Protester in solidarity with Khader Adnan in the West Bank

Sixty-six days. At this hour, that is how long Khader Adnan has gone without food to protest his detention without charge by the Israeli government.

Unless you follow events in the Middle East closely, it is possible this is the first time you have heard of Adnan, or only heard of his in the last few days as Western media outlets finally started to pick up the story. In many ways this is understandable; after all, Adnan is not the most sympathetic of characters. A 33 year old father of two and baker in the West Bank town of Arraba, he is also a member of Islamic Jihad, a small Palestinian group dedicated to the establishment of an Islamic state in the Holy Land. It is this last detail that led to Israeli forces raiding his house in the early morning hours of December 17. But, instead of being charged with any crime, Israel has placed him in “administrative detention”, a decades-long policy that allows the government to hold prisoners without charge for six months and can be infinitely renewed.

This is not the first time Adnan had been arrested and placed in administrative detention. Since 1999, he has been arrested and detained seven times with his total time in detention being over three years , but never charged with any crime. This is not uncommon and is the reason why so many activists find administrative detention to be repugnant; with no guarantee of due process, there is no guarantee that Israeli forces will not abuse the power that has been given to them and that true criminals are the only ones targeted.

However this time Adnan decided enough was enough. The day after his arrest in December, Adnan started his hunger strike in protest of this policy and the indignity he claimed it represented. For whatever reason, this campaign struck a nerve within the region. Solidarity campaigns emerged in the West Bank and around the world. Other prisoners are reported to have joined in his fast. Soon, “Charge him or release him” became the common rallying cry in the online campaign for his release, a demand echoed by human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Carter Center amid growing calls for the international community to act. After all, if he is the terrorist and public safety threat that the government claims he is, there should be enough evidence to actually charge him with a crime. Not only is this appropriate in a fair and just legal system, but it would also help authorities navigate the two possible negative consequences Israel currently faces: the likely public backlash over his death in detention or the possible encouragement other prisoners would receive to repeat Adnan’s tactics if he was released. Instead, Israeli officials have kept him shackled to his hospital bed even as his health deteriorated to the point where medical experts believe he may be past the point of no return.

Yesterday, on the sixty-fifth day of his fast, Adnan set the record for Israel’s longest hunger strike. In doing so, he has brought international attention not just to his situation, but to the entire policy of administrative detention and the conditions that Palestinian prisoners face in Israeli jails. Later today the Israeli Supreme Court will hold a session considering Adnan’s appeal and decide his fate. In doing so, they will likely be deciding more than just whether he remains in prison, but by extension whether he will live or die.

So sympathetic or not, it appears that Adnan may be fighting the right fight here, and one that is long overdue. In a letter to the public delivered via his lawyers he wrote, “I starve myself for you to remain. I die for you to live. Stay with the revolution.” These words may be important to keep in mind as Tony Karon points out, it is unclear what role in the public imagination Adnan will take on following this, but the winds of change can come from unexpected places. Just ask Tunisia, where a desperate act by a common fruit vendor overthrew one of the most stable governments in the region.

Mitt Romney in Iowa

When speaking about US foreign policy during the Republican Primary debates, Mitt Romney often returns to a familiar theme: his belief that troop levels in Afghanistan should be determined through close consultation with the commanding generals on the ground. It is both a criticism of President Obama’s June 2011 decision to begin drawing down troop levels in Afghanistan, and a blueprint for what kind of Afghan engagement we could expect under a Romney presidency. “I want those troops to come home based upon not politics, not based upon economics, but instead based upon the conditions on the ground determined by the generals,” said Romney in the June 2011 GOP debate in New Hampshire. He has since revisited the idea during the August Iowa debate, November CBS foreign policy debate, and November CNN national security debate.

Most of his Republican colleagues agree with him (Ron Paul being the lone voice of dissent), but Romney is both the presumptive presidential nominee and the most fervent advocate of this strategy. Combine this with the “peace through strength” rhetoric that he is so fond of, and one must wonder whether a Romney presidency would lead to the kind of dangerous and futile escalation of military force in Afghanistan that has characterized much of the last decade.

While President Obama has not been immune to this policy of deferring to the military on questions of troop levels in Afghanistan, he appears to have learned his lesson in 2009 after incoming ISAF commander General Stanley McChrystal publicly expressed his recommendation that the US increase forces in Afghanistan by some 30-40,000 troops. Obama decided to buy into the McChrystal strategy and increase troop levels by 30,000, but the general put him in a difficult position by publicly voicing a recommendation before discussing it with the Commander-in-Chief.

So why shouldn’t we let the military dictate troop levels in Afghanistan? After all, it seems reasonable that the commanders who are in the thick of the fighting would know what they need to accomplish the mission. First we must consider that the mission has been in a constant state of flux ever since the first US attacks on Afghanistan in 2001. Each general arrives with a different strategy and different tactics, secure in the belief that he can do the job better than his predecessor.

The political strategy from Washington has been equally erratic, changing from year-to-year within the Bush and Obama Administrations. But a lack of strategic continuity is not the biggest issue. The major problem is that the commanding generals are trained from the very outset of their military careers to think that the mission can always be achieved. They are not attempting to mislead us; it is simply that losing is not part of the psyche of the top military brass. It is difficult for them to accept that most of the challenges we face in Afghanistan do not have a military solution, and in fact greater troop levels often exacerbate tensions and fuel the insurgency. There is a legitimacy deficit that no military strategy — whether it is counter-insurgency or traditional counter-terrorism — can overcome, but you will never hear a top general request fewer resources or ask for a more limited strategic mandate.

Indeed, as Rory Stewart made abundantly clear in his July 2011 TED Talk, incoming commanding generals have tended to be rather optimistic about what they think can be achieved in Afghanistan. For a decade, we have heard that this will be the “decisive year” as a new commander arrives and thinks — just as his predecessor did — that with the right resources, strategy, and personnel, things will be different.

Rory Stewart at TED Global

So, a brief history of such assertions: in 2003, US Army General Dan McNeill, commander of Coalition Forces, Afghanistan and later the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), said that “most parts of the country will soon begin to realize some reasonable degree of security and stability. Without question [2004 would be a] decisive year.” In 2004, US Lieutenant General David Barno explained the strategic shift that he believed would turn the tide of the war, stating that “there [had previously been] no major planning initiated to create long-term political, social and economic stability in Afghanistan. What we’re [now] doing is moving to a more classic counterinsurgency strategy here in Afghanistan. That’s a fairly significant change in terms of our tactical approach out there on the ground.” General John Abizaid, Barno’s commander, agreed that 2005 would surely be a “decisive year”.

In 2005, when Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry assumed command, he expressed concerns that the “institutions of the Afghan state remain[ed] relatively weak,” but was confident that 2006 would be a turning point. In 2006 British Army Lieutenant General Sir David Richards (commanding general of ISAF) was even more pessimistic about the situation he was inheriting, describing it as “close to anarchy.” However, he too was sure that his new strategy of “establishing bases rather than chasing militants” would make 2007 the “decisive year” for the Taliban.

In 2007 General Dan McNeill returned for a second tour in Afghanistan, assuming command of ISAF. His previous experience did little to inspire caution about what could be achieved in Afghanistan, and McNeill fell into a familiar pattern. He first described the dismal situation he was to inherit in Afghanistan: “[there were] shadows cast by former power brokers or warlords…lack of effective governance…a lack of unified effort amongst the international community and lack of effective police. We’re not trained, we’re not equipped, we don’t have the requisite number of helicopters, and we’re not manned to do [counter-narcotics].” And then outlined his new plan to change things by: “shift[ing] to a more ‘kinetic strategy’ (i.e. a strategy focused on military force over counter-insurgency tactics) including aerial bombardment.”

In 2008 US Major General Bernard Champoux echoed many of his predecessors, predicting that 2008 would “be a decisive year.” In 2009 General Stanley McChrystal assumed command of ISAF and publicly voiced his opinion that the US should increase troop levels by some 30-40,000. A June 2010 Rolling Stone article profiling McChrystal, in which he and his aides criticized Vice President Biden and the Obama Administration earned McChrystal an early retirement, but not before he stated that, “[his] new strategy [would] improve effectiveness through better application of existing assets, but [would] also require additional resources,” he added that “the Taliban…no longer has the initiative…we are knee-deep in the decisive year”.

General Allen Takes Over as ISAF Commander

General David Petraeus, the commander of CENTCOM, agreed, saying that “for the first time we will have the tools and what’s required in place to carry out the kind of campaign that [is] necessary here with our Afghan partners.” Petraeus was subsequently appointed commander of ISAF upon McChrystal’s retirement (technically a step down from his previous role at CENTCOM). In 2011, Petraeus also retired from the army to assume the directorship of the CIA, he was replaced by US Marine Corps General John R. Allen. Recently, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that US and NATO troops in Afghanistan would transition from a combat role to a “training, assist and advice” role by late 2013, a year earlier than the mandated 2014 schedule. Senator John McCain, as he has so often before, complained that none of the US military commanders had recommended the drawdown, while General Allen cautioned that “the drawdown schedule is more aggressive than anticipated.” Year after year the pattern has remained the same — new generals, new strategies, new resources, same result.

According to Mitt Romney’s website, upon assuming the presidency his foreign policy priorities would include:

Conduct a Full Review of Our Transition in Afghanistan: Conduct a full interagency review of our military and assistance presence in Afghanistan to determine the presence necessary to secure our gains and successfully complete our mission. The review will involve discussions with generals on the ground and the delivery of the best recommendations of our military commanders.

In his first 100 days, order a full interagency review of our transition in Afghanistan. He will review our military and assistance presence to determine the level required to secure our gains and to train Afghan forces to the point where they can protect the sovereignty of Afghanistan on their own. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan under a Romney administration will be based on conditions on the ground as assessed by our military commanders.

This sounds suspiciously like it might lead to a new troop surge based on Romney’s fairly hawkish views in consultation with generals who are eager to finally “win” in Afghanistan. That outcome would be both harmful to Afghanistan and costly for America.

Baby Doc looks out from the balcony of the elegant Karibe hotel in Port-au-Prince, January 2011

One year ago, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier made a surprise return to Haiti. As “president-for-life” for the second half of the 1971-86 Duvalier family succession, his rule was notorious for torturous treatment of political prisoners, unexplained disappearances and attacks on the press. Baby Doc was also a chubby sports-car loving playboy, whose glamorous wife spent state funds on furs and jewels. With his return in January 2011, the devilishly clownish dichotomy of the inner and outer workings of the regime picked up where it had left off 25 years before. Duvalier held a press conference in a decadent villa in the hills above Port-au-Prince claiming he had returned to help his people, while within days survivors of his regime’s brutality brought testimonies to the Haitian court accusing him of crimes against humanity.

Alix Fils-Aimé is a survivor who filed complaints in the court documenting the regime’s human rights abuses. He shared his story with this blog, describing near starvation, torturous interrogations, and the disappearances of fellow political prisoners.

Now, after a year of fine dining and hob-nobbing with the country’s elite for the supposedly house-arrested former dictator, and statements proclaiming accountability both a duty and an opportunity for the feeble Haitian courts from international human rights activists and lawyers, the judge has waved his report at journalists and said that Duvalier will not be tried for crimes against humanity, only for misappropriation of public funds. So far the report has not been made publicly available and no explanation has been given aside from a weak reference to passing the statute of limitations. Rights activists reply that prescription does not apply to crimes against humanity or cases concerning disappeared people.

“I had no doubt that the ruling would be such,” Alix Fils-Aimé stated. He described the Haitian court system “like going to the market, you get what your money can buy and sometimes what political influence can get you.” But filing the case was an important exercise for him, bringing light to the issue and putting it firmly in the public record. He said those who had filed complaints are contemplating their next moves, whether it be appealing in the Haitian court or taking the case to a regional human rights court.

Fils-Aimé sees corruption in Haitian courts as both ingrained and temporary. He expected a ruling dismissing his brutal experience, particularly under the administration of Michel Martelly who has political ties to Duvalier-era leaders. “I think everyone, the world over, all our friends and partners, and at the level of organizations, of lawyers and human rights associations, all governments, I think they all are fully aware of the truth, they realize that justice has been denied and realize fully now also that one cannot expect justice for what Duvalier has done, under the current regime.”

But Fils-Aimé says impunity in the Haitian justice system, while entrenched, is not inherent; “Things will evolve and things will be different.”

In an ideal world, the search for justice would always trump the pragmatic workings of politics. However rarely do we live in that world. Instead amnesties are granted in the hopes of a peaceful regime change, dictators are allowed to flee their counties for the permanent and well financed vacations exile while their victims remain to put back together what oppressive policies and violence broke. If enough time passes, as Haiti is now discovering with Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, those who grossly abused their power can often act like nothing happen. Of course justice is pursued by some countries determined to make sure that past wrongs are answered to, but success in those endeavors typically requires strong support from allied countries or organizations like the UN. Even then, messy politics makes for messy justice; accusations of bias in prosecution and worries about the cost of proceedings given the typically small groups of suspects tried are common, as are serious questions about the value of such proceedings for both victims and the political process. This, and not the ideal version we dream about, is the world we live in.

Recognition of these realities is one of the reasons why the International Criminal Court (ICC) took so long to come into being and is also a constant issue facing the court. In this battle between justice and politics, the biggest debate to date confronting the court is that of Kenya where it is believed high ranking politicians were involved in promoting the post-election violence that gripped the country in early 2008. The possibility of an ICC investigation was part of the agreement reached between President Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader (now Prime Minister) Raila Odinga, but was also contingent on the inability of the Kenyan parliament to pass legislation creating a domestic tribunal to try those responsible for the violence. After parliament failed to pass such legislation, the ICC opened an investigation and yesterday the decision on which of the “Ocampo Six” – the six people deemed most responsible for the violence – would be tried officially came down.

This is where the politics gets messy.  Not only was the post-election violence largely divided on ethnic terms which ended in a fragile peace, but the members of the Ocampo Six were and remain prominent political figures. For example, Uhuru Kenyatta is the current Deputy Prime Minister, Kenya’s wealthiest citizen and the son of the country’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta. On the other side is William Ruto, the former Minster for Higher Education and a prominent opposition politician. Both Kenyatta and Ruto enjoy significant support with their rural constituents and both have stated they would be running in the presidential elections later this year. Politically, these two are positioned on opposite sides of the conflict but may be facing the same fate. Unfortunately, they also have the ability to take down all of Kenya with them. Again, this is the world we live in.

So what is more important, justice or politics? By ruling that four of the six charged would stand trial, including Kenyatta and Ruto, the ICC stuck to their mandate and chose justice. Ahead of the announcement there was strong support for the court among Kenyans but also increasing fears that violence could once again break out. So far, that has not happened. But with politicians gearing up for their presidential campaigns and two of the major candidates now getting ready to stand trial for crimes against humanity, yesterday’s decision is only the start of this debate, not the end.

Abuja National Mosque in Nigeria | Photo by Kipp Jones

A series of explosions ripped through Nigeria’s second largest city of Kano on Friday, targeting government and police offices. By Saturday, the militant group Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the deadly attack whose final death toll is not yet determined but is expected to be over 200 people.

Boko Haram was founded in 2002 as an anti-Western Salafi sect in Northern Nigeria. Since then, the group has evolved into a jihadist militia opposing the Nigerian government and all contact with the West. Starting 2009, Boko Haram began to carry out attacks against government outposts and critics of their ideology. But despite their violent past, the group has only recently gained international attention as their attacks grew in size and coordination. A series of attacks in Maiduguri and Abuja in June 2011 followed by the bombing of the UN’s Nigeria headquarters in August moved Boko Haram to the front page of security briefs in the West and rumors of US military advisers being deployed to the region to help the government gained credence. With last week’s bombings, this is unlikely to change.

It would be easy to couch the existence of Boko Haram and their appeal in Northern Nigeria in terms of Muslim versus Christian, especially given Nigeria’s history of religious strife. But while Boko Haram is an Islamist group with an extreme Islamic ideology, their supporters are drawn mainly from the unemployed youth in the more impoverished northern states who are frustrated by government corruption and limited opportunities despite Nigeria’s oil wealth. In some ways the increasing prominence of Boko Haram over the past year tracks with the growth of protest movements around the world. Most of these movements, whether in the Global North or the Global South, focus on public corruption, the lack of accountability, and a quest for personal dignity. However the frustration behind these movements has been channeled in a variety of ways, from protests in Tunisia and Egypt, to riots in the UK and war in Libya. Without addressing these larger issues as well as the religious desires underpinning the movement, the world will be hearing a lot more about the chaos of Boko Haram.

This much is clear. What is unclear is what this all means for the future of Nigeria. Do these attacks mean Boko Haram has officially declared war on Nigeria? If so, will a war on these terms spark a civil war between the predominately Muslim north and the predominately Christian south? Can the country find a compromise that works for all of its diverse population? Expect these question to be repeatedly asked in the media over the next few weeks, but for now, don’t expect any easy answers.

The message from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)—the U.S. led security force in Afghanistan—is that security is improving as a result of these efforts. Last spring, a Pentagon report concluded that President Obama’s strategy had produced “tangible progress” in Afghanistan. More recently, David Rodriguez, former Commander of ISAF Joint Command, wrote “there are indisputable gains everywhere we have focused our efforts.” Talk of progress and security gains has been pervasive in my early Kabul meetings.

But that message stands in stark contrast to what I’m hearing from international and humanitarian organizations. In its mid-year report released in July 2011, the U.N. political mission in Afghanistan reported that “civilians experienced a downward spiral of protection” during the first half of 2011 with civilian casualties higher than at any other time since 2001. Indeed, nearly 1,500 civilians were killed during the first half of 2011, an increase of 15% from the same period during 2010. More recently, the U.N. confirmed significant civilian casualties last month largely due to the twin suicide attacks in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif.

ISAF’s rosy assessment of the situation in Afghanistan is also at odds with the most recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which noted that “security gains” have been undercut by “corruption, incompetent governance and Taliban fighters operating from neighboring Pakistan.” The NIE also suggests that the Afghan government “may not be able to survive as the U.S. steadily pulls out its troops and reduces military and civilian assistance.”

To be clear, the Taliban and other armed groups are responsible for the majority of civilian casualties in Afghanistan – roughly 80%, according to the U.N. Despite pledges to avoid killing civilians, armed groups have continued to resort to indiscriminate tactics, including improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks, which combined are responsible for nearly 50% of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, according to the U.N. For the past two years, armed groups have also increasingly resorted to assassinations, targeting public officials and others who cooperate with ISAF and the Afghan government.

Meanwhile, as civilian casualties caused by armed groups have spiked over the past few years, the number of civilians killed or injured by international military forces has gradually declined, largely due to the policies ISAF has put in place to mitigate civilian harm. That being said, Afghans want and expect ISAF and the ANSF to improve efforts to protect them from all acts of violence, regardless of which warring party is ultimately responsible.

Afghans I have met since arriving are very worried about the future. One former government official I spoke with voiced his concern that Afghanistan could slide back into civil war after the bulk of international military forces depart at the end of 2014. Like many others in the country, he isn’t confident that the ANSF will be able to provide security on their own, and he’s concerned about the proliferation of weapons and armed groups.

Why such disparate narratives and assessments of the security situation? One reason could be that ISAF is using different metrics than international and nongovernmental organizations. Counterinsurgent forces tend to examine territory held and the quantity of indigenous security forces trained and equipped to measure progress. And as noted, ISAF has taken very concrete steps to mitigate civilian harm, resulting in fewer civilians killed or injured by international military forces. Meanwhile, the U.N. and nongovernmental organizations are analyzing overall levels of violence and civilian casualties – which have increased over the past several years.

Another reason may be that ISAF is setting a tone for its departure. With the U.S. elections less than a year away, the Obama Administration would like to reassure a war weary public that it has turned the Afghan war around. While not ill – intentioned, the U.S. and its allies may simply be focused on highlighting what they have achieved, including reduced levels of civilian casualties caused by international military forces as well as reinvigorated efforts to improve the quality of Afghan security forces. But the problem still remains – while ISAF has improved its own civilian casualty statistics, the number of civilians harmed or killed in Afghanistan is increasing. Indeed, if “security gains” are to be measured by fewer civilian casualties, then security is deteriorating in Afghanistan.

As international military forces prepare for withdrawal, they should be clear-eyed about the toll the war is taking on civilians and what needs to be done to better protect ordinary Afghans. Over the next six months, I will be taking this message to ISAF on behalf of CIVIC. More specifically, I will be assessing the efficacy of the mechanisms ISAF has put in place to mitigate civilian harm as well as urging the Afghan government to take concrete steps to better protect civilians. I hope we’ll soon be able to agree that security is improving in Afghanistan.

This post originally appeared on CIVIC From the Field.

Photo: Afghan National Army (ANA) doing a route clearence patrol exercise at the Kabul Militairy Training Centre (KMTC).

Released under the Creative Commons License: Courtesy of the U.S. Army.

Egyptian women marching during the January 25 revolution. Photo by Hossam el-Hamalawy

Many things could be said about the past year, but at the very least it could not be considered boring. Within two weeks of the new year, protests over government corruption in Tunisia ousted its long standing dictator, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. That event, which took many observers by surprise, triggered a wave of protests throughout the region. As the year went on, protests in Egypt overthrew Hosni Mubarak and brought on a NATO intervention in Libya while the Yemeni, Syrian and Bahraini governments responded to discontent in their countries with increasing violence and Morocco introduced a new constitution. Of course such protests were not limited to North Africa and the Middle East; as early as January similar protests against corruption and authoritarianism were seen in Gabon before spreading to Mauritania, Djibouti, Uganda, Malawi, Swaziland and Senegal. Further north, protest movements emerged in Spain and Greece against government austerity measures and high unemployment, while Israelis took to the streets over the summer in record numbers in the name of social justice and protests grew in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. By the end of the year, the Occupy movement broke out in the US and Canada against the large involvement of money in politics and the lack of economic opportunity for the average citizen while large student protests over educational reform broke out in Colombia and Chile. And finally, in December protests against government corruption reached all the way to the doors of the Kremlin in Russia. So numerous and active has the protest calendar been over the past 12 months, it is quite possible to narrate the entire year only in major protest movements and events.

Of course, other events happened in the field of human rights. The drama of last year’s contested presidential elections in Cote d’Ivoire continued into 2011 with open fighting between parties loyal to each of the candidates. Just two weeks after the UN Security Council approved a no-fly zone over Libya, it also adopted Resolution 1975 which allowed the French-supported peacekeeping mission there to use all necessary measures to protect civilian life. Two weeks later, incumbent president and 2010 election loser Laurent Gbagbo was arrested by UN forces in his home, ending the standoff. In late November, Gbagbo was transferred to the International Criminal Court in The Hague following an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity. His transfer means that it is likely he will be the first former head of state to stand trial at the ICC.

Both the UN intervention in Cote d’Ivoire and the NATO intervention in Libya gave the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine a boost. While some debate whether NATO overstepped its UN authorization in its campaign, possibly hurting the effectiveness of the doctrine, these two events illustrated that even the international community can learn from its past mistakes when facing imminent civilian carnage, even if the application of the policy is uneven.

Elsewhere in Africa, the Republic of South Sudan officially became independent in July after a referendum in January that saw over 98% of the population vote for independence. Yet as South Sudan celebrated a new chapter of their own history and the end of a six-year long peace process, the UN declared a famine in parts of Somalia following an ongoing drought throughout the entire region and new violence broke out along the just created border between Sudan and South Sudan.

Of course, disasters – both manmade and natural – were not limited to the Global South. In July, Anders Behring Breivik set off a car bomb in Oslo and attacked a summer camp on the Norwegian island of Utøya, killing 87 people and shocking the normally calm Nordic country. In August, a small protest against police brutality spun out of control and set off four days of rioting across the United Kingdom.

Looking at this brief summary of the past year, it is easy to understand why the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, Navi Pillay, declared 2011 as the year where “human rights went viral.” However not all of year’s events treated human rights kindly. The execution of Muamar Gaddafi at the hands of rebel forces in Libya, and the cheers that came from some corners at the online footage of his abuse at the hands of his captors, reminded us that even monsters deserve compassion and we all have it in us to deny others basic dignity. In the US, the execution of Troy Davis brought the death penalty back into the spotlight, but even a sustained media campaign on the apparent shortcomings of the case against him could not save his life. The year was also not a good one for journalists, as the Committee to Protect Journalist announced that 45 journalists were killed in 2011, with Pakistan being the most dangerous country for journalists this year. And while some claimed 2011 to be the year of social media, that also came with tragic consequences as citizen journalists and online activists found themselves in the crosshairs of various groups, from drug cartels in Mexico to government forces in North Africa and the Middle East.

Finally, while there were many positive developments over the past 12 months, the year ended on a sour note with news that President Obama signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act, including the troublesome provision that allows the government to indefinitely detain US citizens in the United States if they are suspected of terrorism. There are many problematic aspects to this provision, not just for human rights but also for the basic principles of democracy and due process in the US. If nothing else, this quiet act at the end of 2011 will give activists a new cause to start 2012 with.

Protester in Bahrain. Photo by Al Jazeera English.

As no Year in Review would be incomplete without a list, here are some of my top picks for 2011:

Most Unexpected event

As I noted at the start, this year has been an incredibly active one for protests, the type of year that probably hasn’t been seen since 1968. Even still, 2011 has been more remarkable in many ways because of the diverse locations where these movements have sprung up and in how they built upon each other throughout the year, aided by relationships forged through social media and increased global communications. While analysts may have suggested that major uprisings or protests were due in some of these countries for a while, I doubt that any of them would have – or even could have – predicted the way these protests merged and multiplied, both online and in the streets. There is no single name for this trend or phenomenon, but that is my choice for most unexpected event of the year.

Most important person or group

Closely related to my choice for most unexpected event, my pick for the most important person or group is actually a generation. Whatever you choose to call them – Generation Y, Millennials, Generation Next, or some other iteration – their presence has been undeniable in shaping major events of the past year. In 1966, Robert F. Kennedy gave a speech at University Cape Town where he memorably stated, “Few will have the greatness to bend history, but each of us can work to change a small portion of events. And in the total of all those acts will be written the history of a generation.” After years of being mostly defined by their consumer habits and entertainment choices, this past year saw this generation find its voice against injustice, as well as the courage to work towards a different world.

Book of the year

My choice for book of the year highlights the aborted Persian Spring rather than this year’s Arab Spring. “Then They Came For Me” by Maziar Bahari tells of his months in Iran’s infamous Evin Prison for his journalistic coverage of the 2009 Iranian Election Protests. While his period in prison was Kafkaesque at times, the story also highlights the humanity of the protestors and ordinary Iranians in their search for dignity in a country that they love.

What to look for in 2012…

While 2011 was a major game-changer in some ways, on the other hand I find that my outlook for 2012 is not much different from what I predicted last year. I’m comfortable with that since much of what I predicted for 2010 came true this past year (and being only a year off is fine with me).

Digital rights and what freedom of expression means in the 21^st century will continue to be a major human rights issue, especially after the EU quietly passed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Act earlier this month and the possibility that the US House of Representatives will pass the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in the new year.

Likewise protests are also likely to continue in 2012. The four countries that managed to overthrow their dictators this year – Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen – still face significant battles in stabilizing their governments and bringing about a full democratic transition. Protests and subsequent crackdowns by the government continue in both Bahrain and Syria, with no end in sight for either. The only country in North Africa to largely escape the protests that swept the region is Algeria, but already some are predicting that may change soon. Similarly, the Occupy movement is determined to not fade away in the new year as they come up with new methods of protest even as many of their camps are disbanded. As this past year demonstrated, protests movements in one corner of the globe can bring about new movements elsewhere, so what is in store for 2012 remains a mystery to even the most astute analysts.

Corporate involvement and influence in politics is also likely to be an ongoing issue. This is the central focus of the Occupy movement, but there have been other indications that more people are focusing on corporate accountability as well. In particular, the increasing evidence of Western technology firms selling surveillance equipment to repressive regimes have raised new questions about what responsibility for-profit organization have in the consequences of their products. Elsewhere, there is growing attention on the long term impact that increased involvement of Chinese firms in Africa may have for both political and economic democracy in the region and the growth of human rights. No matter where you look, corporations are facing more scrutiny which in unlikely to go away anytime soon.

In the end, what I am left with in the final hours of 2011 is how much more optimistic I am about this coming year than I was last year. So much has happened in the past 12 months that it can boggle the mind. But while some events were heartbreaking, most of the past year has been uplifting and at times, even inspiring. If 2011 was the year when “human rights went viral” then it is now on us to make 2012 the year when the world finally consolidated those rights and made them count.

From the point of view of ISAF, this program is filling an important gap. In theory, the ALP program is designed to provide “village level security,” bypass the central government’s corruption and help prevent the Taliban from gaining a foothold in places where international military forces are not present. In practice, serious problems exist with this program. According to Human Rights Watch, ALP units are responsible for “looting, illegal detention, beatings, killings, sexual assault and extortion.” Afghans interviewed by Human Rights Watch claim that it is difficult to distinguish between the ALP and local militias.

Recently, Human Rights Watch (HRW) called on the Obama Administration to halt plans to triple the ALP until and unless the program is overhauled. Moreover, HRW has urged the Administration to focus on training regular Afghan forces in preparation for the 2014 security transition rather than empowering local militias, or “community defense forces” in military parlance.

Last week, ISAF released a report on the ALP, which was initiated in response to serious concerns raised by HRW this past September. The investigation, which was led by a U.S. Air Force Brigadier General, substantiated many of the claims made by HRW. Some claims were not verified not because the investigators found them to be untrue, but because of an inability to locate and interview witnesses that might corroborate the findings of HRW. As ISAF’s report notes, HRW was only able to interview witnesses in exchange for confidentiality, and thus was unable to provide the names of witnesses and victims cited in its report to the investigators.

ISAF’s report urges a number of reforms to the ALP program, including improved training, oversight and accountability measures. By and large, the U.S. led military coalition acknowledges that serious problems exist with the program. Interestingly, however, the report concludes by noting that “HRW ignores the vital service ALP and VSO [village stability operations] are providing every day to give Afghans a chance to end 30 years of conflict and to live secure and peaceful lives.”

While the investigators substantiated many of HRW’s claims, the military investigation team took a cheap parting shot at the human rights group. This is especially interesting given the convergence between strategy and human rights inherent in the COIN doctrine. In other words, international military forces and human rights organizations increasingly share similar goals in Afghanistan and other counterinsurgency environments – protecting the civilian population from violence.

Sarah Sewall explains the importance of civilian protection in U.S. strategy in her introduction to the U.S. Army Field Manual:

The field manual [COIN doctrine] directs U.S. forces to make securing the civilian, rather than destroying the enemy, their top priority. The civilian population is the center of gravity – the deciding factor in the struggle…The real battle is for civilian support for, or acquiescence to, the counterinsurgents and host nation government. The population waits to be convinced. Who will help them more, hurt them less, stay the longest, earn their trust? U.S. forces and local authorities therefore must take the civilian perspective into account. Civilian protection becomes part of the counterinsurgent’s mission, in fact, the most important part.

The U.S. military brass clearly understands the importance of civilian protection to mission success as evidenced by the tightening of the rules of engagement in Afghanistan. And yet, amidst numerous credible reports documenting abuses by the ALP, ISAF has responded by suggesting it plans to triple the size of these units.

Perhaps, there is simply a disagreement over the extent of the problem. The U.N. Refugee Agency recently cited abuses by the ALP “as a factor in a 51 percent increase in displacement of Afghans in the first 10 months of 2011 compared with the same time period in 2010.” While acknowledging that problems exist, ISAF believes the ALP is “a really critical part of security.”

The U.S. military is likely feeling pressure to drawdown as rapidly as possible in Afghanistan. Empowering groups akin to local militias is a way to prevent insurgents from filling the void that international military forces leave as they begin to exit. But, it is also an incredibly shortsighted strategy. As Human Rights Watch notes in their September 2011 report:

The constant resort to militias as a quick security fix suggests a lack of understanding of how oppressive even a small militia can be when it operates without proper oversight and with impunity when it commits abuses. When militias engage in rape, murder, theft, and intimidation, and when there is little or no recourse to justice for victims, the creation of militias doesn’t decrease insecurity, it creates it.

As ISAF transitions more responsibility over to Afghans, the focus must be on ensuring that Afghan security forces operate pursuant to the rule of law. Empowering armed groups that repeatedly engage in abuse and violations of the law risks undoing the important security gains made in Afghanistan. It risks delegitimizing the central government in Kabul, inflaming sectarian tensions and could help strengthen the insurgency. The Obama Administration should re-think its shortsighted plans for the ALP if only to make good on its promise to win the war.

Image Courtesy of NATO.

Both bills attempt to thwart online piracy and protect copyrighted intellectual property. However the way that Congress is trying to do this is by giving law enforcement and individual property owners the right to go after websites that might infringe on copyrighted materials and shutdown the website, prohibit other businesses from serving the sites, barring search results to the websites, and requiring service providers to block the websites. This may seem reasonable at the outset, but the results are far more complicated. The implications of such enforcement, and especially the individual right of action that SOPA allows, may mean that attempting to regulate the internet in this way threatens freedom of speech and information issues, places too high a burden on internet companies to comply, and fundamentally changes the way the internet will function within the United States and make it more on par with such beacons of freedom as China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. It is these consequences that are leading many opponents to claim that SOPA will actually break the internet.

Last Thursday the House Judiciary Committee held a session to mark-up the proposed bill. The main focus was the 55 amendments proposed to the original bill, most of which try to soften the impact of the bill and find an acceptable middle ground between proponents of the bill, including the Recording Industry Association of America and the Motion Picture Association of America, and the incredibly long list of internet-based companies and activists who are adamantly against the bill.

Throughout the hours of debating the amendments (all of which failed), netizens tracked and discussed the developments online. It is estimated that over 150,000 people from 150 different countries watched a portion of the hearings on Thursday through the KeepTheWebOpen.org webstream.  As the bill may determine how the internet functions in the US in the future, what better way of looking at the battle against the bill than seeing how it is being fought online?

The hearings are scheduled to resume on Wednesday, December 21. Follow the developments at KeepTheWebOpen.org.

As I wrote several months ago, the Security Council is unlikely to do anything substantial on Syria. The West’s bait and switch on Libya left Russia and China feeling like they got played. As a result, Russia and China have been loath to agree to anything beyond mere condemnation out of the concern that any Security Council resolution could somehow provide legal authority for military intervention.

Interestingly, Russia introduced a Security Council resolution on Syria yesterday. As Colum Lynch of Foreign Policy writes, the resolution is “watered-down”. While the resolution condemns the Syrian regime for the “disproportionate use of force”, it also seeks to contextualize the crisis in Syria as two – sided. For instance, it condemns the activities of “extremist groups” for attacking state institutions and law enforcement personnel.

While defectors from Syria’s army have reportedly engaged in attacks on security forces loyal to Assad, dissident forces have not attacked civilians to my knowledge. Moreover, the opposition hasn’t sprung up in a vacuum – they organized because the Syrian government has killed and abused thousands of civilians. Indeed, the Assad regime has been speaking out of both sides of its mouth. It claims to have responded positively to the Arab League’s peace proposal while continuing to use deadly force against protestors in Homs just today. While the Security Council may have an interest in halting all violence, any resolution coming from the Council needs to be clear about who is most responsible for Syria’s violence and atrocities – Syria’s regime.

So, why is Russia putting a resolution forward on Syria? Perhaps, they are feeling the heat from the international community. It’s been nine months; the Arab League is fed up. Civil society groups keep coming out with reports documenting the Syrian regime’s atrocities, and Assad’s interview with Barbara Walters was frankly ridiculous. It simply confirmed what many suspect – Assad is not serious about resolving the crisis peacefully. Another factor might be Russia’s domestic electoral crisis. Maybe the Kremlin is hoping to deflect attention from its own domestic problems.

A final reason, which I suspect is the dominant factor; Syria’s crisis is getting way out of hand. It’s gone from a domestic problem to a human rights crisis to a country on the brink of civil war. Wars in this part of the world have a tendency to pull in regional players. Some analysts believe Turkey may intervene to provide a safe haven in northern Syria, a suspicion recently denied by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. By putting forward a resolution, albeit weak, Russia can look like it is doing something on Syria, even if it’s toothless. Such a move enables Russia to downplay or discredit arguments that it is stonewalling action at the Security Council.

So, what should the Security Council be doing? Given that the regime continues to attack protestors while claiming to implement the Arab League’s recent proposal – of which a major condition is halting violence – any strategy for protecting civilians has to include the threat of coercive measures. For numerous reasons, military action is not desirable. It could draw Iran into the crisis; international military resources are stretched thin; it’s difficult to protect civilians from the air; and it would likely draw the international community into another expensive nation building enterprise. An orderly exit from power by Assad and a peaceful transition to representative governance would be ideal. But let’s face it – that is unlikely.

So, if the international community is serious about protecting civilians from violence and promoting democratic governance in Syria, it needs to use a “carrot and stick” approach. While undesirable, the credible threat of coercive action has to remain on the table. Otherwise, the Assad regime will continue to use deadly force to suppress the opposition knowing that there will be no punitive consequences for attacking civilians.

A recent report by the International Crisis Group characterizes the threat of military action as “naïve, counterproductive and irresponsible.” It’s hard to believe that is true if the threat of force were credible. It’s certainly not right now because there seems to be little appetite for intervention by the West, and Russia and China are firmly against military action.

Again, it’s not the desired option. Supporting the Arab League’s efforts to pressure Assad to halt the violence and engage in a political process with the opposition seems to be the best strategy for protecting civilians, averting a full – scale civil war and resolving the crisis. But, as the death toll rises, and the Syrian regime continues to kill and balk on its promises, one has to ask – how much longer should the world wait before intervening?

Doctor treating protesters in Baharin. Photo from Al Jazeera English.

One of the uprisings in the Middle East that has failed to garner a lot of attention is the situation in Bahrain. Even though Bahrainis took to the Lulu Roundabout much the same way Egyptians did in Tahrir Square just days after Mubarak’s ouster and before major protests broke out in Libya, the story itself has escaped Western news cycles. The excellent Al Jazeera English documentary on the uprising, Shouting in the Dark, correctly notes that at the outset of the Bahraini protests they “discovered what felt like a secret revolution… No lights, no TV crews, just a people, shouting in the dark.” Not much has changed since those early days of the protests in February. As the world focused on Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, few stories about the troubles in Bahrain made headlines. One of the rare exceptions is the treatment medical personnel have received from the Gulf kingdom for their role in treating protesters harmed by government security forces.

The targeting of medical personnel is not unique to Bahrain but is a serious breach of medical ethics and human rights. In the case of Bahrain, reports of intimidation of medical staff at the state-run Salmaniya Medical Complex emerged within hours of the early morning raid on Lulu. Numerous human rights groups such as Physicians for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch have documented intimidation of medical staff through violent attacks and threats, as well as the militarization of hospitals in order to control access to medical treatment.

As the government crackdown continued but protests failed to die down, the continued willingness of medical staff to fulfill their professional duty to provide care to all people regardless of politics increasingly landed those same medical personnel in political trouble themselves. Before long, many of the country’s top doctors and nurses were arrested under charges of trying to topple the monarchy. The trial of 48 medics in front of a military court started in June and ended in with at least 20 of them receiving sentences ranging from 5 to 15 years in prison in September. Although the government agreed a week later to re-try the medics in a civilian court, new charges of weapons by the prosecution in contradiction to the official report by the Bahrain Independent Commission suggests that the new trial may not be any better in terms of fairness and impartiality.

Of course, the plight of the Bahrain medics is only one facet of troubles the kingdom has faced since protests broke out in February. However it is also indicative of why the crackdown in Bahrain has been more upsetting to some observers than other protests movements like Libya and Yemen. As Hani Mowafi for Amnesty International Magazine noted last month:

Although the scale of violence directed at protestors has certainly been greater in other countries in the region, the brutality of the crackdown in Bahrain came as a shock to many who had considered Bahrain to be a glittering hub of commerce along the lines of the Dubai model. The government attempted to justify its actions by portraying the protestors and their supporters as part of an Iran-backed Shi’a movement even though the protests focused on expanded political rights and included some Sunnis. Although we saw no evidence of sectarianism on the part of hospital staff, the government has targeted them and portrayed them as Shi’a-leaning. Amid this increasingly sectarian rhetoric, simply articulating what had happened became an act of tremendous courage. Indeed, while we were there, the doctors, nurses and emergency personnel we interviewed described being harassed, detained and released on various occasions following the initial crackdown, although they did not anticipate the full scale of the persecution to come.

Today, protests continue daily in Bahrain as does the government crackdown. Meanwhile, medics are waiting in prison cells for their trial to resume in January and learn what their fate will be for doing their job in a place where every action now has political consequences.

So, instead of spending Thanksgiving weekend watching the Macy’s Parade, eating turkey and shopping (my usual Thanksgiving activities), I was in Amsterdam and London for meetings on fighting human trafficking. Human trafficking, or modern day slavery, is an enormous global criminal and human rights problem. It’s worth setting out the basics. “Human trafficking” is an umbrella term for the issues of forced labor, sex trafficking, bonded labor, debt bondage among migrant laborers, involuntary domestic servitude, forced child labor, child soldiers, and child sex trafficking. Human trafficking can happen anywhere, including the US. Estimates of how many people are trafficked each year vary from 2.4 million to 25 million, and it’s a business worth more than $50 billion a year. For more, see:

http://tinyurl.com/d266fy5

Other despots dug in, and promised to crush the opposition. In Libya, the international community took the unprecedented step of authorizing military action to protect civilians from Qaddafi’s iron fist. But, what began as a narrowly defined civilian protection mission soon turned to regime change. Russia, China and others protested at NATO’s de facto expansion of the mission, dashing any hopes that the Security Council would replicate the “Libya model” elsewhere. Meanwhile, autocrats responded with brute force to protestors in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, eliciting mere condemnation from the international community.

2011 also saw a shift in how the Obama Administration is waging its campaign against al Qaeda and associated terror organizations. Rather than fight expensive wars, the Obama Administration has opted for drones strikes, targeted raids like the one that killed Osama Bin Laden, and providing allied governments in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia with the support they need to wage a counterinsurgency campaign. Part of the shift has to do with the expected decrease in U.S. military expenditures. But, the Administration also seems to believe it can better accomplish its goals with these tactics, which also promises fewer U.S. casualties.

While the increased use of drone strikes reduces the threat of U.S. casualties, it is doubtful that such strikes result in zero civilian casualties, as the Administration claimed this past summer. The New America Foundation’s drones database, which is the most compelling study I have found, claims that the non-militant fatality rate from strikes conducted in Pakistan since 2004 is 17%. Of course, casualty counts are all based on the idea that we can firmly distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, an incredibly difficult task in this type of war.

The Obama Administration’s use of surgical strikes also elicited increased criticism from human rights and civil liberties groups in 2011. While the raid that killed Osama Bin Laden was largely free of any controversy, the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen raised constitutional concerns. Al-Awlaki was a dual citizen of both the U.S. and Yemen, and many suspected that he had inspired the Fort Hood shooting and the Christmas day bomber. As I wrote in September, such accusations still do not strip a U.S. citizen of his right to due process by an independent judiciary, and thus I believe the strike against Al-Awlaki violated U.S. constitutional law.

As 2011 winds down, the Obama Administration is also ending the U.S. troop presence in Iraq and trying to ensure it will be able to do the same in two years time in Afghanistan. Earlier this month, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan as “Fight, Talk, Build.” Under this three pronged strategy, the U.S. has been ramping up offensive operations to eliminate the safe havens in Pakistan, while encouraging talks with the Taliban and facilitating trade and investment in Afghanistan.

International forces have also been conducting joint operations with the Afghan national security forces and plan to gradually hand over more responsibility to Afghan forces in preparation for the security transition in 2014. This past summer, the U.N. and numerous human rights groups raised concerns about accountability and professionalism in the Afghan National Security forces, suggesting the training and equipping of these forces is inadequate. The result has been poor compliance with human rights and humanitarian norms by the Afghan security forces, and the lack of efficient institutional mechanisms to lodge complaints when these forces do violate the law.

I could go on, but that is a brief rundown of 2011 from a human rights perspective. Of course, there are some notables to mention. While the Arab Spring certainly caught many off guard, the most unexpected event was the Security Council’s rapid and decisive action on Libya, including the abstentions from China and Russia. Rarely has the Security Council ever worked, much less worked so fast. While China and Russia have been willing to abstain from these type of interventions in the past, typically it has required more than a couple weeks for diplomacy to secure such an agreement.

Many remarkable individuals played a part in the Arab Spring this year, but the most notable person of the year is a man named Ryan Boyette. I first read about Boyette in Nick Kristof’s column a month ago. Boyette moved to the Nuba Mountains in Sudan in 2003 to work for Samaritan’s Purse, a U.S. based aid group. When the Sudanese government began a military offensive against rebel elements in the area, many humanitarian workers left. Boyette stayed and organized a network of people to record the Sudanese government’s atrocities, which were submitted to groups like the Enough Project, which used Boyette’s information in its human rights advocacy. When it was convenient to leave, Boyette risked his life, literally dodging the Sudanese government’s bombing raids, to document atrocities and support the community he had lived with for more than seven years.

With much of what began this past spring still unsettled, 2012 promises to be another important year for human rights. While not an expert on any one of these situations, here are my predictions for 2012. The hard work of fostering governance that is both democratic and capable of meeting the needs of the people in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya is only beginning. Instability in Egypt and Libya will continue in 2012 as the political will and capacity of both interim governments to move the respective countries towards democracy will be questioned.

Syria’s Bashar al – Assad will fall in 2012, either from a military assault launched by defectors from Syria’s military or outside military intervention. Elements inside Syria seem to be organizing against Assad, and while the Security Council is unlikely to authorize coercive action again, a coalition of countries may soon decide that enough is enough – it’s time to replicate the “Libya model” in Syria. While it’s unclear whether local forces or the international community will be the deciding factor, Assad will no longer be Syria’s head of state this time next year.

Expected cuts to the U.S. defense budget will speed up efforts to leave Afghanistan. While the war in Afghanistan has been costly, in terms of lives and treasure, the U.S. and NATO must focus on more than just “getting out.” As I noted earlier this month, international forces have largely focused on “quantity over quality,” in terms of training and equipping the Afghan national security forces. Training must improve to ensure Afghan forces have the skills necessary not just to rout the Taliban, but also to conduct basic policing functions. The international community must also use its leverage to ensure the Afghan government puts the necessary accountability mechanisms in place, such as a functioning military justice system.

Improved training and accountability mechanisms are necessary to ensure the Afghan government can manage security pursuant to the rule of law when combat troops leave Afghanistan in 2014. Given the deteriorating security situation, there may be a tendency to overlook human rights concerns within the Afghan National security forces. But, turning a blind eye to abuses would be a recipe for disaster as the stability of the Afghan government depends on its legitimacy and popular support. Even while the security situation gets worse, I am optimistic that the U.S. and NATO allies will take decisive steps in 2012 to ensure the Afghan national security forces better adhere to human rights norms. Whether or not such steps will be effective will be answered in 2013.

That is my forecast for 2012. Curious to hear other thoughts and opinions.

A former member of the Soviet Military and Intelligence Services, Bout has been involved in some way, shape or form in every major conflict since the end of the Cold War. He has sold arms to governments and rebels responsible for heinous atrocities and human rights abuses across Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Latin America.

After twenty years of supplying weapons to predatory leaders like Liberia’s Charles Taylor, why did U.S. federal prosecutors focus their case on such a narrow set of charges? It likely came down to jurisdictional issues. National laws govern the export and import of weapons. A clear, binding international treaty regulating weapons transfers, and specifically precluding the transfer of lethal weapons to autocrats and terrorist groups, simply does not exist.

In a recent op – ed, Oxfam’s senior policy advisor Scott Stedjan (also a friend and colleague) explains the situation well:

“Bout, whose renowned ability to deliver weapons and goods to almost any region of the world earned him the nickname ‘merchant of death,’ has long maintained that his transportation services – though reprehensible – are not illegal. For some of his activities, he may be right.

As of last year, only 47 percent of the world’s governments have reported that they have basic controls on the import of small arms and light weapons, such as AK-47s and shoulder-fired missiles. Only 52 governments have any form of controls on arms dealers operating in their countries, and of that, less than half have criminal or monetary penalties associated with illegal gun running.

The consequences of these kinds of legal vacuums can be deadly. Because arms dealers can relatively easily exploit weak national control systems, arms continue to flow to perpetrators of mass atrocities, enabling widespread violence against civilians and sustaining conflicts much longer than they would normally run. In 2004, the Department of Treasury barred Bout from doing business with U.S. citizens and companies because of his association with former Liberian President Charles Taylor.”

Oxfam, which recently published “Beyond Viktor Bout: Why the United States Needs an Arms Trade Treaty,” helps lead a coalition of organizations advocating for a robust arms trade treaty, which would require states to adopt national laws to control the import and export of weapons. Organizations calling for an arms trade treaty are absolutely right that a clear and enforceable international treaty regulating arms transfers does not exist.

However, international human rights and humanitarian conventions, which are considered customary international law, do impose obligations, which could be construed to prohibit weapons transfers to predatory or abusive regimes and non – state actors already. For instance, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Geneva Conventions both require states parties “to respect and ensure respect” for these respective treaties.

While these provisions do not explicitly preclude selling or transferring weapons to abusive regimes or non – state actors, a reasonable court could conclude that a state party engaging in weapons transfers to a foreign terrorist group or predatory militia would be in violation of its obligation “to respect and ensure respect” for basic human rights and humanitarian norms.

Albeit more complex, this is certainly a plausible argument. Indeed, while an international treaty precluding weapons transfers to actors that flagrantly abuse basic human rights and humanitarian norms does not exist, customary international law may already prohibit such irresponsible behavior. Of course, a clear and robust arms trade treaty would eliminate any ambiguity and help stop those who wish to make a profit by fueling armed conflict.

In May 2010, Israel raided a flotilla of aid ships determined to breach the maritime blockade of Gaza which activists claim violates international law by imposing collective punishment on the civilian population of the Gaza Strip. Nine activists were killed in the raid, which created a major international incident for Israel and Turkey, where the ships originated from. However it also solidly placed the Gaza Blockade back in the spotlight for human rights activists in the region and around the world.

Since then much has changed in the Middle East but efforts to breach the blockade have not. Attempts of a second flotilla this past June were thwarted after a sustained diplomatic and legal campaign by Israel that saw the Greek government stall ships from leaving port and Cyprus refusing to let potential participants dock. Although the attempt was much publicized, it also had to compete with growing turmoil in Syria and the ongoing war in Libya for attention within the region. After it became clear that most of not all of the ships would sail, focus quickly shifted to other more pressing issues.

To be clear, it’s not that Palestine isn’t getting attention but just that other issues are dominating the spotlight. In September the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority launched a campaign for statehood at the UN, creating ripples throughout the system as seen with the recent admission of Palestine by UNESCO . Meanwhile, the historic prisoner swap between Hamas and Israellast month dominated headlines for days. Then there is Israel itself, which has grown increasingly hawkish in its stance towards Iran. Such power moves are what makes news, not small symbolic attempts to shed light on a blockade that has existed since 2007.

The lack of sustained attention led Dan Murphy to ask the real question of what if there was another Gaza flotilla and no one noticed? The article refers to the most recent attempt at breaching the blockade with a smaller group of two ships that left from Turkey on November 2. With just 27 activists, this attempt was miniscule compared to the 500 activists that attempted to participate in the June attempt. As expected, the Israeli Navy intercepted the two ships on Friday before they reached Gaza and are now in the process of deporting the activists. Compared to the other two attempts, there has been little drama this time around. It would be easy to overlook this event and let it pass without much coverage. But in the Middle East, conflict is not hard to find and therein may lie the bigger story.

Fortunately most of the conflict of this attempt was left online in a “battle of the hashtags” on Twitter with Israeli officials documenting the issue with #provocatilla (a pithy form of provocative flotilla) and pro-Gaza activists using #FreedomWaves. The stakes were raised over the weekend as several key Israeli government websites were taken offline after calls from the “hacktivist” group Anonymous to target the sites in solidarity with the flotilla. Again, these incidents involve far less drama than last year’s military raid or the diplomatic maneuvering back in June. But it also mirrors the tactics of other groups in the region such as the pro-Assad Syrian Electronic Army and the “Bahraini Trolls” that are nearly inescapable in any conversation regarding Bahrain on Twitter. These tactics may seem inconsequential, the juvenile tricks of people who spend too much time online. But the rise of hacktivist groups and their growing numbers also suggests that these campaigns may be just the tip of an iceberg where serious cyber damage could be wrought.

Finally, a word about the flotilla itself. The clearest message this latest attempts tells us is that the issue of the Gaza blockade is not over. Despite the bigger concerns of the region in a year that has seen the status quo turned on its head, two small ships sailing towards an imaginary line in the sea still garnered a considerable amount of attention. And once again, the blockade is back in the spotlight along with the outlines of what conflict in the region may increasingly look like in the future.