Voters in Tyumen, Russia, in December 2011 (photo: Mikhail Kalyanov)

While U.S. voters grumble about Congressional deadlock and lack of presidential alternatives, we often forget how good we have it. A slow thaw from autocracy in former Soviet states since 1991 has uncovered various national specimens, from reformer to recidivist. Observers have watched with increasing pessimism as jailed and beaten opposition candidates, single-party access to TV and radio, and the (recently innovative) prime minister / president switcheroo have characterized campaigns from Kiev to Kazakhstan. In comparison, if the Super PAC debate is the worst of American politics, we might say, we’ll take it.

Many will remember 2011 as the year Arab civil society trumped their dictators and moved to the ballot box, so making history. Most former (non-Baltic) Soviet republics however have both a steep Communist legacy to evade and unease with pluralism. Below are snapshots of progress for those nations with elections in 2012.

Russian Federation: Presidential election in March. In the face of disputed parliamentary elections last December and the biggest public outcry since the 1990s, current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin appears destined to once again be president, even with the expected second round. Protesters gathering publicly are less muzzled these days and some radio outlets offer surprisingly open criticism of this “managed democracy,” but Putin controls the TV stations (where most Russian get their news), the country’s corporate-industrial players, and the security services. The president also nominates regional representatives and governors, who just happen to be members of his United Russia party. The billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov, co-owner of the New Jersey Nets, entered the contest last fall, so far speaking tamely about electoral reform, yet some suspect him a vote splitter who will only assure Putin’s victory.

Ukraine: Parliamentary election in October. In winter 2004, crowds braved December snows in Kiev and spent several dramatic weeks protesting an unfair presidential vote, rallying around the reform candidate, Viktor Yuschenko, eventually elected in a re-run. Pulled between a Russia-oriented eastern part of the country and an EU-leaning western half, Yuschenko made little progress, and in 2010 the less-reformist Viktor Yanukovych took the head office. And take over he has. In 2011, the state prosecutor’s office both jailed former prime minister (and opponent) Yulia Tymoshenko, and then last month threw out a court case accusing former president Leonid Kuchma, a one-time Yanukovych backer, of murdering an investigative journalist.

Belarus: Parliamentary election in September. Head of state since 1995, President Aleksandr Lukashenka overturned his own term limit to stay in office. His election again in 2010 cued mass protest of the vote and international condemnation of police violence during the turnout, including over 600 arrests and first-hand accounts of beatings of candidates and joumalists. There are new jailings almost monthly of opposition activists and anyone who deigns to challenge or criticize Lukashenka. This “last dictatorship in Europe” shows little sign of thawing. Russia changed the name of its security service, while Belarus still refers to its own as the KGB. Parliamentary elections in 2008 yielded not a single seat out of 110 for the opposition, all going to Lukashenka loyalists.

Moldova: Constitutional referendum in April. While we can predict who will rule in Russia and Belarus in the near future, in Moldova we cannot. A patchwork of ethnicities, Moldova has for 20 years been a low-intensity face-off between its dominant Romanian speakers and Russian speakers supported by Moscow. Even borders are debated: some advocate national union with Romania, while residents of the eastern Transdniester region desire complete autonomy. The difficulty of forming party coalitions, and re-runs of parliamentary elections upon failure to elect a head of state, has meant a topsy-turvy journey for its governments. After nine years of Communist president Vladimir Voronin, violent riots in the spring of 2009 indicated less an ethno-linguistic division than simple rejection of corruption and lack of economic opportunity. With no party majority in parliament to determine head of state, Moldova has had three acting presidents since July 2009.

Georgia: Parliamentary election in October. Since Mikheil Saakashvili stormed parliament in 2003 and ceremoniously drank from then-president Shevardnadze’s tea glass, young Misha’s reform movement has fallen noticeably short. Several achievements are notable, including reduced police corruption, a liberalized economic sector, and broad Western support. While authoritarian tendencies have eroded Saakashvili’s once manic fanbase, unsatisfied citizens have been unable to rally a unified opposition, and Misha’s party in 2008 won 119 out of 150 parliamentary seats. Multi-party politics is alive and well – the question is how much the current administration allows them to participate. A new protagonist is Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire with Russian industrial interests, who recently declared himself a 2013 presidential candidate. Whether Saakashvili steps down after two terms will be a strong comment on the country’s pluralistic hopes.

Armenia: Parliamentary election in May. With its third president, Serzh Sargsyan, now in office, Armenia may appear relatively democratic, yet dispute of his election victory in 2008 resulted in violence with security forces, 10 deaths, and jailing of opposition leaders. At the time Sargsyan had beaten by a wide margin Levon Ter-Petrosian, the first president of post-Soviet Armenia, who continues an active opposition. Astonishment at the strong-arm tactics continues to haunt Sargsyan, who is looking to shore up support for his re-election in 2013. There are also rumors that Robert Kocharian, who served as president 1998-2008, may re-enter party politics, which would threaten Sargsyan’s parliamentary majority. To watch between now and May: opposition leaders want to amend the election code, so that parliamentary seats are decided by proportional representation, which would curtail individually elected candidates who tend to be administration cronies.

Kazakhstan: Parliamentary election in January. Re-elected four times, President Nursultan Nazarbaev can now legally stand for election as often as he likes. Many, however, consider this term his last, as the rumor mill spins about his anointed successor, a drama which could be its own reality show since everyone expects power to stay within the family. After a 2007 lower-house election in which all seats were given to Nazarbaev’s party, the elections on January 15 were a faint harbinger of pluralism, as opposition parties crept in with 15 out of 98 seats. Regardless, the president’s party and family control the major industrial and financial interests, and with the help of western PR firms and steady Caspian oil revenue, stage manage media outlets and governance. Investigative journalists and opposition candidates have suffered the same fate as those in Russia and Belarus.

Turkmenistan: Presidential election in February. When the self-proclaimed “Father of All Turkmen,” Saparmurat Niyazov, died in 2006 there was an international reaction similar to Kim Jong Il’s passing: that is, will the lunacy continue or will there finally be common-sense government. One of the biggest megalomaniacs in history, Niyazov allowed zero opposition, built golden statues to himself, and renamed the Turkmen month of April after his mother. His successor, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, is relatively cult-free yet governs just as strictly, while the would-be opposition is either jailed or abroad. Seven other candidates, presumably alive and in the country, reportedly ran against the incumbent on February 12. The OSCE, which routinely sends observers to post-Soviet elections, again refused to send anyone. Parliament is little more than a rubber stamp for the president.

Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, while not in a cycle this year, do hold parliamentary and presidential elections, though their autocratic leaders brook scant opposition. Political “stability,” if it could be termed as such, can be ascribed to de facto acceptance of the status quo by Western powers due to Caspian oil interests in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and with the anti-terror support role Uzbekistan plays for the US. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan exiled two presidents over corruption in the last six years, and in 2010 made history by reducing presidential powers.

Moscow, unsurprisingly, has sought to limit political reform in its own backyard. When Russia invaded and occupied it briefly in 2008, regardless of how the conflict began, Georgia was the most reformist and US-friendly of the republics. Since the Orange Revolution in 2004/05, Ukraine’s reformists have been methodically dismantled. And when Kyrgyzstan began its experiment with a parliamentary (rather than presidential) democracy last November, Russian officials were outspokenly critical. Yet with its autocrat neighbors, Russia has few political complaints.

Government of the Russian Federation

Social policy has many objectives and many dimensions. It entails providing support for the poor and those who are unable to earn a living for valid reasons. It means implementing social mobility and providing a level playing field for every person on the basis of his or her capabilities and talents. The effectiveness of social policy is measured by whether popular opinion believes the society we live in is a just one or not.

We have a much higher level of social guarantees than countries with a comparable level of labour productivity and per capita incomes. We have made great strides in improving the situation in the demographic sphere, in pensions and in reducing poverty. We have achieved tangible results in the fields of education, healthcare and culture.

But Russian citizens are by no means satisfied with the current situation, and their dissatisfaction is perfectly justified. Today we have to discuss the as yet unresolved issues, as well as the objectives which must form the agenda for the next stage of Russia’s development.

Our system of social mobility functions badly and inconsistently. The glaring income disparity is unacceptably high. Every eighth Russian citizen still lives below the official poverty line. The decline in the national workforce and an increasingly ageing population means the efficiency of social spending has to be increased. People of different vocations, including businesspeople, workers, specialists and state employees, must be given the opportunities to realise their potential, as well as opportunities for professional and social growth.

I am sure that we must develop new economic sectors and continue to develop the processing sector, agriculture and modern transport and intellectual services. This will allow us to perceive Russia as a more equitable country where everyone earns his or her income with their own labour and talent. And the government will provide targeted assistance to those who cannot earn an income or are too young to work.

Assisting families with children is becoming a priority. It is absolutely unacceptable for the birth of a child to bring a family to the edge of poverty. A national goal for the next three or four years is to make this totally impossible. I propose introducing special benefits for the birth of a third and subsequent children in the regions where the population continues to decline. Families where per capita income is not higher than the average in their region will have the right to apply for such child allowances.

Affordable housing is an important prerequisite for improving the territorial mobility of our citizens and enhancing economic competition between urban areas and regions. We will proceed to develop a non-profit rental market for prospective low-income tenants. Today, we assist war veterans, servicemen and new families to buy property. I would like to mention that we will continue this practice – for new families with children, in particular. This is not enough, however. The middle class must have an opportunity to buy property through mortgages Mortgage payments must decrease along with lowering inflation rates. And last but not least, we will increase support of young families and public sector workers in covering mortgage interest. Taken together, [this will] resolve the issue in full by 2030.

Since the 1990s, organisational and economic reforms have been implemented, managerial systems changed, and external assessment mechanisms introduced. This has so far failed to lead to any noticeable changes in the quality of education or healthcare.

I believe that healthcare and education reforms are only possible when they guarantee decent pay for public sector professionals. A doctor, teacher or professor should be able to earn enough on their basic jobs not to have to seek outside earnings. If we fail to fulfil this condition our efforts to change the organisation of the economic mechanisms and renew the material base of these sectors will come to nothing.

Investment in education will be our key budget priority. Not only does education mean that we are training a workforce for the economy, it is also a crucial factor in the social development of society, one that shapes our values and unites us. Our system of education should be able to meet the challenges of the times, but this does not mean that we will give up our most important achievement – the accessibility of education. We need to ensure social equality in education. Schools working in difficult social conditions – as opposed to prestigious “gymnasiums” and “lyceums” which for the most part only work with socially stable children – must be given special support, including methodology, staff and financial assistance.

A fundamentally new legal framework for developing the Russian healthcare system was created in 2011, a well-defined mechanism for the fair distribution of funding to healthcare institutions. Patients will be given an opportunity to choose a doctor and a medical facility. We must work on raising the degree of each individual’s responsibility for his or her own health. Otherwise no amount of money will ever be enough.

The key problem of Russian social policy is not about the amount of resources we use to address social challenges, but the effectiveness and the focus of the measures being implemented. We need to change the situation in the near future, eliminate all sources of loss in the social sector when resources are being wasted or sent to those who can manage without them instead of to people who need them desperately; when we support institutions out of habit without paying any attention to how their work benefits people; when we have the interests of those who work at social institutions above the interests of those for whom they work.

We must reverse this situation in this decade. Each rouble spend on the social sphere must ‘produce justice.’ A just society and economy are the prerequisites of our sustainable development during these years.

Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister of Russia, is a candidate for the 2012 presidential election. This article contains excerpts from the official translation of an article that originally appeared in Komsomolskaya Pravda. The complete translation of the article is available here.

Among Ashton’s critique points was the government decision not to register Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the opposition party Yabloko, for the March election, the intention of Putin and Medvedev to swap jobs (again!), and more generally a support of the Russian people’s desire to “rein in corruption and impunity, and to give more breathing space to democratic process.” Of course, Ashton also urged Russia to not veto the UN Security Council resolution on Syria.

Russian officials were quick to shoot back, accusing the EU of meddling in internal affairs, calling Ashton’s criticism “bewildering” and saying that it “overstepped the bounds of political correctness.” In the official Russian view, the EU and US are using the democracy movement as a pretext to leverage influence in Russia through utilization of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and pro-democracy organizations.

Needless to say, Russia and China disregarded all pressure and vetoed the Security Council’s Syria resolution. Russia and China have since been catching some well-deserved flak from the international community, not that that will have an immediate effect on the ground in Syria. But, in this context, it has had an effect on global opinion of Putin’s Russia and how to deal with it.

Arguably the EU is now finding a new more confrontational diplomatic footing, with more emphasis on supporting democratic developments in Russia. Some might say that it’s about time. But it seems fair to say that Putin’s current hardships were unforeseen by most, including the EU. Where Europe previously was preparing to deal long-term with a Russia like the one Putin took over in 2000, the game has now changed and the EU’s stance has changed with it.

For example, the December 2011 EU-Russia Summit was dominated by preexisting issues, such as visa-free travel and Russia joining the World Trade Organization. Although human rights and democracy issues were discussed at the summit, Ashton’s statements on these matters were deemed “weak” by Mikhail Kasyanov, leader of the opposition party Parnas. Human rights are now center stage, and Ashton statements have grown stronger.

In previous years, EU members states have by-and-large followed a policy of pursuing economic goals, while limiting their criticism of human rights abuses. The European Council on Foreign Relation’s European Foreign Policy Scorecard points to EU diplomacy being a result of an overriding wish for cooperation with Russia on a swath of issues, ranging from trade to global security and cooperation in the Russian/European neighborhood. Putin’s actions at home and abroad have damaged the assumptions that the policy of cooperation policy built on, i.e. that economic modernization and engagement would gradually bring about a more democratic Russia.

Naturally, there are limitations to the EU’s ability to influence Russia. Disagreements over ending frozen conflicts in Georgia and Kosovo are examples. And of course, cold snap and all, Russian natural gas has previously provided Putin with a stick with which to beat the Europeans. But limitations will always exist. The EU now has an opportunity to test these limitations.

Ashton’s critique of Putin’s Russia is a good thing. These days, how else is one to react but with support of those who come out in favor of democracy movements? And in this respect, Putin is certainly not looking stellar. Putin and Assad are all too easy to lump together as autocratic brothers-in-arms, each trying to retain their grip on power with the methods that happen to be at their disposal.

While not forgetting that Russian cooperation is necessary to solve the issues of the day, e.g. Russia’s role in negotiations with Iran, we must hope that the EU will maintain its pressure on Putin’s Russia. In an age where democratic reform is a rallying cry, Putin quiet possibly has made a big mistake throwing in his lot with the likes of Assad. This offers an opportunity that should not be left untried.

In the final installment of her fascinating radio series looking at Russia 20 years on from the Soviet collapse, veteran journalist, critical Russophile (and long-suffering friend of the FPA Russia blog!) Brigid McCarthy looks at a thorny issue: that Russia has still not yet figured out its identity.

Brigid talks to Russian TV host Felix Razumovsky, who leads a popular show called “Who Are We?”. Razumovsky believes that the Russian, and Soviet, Idea has been underpinned by a kind of Orthodox mysticism.

“Psychologically, Razumovsky said, Russians remain profoundly shaped by their Orthodox Christian heritage, and the idea of “Holy Russia.” That heritage can be summed up in a single Biblical verse:

“‘Don’t gather your treasures on earth, but store up your treasures in heaven.’

This very simple phrase is basically what characterizes the Russian soul or spirit,” Razumovksy said.

“Everyone in Russia is still pretty much this way, even if they try to hide it.”

Razumovsky thinks one reason Communist ideology got a foothold in Russia was it offered a modern, secular version of Holy Russia. Soviets were ready to lay down their lives for the sake of a future, workers’ paradise.

“So that’s why Russia took up the call. Excuse me, but no one else in Europe screwed around like this,” he said, with a laugh.”

As a result, Russian people remain attracted to large meta-narratives.

“If you’re a person who needs that bigger force or idea in your life, then it’s easier for you to switch from the Bolshevik/Communist future paradise to the Orthodox Christian future paradise.”

Russians are thus trapped by this idea, unable to lead ‘normal’ democratic lives.

Razumovsky’s idea of the Russian people as self-flagellating religious utopians is a rather Slavophilic concept that seems pretty closely related to Russian messianism.

Its less charitable mirror image is the idea of Russians as hostage to a denial of their history, specifically the crimes of Communism. This seems to be the jist of the latest book by conservative journalist David Satter, the long-time FT correspondent in Moscow,

I’m still in the process of reading Satter’s provocative and compellingly written book, so I’ll reserve hasty judgement, but, according to Owen Matthews, who reviewed the book for the Daily Beast,

“what bothers Satter most is that Putin has returned to the megalomaniacal Soviet assumption that the people exist to serve the state rather than the other way around. “Maintaining the governance of a vast territory … calls for vast sacrifices and privations on the part of our people,” Putin said in 2008. “That has been Russia’s thousand-year history.”

Satter’s message is that Russia cannot hope to reverse its current decline without first coming to terms with the crimes of the Soviet past”.

At the core of both of these stories is a kind of romantic megalomania that supposedly underpins the Russian psyche. For many conservatives in the West, from Richard Pipes to Anne Applebaum to David Satter, it’s a source of fear and frustration. Whereas for some Russians themselves, many of whom also subscribe to this idea, it’s a source of pride – feeling special, tragic, Bigger than other countries. Russia’s failures can thus be explained as resulting from unrealistically, impossibly high aspirations. Russia as Icarus.

I won’t lie: addicted to meta-narratives, I’ve been guilty of flirting with such exceptionalism, but it’s not helpful.

For a start, all countries’ histories and political traditions are cumulative, resulting from layering one thing over another, in ostensibly contradictory ways. If Christmas Day in many European countries used to be a pagan holiday in pre-christian times, and if sauna entrepreneur Peter Kizenko used to be Russia’s top Goldman trader, what’s so strange about Soviet Communism having Russian Orthodox roots?

And, as for historical denialism, Russians are often accused, as Satter seems to have done, of ignoring/whitewashing/denying the crimes of Communism. This is seen as a kind of Freudian foundation for some kind of current psychic pathology. If only we faced up once and for all to the Gulag, then we could finally become a “normal” country! But the truth, unfortunately, seems much more prosaic than that.

Most countries were built on serious slaughter, sometimes outright genocide, and ordinary Russians have the same kind of relationship to Stalinism as ordinary Americans have to slavery or the British have to imperialism – they know about it, they know it was bad, but they want to get on with their lives without being made by some random foreigners to feel constantly guilty or apologetic. It’s that simple.

And, funnily enough, the same crowd of right wing Western writers and analysts who condemn Russians for Soviet amnesia would generally be the last people to call for a similar recognition of the original sins of their own countries.

Catch Brigid’s other thought provoking, wry and engaging episodes on the PRI site.

Source: Ania Viver

On January 18, Russia’s Ombudsman for children, Pavel Astakhov, and Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, stated that they would seek an official moratorium on adoption of Russian children by American families. Cooperation on adoption between the two countries has seen its ups and downs following the pattern of U.S. -Russia relations, but the public discourse on international adoption has also served as a tool of Russian domestic policy to strengthen control over Russians and to spread anti-American attitudes. As a result, the discourse is rarely focused on creating constructive policies that can address problems persisting in the international adoption process.

The announcement is very likely to revive public discourse on the abuse of adopted Russian children in the United States. The timing is not coincidental as a new wave of blameful declamations is preceding the upcoming presidential election in Russia. Once again Russian authorities seek to use old tools and practices in strengthening national unity by pitting ‘us’ – Russians against ‘them’- foreigners via offensive adoption rhetoric.

The situation was different in July 2011, when Secretary Hilton and Russian FM Lavrov signed a bilateral agreement on adoptions that was prepared and agreed upon in a relatively short period of time. Supporters marked the event as another success of the U.S. -Russia ‘reset’ and also praised the willingness and ability of both countries to successfully resolve this long-standing issue. The agreement, that was designed to provide protection to the rights and interests of both adoptive parents and  children, is awaiting ratification. Yet, the downturn in the countries’ relations has brought the matter under review.

Proponents of the moratorium cite the U.S. failure to improve the welfare of adopted Russian children as the main reason for a possible adoption ban. Although the ban would not threaten the bilateral agreement directly, it could suspend  adoptions, while the prospects for ratification remain vague.

Banning adoption of Russian children by U.S. families is intended to prevent high profile parental neglect from repeating itself, but it would also destroy prospects for many orphans to find a family. It primarily concerns children who have not been adopted by Russian citizens due to specific medical and psychological issues. Often foreign adoptive parents adopt children with psychological and medical issues; children, that have not been adopted by Russian citizens, unless they possess educational and financial resources to do so. With even a temporary adoption ban, the chances to find a family would decrease for many of these children.

Meanwhile, the public discourse of foreign adoption does not move beyond pointing blame, neither does it explore the innermost reasons for failed adoption practices. Consequently, it serves to shape negative perceptions, not constructive and result-oriented policies.

The instances of adoptions with less than desirable outcomes are directly related to the mismanagement of the adoption process, including poor evaluation of parental adoptive abilities, for instance, high expectations, misunderstanding of adoption challenges; and also incomplete disclosure of medical and social information about the child, as well as the lack of quality communication with the child in the pre-adoption period.

These are just a few but very important issues that are rarely mentioned in adoption discourse, as it remains focused on emphasizing negative perceptions, not finding solutions to the problem. Meanwhile, media-promoted public discourse on international adoption serves as a very effective pre-election tool that conveniently diverts attention from the existing everyday problems.  It serves to create an ‘outside enemy,’ while seeking to bolster unity among Russian people and to position Vladimir Putin as a strong leader of the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ community.

“Political opposition forces are using new technologies to carry out public events” lamented an exasperated Russian police chief yesterday.

What are these insidious technologies? Twitter? Talking spy rocks (wait, those are British!)? Putin’s beloved nano-particles?

Wait, he was getting to that. The protesters are “using toys with placards at mini-protests”, he concluded.
That’s right: toys.

Protesters in Siberia have circumvented the ban on demonstrations by assembling a series of dolls, teddy bears and action figures in the snow, complete with miniature anti-government placards.

“They tried to tell us our event was illegal – they even said that to put toys in the snow, we had to rent it from the city authorities,” one protester told the Guardian.

Sure, the authorities’ overreaction to such a diminutive problem appears at first sight little exaggerated. However, it’s worth remembering that the Kremlin has always been most vulnerable against miniature threats.

Throughout the Cold War, Soviet air defense, guided by the mantra “if in doubt, shoot it down”, managed to successfully repel hundreds of flying Western intruders, no matter how big or sophisticated from U2 spy planes to entire civilian airliners. Yet all of the Air Force’s myriad defences proved utterly prostrate in the face of a small Cessna that landed right in Red Square in 1989.

But the fear of the Miniature Threat goes even further back. Which post-War Soviet schoolboy could have avoided learning the song “Little Button” about how an ordinary Russian boy who finds a tiny, lost button lying in the street, notices its unfamiliar, foreign design, and uses it to track down an enemy spy.

In its playful ingenuity, the Toy Protest is in close competition with the Belarussian Applause and Silent Protests, in which protesters turned applause and then silence against the Lukashenko government.

But the toys also carry an alternative, unwitting allegory – that the anti-government protests themselves remain a tiny affair in the national scheme of things, a plaything of the Westernised Moscow and St Petersburg based middle classes.

Source: Google Images

The December protests in Russia against parliamentary election results have marked a momentous change to the current Russian political situation. The protests have revealed the looming necessity for authorities to respond in a timely manner, and to acknowledge the new scenario. Widespread public discontent with existing policies is shaping a new, uncomfortable reality for the Russian political leadership – a reality that it has reluctantly been forced into deal with.

So far, the first steps have been small but important. First, not only were the December rallies sanctioned, they also received unusual exposure by state media. Soon after, President Medvedev announced sweeping political reforms including direct election of local governors, as opposed to an appointment by the Kremlin, as well as proposing a simplified registration for political parties and independent presidential candidates. These are significant changes that no one was seriously talking about just few months ago, as they seemed impossible in the country’s political climate.

New developments affected the Kremlin’s inside political circle, including the resignation of the chairman of United Russia, Boris Gryzlov, and the departure of Vladimir Surkov, former chief of staff and the ‘grey cardinal’ of Russia’s domestic policies. Political reshuffling aimed to address public discontent with the way the past election was handled, yet Putin made it clear that a rerun is out of the question. Instead, he attempted to restore the communication and dialogue with voters via a televised call-in show just a few days after the first December rally, and a presidential campaign website that is presumably open to public suggestions and criticism.

Although these changes are valid and testify to Putin’s understanding that old–fashioned tactics no longer work, his latest attempts to address public discontent have not been successful either: they have not gained public approval, let alone confidence. Are the reforms not good enough? Or are they too late? Both. Solutions offered by the political leadership are nowhere near the necessary structural changes, but are rather just short-term concessions that are long-overdue. They are therefore unable to win the public’s trust.

While Putin acknowledges that ‘everyone develops and everyone should meet the demands of today and tomorrow,’ it is time for his own understanding of people’s demands to expand and go beyond ‘stable utility prices and easier utility expenses formulas’ – those were demands and calls from last year’s protests. People have moved on to new, important subjects such as fair elections and the protection of their rights. As long as authorities remain separated from this new reality, their attempts in gaining confidence and approval from the voters will have little effect.

For comparison’s sake, Mikhail Prokhorov – a new presidential candidate – focuses his presidential campaign on up-to date and pressing issues. For instance, he promises early parliamentary elections, decreasing the number of state officials, and reinforcing oversight of their efficiency, and indirectly touches upon the unsubstantiated imprisonments of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev – a matter that has long been taboo in high level political discussion.

Ironically, according to recent polls, Russia’s Prime Minister Putin still remains the most popular politician in Russia. Should the Russian populace find a change necessary, he might reconsider his ‘concession’ tactics and move to either more demanding issues or a heavy-handed approach, using security forces to quell demonstrations, or possibly, embellishing on a growing outside threat from the West.

Who was the last citizen of the USSR?

Obsessed with the 20th anniversary of the Soviet collapse, I watched a unique and astounding film. “Out of the Present” is a documentary about Soviet cosmonaut Sergei Krikalev, who became known as the last Soviet citizen because he was sent up to the Mir space station from the USSR in May 1991 only to return, 310 days later, in March 1992, to a different country-Russia. But the film, by Romanian director Andrei Ujica, is about so much more than space travel or the collapse of Communism. It’s a moving essay about perspective, the meaning(lessness) of politics, about humanity rising above history, and the idea of home.

While Krikalev (left) was in space, the USSR had disappeared below him. Tanks rushed into the streets, Gorbachev resigned, the Soviet flag lowered forever. And yet, from the vantage point of his porthole above the atmosphere, with its view of rivers and mountains and shimmering city grids, all remained as it has always been.

When the USSR collapsed, many of its former citizens felt like they had lost their home. But Out of the Present, subversively, or maybe reassuringly, puts the changes into a cosmic perspective.

Before beginning his re-entry, Krikalev is interviewed from aboard Mir by a Russian film crew, in the early spring of 1992.

The reporter asks: “When you left, the Soviet Union still existed, now it is Russia. Gorbachev was in power, now it’s Yeltsin. Even your home town of Leningrad is now St Petersburg. Which of these changes impresses you most, surprises you most?”

Here is Krikalev’s straightforward reply, made all the more mindblowing by its utter literalness:
“What surprises me most? That at first, the Earth was dark, and now it’s white. Winter has come, and before it was summer. Now, it’s beginning to bloom again. That’s the most impressive change you can see from space”.

Krikalev’s friend and fellow cosmonaut, Anatoly Artsebarsky (the guy with the box of Coke, above received from an incoming cargo spaceship), came to meet him at touchdown. Reporters asked him at what point does a cosmonaut really feels he is home?

Artsebarsky, wearing a Soviet military uniform that has suddenly become outdated, makes no mention of flags, towns, countries, even the sight of familiar people, or family.

“As soon as one breathes the Earth’s air through the open hatch”, he replies. “The smell of the earth – that’s the feeling of being home again”.

Through all the violent displacements of the last 20 years, it’s sometimes easy to forget that while names, politics, labels and even morals change, and no matter what horrors the country formerly known as the USSR has gone through, and will likely go through yet, it still smells of Earth; still passes each year from summer, into winter and spring again. And that is something that no revolution, no tragedy, can obliterate: a thought both maddening and sublime – that life goes on.

Forget democracy – Russia has dispensed with boring, empty bourgeois rituals like voting and peaceful protests in favour of some freedoms that really matter. Like the right to set fire to a police car, film yourself doing it, confess, and get away with it. That’s exactly what the radical anarchist art group “Voina” has done.

At a time when bastion of freedom USA is arresting and jailing schoolchildren as young as 9 for shouting in class, authoritarian Russia has found Voina not guilty of setting fire to a police detention van on New Year’s Eve in protest at the recent blanket detentions of peaceful political activists. This despite Voina taking responsibility for and documenting the act with step by step photos on its zany blog.

It’s a situation that Daniil Kharms would have relished: In Russia, you are more likely to be punished for not committing a crime than for committing one.

Don’t get me wrong. I think Voina are making an important and provocative contribution to Russia’s current debate about freedom and the legitimacy of the Putin government. However, it is also true that their radical actions would certainly be deemed criminal even in the Western democracies, which are becoming increasingly obsessed with ‘law and order’. By contrast, it is the totally peaceful and mundane actions – marching, assembling, running for office – that Russia’s rulers find most threatening and criminal.

Think about it: hundreds of protestors have been arrested since the outbreaks of protests late last year, most on the flimsiest charges. And they’re mostly calm, middle class people, not even calling for revolution!

Over the past several years, people peacefully rallying on the 31st of each month to draw attention to the Kremlin ignoring Article 31 – the right to free assembly – have been denied permission to march and then routinely rounded up for ‘illegal demonstrations’.

Journalists are intimidated, threatened and punished for peacefully writing articles.

Civic leader Alexei Navalny is being sued for patent non-crimes (and smeared with doctored photographs).

Even oligarch-cum-dissident Khodorkovsky was chosen to be convicted of a series of bizarre, imaginary crimes, rather than the many that he likely actually committed over the course of accumulating his opaque fortune.

What is going on here?

If, to paraphrase Kurosawa, in a criminal society, only the criminals are truly innocent, then only the innocent are truly criminals!

Osh, Kyrgyzstan — A security guard stands near an overturned Russian-made Tupolev Tu-34 passenger jet at the airfield outside the southern Kyrgyz city of Osh, a day after the plane crash. The packed passenger jet flipped over and caught fire on landing. PHOTOGRAPH BY: JILDIZ BEKBAEVA / AFP / GETTY IMAGES

It was a rough but lucky landing (both “rough and “lucky” are strong understatements here) when a Soviet-built Tupolev (Tu-134) crash landed in dense fog in the city of Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan. According to The Washington Post 82 passengers and 6 crew members were evacuated, 31 of them were injured and 17 hospitalized. Miraculously everyone on board survived. No doubt, the local emergency services deserve some major kudos for reacting quickly, killing the fire and safely evacuating everybody from the scene.

RT reports there were about a dozen of children among the passengers. One of them, a seven-month-old girl, was diagnosed with a head injury and concussion. The Ministry of Transportation of Kyrgyzstan said that the crashed vehicle was working its last days, with its airworthiness due to expire on 19 January. It was also reported that the aircraft had been manufactured in 1979 and was not equipped with modern navigation systems such as GPS. Reports say one of the likely causes is a mistake made by the pilot operating the aircraft, but the accident is still to be investigated.

Here’s the description of the crash from The Aviation Herald. Note that this report on the number of passengers and crew on board of the aircraft differs from other sources. “An Altyn Air (alias Kyrgyzstan Altyn) Tupolev TU-134A, registration EX-020 performing flight QH-3 from Bishkek to Osh (Kyrgyzstan) with 73 passengers and 6 crew, suffered a hard landing resulting in the right main gear collapse, right main wing separation and the airplane rolling on its back while landing on Osh’s runway 12 in fog and low visibility around 12:15L (06:15Z), official times of landing varying from 12:05L to 12:48L. The aircraft came to a stop on soft ground about 10 meters off the right runway edge. A fire fed by a fuel leak off the left wing erupted which was quickly extinguished by airport emergency services. One passenger received serious injuries, 24 people received minor injuries (concussions, bruises), 16 of which were taken to local hospitals.”

We know that the bird involved in the crash is a Tupolev-134. Here’s a little blurb about the Tu-134s from the Associated Press: The twin-engined Tu-134, along with its larger sibling the Tu-154, has been the workhorse of Soviet and Russian civil aviation since the 1960s, with more than 800 planes built. It also has remained in service with many post-Soviet carriers. In recent years, Russia and other former Soviet nations have had some of the world’s worst air traffic safety records. Experts blame poor maintenance of the aging aircraft, weak government controls, insufficient pilot training and a cost-cutting mentality.

This type of Soviet-built aircraft was infamously involved in several deadly crashes. Here’s more info on Tupolev crashes. More recently, this past June a Tu-134 crashed in northern Russia killing 43 passengers, but it appears that a drunken pilot was at fault. Earlier in 2011 at least 43 were injured when a Tu-154B carrying 124 people, burst into flames before take-off from Surgut, Russia. And of course another painful reminder of Soviet-era aviation was the crash of a Tu-154 plane near Smolensk that killed Polish President Lech Kaczynski and 95 other people in April of 2010. Pilot error was clearly at fault here – both captain and first officer ignored numerous instrumentation warnings including verbal commands from the plane’s terrain awareness warning system (TAWS) warning the pilots to “PULL UP.” Procedure requires any pilot who receives that warning from the TAWS to immediate pull up and throttle to maximum to avoid an imminent collision with the ground. Clearly both pilots heavily deviated from standard safety protocols.

Back to our Kygryztan Air crash. Until the final findings of the commission are published it’s too early to draw any conclusions, although bad weather conditions had something to do with it. The Tupolevs are aging and even though in the past they might have been sound and well engineered planes, they have become outdated compared to modern aircraft. Not to mention they are not being properly maintained as they are mostly employed in cash-strapped countries. Modern day aircraft are sophisticated enough to be able to land automatically without human intervention more akin to a tram with a stop-and-go button. No Cold War-era planes can compete with that. In an initiative to keep its skies safe,  the E.U. banned airlines it deems unsafe from operating in European airspace and according to its website this includes the airline that was involved in the Kyrgyz crash.

There’s a lot of chatter and opinions on aviation websites debating the airworthiness of Soviet-built planes and the skill of Soviet/post-Soviet pilots. I found one post on The Aviation Herald board about the Osh accident particularly interesting. “There has been a lot of pressure on the pilot to fly (as the only road linking the northern and southern parts of the country has been often closed recently because of snow and avalanches. Flying is the only way to get to Bishkek in a reasonable time (road 14 to 16 hours now for a flight that takes 40 minutes). A TU 134 with its navigation equipment should not have been clear on that day. That the pilot was able to bring down the plane speaks for his skills and the robustness of the plane. A similar crash with one of the old Boeing 737 they use here had been fatal for sure.”

One of my colleague here at the Foreign Policy Blogs recently wrote a post in a similar vein about the safety of Soviet-made planes.

Here are more photos of the crash.

Source: Google Images

United States

For Russia’s Foreign Policy, 2011 started with a breakthrough signing of the START Treaty that fostered new hopes and brighter prospects for U.S. -Russia relations. Alas, the enthusiasm from the successful agreement was soon soured by less effective negotiations on the U.S. deployment of a ballistic missile shield in Europe. The lack of an agreement on the structure of BMD and the parameters of its elements, as well as the unwillingness of the parties to compromise, created a serious impasse on one of the most critical issues for the countries’ relations. Recent threats from Russia to review the START Treaty came as a reaction to the situation and threaten to bring the long-term negotiation efforts back to its starting point.

Asia-Pacific

While the world’s attention is shifting to the Pacific region, Russia’s strategy there remains unclear. Although its strong stance on the Kuril Islands dispute and active participation in APEC have demonstrated Russia’s apparent intention to strengthen its position in the region, it is still not clear how it will be pursuing this direction, and whether it will be capable of exploring it at all. An August visit by then North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il revived Russian interest in the construction of a gas pipeline that would feed into a prosperous South Korea via North Korean Territory. However, considering the unpredictability of the impeding North Korean regime, especially after the recent power shift, the possibilities for a multilateral cooperation project are still blurred.

Europe

Europe continues to play an important role in Russia’s foreign policy as the EU and Russia’s interests are intertwined in both energy sectors and near neighborhood issues (Caucasus and Moldova), although the parties do not always see eye to eye on those matters. Nevertheless, high-level meeting of the representatives from Germany, Poland and Russia in May focusing on the creation of the security policy committee between Russia and the EU has demonstrated that cooperation and dialogue on key security issues for all involved could be a great possibility.

MENA

The Russian response to the overwhelming Arab Spring remained mostly within the framework of non-interference in internal affairs of other states, and on calling the leadership of the restive countries to minimize violence and take every effort to avoid civilian casualties. Hence, the Russian decision to abstain in the vote for UNSC Libya resolution and consecutive support for an arms embargo came as a bit of surprise, especially if one compares it with Russia’s reaction towards similar political unrest in Syria.

Without a doubt, Russian reactions to the developments in Libya and Syria do not mirror each other and have led to different interpretations. Some emphasize positive signs of Russia’s ability to cooperate on important international issues, while others find this behavior unpredictable and untrustworthy. It is possible to assume that Russia’s stakes are much higher in Syria, where it cannot afford political turmoil brought by sudden regime change.

WTO Entry

Russia’s admission to the WTO was another unexpected event that marked the end of 2011. After 18 years of prolonged negotiations, Russia was able to finally sign the WTO accession protocol with ratification expected in the summer of 2012. Georgian resistance to the Russian WTO bid – the very last barrier on the Russia’s path to the organization – fell under the efforts of the Swiss mediation group, and with the support from the United States and European Union.

In conclusion, many of the issues mentioned above will still prevail on Russia’s foreign policy agenda next year. This is especially true for the proposed ballistic missile system in Europe. Despite the fact that the Kremlin has shown a few promising signs of possible cooperation with the West, such as the ban on the S-300 missile complex sale to Iran and a vote on the Libya resolution, it stands very firmly on the issues of non-interference in its internal affairs and NATO’s eastward expansion.
2012 will also show to what extent external security matters and the internal political situation will allow the Russian leadership to shift its attention to long-delayed economic issues, mainly improving economic cooperation and the investment climate in the country.

GOODBYE BREZHNEV

As the traumatic events of the 90s send Mother Russia into a coma from which she takes a decade to recover, dutiful son Vova worries that any further shocks to her system might trigger a catastrophic relapse. Thus, he decides to dupe her into thinking she is still living in the Brezhnev era. Using an elaborate collection of props salvaged from the historical scrapheap, he and videographer friend Surkov recreate the late Soviet landscape by cracking down on free speech and assembly, and turning all television programmes into crude pre-recorded montages of vapid government pronouncements leavened with old Soviet movies. Yet as she goes about her illusory life oblivious to the changes outside, Vova and Surkov decide to steal her wallet and deposit her life savings into their Swiss bank accounts. Grateful for her son’s care but suspecting that she is being lied to and patronised, she eventually sneaks out of the apartment and into the streets, only to be quickly detained by riot police for her own safety.

Director’s (Censored) Cut Edition now available in diamond embossed DVD box set. Recommended retail price: $40 billion. Complimentary Swiss watch with each purchase.

UP IN THE AIR (THE STORY OF A MAN NOT READY TO LOSE AN ELECTION)

Vladimir Putin plays an ageing but suave and smartly (un)dressed strongman in his 50s, who is unable to slow down and give up his increasingly alienating job – one that involves firing (at) journalists and democracy activists. Blinkered by his ambition to achieve a life-long goal of four presidential terms, he finds himself no longer able to develop emotional ties with the people. Thus, even the announcement of his imminent appointment to 12 more years at the helm fills him with a vague and anticlimactic sense of emptiness. The otherwise poignant film (Putin delivers a powerful cross between Al Pacino in Scarface, Marlon Brando in Last Tango in Paris and Mickey Rourke in The Wrestler) is let down by a weak supporting cast: the novice Dmitry Medvedev forgettably plays his democratic understudy, while Mikhail Prokhorov is unconvincing as Putin’s potential liberal rival for the future presidency.

Director: Vladislav Surkov. Total potential running time: 24 years

THE DAMNED UNITED RUSSIA

Formerly undefeated United Russia have hit a brick wall. Despite all-star players and fearsome all-powerful coach, the team is torn apart by a crisis of confidence ahead of a decisive championship game. They’ve sat at the top of the table for too long and got too complacent with the fans, who are now defecting en masse. Rattled by narrow defeats at the hands of hardscrabble underdogs Khimky Forest and Rospil Rangers’ rising striker Alexei Navalny, United Russia’s coaches crack under pressure and decide to fix the decisive match. But they are still unprepared for the force of the opposition. Booed by their own supporters, United Russia achieve an ignominious draw despite imprisoning key opposing players, bribing the ref, hiring an army of football hooligans, stuffing the goals with extra balls and fielding 13 players instead of 11. As a result, United Russia get relegated. A haunting tale of hubris and megalomaniacal self-destruction.

In cinemas until early 2012 at the latest.

THE BRICFAST CLUB

This stereotype-busting drama follows five pubescent countries experiencing an unlikely bonding experience while in detention away from the “developed world economy”. At first glance, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa seem to have nothing in common. But over the course of several summits, they realize that in fact, they all share extraordinary levels of corruption and inequality.

As the heady coming of age story unfolds, former foes India and China bond over their young educated population and breakneck economic dynamism. Feeling out of place due to their negligible productive and high tech sectors, Russia and South Africa instead develop a stirring romance based on their populism, single party statehood, rent-seeking and passion for using commodity profits to fund political clientalism. In a saccharine finale that stretches credulity, Russia celebrates entry into the WTO despite the fact that it will likely hurt its competitiveness even further.

OLIGARCH TWIST

“Please sir, can I have some more?” That old chestnut is given a new lease on life by Boris Berezovsky’s bravura performance as Oligarch Twist, an orphaned Russian bobber baron who, fallen on hard times in Dickensian Knightsbridge, hands a writ demanding billions more dollars from his former partner Roman Abramovich. From his London poorhouse (Dolce and Gabbana on Bond St.), little Twist spots the reclusive and monosyllabic Mr Roman marching into opulent Hermes next door. Slipping in through the legs of Roman’s private legion, Boris delivers the fateful line before slapping Mr Roman with a court appointment. The second half of the film veers away from feel good musical and becomes a tense courtroom drama as Twist, a thief with nothing left to lose, lifts the curtain on a decade long web of deceit, plunder and political corruption. As documents are revealed that could have the power to bring down Mr Roman and his cronies, what’s really on trial is no less than the entire history of 90s Russia and the inner circle of the ruling regime.

In broken English with Russian subtitles. Memorable quotes from Abramovich: “Da”.

GRUNT: LOST IN SPACE

15 years and $170 million in the making, this eagerly awaited big budget scifi thriller describes an audacious attempt to land a spaceship – presciently named Grunt, or Ground – on one of Mars’s moons. Yet what could have been another conventional spacefilm (or even porn-film, given the title) is redeemed by a decidedly Russian twist: with just hours to launch, the engineers discover an electrical wiring issue and, instead of postponing liftoff, decide to fix the wire and glue it all back together using a can opener and a tube of Elmer’s. But then the unthinkable happens: as the jerry-rigged seal sheared off by the heat of the launch, the turbo boosters fail to detach, the entire probe is sent into a collision with Earth, and the Americans end up getting to the red planet first.

Available on Glue-Ray DVD.

MARS 500: SPACE MODESTY

This low-budget arthouse sequel to Grunt: Lost in Space proves that Russia remains more than capable of first-class space exploration, as long as it doesn’t involve actually going into space. Inspired by Vladimir Putin’s hit reality show Big Brother, the entire film takes place inside a capsule where six men are constantly filmed sitting in close proximity, playing card games and eating out of toothpaste tubes. Shot in realtime at a disused warehouse outside Moscow using just a portacabin, some ikea furniture, and a couple of two way radios with voice delay, this meditative psychodrama marries the breakneck pacing of Antonioni with the cutting edge special effects of Thunderbirds and Team America: World Police.

Russian-EU co-production. Estimated sitting time: 12 months. Rated PG13 for non-explicit scenes of simulated space flight.

ROMAN HOLIDAY

(Russian title: LUNA PARK)

Roman Abramovich goes on holiday to Italy and ruins everyone else’s by parking Luna, his obscenely huge yacht, in the centre of town, thereby totally eclipsing the historic view.

Dishonourable Mention at Venice Binneale, 2011.

DEAD DESPOTS SOCIETY

“No matter what anybody tells you, words and ideas can’t change the world!” With those rousing words, maverick Professor Vladimir Puting courageously stands up to the prevailing revolutionary winds sweeping the world, in favour of the geopolitical status quo. Advising his friends Gaddafi and Assad to carpe diem in dealing with the protesters while he stalls the international community’s efforts, the inspirational teacher inspires his friends through thick and thin. Yet for all his troubles, in the end, Puting remains all alone. Gaddafi and Kim Jong Il are feeding the daffodils. Kazakhstan teeters on the edge. Castro is on his last legs. Chavez is unwell. One day, Assad too will fall.

Viewers are advised to bring hankies (in case of tear gas).

Source: Google Images

Last Saturday Russia witnessed one of the biggest anti-government rallies of the past two decades. Just a few months ago the possibility of a protest this large seemed very unlikely. Putin’s confidence ratings remained high holding steadfast belief in the efficiency of a strong ruling hand over the country, although the support for his United Russia party had begun to deteriorate.

Unlike previous public rallies, the Saturday march was sanctioned by authorities and, more importantly, had received an unusually extended, but rather neutral coverage, on state-run channels. Thousands of policemen and paramilitary troops stood ready to deploy security measures against possible ‘violations of the public order,’ however, that no arrests or clashes occurred as this peaceful demonstration was enough to make an important point: Russian people’s votes do matter.

Tens of thousands of people joined the rally across Russia protesting against fraud in the parliamentary election, discontented over how the election was handled and refusing to settle for the same type of governmental attitude of turning a deaf ear towards their opinion for the next decade. People of different political opinion came to the rally, united in their frustration with the United Russia party, demanding re-election and dismissal of the Central Election Committee chairman, and chanting ‘Putin must go.’

The rally made it quite obvious that the existing political leadership underestimated increasing public discontent over multiple cases of power abuse in the country, including among others the dismissal of prosecution against high-level officials in cases of fatal traffic accidents, and the fraudulent election of the current Chairman of Federation Council of the Russian Federation. These and other examples clearly showed the negligence and disregard with which current political leadership treats the opinion of Russian citizens and their rights.

Many ask now whether United Russia and Putin stand a chance of political survival. According to an exit poll by the Institute of Social Studies, the ruling party gathered about 38 percent of the popular vote, which is more than 10 percent less than the official number issued, however, it still places Putin’s party ahead of others. In addition, pro-government supporters organized another rally, which according to some estimates garnered close to 25,000 people on Monday. Much of that support could be explained by the lack of strong opposition with a clear and consistent plan of action, as well as the fear of returning to the political and economic instability experienced during the 1990s.

Meanwhile, the Saturday rally has provided opportunities for a new opposition to emerge. Immediately after the Saturday events businessman and billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov, ousted from the liberal party Russian Cause in September, has announced his bid for presidential elections in 2012. Then, Russian ex-finance minister Alexei Koudrin said that he is considering forming a right-centered political party. Kudrin has recently left Kremlin over disagreement with Medvedev policies in September of this year.

One needs to be reminded that both, Prokhorov and Kudrin, come from Kremlin circles and their run for leadership has already been shadowed with suspicion over a possible Kremlin move to divert attention from critical issues at hand. This relation to the regime will definitely breed doubts among electorate in the future. Another question is whose interests this newly formed right-wing party will represent and how much vote it will be able to gather in Russia? The painful experience of the sweeping reforms of the 1990s is still vivid among Russia’s population, and so is a general distrust to the oligarchs reaching for political power.

What’s more, Russians tend to hold rather reserved attitudes towards opposition. November polls conducted by the Levada Center, a Russian independent polling and sociological research organization, demonstrated that for the most part, the Russian population remains very skeptical about existing opposition and finds that it rarely goes beyond simple criticism of the current regime to serious constructive proposals for improving the situation in the country. Hence, any opposition in the country will face a difficult task to win the confidence of the population.

In conclusion, last Saturday an empowered Russian population took a stand against fraud and corruption in the country. We will see in the coming months whether they have been heard in their demands for a change. Hopefully, the change will be timely and peaceful. As one recent Russian blog said, ‘no revolution is needed for a party that got 23 percent of popular votes to get 23 percent of the parliament seats and not 53 percent.’ Excellent point.

Source: Google Images

Events of this past November revealed more cracks in U.S. -Russia relations that seemed propitious just several months ago. To start with, on November 22, the U.S. announced the decision to cease its obligations under The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), referring to information sharing and mutual inspections with Russia. The decision came as a delayed countermeasure to Russia’s unilateral suspension of its own obligations under the same Treaty in 2007.

Just a day after the U.S. announcement, Russian President Medvedev responded with his own “if-then” stipulation by mentioning that Russia could possibly opt out from the START Treaty, if the United States continues its ambitious ballistic missile plan in Europe. Moscow has repeatedly expressed its discontent with the development of the missile defense project in Europe, accusing the West of excluding Russia from participating in the decision making process. This is especially sensitive since Moscow perceives the radar installations in Poland, Romania and Turkey as a direct threat to its nuclear deterrence capabilities.

Finally, few days after a Pakistani decision to close a supply route for U.S. troops, the Russian Envoy to NATO threatened to suspend Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which serves as a critical component to U.S. operations in Afghanistan as it allows the transportation of almost fifty percent of all non-lethal goods to U.S. troops. Consequently, a shut down of the alternative route could seriously undermine U.S. military capacity and put U.S. troops in a vulnerable position. By pointing out at the vital role Russia plays in U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan, Moscow shows that it is entitled to have an equal say in security matters.

All of the above-mentioned events carry an important message: although an attempt to improve the relations between Russia and the United States might have had a good start, as long as their positions on the preexisting matters are not reconciled, a meaningful cooperation is hardly possible. That said, the split over Georgia, Moldova, and the ballistic missile defense in Europe continues to persist and define Russian and U.S. policies towards each other, much as any attempt to address them unilaterally only exacerbates the situation.

Let’s go back to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. It was signed on November 19, 1990 establishing equal limitation on armed forces that NATO and Warsaw Pact member-countries could deploy between Atlantic Ocean and Ural Mountains. For several years it served as a guarantee of security and control over the overwhelming amount of Russian military weaponry.

Consequently, the lack of a similar security agreement, especially the one regarding nuclear weapons, relaxes limitations and allows the parties more room in their defense planning. All that leads to growing uncertainty, distrust and risk of escalation that would keep the parties uneasy and suspicious of each other’s actions. In the absence of an agreed structure or a system for minimizing perceived threats, old concerns will persist and grow as will the rhetoric that accompanies these types of ‘Tit-for-Tat’ actions.

By not renewing the CFE Treaty obligation, Russia demonstrated that it has not reconsidered its position in the neighborhood, neither has it overcome its disagreement with NATO’s eastward expansion. Russia chose to unilaterally suspend its participation in the Treaty in 2007, which allowed to keep its troops in Transdniestria and Abkhazia, breakaway Republics of Moldova and Georgia.

Finally, while the United States turns its attention to the Asia Pacific region, it seems that Russia is gradually slipping from U.S. foreign policy agenda. At the same time Russia looks for ways to emphasize its critical role for the success of the U.S. foreign policy goals and to establish a status of an equal partner on security matters.