an amazing place.” That’s how U.S. President Barack Obama begins his written statement on the first page of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region (PDF), which the White House has just released ahead of next week’s Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna, Sweden. Obama’s quote shows in one fell swoop the breadth of the United States, which stretches from his home state of tropical Hawaii to Arctic Alaska. “Our pioneering spirit is naturally drawn to this region, for the economic opportunities it presents and in recognition of the need to protect and conserve this unique, valuable, and changing environment,” Obama continues. Manifest Destiny pushed the United States west. The continuing desire to play into the national narrative of a country that explores the last frontier, whether it’s in the outer space or the Arctic, certainly informs some of the president’s rhetoric.

With the Obama Administration’s National Strategy, the U.S. finally joins countries such as Norway, Canada, Russia, and Denmark, all of which have official policies on the Arctic. Still, the American strategy is short, at only a mere 11 pages (Norway’s is 73, and Canada’s is 41). The strategy builds on National Security Presidential Directive 66 (NSPD-66), the Arctic policy document released in 2009 by President George W. Bush. The spirit of the new strategy remains somewhat the same. The three main lines of effort are national security, stewardship, and international cooperation, themes parallelled by the Bush directive. One policy goal emphasized by the Americans, but not by the Canadians, Russians, or even the Norwegians, is freedom of the seas and airspace. With the world’s most powerful navy and largest economy, the U.S. has an interest in keeping shipping lanes open around the world. The strategy calls upon the country’s “long-standing policy and approach to the global maritime spaces in the 20th century.” In 1918, during World War I, President Woodrow Wilson declared to Congress as part of his Fourteen Points Speech that the U.S. insisted upon “absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.” What the U.S. might find is that insisting upon both freedom of the seas and environmental stewardship could conflict. It is surprising that under the stewardship section, the strategy states, “Together, Arctic nations can responsibly meet new demands – including maintaining open sea lanes for global commerce and scientific research…by increasing knowledge and integrating Arctic management.” Canada, for instance, would argue that responsible stewardship requires drawing maritime boundaries and allowing for internal waters – the opposite of open sea lanes.

So far, one of the key differences I see between Obama’s strategy and that of his predecessor is that the 2013 version seems to make a concerted effort to consult indigenous peoples and integrate traditional ecological knowledge into decision-making. On that note, a press release stated that both the State of Alaska and Alaska Natives were consulted in the drafting of the document.

In the next few days, I’ll post a more thorough analysis of the new U.S. strategy. In the meantime, it’s interesting to observe that it closes with the following line: “To meet this challenge, we will need bold, innovative thinking that embraces and generates new and creative public-private and multinational cooperative models.” Could the phrase “multinational cooperative models” point to official American support for non-Arctic states like China and South Korea to have a seat at the Arctic Council? That’s unclear for now. The Guardian reports that while a senior official in the White House stated at a press briefing regarding the release of the national strategy, “There are a series of entities that have requested observer status as this time,” the official said. “We have not taken a position.”

Yesterday, I mentioned in a blog post that Eimskip, the Icelandic shipping company, recently moved its North American hub from Norfolk, Virginia to Portland, Maine. This will be the American port’s first direct connection to Europe in 33 years, according to an excellent, fact-filled article in the Press Herald, a local newspaper. Eimskip’s decision is in line with its mission to “provide outstanding transportation services through a dependable transport system in the North Atlantic, as well as offering extensive worldwide network of reefer logistics services.” Eimskip will also open an office and warehouse in Portland. According to the Press Herald, Eimskip has also been in discussions with Pan Am Railways to achieve freight access to North American markets. Pan Am plans to extend its railways 1,500 feet to reach the port, creating much-needed intermodal capabilities. Building on the momentum of the new port activities, Icelandic President Olafur Grímsson will give the keynote presentation at the Maine International Trade Day on May 31.

Eimskip containers being loaded in northern Norway, January 2013. (c) Mia Bennett

The Green Line route. (c) Eimskip

The move to start calling in the ice-free port of Portland twice a month builds upon Eimskip’s recent opening of services to northern Norway. The company’s Green Line will now connect Portland with Sortland, Norway, not too far from Tromso. That city is home to the new Arctic Council secretariat and a city that’s positioning itself as the “capital of the Arctic.” I sailed through Sortland on the Hurtigruten ferry in January, and it’s a stunning port. It is incredible to think that soon, Maine’s famous lobsters and blueberries could be on people’s plates not only in Tromso, but even Nuuk, Greenland and Murmansk, Russia, other destinations that Eimskip services with its fleet of 17 ships.

Eimskip’s network. (c) Eimskip

The United States’ most northeastern state will benefit in that its forestry and fishing products, among other goods, will have new export markets, particularly in Europe. Iceland will benefit, too, as its resources, such as aluminum exports, will have easier access to North American markets. Those containers bringing Icelandic goods to the U.S. and Canada can then bring back electronic circuits, civilian aircraft, lobsters, and paper pulp – the state’s top four exports in 2012 according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Other items that will likely be shipped from Portland include materials needed for Exxon-Mobil’s $14 billion oil drilling project off the coast of nearby Newfoundland, Canada, thereby connecting Maine to resource developments up north.

On the other side of the planet, the Rongcheng Shenfei shipyard in China is constructing two container ships for Eimskip. China has been eying Iceland as a transshipment hub in the Arctic for some time now. So perhaps we could see a Maine-China connection eventually develop via the transshipment hub of Iceland. The Portland-Sortland route could then extend to Beijing and Shanghai. In future years, should Maine take after China’s lead, perhaps it will position itself as none other than a near-Arctic state. This would be rather fitting, as after all, it was only 1,000 years ago that Leif Ericson and his band of explorers are believed to have reached the coasts of Nova Scotia and possibly even the Pine Street State. Watch out, Alaska!

McLobster: Coming soon to Mcdonald’s in Murmansk?

A new era in Icelandic politics. (c) Mia Bennett

On Saturday’s parliamentary elections in Iceland, two center-right parties seized power from the incumbent Social Democrats. Iceland Review states that the Independence Party won a reported 28.5 percent of the vote, while the Progressive Party won 25.2 percent. What does this mean for Iceland’s Arctic strategy and the region at large?

The EU dimension

First of all, EU membership is now likely off the table. Both the Progressives and Independents oppose acceding to the union. In fact, it was the Progressive Party which promoted the idea of replacing the Icelandic króna with the Canadian dollar. In 2012, the party’s leader, Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, said, “If we are going to adopt another currency, then the Canadian dollar looks very promising.” Yet they’re still pro-króna more than anything. For the EU, the fact that Iceland will not be joining the union any time soon means that at least for the near term, Brussels has lost the chance of gaining an Arctic coastal state. The EU’s website states that it has three (and potentially four) Arctic Council member states among its members, but the number will now probably remain at three. The Arctic Dialogue, a high-level summit between EU and Iceland officials regarding Arctic energy activities, such as Iceland’s hydrothermal industries and oil and gas in the Arctic at large, took place on April 15. The dialogue was part of the accession talks for Iceland to join the EU. With the new government in power, it’s unclear whether these talks will even continue. This could affect Iceland-EU cooperation, which might occur now on a more limited level now that membership is not in its crosshairs. Yet in an April 8 press release, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle emphasized that the “European Commission remains fully committed to continuing the work with the government of Iceland after the elections.” Whether this commitment will be mutual has yet to be determined. In any case, Iceland supports EU’s bid for permanent observer status in the Arctic Council and will probably continue to do so. Talks may also still go on regarding a joint maritime service center oriented towards economic development and monitoring of activities in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. So just because EU membership is shelved doesn’t necessarily mean that all talks and cooperation with the EU will be put on hold.

Domestic issues

Either Gunnlaugsson or Bjarni Benediktsson, leader of the Independence Party, will become prime minister. Regardless of who takes the top office, it’s likely that Iceland will refocus on growing its primary industries. In March, Gunnlaugsson stated in an interview with Bloomberg, “There are great growth opportunities in the fundamental industries of Iceland.” The center-right parties’ express interests in resource development could cause Iceland to continue to rely on export-oriented industries such as fisheries, aluminum processing, and potential oil and gas development to fuel its economy. This, in turn, would help stabilize the króna, which plunged in value against foreign currencies during the crisis. Thousands of Icelanders are basically underwater with their mortgages, as many have a principal that varies based on the króna’s exchange rate.

With the Althingi’s possible increased emphasis on natural resource development, Icelanders are naturally concerned about environmental protection. Members of the Progressive Party answered the following question from Grapevine, an Icelandic newspaper:

Will your party do something to protect the land and its resources? Is a more stringent regulative framework needed to ensure conservation of the environment?

“The Progressive Party believes that it is important to include an article in the constitution that puts resources within Icelandic territory into the national ownership.”

No mention was made of conservation, but the fact that the Progressives want to emphasize Icelandic ownership over natural resources is interesting. I think this has more to do with offshore fisheries and potential oil and gas resources rather than land (recall the Anglo-Icelandic Cod Wars), but let’s not forget that land, too, is a hot-button issue in Iceland. When Chinese businessman Huang Nubo expressed interest in buying land in eastern Iceland to turn into a $200 million tourist resort, it stirred up a lot of controversy. Gunnlaugsson was rather supportive towards Huang’s plans, while Benediktsson was more opposed. In 2011, he said that foreign purchases of land would need to be “carefully considered.” He did add, however, “I think there lies a very high chance of cooperating with this man who seems to want to go in tourism and other such things.” (A great blog post about Huang’s saga can be found here.)

Huang seemed to be quite positive about his chances with the elections. In March, he commented to the China Daily, “There will very likely be a favorable turning point on the deal in April…But if I get nothing clear and final from the Icelandic government by the end of May, I’ll no longer be interested in pursuing the project, and I’ll let it go.”

So perhaps given the election results, we will see a continued strengthening of the Iceland-China connection from parliamentary quarters, particularly if Huang’s development plans are approved (although this is a private business venture rather than a government-backed deal). Iceland may continue to look to Asia, the Nordic countries, and nearby North America for business opportunities rather than continental Europe. The country may also continue to position itself as an Arctic coastal state strategically situated in the North Atlantic, emphasizing its Arctic identity over a European one. By consequence, the U.S., which had an air force base in Keflavík until 2006, could soon have to contend with Chinese investment not just in the Pacific, Caribbean, and Indian Oceans, but the Atlantic, too.

The U.S. doesn’t need to worry too much at this stage about losing out in the competition for Icelandic business. Eimskip, the Icelandic shipping company, moved its North American hub from Virginia to Portland, Maine in March 2013 in order to shortern North Atlantic shipping times – a decision I’ll write more about in my following post.

Mr. Grimsson goes to Beijing

President Grimsson: Still the face of Iceland in the Arctic.

All in all, things probably won’t change too much in the Arctic with the new parties in power in Reykjavik. Iceland’s most visible face in the circumpolar north has not been the prime minister, but rather President Olafur Grimsson, a political independent. As his office is elected separately, he will continue in his position. The longest serving president in Icelandic history, he has held office since 1996. Long terms, however, are not unusual; the previous president, Vigdís Finnbogadóttir, served for 16 years. The Grapevine says that opposing a sitting president is considered “bad form,” so it’s unlikely that we’ll see any real challengers to Grimsson. For a long time, the president was also not supposed to become mired in politics, as the position is more akin to a head of state than a political leader.

Yet Grimsson changed that with his involvement in the financial crisis in Iceland in 2008. A high-flying president comfortable in front of reporters and cozy bankers, many thought he was partly responsible for the country’s economic collapse. But Grimsson managed to save face by vetoing a bill passed by the Parliament, then led by the Social Democrats, that would have required Iceland to pay back some of the $5 billion lost in Dutch and British Icesave accounts. After the veto, the bill went to the people in a referendum, and Icelanders voted against it. Grimsson became the first president to use the power of the veto, symbolically transforming the office into a very political — and powerful — one.

Grimsson, former leader of the socialist People’s Alliance party, betrayed the wishes of the Social Democratic prime minister and her party. In 2012, the main opponent against Grimsson, Thora Arnordsdottir, ran on a platform calling for the president to stay out of politics. Now that the Independence and Progressive Parties will take power, Grimsson will have political allies in the Althingi. Grimsson, whom blogger Heather Exner-Pirot has called a “known Sinophile,” will probably continue building ties with the snow dragon and other Asian states interested in the Arctic. The Chinese-Iceland attraction is mutual, too: earlier this year, a popular television show on CCTV about the Arctic featured Iceland, showcasing the country’s natural beauty, geothermal energy and aurora. If that attraction is confirmed by parliament’s new leading parties, then the Iceland-China connection stands to grow stronger in the coming years while the island nation expands into new markets as well. This time, shipping — not banking — will provide the way forward into far-flung corners of the globe.

U.S. Sen. Mark Begich (D-AK) at a hearing in March 2013. (C) U.S. Coast Guard.

Last month, I discussed Japan’s designation of Masuo Nishibayashi as Arctic Ambassador — the second Asian country to create such a position. While Japan joins Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Russia and Singapore as countries with Arctic ambassadors or equivalent positions, the United States still does not have a similar role. Canada once had an Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs, but eliminated the position in 2006. Yet Canada will soon become the chair of the Arctic Council, and with Minister of Health and MP Leona Aglukkaq slated to become chair, the country does not lack a point person representing national policy in the Arctic. The U.S., by contrast, finds itself lacking a figurehead at the top.

In the U.S., Alaskan officials are at the vanguard of a lot of the country’s initiatives and policymaking in the north, whether it’s regulating offshore oil drilling or looking into the best site for a deep-draft port. Thus, it comes as no surprise that U.S. Senator Mark Begich (D-Alaska) is one of the few Americans calling for the creation of an Arctic Ambassador. In a letter (PDF) to President Obama, Senator Begich stated, “The changes we see in the Arctic today now warrant taking the next step to heighten our diplomatic presence at the top of the globe with the appointment of a U.S. Ambassador to the Arctic.”

On Feb. 11, 2013, Senator Begich introduced S. 270, also known as “United States Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs Act of 2013.” He lists a number of geographic reasons as to why the U.S. merits such a position, including the length of Alaska’s Arctic shoreline, the 100 million acres of American territory above the Arctic Circle, and “an even broader area defined as Arctic by temperature that includes the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands.” With the definition of the Arctic under contention lately, given that countries such as China are claiming to be near-Arctic, Senator Begich is making sure to cover his bases. He confirms that the U.S. qualifies as an Arctic state according to three different definitions. Most importantly, it’s a littoral state, joining the exclusive club of five Arctic states (one into which Iceland has been trying to muscle its way by positioning itself rhetorically as an Arctic coastal state). Climate change, growing tourism, oil and gas development, are also posited as reasons the U.S. needs an Arctic Ambassador.

Based on the text of the bill, a U.S. Arctic Ambassador would have two key duties. First, entrusted with diplomatic representation, he or she would represent the U.S. at the Arctic Council, the United Nations, and to other Arctic states when Arctic affairs were of concern, thereby enhancing “the ability of the United States to respond quickly and appropriately to issues of mutual interest to the Arctic Council and Arctic countries generally.” Second, an Arctic Ambassador would play an advisory role, serving as a “principal adviser to the President and the Secretary of State regarding matters affecting Arctic affairs.” The first task might be easier than the second, as the U.S. generally shies away from taking a strong stance on issues in the Arctic, preferring to let the Arctic Council and other Arctic states do much of the heavy lifting. Yet an advisory role would be more difficult to fulfill, as there are numerous competing agencies and levels of government within the U.S. that have different interests in the Arctic. Would a U.S. Arctic Ambassador promote the interests of Alaska, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, or the Coast Guard, for instance? Perhaps the best starting point would be to simply inform the president of ongoing affairs in the Arctic, raising the presence of the region on the Oval Office radar. Still, that’s not to say that it would be impossible to create an effective U.S. Arctic Ambassadorship. Already, there are U.S. ambassadors to the the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations Environmental Programme, among other international organizations. Yet there are no ambassadors for particular regions. There are ambassadors-at-large for certain issues like war crimes and global women’s issues, but not “the Mediterranean” or “Africa.” So in the American context, it might make the most sense to create an Ambassador to the Arctic Council.

There are several American officials right now who might qualify to serve as Arctic ambassador. Although this post from Foreign Policy magazine’s blog, The Cable, is now over three years old, some of the information is still current: Julia Gourley, for instance, is still the U.S. Senior Arctic Official, while David Balton is still the Oceans and Fisheries Ambassador and oversees U.S. foreign policy in both the Arctic and Antarctic. At the Arctic Council ministerial meeting in 2011, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar, and Alaska’s Lieutenant Governor Mead Treadwell formed part of the American delegation.

Another question besides who would serve as the Arctic Ambassador is where it would fall within the State Department hierarchy. This organization chart shows the chains of command within Foggy Bottom. Would an Arctic Ambassador fit best under Oceans and International and Environmental Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs, or another area entirely? The Arctic Council chairmanship will pass to the U.S. in 2015, and it will be interesting to see who the country chooses as chair since there is currently no clear candidate.

For now though, the debate is a moot point. Bob King, Senator Begich’s Legislative Assistant for the Arctic, Oceans, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, communicated in an email to me that the State Department responded politely to Begich’s advocacy, thanking him and his staff for their interest but “suggesting they already had the right team in place.”

MV Explorer (c) James Caird Society

There’s been a lot of developments in Arctic shipping lately, particularly in light of the study by members of UCLA’s Geography Department forecasting new trans-Arctic routes to become navigable by mid-century. With the possibility of more ships transiting the Arctic, it’s imperative that a Polar Code be developed. Shipping in the poles might be increasing quickly, but the slow rate at which pollutants decrease in the cold ecosystems of the polar regions isn’t changing at all. Any oil spill or discharge in the region could be more harmful to the marine environment than a similar one in a warm region such as the Gulf of Mexico, where pollutants break down more quickly in the temperate waters.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has been working on the Polar Code for some time, but delays are pushing back implementation until at least 2014. In February 2012, Lars Erik Mangset of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) criticized the slowdown, observing, ”These rules could limit emissions and discharges of pollutants to both the air and water, they could also help to limit climate change impacts, and reduce disturbance and strikes of marine mammals. The longer the Polar Regions are deprived of these protections, the greater the risk. It is unacceptable that these globally important areas are deprived of environmental protection and that commercial interests without a stake in the future of Polar Regions should override the development of environmental protection. ”

Progress was made couple of weeks ago, however, when the IMO convened in London to discuss the Polar Code. At the meeting, Canada called for a complete ban on the discharging of oil, oily waste, or garbage into Arctic waters. Already, in Antarctica, the Marine Pollution (MARPOL) Convention entirely prohibits such discharge from any ship. Vessels must have compartments onboard in which they can store discharge until leaving the Antarctica area. Environmental groups are praising Canada’s demands for strict pollution controls. CBC News reports that Mangset, of the WWF, remarked, “Canada actually took quite good leadership on this issue.”

The fact that Canada is calling for tough regulations on dumping in the Arctic shouldn’t come as a surprise. After all, Canada’s Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA), passed by Parliament in 1970, placed strict controls on dumping. It permits absolutely zero discharge in Arctic waters. The AWPPA inspired the inclusion of UNCLOS’ Article 234 on ice-covered areas, sometimes called the “Canadian clause.” Furthermore, as Transports Canada’s website proclaims, Canadians have championed the environment at the IMO both by holding high positions in the organization and by leading efforts in areas like pollution liability.

The website also notes that one of Canada’s actions that helped the environment was to expand the area covered by AWPPA from 100 miles to 200 miles. Of course, an element of strategy also undergirds the expansion, which essentially uses environmental means to legitimize Canadian patrolling and control over waters it already views as internal. Thus, if the Polar Code adopts a zero-discharge policy in the Arctic, it would underscore Canada’s ability to enforce regulations it already has in place in its archipelago. Ultimately, Ottawa’s strategy “is to harmonize our domestic regulations with international standards.” It succeeded in doing so with the Law of the Sea, and perhaps it will do so with the Polar Code, too.

The Polar Code would also regulate shipping in Antarctica, where more and more tourists have been traveling in recent years. Cruise ship passengers venturing to the poles should carefully read the waivers they sign before going aboard potentially risking life and limb (although I’d probably recommend a close reading before participating in any cruise, given the recent calamities in Italy and the Gulf of Mexico). In 2007, the ice-class MV Explorer sunk after hitting an iceberg near the South Shetland Islands. All 154 people aboard were rescued by the MS Nordnorge after waiting in lifeboats for five hours, yet they were lucky another ship was in the vicinity. The MS Nordnorge, a cruise ship operated by the Norwegian company Hurtigruten, had a brief stint in the winter of 2007-2008 with a seeming double life as a rescue vessel: just a couple months after the M.S. Explorer sinking, Nordnorge successfully evacuated 294 passengers from the MS Nordkapp, which had run aground in Antarctica.

The worrying thing is that MV Explorer and MS Nordnorge are ships that are designed for operating in polar waters. Although a Polar Code would create guidelines as to ship construction and operation standards, it wouldn’t prevent disasters from happening. That’s why a strong Polar Code needs to be combined with robust search and rescue facilities in the Arctic states and in Antarctica.

The IMO’s website states that the update to the Polar Code, once it sees the light of day, “should also consider the particularities of the Southern hemisphere with regard to environmental and port State control issues and should take account of the IACS Unified Requirements for polar ships and the Finnish ice navigation rules.” Even though Finland isn’t considered an Arctic littoral state, as Norway’s long coastline prevents it from having an outlet to the Arctic Ocean, there’s a lot that the Arctic Five could learn from their somewhat more southern neighbor. At the Scott Polar Research Institute, I attended a talk recently by Dr. Eero Rinne of the Finnish Meteorological Office. He stated that essentially, Finland is an island (and also implied that neither Russia nor northern Sweden is in Europe): “Wherever we want to go in Europe, we have to sail. It’s the only country in the world where all the harbors are blocked with ice in the winter, even mild ones.” The Gulf of Bothnia has ice up to half a meter thick, which requires icebreaker escorts. At any given time, there are more than 2,000 large vessels sailing in the Baltic, a number comparable to traffic in the English Channel. Of course, not all of these ships are sailing up the Gulf of Bothnia, but Finland still has a wealth of experience in ice navigation that it could share with other Arctic states as shipping along the Northern Sea Route — and possibly, eventually, the Northwest Passage and over the North Pole — grows.

Masuo Nishibayashi

Japan has appointed an Arctic Ambassador, a press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states. Masuo Nishibayashi is already the Ambassador in charge of Cultural Exchange, so he will now fill two roles simultaneously. Nishibayashi joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1983 and has spent most of his career in the Americas. He has served as Consul General in Boston and Sao Paulo, Latin American and Caribbean Affairs Bureau Counsellor, and Ambassador to Cuba, among other positions.

Nishibayashi will represent Japan at Arctic Council meetings including the upcoming eighth Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna, Sweden. Justifying the appointment of an Arctic Ambassador, MoFA’s press release explains: “Japan is located outside the Arctic region, but as a maritime state and one that attaches much importance to global environmental issues, it needs to be appropriately involved in international discussions regarding the Arctic.” By having an Arctic Ambassador, Japan is demonstrating its commitment to remain involved in polar affairs. Furthermore, the appointment of an Arctic Ambassador may help to make Japan’s policies in the Arctic more coherent, as there are currently numerous agencies that are involved – a similar situation to the U.S., where there is a lack of coherence in terms of policymaking due to competing agencies and interests. Japan applied for Arctic Council permanent observer status in 2009 and eagerly anticipates a decision on its application, which will likely be made at the May meeting. The country has been involved in polar research since the 1950s and is especially interested in climate change research. Oil and natural gas resources could also prove valuable, especially as the country decreases its reliance on nuclear power.

Arctic shipping also attracts Japan to the north, as the Northern Sea Route could prove to be an important shipping lane to reach Europe. In January, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was supposed to give a speech entitled “The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy” to the CSIS in Jakarta. Due to changes to his itinerary, he was unable to deliver his talk, but the MoFA still posted the text of the would-be speech online. In it, Abe states, ”In light of our geographic circumstances, the two objectives are natural and fundamental imperatives for Japan, a nation surrounded by ocean and deriving its sustenance from those oceans – a nation that views the safety of the seas as its own safety. Though times may change, these objectives remain immutable.” As an island nation, Japan relies on shipping to import and export most of its goods, so maritime security, economic security, and national security are inseparable.

Japan also has made statements supporting indigenous peoples in the Arctic, citing its own experience with the indigenous Ainu people of Japan. The Ainu have historically been oppressed though, and the government only recognized them as an indigenous people in 2008. The Ainu are not often considered to be an Arctic people, but they do share many similarities with Arctic aboriginal groups, such as animist beliefs. Interestingly, an exhibit on the Ainu at the Smithsonian Museum in 1999 was called “Ainu: Spirit of a Northern People,” and one of the curators was the Smithsonian Natural History Museum’s Curator of Arctic Anthropology and director of the Arctic Studies Center. This map of Arctic indigenous peoples by W.K. Dallmann also includes the Ainu as an Arctic people, thereby making Japan an Arctic country.

In November 2012, Japan’s Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Shuji Kira, gave a speech at the meeting between the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and Observers/Ad-hoc Observers. Like the other Asian states that are trying to convince the members states as to why they merit permanent observer status, Kira expressed his respect for the sovereignty of the Arctic states. He said, ”As a State who has always valued the “rule of law”, let us reiterate our support to the view expressed in the Ilulissat Declaration that an extensive international legal framework, including the law of the sea, applies to the Arctic Ocean. In committing to this legal framework, it is needless to say that Japan recognizes and respects sovereignty, sovereign rights, and  jurisdiction of the Members of the Arctic Council.”

In Abe’s would-be speech to the CSIS in Indonesia outlining the country’s five principles for diplomacy, the second principle he expressed entails “ensuring that the seas, which are the most vital commons to us all, are governed by laws and rules, not by might.” Given the context of his speech, which mostly focused on the Asian seas, it appears that Abe might be rebuking China for its recent actions around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Indeed, in another speech that Abe actually gave to the  Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., he argued: “A rules-promoter, a commons’ guardian, and an effective ally and partner to the U.S. and other democracies, are all roles that Japan MUST fulfill.” Speaking of the island conflict with China, Abe claimed, “History and international law both attest that the islands are Japan’s sovereign territory. After all, for the long period between 1895 and 1971, no challenge was made by anyone against the Japanese sovereignty. We simply cannot tolerate any challenge now, or in the future. No nation should underestimate the firmness of our resolve. No one should ever doubt the robustness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.” Indeed, Japan and the U.S. are holding talks in Hawaii discussing how to respond to various scenarios that might unfold in the islands, including a Chinese invasion — much to Beijing’s consternation, as Reuters reports. Japan therefore has a clear interest in supporting the historical sovereignty of Arctic states in their territory, as it helps to bolster its own claim to title in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Japan is a maritime nation, and the opening of the Arctic shipping lanes means that it has a commercial interest in the region. Politically, it also seeks to position itself as a regional actor committed to the rule of law and the Law of the Sea, in line with the Ilulissat Declaration. In the Arctic, territory is the first provider of legitimacy, but Japan is doing everything it can to gain legitimacy through rhetorical, political, and diplomatic actions.

Polar Research Institute  Skarphéðinsson and Yang. (c) Iceland MFA

Coming on the heels of a UCLA study reporting that new trans-Arctic routes could be open to shipping by mid-century, Huigen Yang, the Director Polar Research Institute of China, met with Iceland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Össur Skarphéðinsson, on March 15 to discuss northern shipping. Both countries stand to benefit if the Northern Sea Route is developed: China, which has a higher throughput of cargo than any other country in the world, could have a potentially faster shipping route, while Iceland could profit from building a transshipment port.

During discussions, Yang suggested that China might ship 10 percent of its freight to Europe via the NSR. Some publications are reporting that this could be worth $700 billion, but this appears to be a mistake: daily trade between China and the EU is worth €1 billion a day, so if that is approximately €365 billion a year, then 10% would be €36.5 billion - still a sizable amount.

As reported by News of Iceland, Skarphéðinsson stated, ”Singapore, Dubai and European port companies have already visited Iceland and showed much interest in these possibilities. We have always believed in this sailing route, both because of the ocean currents and because of the ice thickness, and it is important that a large nation like China agrees with us, and they have already prepared to use the route. Huigen Yang said that the Chinese are already preparing to build reinforced container ships, that are designed by the Finnish, and they have already demonstrated in the Kara Sea that these ships can sail through meter thick ice and would not need the aid of icebreakers.”

A few points to make here before people, including the Icelanders, get too excited:

1. The Singaporeans, who possess the world’s busiest transshipment port, are keeping their eyes on the NSR, but I think it is more to monitor potential competition rather than to use the route as a real alternative. Based simply on a time factor, Singapore would not experience any savings by shipping to Europe via the Russian route instead of the Suez Canal. From Hamburg to Singapore, the distance via the NSR is 9,730 nautical miles, while it is 8,377 nautical miles via the Suez Canal.
2. I had not previously heard of Dubai – home to the Jebel Ali Port, one of the world’s top 10 container ports – being interested in shipping cargo to and from Iceland. I’m not sure how the emirate city would stand to benefit from shipping along the NSR, but there is a chance that shipping services companies  based in Dubai such as GAC-ORO that happen to have experience in polar shipping could sell their knowledge to Reykjavik businesses. For instance, GAC-ORO helped manage the departure of the first ever loaded LNG tanker from Snøhvit, north of Hammerfest, Norway last October.
3. Even if the Chinese think that the reinforced container ships would not need icebreaker escorts, the Russians, and possibly even shipping insurance companies, could still mandate that shipping companies use them in order to sail the Northern Sea Route.

Skarphéðinsson continued: ”This can revolutionize the geopolitical position of Iceland against Europe, Asia and the US, because Iceland is at an important location in this sailing route between continents. The Americans did not understand this some time ago, but most people are starting to realize this now.”

One of the reasons Iceland may be trying hard to sell the strategic nature of its geopolitical position is because it is seeking membership with the EU, which, in turn, desires permanent observer status at the Arctic Council. A decision on the EU’s status might be taken in May at the Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Kiruna, well before any vote will be held on Iceland’s membership in the EU. Still, it would bolster the EU’s credibility as an Arctic “supranational organization” if Iceland were eventually in its fold, even though Iceland is generally not accepted as an Arctic coastal state, as its EEZ does not extend into the Arctic Ocean. Right now, Denmark is the only coastal state in the EU, yet Greenland — the country’s claim to being in the Arctic littoral neighborhood — is not formally a member of the organization. Greenland is instead counted as an Overseas Country and Territory.

Icelandic-Chinese relations continue to grow just as Norwegian-Chinese relations warm as well. In the build-up to the likely decision in May on permanent observer status, ties between Asia and the Nordic countries will likely remain cozy.

Panelists at the Asian-Arctic Seminar at KTH, February 19, 2013.

Last month, I participated in a Stockholm Arctic Seminar on Asian Arctic expansion put on by Mistra Arctic Futures at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH). The first panelist to speak was Piotr Graczyk, a researcher and PhD candidate from the University of Tromsø. He discussed the history and operations of the Arctic Council. Karl Hallding, head of the China Cluster at the Stockholm Environment Institute, gave an overview of China’s rise in international affairs, illustrating how its growing prominence as a political actor and economic powerhouse has paved the way for its increasing interest in the circumpolar north. Dr. Aki Tonami, a researcher at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, elucidated the complicated bureaucracy underlying Japan’s Arctic policymaking process. I spoke last, attempting to paint a picture of South Korea’s interests and role in the Arctic. The panel concluded with a fifteen minute Q&A session, where the panelists discussed with the audience what growing Asian interest in the Arctic means for the future of the Arctic Council. The Indian Ambassador to Sweden asked whether the involvement of non-Arctic states in polar research would benefit the region’s actors at all, and I argued that it would. I believe that scientific contributions from non-Arctic states would help to draw connections between what is happening around the North Pole with places like the tropics, where climate change is also having an impact.

My research on Korea’s interest in the Arctic grew out of an essay I wrote for my MPhil course in Polar Studies at Cambridge, U.K. I previously presented this work at the Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromsø, Norway in January 2013. I pinpoint shipping and shipbuilding, hydrocarbons and scientific research as three factors motivating Korea to turn northwards. In a broader sense, since the presidency of Lee Myung-bak, which began in 2008, Korea’s foreign policymakers have begun looking beyond the peninsula and towards the rest of the world while pursuing a strategy of “Global Korea.” To highlight a few examples, Korea will host the United Nations Green Climate Fund, and it was the first non-G8 country to host a G20 summit. The Arctic forms a key part of Korea’s newly global interests. While resources, shipping lanes and trade are important, Korea is not content to merely be an economic actor. Instead, like its neighbors, Japan and China, it also seeks a political role. All three east Asian states have applied for permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. Approving Korea’s application would further enhance the legitimacy of both Korea’s actions in the Arctic and the Council, which already has non-traditional members such as cross-border indigenous peoples’ organizations. Without affirming the participation of these three Asian states by granting them permanent observer status, the eight Arctic states risk losing control of the discussion as the Asian states could attempt to move it to other forums.

All of the presentations and the panel discussion are available to watch online here.

The end of the Breakfast Club?

Canada, the upcoming chair of the Arctic Council, has named Patrick Borbey as the new chair of the group of Senior Arctic Officials. His role will be to work with the SAOs from the other seven permanent member states along with representatives from indigenous organizations. Borbey will still retain his title as head of the Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency. Health Minister Leona Agglukaq noted in a press release, “As Canada assumes the chairmanship in May of this year, we will lead the important work of the Arctic Council. Mr. Borbey’s extensive experience working with Northerners will be a great asset in his role as the chair of the Arctic Senior Officials.”

Borbey formerly served as Senior Assistant Deputy Minister of Treaties and Aboriginal Government and Assistant Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs at the Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development. Then, in December 2011, he became head of CanNor. The Conservatives opened the agency in 2009 to promote economic development across the country’s three northern territories. It’s a small agency, with a budget this year of CAN $51.1 million. In an interview with Nunatsiaq News last year, Borbey stated that one of his goals as CanNor head would be to increase mineral development with projects such as the Mary River iron ore mine. “Those are the big ones, the big game-changers that are really going to bring lots of prosperity,” he expressed.

Borbey’s experience promoting northern natural resource projects will fit in well with Canada’s plans for its two-year chairmanship of the Arctic Council. The country will pursue a strategy of “Development for the People of the North.” The strategy’s three prongs will be responsible Arctic resource development, safe Arctic shipping and sustainable circumpolar communities. This mission contrasts with the goals of Sweden, the current chair, which focused on climate change and the environment alongside economic and human development. Earlier this year, for instance, Sweden convened a meeting of the Arctic environment ministers in Jukkasjärvi.

The current chair of the SAOs, Gustaf Lind, will step down in May, when Sweden passes its chairmanship to Canada. The end of the Swedish chairmanship will mark a close to the six years of Nordic chairmanships, with Norway, Denmark and Sweden having formed an “umbrella program” in 2006 to coordinate their three successive chairmanships. Sweden promoted a more open, outward-facing Arctic Council, with the SAO Chair holding informal observer breakfasts before SAO meetings. It is unclear whether Canada will continue to hold these breakfast meetings given its more insular tendencies focused on upholding Arctic sovereignty. Canada’s emphasis on developing the Arctic for the benefit of the region’s residents comes at a time when many countries are looking to foreign investors. Many in Greenland hope that Chinese company Sichuan Xinye Mining Investment Cothe and U.K.-based London Mining Plc will begin mining a large iron ore deposit on the island, while in Russia, Lukoil President Vagit Alekperov announced today that the company will support a bill to allow independent producers to explore for oil in the Russian Arctic. Currently, only state-owned companies are allowed to do so. If Borbey and Agglukaq have their ways, however, the revenues generated by northern resource development would stay there.

2009 blueprint of AOP/S.

Defence Minister Peter MacKay and Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose announced today that the Canadian government has signed a $288 million definition contract with Irving Shipbuilding for Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (A/OPS). The definition contract will allow Irving Shipbuilding to design the ships and their electronics and mechanics up to a production level. A separate contract will be awarded for the construction of the ships, which is slated to begin in 2015. The first ship will not be operational until 2019, and the fleet will not be fully operational until 2023 — a full 17 years after Prime Minister Stephen Harper pledged during the 2006 election to acquire three icebreakers. The ships were set three years behind schedule last year, a delay I discussed in a previous post.

At today’s announcement of the definition contract, the Honourable Kerry-Lynne D. Findlay, Associate Minister of National Defence, stated, “The Arctic/Offshore patrol ships represent a new capability for the Royal Canadian Navy that will help them achieve success in their missions-patrolling our three coastlines and protecting our sovereignty…We are committed to the complex work of rebuilding our Navy’s surface fleet, to creating high-quality marine sector jobs, and to getting the job done right.”

While the press release states that the contract will support up to 200 jobs, the Chronicle Herald, a Nova Scotia newspaper, is questioning where the actual work will be done. Denmark’s Odense Maritime Technology will carry out some engineering work, whereas General Dynamics Bath Iron Works from Maine will help with top level design. Perhaps this is all in the spirit of Arctic cooperation, though?

The government’s budget for the ships may also underestimate the actual cost of construction. MP John McCallum, a Liberal and former Defence Minister, questioned the figures used in the budget during a House of Commons debate last February. He asked, “Mr. Speaker, recently officials were evasive when I asked how they were accounting for inflation in the shipbuilding contract. Now we learn that their assumed inflation rate is 2.7 percent versus an industry rate between 7 percent and 11 percent. This huge inflation gap shows gross financial incompetence by the government and would add at least $14 billion, or 56 percent, to the total cost of the ships. Does this mean that we will get way fewer ships, a massive budget overrun, or both?”

A brief sketch of the planned capabilities for the A/OPS is available on the National Defence and Canadian Forces’ website. The idea is for the ships to be able to operate in Canada’s Exclusive Economic Zone, which spans three oceans: the Pacific, Arctic, and Atlantic. The A/OPS will have medium icebreaking capabilities. The exact number of ships was not stated, but it was previously rumored that Ottawa would like a fleet of six to eight A/OPS. Mark Collins wrote an excellent post about the A/OPS last November, in which he quoted Senator Colin Kenny as calling the ships nothing more than “window-dressing” due to their middling capabilities. Kenny wrote an op-ed in the National Post last year in which he asked:

“If it’s big on trade, and big on security, why not build vessels capable of protecting our ports and our seaways? Why build vessels whose only purpose is to bolster our sovereignty claims in the Arctic? Sovereignty issues are going to be decided through diplomacy and/or in the courts. Arctic patrol ships won’t matter there.”

Kenny does have a point here in that sovereignty issues will ultimately be decided by countries in multilateral forums like the United Nations. Yet there is still some sense in having ships that are able to police and monitor a country’s EEZ, particularly as shipping picks up. Ships can carry out counter-terrorism operations, surveillance and SAR, among other tasks. The problem with Canada to a certain extent is that its ships will have to be able to operate in both the Arctic and the warmer, open water conditions in the country’s southern latitudes. Thus, they will be not be ideally suited for either Arctic or open water operation and will instead sit somewhere uncomfortably in the middle.

Canada might want to look to New Zealand’s Royal Navy to see how its vessels patrol the country’s EEZ. The navy has two offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), which have a maximum speed of 22 knots — much faster than the A/OPS 17 knots. The OPVs have a range of 6000 nautical miles, whereas the A/OPS will have a range of 6,800 nautical miles. They are built to sail in both the tropical waters of the South Pacific and the frigid waters of the Southern Ocean close to Antarctica, where there will sometimes be ice. Though they are not designed as icebreakers, the OPVs have strengthened hulls. Most of the time, Arctic states look to each other as models for how to operate in the poles. Yet they could also look south to places like New Zealand and Chile, whose navies have to operate in the circumpolar south. Interestingly, the Icelandic Coast Guard’s OPV Thor, whose job is to monitor the Icelandic EEZ, was built in a shipyard in Chile, so there might already be some cross-polar collaboration after all.

HMNZS Otago.

New Zealand’s EEZ.

New Zealand’s EEZ.

Fastest Trans-Arctic navigation routes during September at present
(2006-2015) and by midcentury (2040-2059) with RCP 4.5, for ships
seeking to cross the Arctic Ocean between the North Atlantic and the
Pacific. Red lines indicate fastest available routes for Polar Class
6 icebreakers; blue lines indicate fastest available routes for common
open-water ships.

A new study published today in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences by Dr. Laurence Smith and Scott Stephenson of UCLA’s Geography Department reports that new trans-Arctic shipping routes will be navigable during the summer by midcentury.

The authors found that first, common open-water ships will be able to transit the Northern Sea Route (NSR) during September by midcentury (2040-2059). The optimal route — that is, the fastest route that avoids thick and/or concentrated sea ice — between Rotterdam and the Bering Strait will also begin shifting farther north from the Russian coast. The technical feasibility of transiting the NSR in September rises from 40 percent during the 1979-2005 period to 94 percent under an assumption of increasing but eventually stabilizing levels of CO2 equivalent emissions (RCP 4.5). Transit feasibility is 98 percent under a more extreme climate scenario in which emissions continue to increase beyond 2011 (RCP 8.5). The northward shift of the optimal Europe-Asia route is interesting because it could mean that vessels might be able to avoid paying Russian escort fees. Yet at the same time, the fact that ships might be able to skirt the NSR means that they might be taking greater risks by not having icebreaker escorts. Not only would shipping possibly be dicier: The farther distance from shore also means that search and rescue efforts would be more complicated in the case of a disaster. Already Russia, together with Alaska, faces a similar problem on its far eastern coastline along the Bering Strait. There are few regulations governing ships that pass through the transit but do not stop in either Russia or Alaska, as they have the right of innocent passage. Alaskan Lieutenant Governor Mead Treadwell has pointed out that this loophole will need to be solved bilaterally. With the heightening possibility of more ships sailing ever farther north even into the Arctic Ocean itself, Smith and Stephenson emphasize the urgent need for creating an International Maritime Organization (IMO) framework with essentially a robust polar code. The IMO is still drafting the polar code and will meet next month to discuss its status, though it may not be finished before 2015. While more delays wouldn’t come as a surprise, let’s hope that they don’t stretch to 2050.

Second, the optimal route for Polar Class 6 (PC6) vessels between the Bering Strait and Rotterdam will shift dramatically northward to cross the North Pole. PC6 vessels are defined as those that can operate in the summer and autumn through medium, first-year ice with old ice inclusions. With the ice becoming thin enough in the summer for PC6 ships to sail through, the great circle route — the shortest distance between two points on the globe — over the North Pole will be navigable. Of course, it is important to remember that most shipping is not done using PC6 vessels, and most shipowners still do not have any plans for Arctic shipping, according to a 2011 study by Frederic Lasserre of Laval University in Canada. When he surveyed almost 100 firms over whether they were considering shipping in the Arctic, 17 said yes, 70 said no, and 10 said maybe. While 2050 may seem like a long ways away, it takes years to build up a fleet, especially expensive polar class ships. Thus, the ships might not come knocking on the North Pole’s door until even after 2050.

For these same PC6 vessels, the optimal route between the Bering Strait and North America (specifically St. John’s, Newfoundland) will transit the Northwest Passage (NWP) — not the NSR. However, the Russian route will still dominate traffic between Europe and Asia, which is already its main market for non-destinational shipping. Thus, the opening up of the NWP does not necessarily threaten the potential for the development of the NSR. The real threat to Russia gaining economically from operating the route is that outlined above — the optimization of more northern routes that bypass its shores and ports. At the same time, insurance companies might not cover ships that choose to sail farther north of Russia, which might cause them to ultimately stick closer to shore and pay the escort fees.

Third, the NWP will become more navigable than it is at present. From 1979-2005, the probability of September passage was 15 percent. By 2040-2059, the chances will be 53 percent and 60 percent under the moderate and extreme climate scenarios, respectively. These figures are still not as high as those for the NSR, but the marked increase in probabilities means that Canada might want to begin considering developing long-term infrastructure plans for northern shipping. As Scott and Stephenson mention, it might also behoove Canada and the U.S. to resolve their dispute over the status of the waters within the NWP — whether they are internal waters or a territorial strait — sooner rather than later.

Details on the climate change scenarios

Two different climate change scenarios using representative concentration pathways (RCPs) were incorporated into the model. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) uses RCPs to model climate change and describes them as “time-dependent projections of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations,” measured by radiative forcing, which itself is quantified by watts per square meter. The higher the number, the greater the difference there is between incoming and outgoing energy at the tropopause.

The first scenario, representative concentration pathway (RCP) 4.5,  is a “stabilization” pathway, where the amount of CO2 equivalent increases but then levels off by the turn of the next century. RCP 8.5, the more extreme pathway used in the model, assumes radiative forcing will continue to increase beyond 2100. More information about RCPs is available in an RCP report here.

Amb. Holm (R) (c) Mia Bennett.

Northern diplomats and policymakers like to reinforce the notion of cooperation in the circumpolar north, and Denmark’s Arctic Ambassador Klavs Holm is no different. On Thursday, speaking at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, he complimented the council’s camaraderie, noting, “There’s a very good atmosphere. I never experienced anything quite like it in my 30 year career.” Giving a little bit more color on what happens at the meetings after the speeches have concluded and the brännvin and vodka downed, he added, “There’s a party on the last night. The Sami do throat singing, and the Koreans do Gangnam style.”

Those two sentences capture a lot about the nature of the council’s inner workings. First, delegates do actually seem to get along if they’re partying and entertaining each other after the hard work is done. Second, Holm does not mention any of the member states: instead, he uses the indigenous Sami and the external Koreans as examples. In a nutshell, this emphasizes the diverse nature of delegates at council meetings, which incorporate indigenous groups that stretch across national borders and stakeholders whose provenance is not in the Arctic. The council’s current formation represents a somewhat more inclusive type of governance than other intergovernmental organizations like ASEAN or the Organization of American States. Yet the council now stands on a precipice between whether to admit external states as permanent observers or remain more traditional and geographically minded in terms of who it accepts.

Holm — and Denmark — are strong advocates of expanding the number of permanent observers. He made clear that “the Danish position is that we welcome new observers,” who he said would add to the work of the Arctic Council and its task forces. “I don’t really care if there are 30 observers watching – it’s not going to dramatically change the workings of the Arctic Council.” Holm noted the importance of “networking” and “presence” and also suggested that it would benefit the council if discussions over northern issues remained under its auspices and did not move to other forums, which could be the case if external actors were denied permanent observer status.

At the end of the day, Holm’s speech revealed how territory still matters. In a humorous but telling comment, he admitted, “The sad thing here for us is that the Lomonosov Ridge goes all the way to Russia.” Holm added, “I’m happy I won’t have to deal with it because I’ll be retired.” Resolving territorial conflicts is sticky, but the Arctic states shouldn’t have nearly as tough a time as, say, the countries around the South China Sea. According to Holm, Canada and Denmark have agreed to resolve the dispute over Hans Island during the Canadian chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Hans Island is small, and there are no natural resources on the barren spit of rock, though mineral deposits may exist in the surrounding seabed. Its diminutive size and paucity of resources facilitates the determination of sovereignty, as there’s simply less desirable stuff up for grabs. Even the Danes and Canadians themselves seem to realize the silliness of the disagreement, with a spokesman from the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs once quipping, “Notwithstanding the disputed area, the Canadian Foreign Affairs Ministry is allowing its cafeteria to sell Danish pastries as a goodwill gesture towards the Danish government and people.” A resolution to the dispute between two countries with generally good relations would augur well for future cooperation in the northern seas on more complicated matters.

Territory and geographic presence remain of the utmost significance for Denmark, which wouldn’t be an Arctic state were it not for Greenland. Holm discussed the potential for digging minerals and rare earth metals out of the island, which he said was “the worst country to mine in” due to its huge distances. He downplayed the media frenzy over mining companies’ desire to begin extraction activities and also underscored that Greenland has its own competence in deciding matters of mining and oil extraction. Its parliament, for instance, recently voted to remove a ban on uranium mining. Greenland will hold elections on March 12, and polls show a tight race between the pro-independence, pro-mining Inuit Ataqatigiit party, which is currently in charge, and its rival Siumut Party.

Holm quoted the Greenlandic Prime Minister, Kuupik Kleist, who said to a group of high school students that before you declare independence, ask whether you will be “stronger together with friends or alone.” Denmark, for one, would certainly be a stronger actor in the Arctic if its Greenlandic friends remain in the Kingdom.