Two of Transparency International’s (TI) biggest reports were recently released. The first is the 2011 Bribe Payer’s Index (BPI). The 2011 BPI ranks 28 of the world’s largest economies based on the perceived likelihood of companies from these countries to pay bribes abroad. It is according to the views of business executives as captured by TI’s 2011 Bribe Payers Survey.

We don’t see a good sign when we look at the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). According to the report, companies from Russia and China (combined investment of US $120 billion overseas in 2010) and are increasingly active in global business, are seen as most likely to pay bribes abroad. Below is the breakdown (Maximum score of 10 corresponds with the view that companies from that country never bribe abroad and a zero corresponds with the view that they always do):

Brazil- 7.7/10 (14th out of 28 countries)
Russia- 6.1/10 (28th out of 28 or dead last)
India- 7.5/10 (19th out of 28)
China- 6.5/10 (27th out of 28 or second to last)
South Africa- 7.6/10 (15th out of 28)

The second TI report is their Corruption Perceptions Index or CPI, which scores 183 countries and territories from zero (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean) based on data from 17 surveys. These surveys examine factors such as enforcement of anti-corruption laws, access to information and conflicts of interest.

India is perceived to be more corrupt than China which is ranked 75th on the list, but is better off than Russia, that is placed at the 143rd position tied with Nigeria.

Brazil- 3.8/10 (73rd out of 182 countries)
Russia- 2.4/10 (143rd out of 182)
India- 3.1/10 (95th out of 182)
China- 3.6/10 (75th out of 182)
South Africa- 4.1/10 (64th out of 182)

When we analyze both reports, the winner of the 2011 most corrupt BRICS country award is… (drum roll)… RUSSIA! Nostrovia!

Any leadership that cannot be peacefully turned over by the population is inherently unaccountable. Citizens should always have the ability to vote for their preferred leaders and reject those who they do not favor. Even some elected leaders who remain in office too long can begin to become unaccountable, as inertia and a lack of viable alternatives keep them in office as their energy and skill begin to diminish. One might think not only of Hugo Chavez but, arguably, Michael Bloomberg.

On the other hand, there are things that an unelected (or elected through rigged polls) leader can do to increase accountability. Consultations with civil society and the general public, maintaining transparency in governmental processes, and a fair judicial system won’t replace free and fair elections, but they will improve the ability of the population to effect some change. The problem is that most “benign dictators” believe that they are doing these things to a greater extent than they are. Don’t we all want to believe that on balance we are doing the right thing?

Egypt’s allies, and especially the United States, are walking through a minefield at the moment. Hosni Mubarak is still in power (as of this writing), so they have a difficult time saying outright that he is in the wrong. This clearly is a failure to hold him accountable. But much as human rights activists would like things to be otherwise, the primary concern of the White House and the State Department is not to maintain maximum accountability in the world. Their job is to maintain security and prosperity for the American people, and sometimes that requires a little authoritarianism here and there. It is certainly right to pressure the Obama administration to promote human rights and condemn the excesses of the Mubarak regime, but the reality is that that is only one of many considerations they have to grapple with. Clearly we cannot rely on foreign leaders to hold governments accountable; that is why true democracy, even when it brings unsavory types to power, is better than benign dictatorship.

Lastly, it is tempting to see the current demonstrations as the Egyptian people finally seizing the opportunity to hold their government accountable. They are expressing the grievances that were never before heeded, and they are attempting to effect the change that they could not achieve through the ballot box. But violent protests that bring a country to a halt – closing businesses, leaving people to hide in their homes – are not a means for ensuring that the voices of the population as a whole are clearly expressed to those in power. The demonstrations are the voice of the most aggrieved, the most daring, perhaps the most violent, but not necessarily a representative majority. The Egyptian people may have had no choice but to take to the streets, and we can hope that their efforts are not in vain. But that does not mean that a new leader in Egypt will mark a boost in accountability.

Haiti has been through some of the worst stresses any country has experienced in the past few years, with already weak rule of law compounded by a devastating earthquake and a disputed election. Thus it is to its credit that officials (if briefly) detained Duvalier on charges of corruption and embezzlement. The fact that he is now apparently living well in villa with a view may unfortunately be par for the course.

Amnesty International would like Duvalier to face much more serious charges, including crimes against humanity for human rights abuses committed under his regime. Many Haitians would agree. The Haitian government has said they will investigate these crimes, but it is likely to be a much more uphill battle than the corruption charges.

Since corruption is something in which nearly all those in power engage in some form (after all, we know that “power corrupts”), and since cracking down on a leader who illegally enriches himself is generally universally popular, corruption can be a handy way to put someone behind bars when other crimes were too vague or too delegated to others to mount a successful prosecution. Of course, a few years in jail for corruption does not match the dishonor and punishment of being convicted for crimes against humanity, but the more years go by, the fewer people have memories of those anyway. Why not stall a bit by getting him out of the public eye and doing so with a broadly popular mandate to boot, right?

Unfortunately, that’s not exactly what corruption fighters had in mind. Corruption should be prosecuted, but not to the exclusion of more serious crimes. Brutal dictatorships tend to be corrupt, but they also tend to order the repression of opponents, torture of detainees, and extra-legal execution. If only it were as easy to hold someone accountable for those crimes as it is to let him make a friendly visit back to his home country.

While the protests began after a single jobless youth set himself ablaze as a statement against high unemployment, it was clear that they spread due to broader frustration with the regime’s self-enrichment. It is remarkable that the level of corruption was so egregious that it could motivate thousands of people to take to the streets.

Tunisia has been described as a benign dictatorship, a country ruled with a firm grip but one that did not leave wide trails of suffering and death in its wake. Tunis had the feel of any breezy Mediterranean city, relaxed and secure. It had the highest scores in the region in Freedom House’s 2010 survey of women’s rights in the Middle East and North Africa. Of course, the benign side of the regime peeled away in face of threats to its power – such a common weakness of dictatorships.

The challenge in a country like Tunisia is changing the system and not just the figurehead. Ben Ali may have stepped down, but the systemic corruption over which he ruled has benefited many more than the inner circle he takes with him. The tentacles of easy enrichment and also slightly unsavory activity mean that it is likely that only a handful of people in the country with any prospect of leadership will have an interest in establishing a clean and accountable government. Since a handful is not enough to run a country, the unpleasant elements are more than likely to seep back in.

One thing that will be very interesting to watch is the reaction in the region. Ben Ali is the first Arab leader to be forced out in 25 years, and recent events in Tunisia are being closely followed by both neighboring citizens and their leaders. Facebook and Twitter have been credited with abetting the protests, even in this country ranked among only a handful of “internet enemies” by Reporters without Borders – if this can happen in Tunisia, where else might it occur? Will there be talk of another “wave of democracy” in the region, as we heard in the early heyday after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq? And will it be more positive this time around, or unravel just as bloodily? The climate of fear that continues to reign in the streets of Tunis, and the disputes that are already emerging over who is now in charge, do not bode well. However there is room for cautious optimism – if only because that is what has just been demonstrated by the Tunisian people themselves.

In the category of “I knew just as much simply by keeping up with the news,” the leaked diplomatic cables revealed overwhelming corruption in Afghanistan. One lonely Afghan minister was singled out for being “the only minister that was confirmed about whom no allegations of bribery exist.” He happens to be the agriculture minister, which hopefully is a positive sign given Afghanistan’s difficulties ending opium farming. But the scale of corruption cited in the cables is indeed disheartening. It is not the regular reports of bribes paid and skimming off the top, but the fundamental emphasis on personal gain over the national good that most bodes ill. For example, one minister, who incidentally is not cited as the honest one, said that “these political leaders are only thinking of dividing up the spoils rather than the quality of government needed to tackle Afghanistan’s problems.” If this is indeed the case, Afghanistan is facing a bleak future.

The cables also elucidate the tightrope that the United States is walking between security and corruption in Afghanistan. One report describes an Afghan border official who is regularly accused of illegal trafficking and taxing. However, he operates in an area that is a crucial transportation zone for NATO convoys, and he has always been cooperative with NATO leadership. U.S. and NATO officials don’t want to be seen as complicit in his corruption, but their primary objective is security, not fighting corruption. It is such competing interests in Afghanistan that pose the greatest challenge to integrity.

shifty look

Another case that may seem obvious is Russia. As Reuters eloquently put it, “Vladimir Putin rules Russia by allowing a venal elite of corrupt officials and crooked spies to siphon off cash from the world’s biggest energy producer.” Putin has denied the rumors that his leadership position has brought him extreme wealth. And rightly so: the cables are reports from diplomats on the information they are gathering, and we should not take any of them as confirmed facts. At the same time, the diplomats likely would not include something in the cable if they had no more basis for believing it than Putin’s shifty look.

Perhaps more troubling that these revelations, however, is how the cables will impact the United States’s efforts against corruption. For example in Kenya, the U.S. ambassador has been outspoken regarding what has sometimes been a rocky road towards integrity. Late last month he called for both Kenya’s chief justice and attorney general to be replaced, and for corrupt ministers to be jailed. But Wikileaks has revealed disdain on the part of the ambassador towards Kenya’s leaders. It is doubtful whether he can continue to be a voice of authority among people who now believe he holds them in contempt.

Finally, the leaks have led some people to depict the functioning of U.S. diplomacy itself as corrupt. For example, one website says “WikiLeaks shows the American and European governments used monetary incentives, threats, and even espionage to advance their ‘climate’ agenda at the COP15 global-warming summit in Copenhagen last year and beyond.” While what it goes on to describe sounds more like typical diplomatic negotiation and does not demonstrate the kind of private personal gain normally associated with corruption, headlines like “WikiLeaks reveals corruption in the climate change treaty” certainly harm diplomatic efforts.

If Wikileaks is still holding a document that provides evidence confirming any of the world’s many corruption rumors, I encourage them to publish it immediately. In the meantime, the site does not seem to have done much yet for the world’s fight against corruption.

p.s. Happy Anti-Corruption Day! I personally don’t get much out of designated days like this, but I thought it was worth mentioning.

The theme of the conference this year was “Restoring Trust”. Presumably that is a theme running through nearly all anti-corruption work, so it likely says more about the state of the world today than the topics covered.

One workshop I found especially interesting was entitled “Corruption Knowledge or Knowledge on Corruption?”. It focused on multi-stakeholder research, meaning corruption research that brings together both government and civil society. Case studies were given from such CPI stellar performers as Tajikistan and Vietnam. The lesson from all presenters was that more could be done in these challenging contexts by partnering with the government than blatantly opposing the authorities and risking the consequences.

The Vietnam example was presented by Dang Hoang-Giang of the local Center for Community Support Development Studies (CECODES). This is one of the only groups in the country that could be considered a think tank, producing (generally) independent data and analysis that could be useful to policymakers. Most NGOs in Vietnam focus on basic services, which are less likely to bring them into conflict with the government than advocacy. CECODES is no Brookings Institution (I have not even been able to find a working website), but it manages to put out reports in one of the most challenging environments for civil society on the planet. One interesting innovation is that it formed as a corporation instead of as an NGO in order to facilitate its work.

CECODES presented on a multi-stakeholder study it had done of accountability in the water sector. Another of the organization’s innovations is that in order to conduct the study, it partnered with the Vietnamese Fatherland Front (VFF), which has close ties to the Communist Party and, by extension, the government. The VFF is generally involved in government social programs, as well as in approving election candidates. However, CECODES took advantage of the VFF’s mandate to express the voice of the people in order to elicit their support for a public opinion survey on quality of water services in the country. The focus was on quality rather than explicitly on corruption because setting out to uncover corruption in government services would not have been as conducive to CECODES’s continued operations. With the support of the VFF, CECODES was able to conduct a full study of the water sector (including, more tacitly, corruption) and subtly push for improvement in this basic service.

The Vietnamese and other examples on the panel were very positively portrayed, displaying all the benefits of a multi-stakeholder process: not only do you have the buy-in of the government up front, thus presumably smoothing your path as well as hopefully paving the way for sincere use of the end results, but you have access to a range of perspectives and expertise, which should improve the validity of your results. But the title of the workshop, “Corruption Knowledge or Knowledge on Corruption?” was not really addressed as such. That is, if you bring into the process the very people who are behind most of the problems, can you really solve them?

In Vietnam there is a good case to be made, since the government there is so opaque and so unforgiving towards opposition that chipping around the edges is a major endeavor in itself. But another case study was of ongoing research in Uganda. Ugandan civil society may not be fully free to operate in all situations, but it nevertheless functions reasonably well. This means that a multi-stakeholder approach there must go beyond what happens in Vietnam, where it might be enough simply to conduct such a study at all. In Uganda, research involving the government will only prove its worth if it uncovers hard-hitting facts about deficiencies, and then the government makes serious efforts to remedy them. Otherwise we are blurring the line between cooperating and co-opting.

It is sometimes difficult to know what the CPI really tells us about corruption in the world. The results are based on an external or at least internationalized view of each country, meaning that it may have no relation to how ordinary people experience corruption every day. Nor is it based on experience (e.g. surveys asking “How often have you paid a bribe when dealing with government x?”), but rather on how a country is perceived. Perceptions should not be underestimated, as they can have large impact on how people behave – if you think that government x is corrupt, you are more likely to find alternative channels of influence or perhaps even take your business to another country. On the other hand, perceptions feed themselves: once you hear that Transparency International rated Somalia as the most corrupt country in the world in 2010, aren’t you more likely to perceive it that way in 2011?

The great thing about the CPI is not that it allows us to categorize countries by their level of corruption (in fact the value of that is rather dubious), but that it draws the world’s attention to a problem that we are all facing in some form. Every year these scores make headlines; every year there are people in remote regions sitting in internet cafes to find out how their country compares to their closest neighbor. As an American, I don’t care that we are 0.2 points above Uruguay; I care that we are a full 1.8 points below Canada. Nor do I really care that the CPI gives next to no explanations, no context to show why the score emerged the way it did. Instead I think, “I’m not surprised; the United States has new scandals emerging every month. Something needs to be done about corruption in this country.” And maybe I do something, or put pressure on those who can.

This year I was in Morocco for the CPI launch. The TI chapter in Morocco did the usual slide presentation showing historical values and regional comparisons. But then it changed the subject from the index itself. Although it was not mentioned in the generation of the actual index, the chapter focused in particular on a new anti-corruption law that they consider insufficient, as well as so-called reforms that they believe are in fact a step backwards. They pointed out that the anti-corruption law says it will improve communication with civil society, and yet civil society was not consulted in the development of the law. They called efforts to monitor the assets of public officials a facade, and said facts demonstrated the state’s incapacity to follow words with action. They then opened the floor to questions from the journalists present, who inquired about recent scandals and corruption in particular sectors and regions. Such a dialogue with the press is not possible without a hook, and the CPI serves this purpose well – no one really needs to discuss the CPI itself.

Transparency Morocco is involved in projects such as Education Watch, in which they measured corruption in primary schools, and a National Integrity System study that tracks transparency and accountability across state and non-state institutions. Morocco is likely to be the next site for the meeting of those states that have signed the UN Convention against Corruption, an event that will allow the chapter to lobby their government even harder for enforcement. The chapter is comprised of lawyers, accountants, former public officials and others who see corruption as the major obstacle to their country’s success.

The CPI is a tool that does not really mean much in itself, one that can occasionally distract from the task at hand and can hurt some countries that are making genuine and rapid efforts. But the annual launch reminds us of the powerful work that is being done against corruption every day in some of the most challenging contexts in the world. For that it is something to look forward to.

During his speech at the summit, President Obama chose to highlight a provision of the financial reform act that passed this summer: that the United States “now require[s] oil, gas and mining companies that raise capital in the United States to disclose all payments they make to foreign governments.” This new measure is not incidental. If enforced, it could have a profound impact on the ability of heads of state to secretly siphon off a portion of the proceeds from natural resource exploration. Companies registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission would have to report what they pay for exploration, enabling watchdogs to track the expenditures and discover how much is missing. It is not a new idea, but one that should have much broader application under the U.S. law.

Of course corrupt governments can get around the law by not contracting with U.S. companies, courting those that fall under a different jurisdiction in order to continue to fund their mansions and Mercedes. The law could be a boon for Chinese oil exploration, since China has demonstrated that it cares less about integrity and accountability than Western countries. But it would be difficult to avoid companies registered in the United States altogether, as has been proved with the success of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (which makes foreign bribery illegal). Of course the provision will not end corruption altogether, but it will reduce the space for it by demanding transparency and setting a strong example for others. Perhaps it will even inspire similar laws in other countries.

It is not surprising that President Obama chose to focus on fighting corruption in his Millennium Development Goals speech. While the goals themselves do not include reducing corruption (they are much more concrete), it is difficult to imagine meeting them without some effort in this area. At a side event at the summit last week, Transparency International brought together a panel of experts who went as far as to say that corruption is the main stumbling block to meeting the goals. Presumably most of the side events concluded that their pet issue was the main stumbling block, but the corruption-fighters do have some evidence on their side. TI issued a report showing correlations between levels of corruption and failure to increase access to clean water, to reduce maternal mortality, and to increase access to education. For example, if a woman has to pay a bribe she cannot afford in order to gain a place in a delivery room, or travel on roads that have not been repaired due to illegally diverted funds, she may not survive a difficult birth.

In some of the poorest countries of the world, corruption could make the difference between fulfilling people’s most basic needs and leaving them to perish. That means that a few more dollars in the pocket of someone who is not on the cusp of survival is endangering the life of another human being. It is difficult to imagine anyone accepting a bribe if they saw things in these terms.

Vietnam has undergone a period of remarkable growth over the past twenty years. Like China it has maintained a socialist political system while cautiously opening its economy, and the results are evident. GDP growth was above 7 percent in 2002-2004 and above 8 percent in 2005-2007; while it cooled to just over 5 percent last year, this was still the strongest growth in the region, and despite the global slowdown.

Meanwhile, the cities are under strain as factories displace rural dwellers and urban populations soar. Hanoi’s population has more than doubled in ten years, growing from just under 3 million people in 1999 to 6.5 million in 2009. The government has announced plans to move 1,800 families out of the old city center into high-rise apartments on the outskirts of Hanoi. While this will reduce cramped conditions in historic buildings, it flies in the face of contemporary Western notions of urban planning. Yet as incomes rise and the ubiquitous mopeds are replaced with cars, it is difficult to imagine how the downtown traffic will move at all without some change.

When the economy opened and investment began pouring in, the officials in charge may have thought that economic development was more important than preserving Vietnam’s rural charm. To ordinary people who now have electricity and running water, it probably is. But enthusiasm for investment may have obscured the benefits of sustainable development. Because that is what Vietnam’s development is: unsustainable. Take just one example: When people who live above their shops are moved to high-rises, where will they work? If they continue to run shops downtown, how will they get there without further clogging the streets? And who will shop there if everyone is living elsewhere? The tourists? But will the tourists continue to stream in when their idyllic image is shattered by the reality of the ravaged countryside and hollowed-out city center? And this is to say nothing of the battered ecosystems, the polluted water supply, and the already horrendous air quality.

The government has primary responsibility for reversing the damage it has already done. It must hold companies to account and trust that doing so will reap better long-term benefits than the current free-for-all approach. Foreign investors have a role to play as well. Official environmental (and labor) standards may be low, but foreign companies can maintain their own standards. Provide relevant services for the community, protect local ecosystems, control emissions and other environmental degradation. This is important not only for international public relations but for building a local constituency, as Vietnam is a growing market in itself. Fast and furious development shows impressive results on paper, but when you examine the big picture, slow and steady wins the race.

The Achilles Center for Protection of Drivers’ Rights is a nonprofit organization dedicated to ending corruption related to the traffic law. To this end, the organization operates a phone line that drivers can call when stopped by police in order to clarify their rights and seek advice. Some common corrupt activities the group has cited are removal of license plates, confiscation of driver’s licenses, and impounding of vehicles, all illegally perpetrated by police.

Anecdotes of Achilles’ successes were relayed to me recently by an Armenian anti-corruption researcher. One example was a man stopped for no discernible reason and asked to pay a bribe. He called Achilles, who requested that the man pass the cell phone to the policeman. When the policeman got on the line, the Achilles representative lambasted him first for taking the driver’s phone, an action that could warrant disciplinary action in and of itself, and then for requesting a bribe. The driver was ultimately allowed to go without payment.

To anyone who can’t imagine being cornered into paying a bribe, it would seem that such a service should have phones ringing off the hook. But in early 2009 Achilles reported an average of just 8 or 9 calls per day. This could indicate lack of awareness of the service, or a low incidence of corrupt police. Or it could be a sign that Armenians would rather pay a bribe and move on with their lives than try to combat a system they believe is unlikely to change.

Such complacency may be the real Achilles heal. The Achilles organization has made a genuine dent in corruption, bringing successful lawsuits against police to court and advocating for new legislation. The Armenian people should meet them halfway and realize that it is in fact possible for their lives to change for the better.

Exactly a year ago I traveled to a U.S.-Mexico border town to gauge the human rights impact of foreign investment there. I spoke to various business representatives, people working for nonprofit organizations, government officials, etc. about a variety of topics, including the security situation. The universal response was that security was not a problem. Sure, it was an issue in some border towns, especially Ciudad Juarez (across from El Paso). But not in little Reynosa, where the population had boomed from 280,000 in 1990 to 520,000 in 2005. Maybe a few isolated shootings, they said, but no worry if you weren’t involved in the drug trade.

I also spoke to a Texan journalist who frequently crossed the border for reporting. He did not seem particularly concerned about safety either. However, he did say that journalists tended to self-censor with regard to reporting on gangs. If that were the case, how were the business and government representatives so sure that Reynosa was a safe environment? How did anyone who was not directly involved really know what was going on?

In February Reynosa was dragged into Mexico’s drug war full force, with weeks of gang violence spilling over into civilian lives. One of the defining features of this development has been its impact on the local media. Journalists were singled out, with several abductions and murders taking place in Reynosa. Clearly an objective of the gangs was to ensure that their activities were not monitored. Nor has the violence ended: just this Tuesday more shootouts occurred.

There have been accusations that corrupt police are protecting the drug traffickers. Yet these are no more than rumors as long as the journalists uncovering them cannot dig deep and publish what they find. The media fill a crucial role in accountability when the authorities – whether due to their own involvement or, as is likely the case in Reynosa, their own incapacity – leave a gap. Allowing journalists to be cowed into silence is as great a blow to accountability as opaque government records or siphoning off oil revenues.

This month Rajesh Tandon, a prominent civil society leader from India, spoke at the closing of the International Society for Third-Sector Research conference. In response to a question from the audience, Tandon argued that it is no longer possible to have economic development without democracy because of the availability of information. For example, the ease of sending images by cell phone has made international news out of events like the Chinese crackdown on Uighur protesters last year, whereas ten years ago it is unlikely anyone but locals would have known what happened. Moreover, cell phones as well as the internet can help organize social movements demanding accountability in places that were once able to silence all opposition.

All this is true. But I fear that the world’s tyrants are more resilient than this suggests. New technology may empower ordinary people, but they are not the only ones with access. Those in power, whether in China, Guinea, or Saudi Arabia, have both the incentive and the resources to out-maneuver their opponents. New technology is the playground of the young and agile, neither of which generally characterize authoritarian bureaucracies… but they can learn, both from their opponents and from each other, in the same way A.Q. Khan spread nuclear secrets around the world.

For example, what happens now that millions of people saw videos of Chinese police beating Uighurs: Has treatment improved, or has the Chinese government simply wakened to the need to repress in a lower-profile manner? When was the last time you heard about the Uighurs anyway?

In face of this, those of us fighting for governments that better serve their people must not become complacent. We have a head start right now, and we have to be careful not to squander it. Keeping on the cutting edge, developing continually new strategies, and thinking outside the box are the tools of the information age. With these, the collective brainpower of average citizens is far greater than their oppressors’.

New technology is indeed a democratizing force, but only if it is channeled effectively will it fall into the right hands.

Julian, whose picture appears in a recent Economist article, spent the bus ride and longer more or less arguing that he and his colleagues were the sole people at the conference who were doing anything serious about corruption. The only way to expose corruption, he said, is to make information public that proves it. Anyone sniffing around the edges was doing no more than that. There was no need to worry that the “wrong” information might be revealed, causing unintended consequences or unnecessarily damaging a reputation. Wikileaks takes care of that, he said, by vetting all submissions. And isn’t it better that the information is out there to be used than buried by a select and self-interested few?

I argued in vain that all of us at the conference were contributing our bit to fighting corruption, that a range of different anti-corruption methods were required. I was also shot down when I called him a cynic. Despite our somber topic, most of the conference attendees were generally optimistic that their work was changing the world. Julian was dark, portraying general evil at every turn. He may have been optimistic, but only about counteracting the relentless wicked nature of human beings.

In contrast to the Economist, Julian would not admit that he had founded the company. He vaguely indicated that there were several people involved and no one was directly responsible, just as their information was distributed in such a way as to make no single country’s laws applicable. The countries with the most generous laws on freedom of information, protection of sources, admissibility of wiretap evidence, etc. are each given a piece of the pie.

On 17 June Iceland passed a reform to its media laws after consultation with Wikileaks. The reform, whose protection for sources and journalists who might face foreign libel suits is considered the strongest in the world, was designed in collaboration with Wikileaks. The addition of this law to the world’s mix of legal frameworks will allow initiatives like Wikileaks to further flourish in this globalized media environment. But in the United States, land of checks and balances, Wikileaks’ “multi-jurisdictional” model smacks of a lack of accountability and the trap of the “benign” dictator. May they continue to have only the best interests of the world in mind and not make any missteps along the way.

News site The Daily Beast conducted such a survey for the fifty U.S. states. They compiled information on public corruption, racketeering and extortion, forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, and embezzlement from 1998 to 2008 and came up with a full ranking. New Hampshire came out on top with the best ratings. Tennessee takes the prize for most corrupt.

Like the CPI, the Daily Beast ranking does not give much detail on why different states landed where they did, although it does describe a “Recent Scandal” for each state. New Hampshire’s damning story is of two local men who were charged with mail and wire fraud (watch out, New Hampshire!). Some other scandalous accounts are of odometer tampering (Wyoming) and a woman who stole her ex-husband’s checkbook and wrote herself $4,100 worth of checks (Iowa). There are also some surprises. Illinois is in fact one of the better-ranking states by the Daily Beast’s measure, at number 47 of 51 (where 51 is least corrupt, including Washington, DC). Apparently the Blagojevich saga only ran so deep.

Just like the CPI, rankings like the Daily Beast’s are better for pitting neighbors against each other than comparing two very disparate entities. My own positive view of Vermont was apparently false, as Vermont ranked only 39 against New Hampshire’s crystal-clean number 51. But my home New York can be proud of its 24th place against only 21st for New Jersey. Washington State scraped by Oregon at 38th to 35th. South Carolina can boast its 9th place against North Carolina’s 5th. Indiana wins against Illinois 49th to 47th.

After the CPI is published (or most international rankings, for that matter), country representatives request meetings with those who put out the ranking in order to ask how they can move up the ladder. Usually they are not looking to move into the top place, but rather to surpass their main rival: Bulgaria vs. Romania, Algeria vs. Morocco, Laos vs. Cambodia. Such competition can spark positive action, leading to genuine change in hopes of moving up those one or two spots. Do you think we can generate such positive competition here? Come on New York, you can beat California next year!

Apple has launched an app, called “Antimordidas” or “Antibribes”, to help users fend off corruption in Mexico City. The app has various features such as a calculator for verifying traffic fines and a user-friendly compendium of traffic regulations. It is soon to be launched for Blackberry as well. Given the interest that this story has garnered in other countries, especially India (where most versions of the story do not specify that the app is only available for Mexico), apps for other locations should not be far behind.

It is always encouraging when new technology is used to combat ancient problems. However, it is unfortunate that the app is limited to smartphones. Corruption hurts most for the people who can least afford it – who happen also to be the people who can least afford smartphones. The Economist has predicted that within five years everyone on earth who wants a cell phone may have one, but smartphones will remain luxury items (except in New York, where people seem to think they are a fundamental need).

Shouldn’t it be possible to fight corruption with a traditional mobile phone? You don’t need fancy apps, just a number to call to report abuse anonymously (which does exist in some locations). An information line is also handy, where callers (or better yet, texters) can find out similar facts as those displayed on Mexican iPhones. Further innovation from handset manufacturers would be welcome. As a social program, they could support a designated mailbox for subsidized SMSs detailing shoddy infrastructure projects or dishonest service providers. Allowing photos to be sent for free would be better still.

There is space for much more innovation in smartphone anti-corruption technology as well. A good start would be a streamlined app for reporting bribery, with automatic submission of time, date, and location: for government agencies and some service providers, no further information would be necessary to discern trends and determine which offices require management intervention.