In an interesting (but probably passing) change of direction, China is putting pressure on Sudan “to seek urgently the release of 29 Chinese workers held by rebels in the border state of South Kordofan.” China traditionally sees national sovereignty as sacrosanct. But now it is their ox being gored and suddenly a fixed position on questions of national sovereignty seems foolish. Hopefully they keep this incident in mind the next time one of their client states commits brutality against its own people.

African Heads of State meet in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (EPA/Jacoline Prinsloo)

The African Union was supposed to decide on its leadership this week. Instead gridlock has set in. South Africa had hoped that its Home Affairs Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, would emerge victorious, but she has been unable to garner enough votes. As this story has developed I have been skeptical of whether or not Dlamini-Zuma could muster enough supports. Not because she is not qualified. But rather because South Africa occupies an interesting position on the continent. By virtually every measure it is the most powerful country on the continent, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. But that means that many Africans are wary of South Africa and want to push back against its pretensions to continental leadership. Or at least its pretensions to official positions of leadership. Culturally, economically, politically, and militarily the country is the de facto regional superpower.

Meanwhile Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe has denounced the AU for recognizing Libya’s National Transitional Council at a recent summit. At the Harare airport, Mugabe levied accusations toward his African colleagues for being: “‘fronts’ for Western powers whose ‘criminal’ NATO bombardment of Libya helped lead to the killing of Col. Moammar Gadhafi, a former Mugabe ally.” Of course he did.

Finally, if you’re going to be anywhere near the Research Triangle in North Carolina this weekend, I’d encourage you to swing by the South East Regional Seminar in African Studies (SERSAS) and the South East Africanist Network (SEAN) Conference. The main program will take place on Saturday at the University of North Carolina’s Fedex Global Education Center. The conference theme is “Border Crossings, Migrations, and Interventions,” but panels will deviate from those themes. I’m on the panel and would love to meet any readers who might be in the area.

This week, a first-of-its-kind study, “How Africa Tweets” was published by Portland Communications and Tweetminster which examined more than 11.5 million geo-located tweets during the last three months of 2011 and surveyed 500 of Africa’s “Top Tweeters.” For the first time, we have numbers to back up what many of us have assumed anecdotally (with a few surprises), such as:

How much is Twitter used in Africa?

The African country with this highest volume of tweets during the research period was South Africa (5,030,226 tweets) which was more than double the number of tweets of the second and third highest, Kenya (2,476,800 tweets) and Nigeria (1,646,212 tweets). To put these numbers in perspective, there are about 150,000,000 tweets sent every day worldwide.

Who’s using Twitter in Africa?

Those who tweet in Africa tend to be younger—60% between the ages of 21-29, compared with the worldwide average age of 39 years. The study made an interesting observation that Africa’s business and political leaders are largely absent from the continent’s twitterverse. This is a stark contrast to the US where virtually everyone in public political life communicates via Twitter, from political parties, local officials, presidents and presidential candidates (except for Ron Paul.)

Even terrorist networks are taking advantage of social media in Africa, check out my earlier post here.

How is Twitter being used by Africans?

57% of tweets were sent by mobile phones, which is only slightly higher than the 55% worldwide while only 37% of those in the US primarily tweet by mobile phone. (The explosion in mobile penetration in Africa made social media tools much more accessible.) More than 70% of Africans surveyed use Twitter as a source for national and international news. Not surprisingly, nearly 95% of those who use Twitter also use Facebook.

What does this mean?

First, it means that an increasing number of Africans are being exposed to news and information on subjects and from sources they may not have had access to previously. Secondly, we in the US now have a direct means of communication with those in Africa to share ideas, policies and to advocate for peace, change and reform. Thirdly, and I find this really interesting, Africans can talk BACK and share their ideas, concerns and issues. Social Media is a great “equalizer” because it provides a platform to reach millions and millions to those who might not otherwise have the means to communicate on a large scale. Fourthly, and this is what I found MOST interesting, the study revealed that 60% of those on Twitter in Africa “mainly follow African Tweeters.” This means that Africans are not just using new tools to reach “outside”, but they are establishing and strengthening the channels of communications amongst themselves. Now, they can follow world events with commentary from other Africans and gain a perspective that has been virtually absent. Also, strengthening these African-African ties will allow activists across nations to mobilize and coordinate in unprecedented ways.

The study also found that use of Twitter still pales in comparison with the US and other regions of the world. Twitter users in the Middle East and North Africa combined only make up about 5% of the Twitterverse. This disparity is not solely due to economics or access to technology. As the study points out, there are significant security and privacy barriers (particularly for the use of social media tools which incorporate geo-location services.) And how does Twitter’s policy shift this week to allow tweets and accounts to be selectively blocked, depending on the country of access weigh on these trends? Given the clear role that social media played in the Arab Spring, is this a step backwards?

You can download the complete study findings here.

February 20 – Thousands demonstrated across Morocco in solidarity with protesters in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as to call for an acceleration of reforms in Morocco. The demonstrations were called for by the Freedom and Democracy Now movement, which used Facebook and other social media to mobilize followers. This date became the name of the protest movement that later challenged the democratic reform process. The group was handicapped by inconsistent messaging, internal disputes and, in the end, a refusal to participate in consultations for the proposed constitutional reforms.

March 9 – King Mohammed VI addresses the nation and calls for unprecedented reforms to the Constitution. He assembles a consultative constitutional commission, made up of academics, policymakers, civil society and political party leaders, trade unions and youth and charges the group with drafting the reformed Constitution.

March 19 – Morocco, represented by Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri and Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi, participated in the high-level International Conference in support of the new Libya, co-chaired by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron. Morocco pledged to “support the Libyan brotherly people at the multilateral level, notably within the UN, so that Libya can regain its stature among nations through its legitimate representatives from the National Transitional Council (NTC).”

March 23 – Morocco’s Foreign Minister, Taieb Fassi Fihri, visited the US to meet with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. (Minister Fassi Fihri was the first Arab foreign minister to visit the US since the beginning of the Arab Spring.) During the visit, Minister Fassi Fihri and his US counterpart discussed strengthening bilateral relations through a strategic partnership, reiterated the US and Moroccan commitment to resolving the Western Sahara conflict through autonomy for the disputed territory under Moroccan sovereignty and pledged to work together to promote stability in the region, particularly as conditions worsened in Libya.

April 28 – A young Moroccan man, dressed as a “Western Hippie,” walked into Cafe Argana, very popular among tourists and Moroccans, in Marrakesh’s Jamaa el Fna square (which is a UNESCO World Heritage site), left a suitcase filled with explosives and remote detonated the device. Seventeen people, Moroccans and European tourists, were killed and injured more than 20 others. Moroccan authorities claim that those responsible for the bombing were linked with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), though AQIM denied responsibility. In late October, the alleged mastermind of the attacks, Adel al-Othmani, was convicted and sentenced to death and his co-conspirators received sentences ranging from two years to life.

June 17 – In a speech to the nation, King Mohammed VI announces historic reforms to the Constitution presented to him by the consultative commission. Among the reforms: the role of Prime Minister is greatly enhanced and the King must appoint the Prime Minister from the party which wins the most seats in the elections, stronger mechanisms for the promotion and protection of women’s equality, human rights, recognition of Amazigh (Berber) as an official language, the King must make key appointments in consultation with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and the judiciary is restructured to increase independence and transparency.

July 1 – The proposed reforms are put to a national referendum. Voter turnout is 73% and 98% vote in favor of the reforms.

September 4 – Princess Lalla Aicha, sister of the late King Hassan II and aunt of King Mohammed VI, died at the age of 81 in Rabat. Lalla Aicha was the first female Arab Ambassador (United Kingdom, 1965-69) and was very active throughout her life as a women’s rights activist and vocal advocate for the Red Crescent.

October 21 – Morocco is elected to a two year term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2012-13.

October 22 – Three European aid workers were kidnapped by members of AQIM from within the Polisario-controlled refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. The Polisario Front, whose members reportedly assisted the kidnappers, currently challenges Morocco’s sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara.

November 25 – Morocco holds first parliamentary elections since the adoption of broad constitutional reforms approved by referendum in July. The elections were also the first parliamentary elections in the region since the Arab Spring began. (Egypt’s parliamentary elections began the following Monday and the Tunisian elections which preceded Morocco’s were to choose a constituent assembly to write the country’s new constitution.) Voter turnout was 45%, up from 37% for the 2007 national Parliamentary elections. The winning party in the elections were the moderate Islamist party, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), which won 107 of the 395 seats in the Lower House of Parliament. Shy of a majority, the PJD was required to form a governing coalition with other major parties.

November 29 – King Mohammed VI appoints Abdelilah Benkirane, leader of the Islamist Party of Justice and Development as Prime Minister of the newly elected parliament.

December 2 – “Morocco Mall” in Casablanca, the largest shopping mall in Africa, opens its doors. The opening of the $260 million project brought drew Moroccan royalty, Princess Lalla Meryem (the sister of King Mohammed VI) and American pop culture royalty, Jennifer Lopez.

December 23 – President Obama signs the 2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Omnibus) for which Congress’ report language, for the first time, authorizes US assistance monies to be used in all regions of Morocco, included the Moroccan-administered Western Sahara. Congress also called on the State Department to make resolving the Western Sahara conflict a “ priority.”

In fact, months before the Arab Spring began, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI stressed that economic empowerment for the young people across the region must be a priority—one that shouldn’t be frustrated by the Western Sahara conflict that’s festered since before they were born. In a 2010 speech, he said,

“Our goal is to fulfill the aspirations of young generations who want to see the energies of the Moroccan and the Algerian peoples devoted to tackling the true challenges of development and complementarity, instead of being wasted on the complexities of a dispute from a long-gone era. ”

This past week, Congress agreed that empowering youth by promoting regional prosperity and resolving the Cold War-era quarrel is the best response to the Arab Spring. In Congress’ report language for the 2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Omnibus) (click here for the report language  and here for the Act), which was signed on Friday by President Obama and funds many federal agencies including the State Department, a provision was included that urged “the Department of State to prioritize a negotiated settlement” to the Western Sahara conflict. The settlement called for by longstanding US policy for resolving the Western Sahara conflict—supported and reiterated by Congress and the Clinton, Bush and Obama Administrations— is a solution negotiated between Morocco and the Polisario Front based on autonomy for the disputed territory under Moroccan sovereignty. In 2009, Secretary Clinton reaffirmed that US support for a solution based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty “originated in the Clinton Administration. It was reaffirmed in the Bush Administration and it remains the policy of the United States in the Obama Administration. […] And I don’t want anyone in the region or elsewhere to have any doubt about our policy, which remains the same.”  Earlier this year, she called Morocco’s proposed autonomy plan “serious, realistic and credible, a potential approach to satisfy the aspirations of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity.”

This recent action by Congress is extremely significant because the US has now taken its support a giant leap forward by permitting the use of US aid program monies in the Western Sahara, which is currently administered by Morocco. In the report language, Congress clarifies that “funds provided in title III of this Act for Morocco may be used in regions and territories administered by Morocco.” (Currently, Morocco operates its own programs in the territory, such as the National Human Development Initiative  which has benefited millions of Moroccans throughout the entire country, including in the Western Sahara.)

Now, US policy supports not only the political resolution of the Western Sahara conflict, but directly funds programs aimed at promoting socio-economic development—called for by millions in the region during the Arab Spring. Congress has sent a powerful message that addressing economic development and empowerment is not just a talking point, but an actual budget line-item.

Congress also asked the Secretary of State to submit a report describing the steps Morocco is taking to address and improve human rights, which will provide Morocco an opportunity to demonstrate its progress in this area. Not only did the recent Constitutional reforms enshrine protection and promotion of human rights as a national principle, but the newly elected leaders of Parliament have publically stated that it is a priority of their new government.

While Morocco was definitely ahead of the Arab Spring curve, it is still a ‘learning’ curve. Undoubtedly there will be missteps among the progresses ahead as Morocco seeks to consolidate lasting and strong democratic reforms. (But would it be real reform if it came too easily?)

One thing is for certain—at a time when US policy and reaction to the Arab Spring seems unclear/uninformed/uncreative/un[fill-in-the-blank], it’s encouraging to see the US doing it right in Morocco’s case and putting its money and its mouth behind supporting reform efforts that will not only benefit Moroccans, but will inevitably flow outward to support the aspirations of hundreds of millions in the Middle East and North Africa.

In the Arab world, in particular North Africa, what is being now referred to as the Arab Spring made 2011 a tough year for the dictatorial regimes of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and of course Gaddafi, who was killed in Libya. In the Western world, a movement that started as Occupy Wall Street in New York stirred up similar protests across major cities in the US, Britain, Italy, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal and Asian countries as citizens fought back against growing greed and inequality. Public anger over the debt crisis brought down Prime Minister George Papandreou and Silvio Berlusconi in Greece and Italy respectively.

Yet, despite the Southern African region’s high level of poverty, unemployment, and inequality, we did not see a wave of public anger similar to what we have seen across the globe. In a case study of five Southern African countries, the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa has found that poverty and inequality is tearing apart Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Angola, with many citizens living on a mere US$1 per day. The irony here is that some of those countries, such as Namibia and South Africa, are resource-rich countries with some of the highest GDP in the world.

Amid this global backlash against greed and inequality, why were most Southern African streets (apart from isolated and sporadic protests in Malawi and Swaziland) empty, quiet, and business as usual? What happened to the militant spirit that has sent many young people toyi-toying in the streets of Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa against colonialism, poverty, and social injustice in the 60s and 80s?

One answer given for this widespread citizenry indifference in Southern African has been explained in terms of the belief that some of the governments in the region would not hesitate to use harsh measures if confronted by an Arab Spring-like mass action. True to this, in Zimbabwe some 45 activists were rounded up and charged with treason for watching a Mideast uprising video. In Malawi, the security force launched a violent crackdown on the protestors, leaving at least 18 protestors dead. In Swaziland, pro-democracy activists were banned, arrested, tear-gassed, and sprayed with water cannons.

It is also true that when the uprising was under way in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, none of the Southern Africa governments (well, South Africa maybe did but flip-flopped later to save face with the radicals within the ANC and other hawkish Africanists in the region) picked up a phone to urge Mubarak, Gadaffi, or Ben Ali to exercise restraint in dealing with the protestors. Instead, what we heard from Southern African governments was the usual song of complaint about Western interference in Africa’s internal matters.

But here is another explanation: Southern African citizens’ indifference can be explained in a “been there and done that” syndrome. This is because in some ways Southern Africa is a little bit ahead of North Africa in terms of democratization, meaning that most governments in Southern Africa are products of democracy and came to power through elections. Whereas North Africa might have been stable and economically advanced but did not have democratic governments. However, a distinctive characteristic of the southern African democracy is that not only we have a democracy without democrats but also a democracy without citizens. Southern Africa’s democracies did not and do not produce citizens but subjects controlled by governments due to the hierarchical nature of Southern African politics which demands obedience and loyalty from citizens. Why? Although they claim to have fought for democracy (such as SWAPO in Namibia, ANC in South Africa, MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO in Mozambique and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe), most ruling parties in Southern Africa don’t operate as democrats. Their politics and decision making processes are highly centralized. By the way, the same can also be said about most opposition political parties too.

It is against the backlog of this unquestioning and uncritical citizenry, that we understand why Mugabe is still in power today and why most ruling parties in that region have won elections with landslide victory. This is why the Namibian president can place a moratorium on public discussions about the SWAPO presidential succession. And this is why the ANC-dominated National Assembly in South Africa can pass a law (reversing the gains made against apartheid repressive laws and policies) to limit free speech.

On the flip side, events in North Africa made the world forget (as the international media and world government shifted its attention to the Arab Spring) about Southern Africa, especially with regard to what’s going on in Zimbabwe and Malawi

SWAPO March

Here are a few predictions for 2012: The ruling party SWAPO’s 2012 election campaign to replace the incumbent Namibian president when his term expires is shaping up to be between Geingob (who is the vice president of SWAPO) and me Pendukeni Ithana (who is the secretary of SWAPO). One is believed to be a technocrat and the other a populist. But both are insiders, so expect less change here if either of them wins. What is clear, however, is that another potential split (this would be the third split if it happens) from the ruling party is looming as the in-fighting has already started. More is too come as we inch closer to Election Day.

Robert Mugabe

In Zimbabwe, it is clear that the opposition party MDC (MDC has lost the mojo, and has been weakened by in-fighting too) is not the party that will bring down Mugabe (as it was hoped), but expect a potential split within the ruling ZANU-PF party. As Mugabe’s health continues to deteriorate, we expect infighting as members vie for control and Mugabe’s position.

On the other hand, South Africa will continue walking the populist road and of course with less transparent governance. Unless restored, expect the worst from Malawi because its life line support, which is aid from the international community, has been cut off, which is going to make life difficult for ordinary citizens. Angola and Mozambique (riding on oil) will continue unabated because we don’t really hear much about these two countries in terms of international coverage anyway. The remaining question is will Swaziland eventually collapse economically, or has it already collapsed?

Today, in Washington, DC there was a really interesting roundtable, “What’s Next for Morocco? Assessing opportunities and challenges after the elections.” The experts on the panel were academics, think tank leaders and former US diplomats. (Click here for a full description of the event, the participants and the video.)

I say “interesting” because the panel asked the question that no one outside Morocco seems to be asking …Ok, what’s next? There was constitutional reform, a referendum, parliamentary elections, the King has appointed a prime minister from the wining party and now the parties are in discussions to form a governing coalition. So, what’s the next Act in this centuries-old chef d’oeuvre?

Well, the panel seemed to conclude that the political parties now have a hefty task of stepping up to the plate to assume the representative leadership role that the Moroccan people placed upon them. (Dr. Anouar Boukhars used the phrase that the political parties, particularly the Islamist Party of Justice and Development who won the most seats “will have to meet the challenge of incumbency”, which I thought was SO on point.)  So, what does this mean for the PJD and the governing coalition? (i.e. does the strong showing of Islamists in the elections means that Moroccans are tending towards a religious/conservative shift?) No. As the panel and several in the audience pointed out, Moroccans wanted a new face for their representatives who could address their socioeconomic needs and desire for a greater political voice…not to roll-back the social clock a few decades.  After all, even the PJD was clear during its campaign that while Islam is a “reference” for their ideology, their platform lays out how they intend to provide Justice and Development through economic and democratic reforms…not a reform of Friday prayers.

Another interesting—almost dramatic—point during the roundtable was when a member of the audience challenged a notion that was repeatedly emphasized by both the panel and other members of the audience…Morocco’s reform process in the larger context of the ‘Arab Spring’.  He asked, (and I’m paraphrasing) “Why do we keep referring to Morocco as part of the ‘Arab Spring’?! Morocco’s not Arab, Morocco’s not North African, Morocco is Morocco!! It’s just different!” (I could almost feel le sang of the Moroccans around me heat up when they were told they were not Arab.)

While I don’t agree with what he said, I understand his point because it’s clearly seen in the US and international media.  No one is talking about Morocco because 1) the demonstrations and reform process have been largely peaceful and 2) people are not quite sure where Morocco fits. Morocco is so unique, politically (unlike other countries in the region, there was no regime change during the constitutional reform process), economically (an FTA with the US and a to-die-for trade status with the EU!), socially (many of its reforms, particular for women and minorities are unlike any other Muslim/Arab country) and ethnically (I do agree with the “passionate” audience member who did emphasize the deep Amazigh, “Berber”, roots of so many Moroccans).  BUT, to say that Morocco is SO unlike its neighbors that it’s uniqueness makes it immune to the unrest and dramatic change happening in the region is just, well, naïve.  AND, to say that Morocco is such an outlier that its experience can’t be an example in the region is a waste of a perfectly good…example in the region.

One thing that that everyone seemed to conclude at the roundtable was that, while there may be some difficult scenes ahead, there’s little chance that the array of political actors in Morocco will be exiting stage left anytime soon.

A new report from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), Africa and the Arab Spring: A New Era of Democratic Expectations, the first volume of the Africa Center’s new Special Report series, uses the Arab Spring as a lens through which to view African politics. I think it is a bit too overdetermined to look at the Arab Spring and to look at ongoing crises in African politics and think that the one will fuel changes in the other. But the report is soundly done and certainly raises a number of important ideas and questions.

Deposed African National Congress Youth League leader Julius Malema believes he is finished in South African political life and plans to become a cattle farmer. Just remember, a phoenix has to fall before he can rise again. Don’t for one minute think that Malema’s turn in public life is complete.

Gbenga Sesan, the executive director of Paradigm Initiative Nigeria, has written a public letter to Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan. In it he asks some pretty pointed questions, including this one: “If the president can throw his wife a party in Australia and senators earn millions of dollars a year, why does the president keep asking us, the people, to make sacrifices?”

Recent revelations of obesity in South Africa raise the question: “Has Freedom Made Us Fat?” My guess would be that affluence more than freedom is the source of obesity in the richest country on the continent. Yes, tens of millions of South Africans do not share in the country’s wealth, but the country’s middle classes are doing quite well, and there has always been a link between weight and wealth on a continent where the former can actually serve as a status symbol indicating the latter.

According to Jeffrey Gettleman of The New York Times, “…the African Union force in Somalia has hardened into a war-fighting machine — and it seems to be winning the war.” Progress has clearly been excruciatingly slow but these advances coupled with more aggressive action from Kenyan troops reveals that the region’s leaders are not resigned to Somalia being a failed state forever.

I am late in getting my Year in Review post up for 2011, but for the time being, here is the Mail & Guardian’s slideshow of South Africa’s most memorable moments of the year.

Just a bit of background on Boko Haram (the name roughly means “Western education/thinking is sinful/forbidden”). They are an Islamist movement that targets government institutions in Nigeria, often using extreme violence.  Essentially, their goal is to establish a fully Islamic government in Nigeria, including the implementation of sharia law.  Nigeria is a particularly contentious stage for Boko Haram, given the existing tension between the 50% of the population who are Muslim in the North and the 40% who are Christian in the South. Boko Haram feeds off existing frustration of Nigeria’s Muslim population that their political voice is being drowned out by the influential Christian/secular voices, which dominate political life. (Add to that Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa, ~150 million and extremely oil-rich.) For more on Boko Haram, including an outline of its origins, ideological foundation, I recommend the Council on Foreign Relation’s “Backgrounder: Boko Haram” and the statement submitted for the hearing record by Dr. Peter Pham, director of the Atlantic Council’s Ansari Africa Center, who testified at the hearing.

So, why is the US Congress holding a hearing on a terrorist group whose focus is primarily limited to destabilizing Nigeria? Here’s why: al-Qaeda In The Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

AQIM is the growing off-shoot of the al-Qaeda we have become all too familiar with in the US since 9/11, which bases its operations in the Maghreb (North Africa and the Sahel region.) Al-Qaeda has made it clear that it wants to take advantage of the rampant instability of many African nations in the Maghreb/Sahel and its protégé, AQIM, has found the perfect and most susceptible source of manpower…disaffected, economically vulnerable and easily manipulated fighters, mercenaries and militants from a several existing “movements” in the region. Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Polisario Front, an Algerian-backed separatist movement challenging Morocco’s sovereignty in the Western Sahara, are two such groups. (Recently, AQIM militants kidnapped three European aid workers from within the Polisario refugee camps, reportedly with help from Polisario members. ) What do these groups have in common? Not so much ideology. No, these willing militants-for-hire are fueled by desperation, frustration and, in some cases, intense greed for spoils from illicit trafficking of goods, people and arms.

It’s this “emerging threat” from the targeting of these vulnerable groups by Boko Haram and AQIM that was the focus of the hearing. Throw in the mix that, post-Gaddafi, there are a lot of arms—and mercenaries trained to use them—floating around the region with a lot of time on their hands and serious axes to grind against Western interests. Experts who testified at today’s hearing cited evidence of Boko Haram’s evolving focus and attempts to broaden its influence in the region, highlighting the August 2011 bombing of a UN building in Abuja, Nigeria, the group’s first attack on a “transnational target,” according to Pham.

The main take-away from today’s hearing: The US must do all it can to help Nigeria cut Boko Haram off at the knees before it fully develops its terror network with AQIM and its ready mercenaries from the likes of al-Shabaab and the Polisario Front.
You can download the Subcommittee’s report “Boko Haram – Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland” and watch the video from the hearing at : http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-boko-haram-emerging-threat-us-homeland

Today, the Washington Post’s “Right Turn” blogger Jen Rubin (@JRubinBlogger) put the Moroccan election in the greater regional context of how it can be compared/contrasted to other reform efforts, particularly Egypt.  (Thankfully, she clarified up front that Morocco isn’t Egypt and vice-versa, but that they “face common challenges.”) What I found most interesting was when Jen wrote,

“The United States has a limited but critical role to play in these sorts of situations. While it is likely not effective for Washington to insert itself by demanding a specific timetable, the U.S. government can certainly apply diplomatic pressure and hold out the lure of improved relations, trade and investment if Egypt moves toward a more democratic system.”

I agree that the role the US could play is limited and it would appear that US policymakers are taking a “hands-off” approach to developments in the region, careful not appear that they are trying to influence outcomes. (I actually think that US policymakers are all over the place when it comes to US policy in the region and this lack of a cohesive, clear policy just gives the appearance that they actually know what’s going on and have decided to take the “hands-off” approach.) The US SHOULD use its influence—diplomatic, economic, etc.—to encourage democracy in the region.  I would just add that the US officials should do a better job at publicly and strongly praising examples in the region, like Morocco, who are making genuine reforms and “getting it right.”

Daphne McCurdy, a senior research associate at the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), who was one of the 4,000 US, Moroccan and international elections observers in Morocco last week, shared her perspective on Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel.  I was really anxious to hear what an American elections observer had to say, but I was disappointed in some of her characterizations, which were a bit pessimistic and a tad unfair.  Daphne writes,

“Like the rest of the Middle East and North Africa, Morocco was faced with popular protests earlier this year. However, in contrast to other rulers who responded to demonstrations with force and refused to make concessions until too late, King Mohammad VI quickly promised constitutional reforms, getting ahead of protesters and effectively undermining their influence. Democracy activists saw this as little more than the king’s tried and true strategy of implementing superficial changes to appease the public without changing the country’s fundamental power structure.”

I believe in holding political leaders accountable for sure, but cut the King some slack. If he had moved too slowly, then haters would have said he didn’t genuinely want reform. (I was in Rabat, Morocco in late January of this year and watched Ben Ali’s speech when he told Tunisians that he would make his exit by…2014. Tunisians were like, “Umm, how about you leave now?”) So, the fact that he moved “quickly” means he was just trying to “undermine” the protesters with “superficial changes”?

And I totally disagree that the changes are superficial.  Yes, the King still maintains significant powers and control, but for the first time, he must choose a Prime Minister from the party which wins the most seats in the election AND key appointments (ministers, ambassadors, etc.) are to be done in consultation with the Parliament—which has NEVER been done before in Morocco. I guess I just see the mint tea glass half full.

I do wholeheartedly agree with Daphne’s conclusion that “political parties [should] take more ownership of the political process.” I believe that is what the King is attempting to do with the recent reforms…to empower Morocco’s historically weak political parties to be real actors and representatives held accountable by the Moroccan electorate.

Also today, on Forbes.com, author Richard Miniter did a good job dispelling many misconceptions/false assumptions about the PJD (Islamists) who won the most seats in Friday’s election.  Miniter correctly notes that the PJD didn’t win the most votes because of some radical, religious agenda.  Rather, they focused on education, jobs and economic reform.  THIS is what the Moroccan people want and need and their support of the PJD demonstrates this.  Miniter writes,

“The PJD won them [voters] over by focusing on fighting corruption and creating jobs. If they fail at either one, they will lose the next election.”

If that’s not good ol’ democracy at work, then I don’t know what is.

Miniter also makes the point I made earlier,

“President Obama should take a moment to congratulate Morocco on a successful election and urge the Islamists to stick to their platform of economic hope and change.”

Exactly.

By the way, The Christian Science Monitor published a really bizarre, confusing and lop-sided opinion piece by Ellen Lust on the Moroccan elections.  Don’t even get me started.

The one article that I have yet to see—but would love to—is a look at how Morocco held free and fair democratic elections in the Western Sahara.  (In the refugee camps controlled by the Polisario Front, there’s only one allowed political party—the Polisario Front—which makes vote tallying REALLY easy.) Any takers?

Stay tuned later in the week for “W.W.(P).J.D?: Facts, Fears & Fortune-telling about Islamists in Morocco, Egypt & Tunisia.”

1) What was the turnout?
The official figure is 45%, which is definitely decent. (). The big fear was that low voter turnout would mean that Moroccans were not truly behind the recent Constitutional reforms. However, this turnout is higher than the last parliamentary elections in 2007 (37%), so, while it would be great if it was higher, this turnout does signal that Moroccans ARE increasingly becoming more a part of the democratic process.

2) Was it peaceful, free/fair/transparent?
The official elections observers have yet to come out with their report (I’m waiting to see what the National Democratic Institute has to say.) But, from all I have heard from official and unofficial sources, in the US and Morocco, everything went fairly smoothly, with some small isolated incidents between clashing party supporters/campaigners. One party, PJD, has alleged fraud and irregularities

3) Did the Islamists win?
Yes, this is the biggie and, it appears that, yes, they won. Who are “they”? Morocco’s Justice & Development Party (PJD) (For more about them, check out my last post.) And they apparently won big. This morning, the Minister of Interior announced that they had won 80 seats, nearly double the number of seats they held previously, making them the party with the most seats in the new Parliament.

So, what does this mean? Well, under the new Constitution, the King must appoint a Prime Minister from the party that won the most seats, which means that Morocco will most likely have an Islamist PM. (The Sec. Gen of the PJD has already said that he is willing to compromise and work with others in Parliament to form a strong coalition.

Of course, what’s more interesting is what this will mean for Morocco and how does it changes (or not) the vision of the King and Moroccans on how they move forward, progress and increase democracy. As someone with a professional and personal interest in Morocco, my first worry last night was that an Islamist –led Parliament would mean that there would be an attempt to roll-back many of the reforms that have set Morocco apart over the last decade, most notably in the areas of women’s rights, religious tolerance and interfaith dialogue and greater international cooperation and involvement. But then, I remembered that these unprecedented strides didn’t come about because of a particular political agenda. Rather, they were the result of a national consensus, led by the King, to move forward. These changes did NOT come without debate, great controversy and compromise. I believe these changes transcend political affiliations and are a part of a modern, Morocco that all parties, groups, ideologies, etc in the country wanted to see and are not considering “turning back.”

It is also interesting to note that the PJD made its announcement claiming victory to international reporters before even semi-official results were in. (According to many on Twitter, this was hasty and a bit odd.) But I think it is a real reminder that the PJD realizes that the world is watching. Is there such thing as a moderate Islamist party and would such a leadership conflict with principles of increased democracy? This is one of the major questions of the Arab Spring.

It’s also clear that the world is watching because what’s happening in Morocco is such a contrast from the events in Tahrir Square. As Egypt prepares to go to the polls on Monday, under MUCH different circumstances, this question of Islamists as democrats? will be raised again.

Of course, Morocco isn’t Egypt for many reasons and, even Moroccans, would shun such a comparison or suggestion that Egypt could take a page from Morocco’s book. But, what is happening in Morocco is proof that, if done correctly, with input and buy-in from all parts of society, and an open space for debate and dialogue, democracy is not only “possible” in the Arab world, but it’s what the voting citizens in the region are calling for.

Even though yesterday’s vote represents a major accomplishment in Morocco, it’s only the beginning. The real question will be how the new Parliament will form its new government and assume its new, more powerful role AND if the Moroccan people will truly hold their elected officials accountable.

Just before the elections, I was listening to a Moroccan radio call-in show about the elections and, when asked if she would boycott, a caller said, “I’m seriously considering it. Not because I don’t love my country…I do. But we have a system that works, even with its flaws. I’d rather have a monarchy that works than a democracy that might not.”

Amen, sister.

AP Photo/Abdeljalil Bounhar

On Friday, Morocco will hold highly anticipated parliamentary elections. The contest is widely seen as a test of royal reforms. Mohammed VI has clearly placed his bet on measured reforms to reduce social tensions and lift the country’s political malaise. By organizing early elections, the palace hopes that an influx of new faces into government and parliament will convince the majority of Moroccans that credible steps towards reforms are underway and real political and economic change is on the horizon. After all, the country has not seen this kind of momentum for change for decades. To prove the cynics wrong will of course require more than a minor change in the cast of characters. The plurality of Moroccan voters is still skeptical that the election will bring change they can believe in. Political parties have so far failed to inspire hope for real political change and the Herculean task of gaining voters’ confidence and trust is amply visible in the current campaigning for the November 25 legislative elections. Many Moroccans remain doubtful that Morocco’s established political parties can take advantage of the opportunities that the new Moroccan political pact offers. Morocco is at a crossroads.

Despite its failure to significantly limit Mohammed VI’s powers, the 2011 constitution does provide a margin of political maneuverability that did not previously exist. Most importantly, it enhances legislative capacity and access to the policy realm, and puts limits on the sovereign’s acts and power. Under these reforms, parliament—which had long been relatively weak—now has the potential to play a more assertive role. The key question, then, is whether Morocco’s political parties and leaders are up to the task and ready to push the democratic envelope to exercise their new constitutionally authorized powers. Constitutions matter, but what matters more is what people do with them.

Thus far, most political parties have failed to generate popular enthusiasm and interest. Even the most credible opposition political party, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), pains to convince voters of its capacity to effectively shape the development and governance trajectories of the Kingdom. Senior figures in the Islamist party have expressed to me their concern about low voter turnout. Low participation would seriously impact the party’s chances of winning the parliamentary contest. The electoral law with its complex proportional representation system favors rural areas, where the Islamists have almost no support and where turnout is always much higher than in urban areas. The PJD cannot compensate for this weakness unless it over-performs on Election Day in its urban strongholds. That probably cannot happen without higher turnout.

The regime must also be concerned about low turnouts and the impact that it might have on popular perceptions of the meaningfulness of elections. It is important to note, however, that low popular participation will not signify support for the dwindling February 20 protest movement. The latter has called for boycott of the electoral contest, but the main reason many Moroccan voters might stay home is due to the ineptitude of the political class, but this is no reason for complacency. Confidence in electoral processes is critical to the success of the political reforms recently inaugurated in Morocco. Despite broad support for the King’s reform effort, most Moroccans expect that the reform process will lead quickly to accountable and responsible governance, and low level of economic inequality. Unless immediate remedial measures are taken to prevent corruption in the public sphere and redress the glaring social and economic disparities, Morocco is poised to experience tough times ahead. Unemployment figures are already dangerously high, standing at 31.4 percent for those under 35. Young people in this age bracket also constitute 57% of the thirteen million Moroccans that are registered to vote.

As it stands, it would be unrealistic to expect an unusually high turnout in Friday’s election. Morocco is just emerging from the twin legacy of monarchical dominance of politics and subservience to a self-serving political class. The electoral schedule has complicated the parties’ task as it left little time for them to hold their conventions, hone their electoral programs, and showcase that in this historic time of regional change, they are determined to renew themselves. Despite these challenges, it is extremely crucial that the elections are perceived as fair and free from the manipulative practices of vote buying and other undue influences. The presence of more than 4,000 national and international observers for the Nov. 25 vote should help.

The integrity of the contest will boost the credibility of elections and legitimacy of the newly reformed institutions of the state. “Only free and fair elections,” Saadeddine Othmani, of the PJD, told me, “can produce the new political elite the country so badly needs.” It is also these elites that would be tasked with drafting the many “organic laws” that the new constitution stipulates. In other words, transitional periods, as Morocco is currently experiencing, are naturally characterized by limited levels of democracy and low levels of popular participation, but as civic consciousness rises and free and fair political competition becomes fully routinized, potent political parties and civil society actors are bound to emerge, strengthening the institutions of government and driving up levels of democratic participation.

The Moroccan regime has navigated quite successfully the treacherous times of the Arab awakening, though its institutional reforms did not gain the acquiescence of the February 20th protest movement, which remains fractured, disorganized, and lacking popular support. Nevertheless, the monarchy would be advised to take seriously the demands of the protesters, especially those dealing with corruption, rule of law, and public accountability. That starts with the November 25th elections where over 30 parties are competing for 395 seats, ninety of which are reserved for women and younger deputies. The palace must resist the urge to intervene in the affairs of the upcoming elected government, even one led or bolstered by the PJD.

King Mohammed has declared his commitment to substantive reform and democratization. The constitution’s provisions allow the monarch to use his significant prerogatives to advance or block real changes. What he does, and chooses not to do, is critical. Whether or not Morocco’s political parties and leaders step up and exercise their new-found powers is just as critical, as is the public’s willingness to engage. The stakes are considerable. If constitutional reforms consecrate the separation of powers and independence of the legislature and judiciary, and if Moroccans willingness to seize the moment matches the desire they have expressed for change, the regional implications would indeed be significant. Morocco has the potential to become a model of top-down reforms and a role model for the Arab Spring.

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Anouar Boukhars is a former visiting fellow with the Brookings Doha Center. Boukhars specialized in Arab democratization, U.S. policy in the Middle East, and international security. He currently holds the position of assistant professor of international relations at McDaniel College.

First, let’s be clear on who Morocco’s PJD really is.  Yes, they are Islamists. (Though some refer to the PJD, tongue in cheek, as “les Islamistes Light.”) No, unlike many other Islamists parties in the region, they are not extreme, but quite moderate. (Actually, not even all women in the PJD wear hijabs.) Yes, the PJD is an “allowed” political party in Morocco. (In fact, it has been active and worked within Morocco’s democracy since the late 1990’s and currently holds 14% of seats in the lower house of Parliament, the second largest party.) Is the PJD’s political agenda radical and religiously based? No. Experts often note that “indeed, the PJD intentionally downplays any religious agenda.” One of the reasons that the PJD has been so popular among Moroccans is that, while they do represent conservative, religious based principles, their platform focuses on democracy and human rights reform, education and social development and business/trade.

The PJD is not without controversy though. They did strongly oppose a proposed reform of Morocco’s new Constitution which guarantees “freedom of belief”, which they claim would have led to the promotion of non-Islamic values such as breaking the Ramadan fast in public, sexual openness and homosexuality and secular agendas behind laws in a Muslim country. One PJD candidate recently claimed during a campaign speech that God would “doubly” bless those who voted for the PJD, while those who voted for any other party would receive a mere single serving.

So, are the Islamists going to win a majority of seats or not? While there are varying opinions and lots of buzz, many are saying that the answer is no. Salaheddine Mezouar, Morocco’s current Finance and Economy Minister and member of the newly formed Coalition for Democracy (a secular group and the main challenger to the PJD) says that,

“Morocco is different. It is not Tunisia, nor is it Libya or Egypt. [...] Here in Morocco we have a plurality. Morocco has never known one-party rule. Moroccan political parties have practiced democracy and are well-educated, which makes an outcome of that kind (an Islamist victory) improbable.”

I tend to agree with Minister Mezouar. Though, I think that most believe that, even if the PJD wins, the overall commitment to moderation, democratic reform and advancement in Morocco (shared by Islamists and secularists) will prevail. They key is going to be, as we all know, will les Marocains turn out the vote?

There will be at least three big questions on next Saturday morning 1) What was the turnout? (Some of my contacts on the ground in Morocco report a lower level than expected of enthusiasm, which doesn’t bode well for the final voter turnout.) 2) Was it peaceful, free and fair? (Morocco has a history of free and fair elections and more than 4,000 US, Moroccan and international observers are going to be on the ground, so this looks to be a yes.) 3) Did the Islamist party win a large number of seats in the new Parliament? (I’ve heard rumors all over the place on this one.)

An additional question that I have (and maybe I’m the only one) is “What will be the US response to the elections, particularly if the Islamists win?” In any case, the US should support Morocco’s efforts more publically because it’s clearly a stand-out in a region that is in turmoil.

There’s a lot of good info here on the upcoming elections. More to come, inshallah.

Of the 53 countries assessed (South Sudan had not yet gained autonomy and Western Sahara has not yet been recognized as an independent nation state) here are the top ten:

1. Mauritius  2. Cape Verde  3. Botswana  4. Seychelles  5. South Africa  6. Namibia  7. Ghana  8. Lesotho  9. Tunisia  10. Egypt

Clearly Southern Africa does well, with four representatives in the top ten, as do islands, with three.

The bottom ten (from the very worst to the merely awful):

53. Somalia  52. Chad  51. Zimbabwe  50. Democratic Republic of Congo  49. Central African Republic  48. Sudan  47. Eritrea  46. Côte d’Ivoire  45. Equitorial Guinea  44. Guinea-Bissau

Obviously the instability in the Horn and in Central Africa explains a great deal of the composition of the bottom feeders. And parts of West Africa continue to be wracked with instability though that region seems to have some of the continent’s greatest variance with a number of success stories (Ghana, Benin at 11, Senegal at 15) to go with those on the other end of the spectrum.