There was no shortage of political turmoil in 2009. Widespread protests in Iran after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was reelected by a fraudulent vote, a coup in Honduras, a new President for Somalia (really the President of about 10 square blocks of Mogadishu), an Afghan presidential election “marred by fraud”, an Israeli-American row over a settlement freeze, and many, many more stories caught our attention.

Through it all, China and India enjoyed strong economic growth, Russia plummeted, Brazil got the Olympics, and Europe got a President and Chief Diplomat.

Undoubtedly, President Obama has dominated headlines all year, all across the world. Great excitement was matched by great expectations—perhaps too lofty. His speech in Cairo promised a new relationship with the Muslim world. But an apparent backtrack over Israeli settlements, and an escalation of the Afghan conflict, has cast doubts on his claims. Despite the attention, the President has operated quietly and slowly—for the most part, he has lived up to his “No Drama Obama” moniker. With a year of his presidency under his belt, will President Obama step more boldly on to the world stage in 2010? It remains to be seen.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was expected to coast to reelection in June. Instead, the gap between Ahmadinejad and his primary challenger, Mir Hussein Mousavi, tightened dramatically in the closing days of the race. When election results showed Ahmadinejad with a comfortable win, the opposition alleged widespread voter fraud had rigged the election. Hundreds of thousands of Iranians took to the streets in weeks of protest to follow—brutally suppressed by the hard-line regime, but not before the world saw a much different side of Iran.

Heading into 2010, attention will be focused on the aforementioned suspects: AfPak, negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, and gridlock in I-P. But beneath the surface are rising nationalist tensions in disparate regions, the increasing impact of global climate change, and the green shoots of a new 21st century economic model.

Events the world would be better off without: Terrorist attack in India turns the Indo-Pak cold war very hot; Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities plunges the Mideast into conflict; belligerents in “Africa’s World War” (the most horrific conflict since World War II), now in its 15th year, ramp up ethnic cleansing campaigns; increasingly worse global economic trends; the Afghan “surge” fails.

But on the potential bright side: Afghan Security improvements influence an Indo-Pak détente; reasonable settlement over Iran’s nuclear program opens the door for the Islamic Republic’s further integration into the world system; the 2010 World Cup in Africa inspires the forgotten continent towards a new future; a prisoner-swap deal brings Hamas into the peace process, Marwan Barghouti unites Palestinian factions as the successor to Mahmoud Abbas, and Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu pulls a Menachem Begin.

Finally, two potential global game changers (a.k.a. wild predictions): Osama Bin Laden or Ayman Al-Zawahiri are captured by special forces or killed by an American drone strike, or a Russian economic collapse splits Medvedev and Putin, throwing Russia into turmoil.

1) The talks are seemingly stalled, and most are pointing at a dispute over climate aid to developing countries.

2) The chief of the climate summit, Danish Climate Minister Connie Hedegaard, has stepped down from her post, after calls for increased transparency. The Danish Prime Minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, will fill the role.

Other news:

3) Pakistan’s political immunity law (the National Reconciliation Ordinance, or NRO), has been overturned by that country’s Supreme Court. President Asif Ali Zardari still holds presidential immunity, but many of his allies have been stripped of their political immunity.

4) Meanwhile, Pakistan has denied a U.S. request to immediately widen the scope of its military offensive to North Waziristan.

As touched on this blog a few times before, the state of India is not a nation-state—it is indeed a multi-ethnic empire, binding together many territories that have shared no common historical narrative. The idea of India is an imagined comunity, and not a particularly strong one at that. Citizens identify closer with their regional state and area than with India as a whole.

Thus, it would not be difficult to see a future where the Telangana row because increasingly common. India’s economic inequality is horrific—and if wealthier citizens and states start believing the poor are holding them back, the entire social fabric of the Indian ‘nation’ could collapse.

Furthermore, the state already faces a Maoist separatist movement/rebellion in its east/northeast (primarily in the northeast), and the issue of Kashmir in the north/northwest is ever looming over stability and peace in South Asia. These internal fractures make it much more likely that the future of India’s political system will have a weak central government that is even less powerful vis-a-vis the states than it is today. Power projection further afield (read: Pakistan) could be used as a way to bind the nation together—it could just as easily tear it apart, as regional areas not affected by any crisis may question why they’re fighting a war for a state (say, Gujarat or Punjab) that they’ve never been to, don’t ever plan on going to, and don’t know anyone else who has gone to.

2) Der Spiegel, Germany: Really, you can’t get more brutal than this, from Klaus Brinkbäumer:

The United States is now a republic of bloggers and talk radio, a country of shouting citizens and an eternal presidential election campaign, full of paranoid, spoiled and self-righteous people.

3) Dar al-Hayat, Lebanon: Both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships are taken to task, by Husam Itani.

4) The Daily Star, Lebanon: A defense of Turkish foreign policy, from Suat Kiniklioglu, the Justice and Development Party’s deputy chairman for external affairs.

2) (The Daily Star, Lebanon) Saif Nasrawi examines a growing political trend in Egypt.

3) (Hindustan Times, India) The Indo-Chinese climate change axis.

4) (Dar al-Hayat, Lebanon) Abdullah Iskandar on the Kurdish question and democratic government in Turkey.

We had a chance to win this war and secure the peace, immediately following the fall of the Taliban and through 2004-2005. But instead we invaded Iraq for absolutely no reason. And here we are today.

There’s a reason why the Taliban is going to be hard to flip to ‘our side.’ It’s because the Afghan war is already over. The Taliban and its allies won. They’re just waiting us out at this point.

1) The always provocative Gideon Levy, in Haaretz: Let’s face the facts, Israel is a semi-theocracy.

2) Nir Rosen, in the Boston Review, hammers the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.

3) Hassan Haidar, in the Lebanese daily Dar al-Hayat: The Rediscovery of Afghanistan.

4) FP interviews Vaclav Havel.

News:

1) A joint British-Malasyian (Shell and Petronas) bid won the rights to the Majnoon oil field in Iraq.

2) Developing countries lambast announced aid packages from rich countries as too small; a draft agreement being circulated calls for up to 40 percent emission cuts from 1990 levels by rich countries.

3) U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates claims al-Qaeda is fleeing South Waziristan (ed: so, we’re just going to let them get away again, right?), and a top al-Qaeda militant is killed in a drone strike in North Waziristan. (BBC claims Saleh al-Somali, other media outlets Abu Yahya Al Libi.)

Were we to ‘get’ Bin Laden and/or Zawahiri tomorrow, it would not change the fact that a withdrawal without some sort of regional stabilization is an unwise idea. Yes, it’d be a major symbolic victory, and it would matter quite a bit. But that wouldn’t translate into immediate success in the region, and the American public need to know that fact.

Achieving progress in Afghanistan will be hard and progress there likely will be slower in developing than was the progress in Iraq. Nonetheless, as with Iraq, in Afghanistan hard is not hopeless.

Wonderful to put to rest any suspicions that the military might be trying to copy its Iraq surge success onto Afghanistan, despite the vast difference in geography, population demographics, society, etc, etc.

2) Peace Now claims Israel is still building more in the West Bank than in Israel proper:

Even during the freeze a larger number of housing units than the national average will be built in the occupied territories.

Meanwhile, a 10,000 strong pro-settler protest marched through Jerusalem.

3) Pakistan detained five Americans who had been missing since leaving the Washington, D.C. area last month.

4) Yes, the bombings yesterday in Iraq were horrific, mindless acts of violence. But this response is actually encouraging, for the political future of Iraq.

Iraqi MPs have demanded that top ministers face questions in parliament over security …

I know Pakistan would never go for the partition of their country, but seriously, this border makes absolutely no sense in the present. It splits the area’s Pashtun population—though to be fair, most Pashtuns have never abated by the border—making coherent policy in the region nearly impossible (and we’re seeing this in the current debate over the need for action in Pakistan, as well as in Afghanistan). Futhermore, it’s completely ungovernable and totally fails as an effective separation of control between Afghanistan (no real state authority anywhere in the country, really) and Pakistan (little state authority in Balochistan, virtually none in the NWFP and FATA).

But, as said above, this is all entirely hypothetical, since borders are apparently sacrosanct now, even when they aren’t real borders (Afghanistan doesn’t even recognize it as the border!) and serve no beneficial purpose. No one will ever think of proposing an independent Pashtun state—not because it doesn’t make sense, but because politics are involved. (Click on the picture below for a bigger map of pre-Durand Line Afghanistan.)

Pre-Durand Line Afghanistan

2) Dawn, Pakistan: U.S. signaling

3) The Nation, Pakistan: No light in the Afghan tunnel

4) Guardian, U.K.: The U.S. cash behind extremist settlers

5) Hurriyet, Turkey: Pakistan and Turkey’s difficult decision

Brazil’s future as one of the next major powers—indeed, the B in BIC* stands for Brazil—over the next few decades looks almost assured. It faces no credible threats, possesses a large population and a significant allotment of natural resources. If anyone were picking a foreign leader of the decade, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva would undoubtedly be near the top.

What Brazil—and most other Latin American countries—lacks is a strong emphasis on the rule of law. The extrajudicial killings by the Brazilian police are horrific, and must be stopped. Yes, policing in Brazil (and Mexico, Colombia, etc) is hard:

But Rio state Public Safety Director Jose Beltrame, in charge of the city’s armed security forces, did take issue with the 2008 U.N. report, saying critics don’t recognize that his officers must constantly confront drug gangs who rule over slums and are armed with military rifles, grenades and anti-aircraft weapons.

But the police are not judge, jury, and executioner. Having a significant problem with drug lords is absolutely no excuse for this level of wanton brutality. Brazil hosts the 2016 Summer Olympics, and the 2014 World Cup. It’s likely the country will attempt to spruce up its image before these two events, and it can start by cracking down on murders committed by the police.

*Yes, I know most use BRIC. But I don’t see why Russia should be included with the other three at all. Its economy is notoriously inefficient, corrupt, and dependent on export (oil and gas) prices.

1) Mayor of Kabul sentenced to four years for corruption.

2) Russia and India signed a nuclear agreement.

3) Iraq election law dispute resolved—for now.

4) Somalis are protesting the brutal bombing last week that killed three government ministers along with medical school graduates and their families. Al Shabbab, the main militant group, has denied involvement. It is extremely rare to see street protests in Mogadishu—could the militants have gone too far this time?

5) Iranian protesters have, in recent months, co-opted state sanctioned rallies and marches (Jerusalem Day, and now Student Day) to spread their message.