Although Tony Blair has “long since given up trying to persuade people [that the Iraq War] was the right decision,” he has found a convenient new way to justify it in time for the 10th anniversary of the invasion. According to Blair, since Saddam Hussein was “20 times worse” than Bashar al-Assad, it logically follows that had the Iraq War never happened, we would now be witnessing brutal repression in Iraq that would make the carnage in Syria look like a minor sideshow. “I certainly think that if Saddam had still been in power, it’s true there would have been, probably, an uprising amongst his people,” said Blair. “But I think it would look a lot more like Syria and probably a lot worse than Syria.” Connecting the dots in this way is a major feat of mental gymnastics which doesn’t hold up to even a cursory examination.

Blair’s speculation treats the Iraq War as though it took place in a vacuum. We’ll never know how the Arab Spring would have turned out if the Iraq War had never happened, but the fact is that it did happen, and it had such a transformative effect on the Middle East and international policy-making in the region that Blair’s prognostication is utterly meaningless. But let’s indulge him in envisioning this alternative version of events for a moment.

Blair is speculating about what might have happened to Iraq had the invasion never occurred, but he is selectively imagining that the international posture on intervention would remain unchanged under this fantasy scenario. Clearly that is wrong. The U.S., U.K. and other allies would have been far less reluctant to use limited forms of intervention such as enforcing no-fly zones and supplying material support, including weapons, to opposition groups had the Iraq War never happened. So it is far more logical to think that the experience of Iraq has eroded the political will of the international community to intervene in Syria, rather than Blair’s twisted conclusion that the example of Syria vindicates the decision to remove Saddam Hussein by showing just how bad things could have been in Iraq years later.

While other members of the Blair-era Labour Party have admitted that they were wrong about the war, Blair continues to stick to his guns, spinning hopeful arguments about the lessons of Syria which demonstrate at best a startlingly unsophisticated way of thinking, and at worst a cynical and self-serving abdication of responsibility for his role in the devastation of Iraq.

Back in the swing of things.

“Iraq could overtake Russia as the world’s second-largest oil supplier behind Saudi Arabia by the 2030s, nearly tripling its current output, according to a report from the International Energy Agency.” (h/t The LA Times)

“Iraq has signed contracts to buy Russian arms worth $4.2bn (£2.6bn; 3.2bn euros) this year, Russian news agencies report.  Moscow, the main supplier of arms to Iraq under Saddam Hussein, thus becomes the country’s second-biggest arms supplier after the US.” (h/t The Chicago Tribune)

______________________________________________________________________________________

Two isolated news stories, linked by two players and joined at the provocative nexus between arms and oil…

Tuesday, negotiations between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his Russian counterpart, Demitry Medvedev, yielded big news: Thirty Mi-28 attack helicopters and forty-two Pantsir S1 surface-to-air missiles were sold to Iraq. Future parleys are expected to proffer a small fleet of MiG-29 jets to support new armored vehicles and other instruments of ground war.

The weapons deal – negotiated this summer by Iraq’s acting Defense Minister, Saadoun al-Dulaimi – will cost Baghdad some $4.2 billion. Luckily, Iraq is about to be flush with cash.

While the details of the arms purchase were under discussion, the International Energy Agency was busily prepping a “landmark” report that hypothesizes Iraq can overtake Russia as the world’s second largest oil supplier (behind the Saudis) by 2030. The Paris-based IGO serves as a statistical aggregator and information hub for the international energy market. They’re particularly bullish on Iraq, the world’s third largest oil-exporter, which “could double its production by the end of the decade, reaching 6.1 million barrels a day by 2020.” That’s up from the 3 million barrels Iraq currently ships by close of business. By 2035, 8.3 million barrels per day is a reality, given infrastructural investment.

It seems mere months ago that international experts and opinion-makers were bemoaning Persian proto-occupation of an Iraqi puppet state…before Syria shook, while sanctions floored the rial and Iranian leadership doubled-down on an isolation posture.

In the energy market, Iraq looks to subsume Iranian market share as a key supplier to Asian markers – particularly China. This will afford a revamped military apparatus, and parochial swagger in absence of Assad.

As I prefaced this summer, there’s budding perspective that an emergent Iraq may surprise as a regional power – and a revived counterbalance to fears of Iranian hegemony:

Iraq’s parliamentary democracy (although fragile) and quietest Shi’a tradition (as embodied by Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani) remain obstacles to the brittle legitimacy of Iran’s titular theocracy.

Toss in military muscle and an evolving economy and influence might be flowing the other direction. Too soon to say, for sure, but recent events are promising for a country that’s suffered instability since the Reagan administration.

An Emerging Power?

The Council on Foreign Relations recently published an interesting memorandum titled “Renewed Violence in Iraq.” The contingency report, authored by Douglas Ollivant of the New America Foundation, offers suggestions as to how the U.S. can help the Iraqi government cope with myriad internal security threats.

Ollivant begins by identifying the major social/national fault lines that hector the body politic in Iraq: Shi’a-Sunni; Arab-Kurd, and intra-Shi’a. By now, they should ring familiar. The author notes that:

Either of these contingencies could spark the other, as political declarations enflame ethno-sectarian tensions, or ethno-sectarian conflict spurs political declarations of independence or withdrawal from the political system. To complicate matters, turmoil in the region could also spill over into Iraq and exacerbate internal tensions.

The last line stuck out to me. As an interested academic-type and foreign policy observer, I’m slightly staggered by the lack of attention paid Iraq even before America’s troop withdrawal, back in December 2011 – particularly given Baghdad’s public discomfort at instability in Syria, Egypt, etc. As Ollivant notes, “The United States has a significant stake in helping Iraq overcome these challenges; Iraq is a critical state within a critical region.”

As we know, the violence that simmers was triggered by invasion, and accelerated by mistakes made by coalition officials, in its aftermath. As such, Ollivant suggests U.S. support for improving intelligence cooperation between the two countries, reinforcing the Iraqi electoral process, and cultivating friendly, bilateral relations between Iraq and Turkey.

To what end, you ask? Iraq remains an unpleasant memory — an ultimately unpopular war, best recalled by a false-start “Mission Accomplished” that bled American blood and treasure on the streets of Baghdad and Basra, Fallujah and Tikrit.

Well, Ollivant summates beautifully:

Iraq is also not only an influencer but a participant in the “Arab-Persian” axis. It is primarily an Arab country like much of the Middle East, but it has a Shia majority like Iran that exercises political control. Similarly, Iraq is a frontline state in the conflict between moderate Islam and al-Qaeda, a battle for ideas that will continue to be of major import in the fight against terrorism. Iraq has a significant minority Kurdish population, a distinction it shares with the otherwise dissimilar Iranian, Turkish, and Syrian regimes. With the world’s fifth-largest oil reserves, Iraq’s output can stabilize or roil markets, directly affecting the U.S. economy. As Iraq moves back into the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quota system, how it aligns within the organization—whether with the stability-oriented bloc of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States or with the more ideological bloc led by Iran and Venezuela—will have clear implications for U.S. energy policy.

An excellent aggregate of America’s enduring interest in the future of Iraqi governance and energy output.

But, Ollivant prefaced that statement with an interesting aside. He notes that Iraq has potential as an “emerging regional power.” This is true. As I wrote back in July, Iraqi oil production now outpaces Iran. Concurrently, Iraq’s parliamentary democracy (although fragile) and quietest Shi’a tradition (as embodied by Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani) remain obstacles to the brittle legitimacy of Iran’s titular theocracy.

Since before the 2003 invasion, critics of the president’s initial war aims were shouting that the creation of democracy in Iraq would simply ensure increased Iranian influence. Now that the country has steadied, slightly, it’s interesting to consider the influece Iraq could have to her east, given delicate American assistance, regional partnerships (e.g., with Ankara) and electoral stability.

“Abu Bakr Baghdadi Emir of the Islamic State of Iraq”

“You will soon witness how attacks will resound in the heart of your land, because our war with you has now started…“

- Abu Bakr Baghdadi

Presaging the latest wave of violence in Iraq, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) released a recorded message, heralding the start of Ramadan. The speaker, believed to be Abu Bakr Baghdadi (the name, itself, has become something of an heirloom nom de guerre), foretold a new campaign of violence against the Iraqi government, heralded the Syrian uprising, and directly threatened Americans. Not those Americans still stationed in Iraq – forgotten on the home-front as they while away in bureaucratic limbo. No, Baghdadi has promised to bring the war in Iraq to us here in the States. And yesterday, at a House Committee on Homeland Security briefing, the issue was addressed by Congress.

Representative Michael McCaul (R-Texas) spoke to the threat and offered a realistic assessment: Attacking the United States proves easier said than done, but now’s the time to stiffen our guard.

“…When you have the leader signaling that it is time to go on the offensive, there is a heightened sense of concern for law enforcement and intelligence agencies here in the U.S.”

Fair enough. Of course, this isn’t the first time America has faced a “threat” from AQI.

The L.A. Times reminds us:

Two Iraqi refugees were arrested in Kentucky in May of last year and charged with attempting to ship weapons from the U.S. to assist Al Qaeda in Iraq. The fingerprint of one of the men had allegedly been found on a bomb that attacked a U.S. convoy in Iraq in 2005. Federal officials believe the two men had been trained to build roadside bombs from cordless telephones.

In January 2011, a Canadian man named Faruq Isa was arrested for allegedly recruiting fighters to launch attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq. Isa is fighting extradition to the U.S. from Canada to face charges of conspiracy to kill Americans.

The former incident consisted of two ham-fisted, would-be jihadists ensnared in an FBI plot that lured them into action. The latter incident involved a more serious threat that cost five American soldiers and seven Iraqi police officers their lives – in Iraq. Tragic, nonetheless, but impossible to construe as an attack – or even a threat – against the North American mainland.

I’m inclined to presume Baghdadi’s threats ring hollow when directed against Americans living in America. However, on the ground in Iraq, his organization’s ability to mobilize the mechanics of terror is clearly on the uptick. With fighters waging war against the Assad regime, some Iraqis have expressed fears that a slow-burning civil war in Syria would provide a new toe-hold for extremists, bent on engulfing the region in the flames of sectarian conflict.

In an odd way, this might distort Baghdadi’s human capital. Consider this passage regarding the shape and stature of the 2012-iteration of al Qaeda, prepared this year by Rand Corp.’s Michael Jenkins:

A weakened but still lethal al Qaeda in Iraq continues its campaign of terror aimed at Iraqi government officials, Sunni tribal leaders who have turned against it, and members of the Shia community, in an effort to provoke a sectarian civil war between the country’s Sunni and Shia communities as the remaining American forces are withdrawn. One of the West’s greatest concerns is that these experienced, technically savvy veterans of al Qaeda’s terrorist campaign in Iraq will slip into the West, elevating the domestic terrorist threat.

With all hands on deck in the battle for Syria, one wonders whether AQI can effectively wage a two front war. Only time will tell.

Iraqi oil is booming…so what?

Although American statesmen and Republican politicians of the Bush era hate to admit it, one of the foundational aims of the war in Iraq – the creation of a liberal democracy – guaranteed an increase in Iranian influence both within Iraq and across the region. The politics of Shi’a majority were immediately advantaged by electoral democracy, and parties and personalities – both homegrown and upon return from exile – supported by (and supportive of) Iran were sure to emerge. Members of Congress failed to recognize that America couldn’t fight its way out of this natural end result, and war waged on against militant Iranian proxies fighting in the streets of Baghdad and across the Shi’a south.

To quote the Cato Institute’s Ted Carpenter way back in 2008:

The United States did Tehran a huge favor by removing the [Ba’athi] political elite, and paving the way for the Shiite-Kurdish alliance that now dominates Iraq’s political affairs. Having taken that step, it does little good now for proponents of the war to whine about Tehran’s expanded influence.

Of course, we’ve mostly heard the latter since the end of American power presence in Iraq. Here in the States, Republican and Democrats, alike, bemoan the Shi’a dominated, post-war Iraqi government’s predilection to play it close with the Iran/Syrian alliance. Nouri al Maliki has proven supportive of the Assad regime, and has maintained even closer ties to his sectarian cousins in Tehran. Some have suggested that Iraq has matured into Iran’s latest client state, not the “sovereign, stable and self-reliant” nation President Obama extolled when proclaiming an end to America’s military misadventure.

If Iraqi governance is to achieve self-determination it will do so based on its economic solidity. Now, despite myriad security setbacks, there now appears to be a light at the end of that tunnel. Today, Bloomberg reports that Iraqi crude production in the month of June outpaced Iran’s for the first time in more than two decades. This was due to the precipitous decline of output from the Islamic Republic ahead of a European Union ban on purchase from the nation that started July 1:

Iraq pumped 2.984 million barrels a day in June, outpacing Iran’s 2.963 million, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ Vienna-based secretariat said today in its Monthly Oil Market Report. That’s the first time Iraq’s output has exceeded Iran’s since 1988, when the countries ended their eight-year war, statistics compiled by BP Plc show.

Stated frankly, this news is significant for two reasons. First, Iraq’s robust oil production alleviates concerns that the EU embargo on Iranian crude will press global supplies. Second, the recovery of the Iraq’s largest currency earner should remind us that Iraq can stand on its own two feet.

Now the bad news. This maturation of Iraqi oil doesn’t resolve Tehran’s leverage in Baghdad for one critical reason. Since Saddam was toppled, the constitution written, and governance established, controversy has simmered over oil contracts, and the constitution’s hydrocarbon law, which remains a work in progress. Political divides within the country surrounding oil profits have contributed to the long-standing debate over the costs and benefits of a strong central government versus stronger decentralized governments.

Before Iraq can move forward as state, it still must come together as a nation. At present, it remains critically fragile — one hopes this oil boom might afford a brighter future.

Al Qaeda in Iraq since 2003!

Way back in February I expanded on a report in the Christian Science Monitor that suggested al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had set up shop against the Assad regime, in Syria. Writing both here and for The American Spectator, I joined the chorus of analysts, academics and pundits who urged caution against arming Syrian rebels – precisely because it’s unthinkable to equip battle-hardened veterans of an Iraqi insurgency who cut their teeth fighting American servicemen in the street of Fallujah, Tikrit, et al. 

These initial warnings surfaced around the time al Qaeda’s de facto leader, Ayman al Zawahiri, urged Levatine Islamists of all shapes and sizes to take the fight to Damascus. In essence, he was appealing to members of the most-radicalized membership of the Ikhwan movement and violent Salafists, many of whom live on the eastern side of the shared, 600 mile border between Syria and Iraq.

Needless to say, rank-and-file types serving in such organizations as AQI, the United Jihad Factions, Jaish al-Rashidun, and the Islamic Army in Iraq weren’t necessarily produced by a monolithic, indigenous militant Islamist movement in Iraq. They came from other countries. Many of them came from Syria. And now they’ve returned home.

This latter statement was confirmed by Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, on Thursday. AP reports suggested leadership in Baghdad feared an extremist toehold in Syria – Zebari elaborated cautiously, but did state his main concern is “extremist, terrorist groups taking root in neighboring countries.”

An understandable concern, given the current state of Iraq – a country so fragile, it exists in a perpetual state of simmering self-implosion. A famous German proverb states that a long war leaves a country with three armies – an army of cripples, an army of mourners, and an army of thieves. While the latter force occupies the parliament in Baghdad, one might argue a fourth army manifested itself in the Iraq war, and it’s now pitched camp in Syria.

Lest we make the same mistakes again; let us recognize the latest confirmation of collateral damage wrought by war in Iraq – when first we beheaded (if not quite literally) our unlikely Iranian counterbalance and ally in the war on radical Islam, Mssr. Saddam Hussein. The Butcher of Baghdad was a vile despot. His tyranny represented the petty archaism of socialist Pan-Arabism, and his iron fist throttled the lifeblood of his countrymen. But coalition war on Iraqi Arabs cultivated popular protest – the sort of social upheaval  that resulted in the ouster of two of America’s most-unpopular proxies, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Of course this was before the NATO bombing campaign over Libya created a migration crisis that ultimately destabilized Mali.

Before the next Turkish plane gets shot down, I’d expect Ankara to demand a contingency plan from fellow NATO members. Well, it’s time to “just say no” to any military intervention (“kinetic,” supportive, or otherwise) and tone down the insatiable instinct to intervene.

Askariya remains hotly contested. Photo Credit: Mandi Wright/Detroit Free Press/KRT

The past weeks in Iraq have been marked by an alarming uptick in violence. A recent CNN tally suggested at least 180 people were killed during the month of June – most of them victims of frequent bombings and small arms attacks.

Umpteen explosions in Baghdad, and high-profile assaults against Shi’a pilgrims occupied the top headlines – the June 13 attack that killed 93 people contributed a disproportionate casualty count to the month’s bloody tally.

But in Samarra a sectarian conflict quietly boiled over today, leaving two members of the local awakenings council dead. A day prior, gunmen unloaded three bombs beside the house of Hatim al-Mansouri, head of the local pro-government, Sons of Iraq movement. Formally known as the National Council for the Awakening of Iraq, the Sons and the awakening councils are made up of predominantly Sunni Arab fighters who turned against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) at the tail-end of 2006. Their decision to sever ties with AQI was christened the “Anbar Awakening” by Iraqi operatives, and was hailed as a critical turning point in the US war effort.

Years later (and despite the fact that a majority of violence has recently been targeted towards Iraqi Shi’as), it now appears the country’s Western Sunni Arabs are once again embattled, but their foes have taken a different shape.

Sadly, the recent charge in violence may be linked to the 2006 blast that blew apart the gilded dome of one of Shi’a Islam’s holiest shrines. The attack on the Askariya shrine in Samarra, some 65 miles north of Baghdad, has reverberated for years. In the immediate aftermath, clerical leadership simultaneously rallied and reigned in their followers’ outrage at the shocking assault on a major Muslim landmark. In the years that followed, the incident dramatically escalated the vicious cycle of sectarian violence that dragged a fractured country deeper into civil war.

Although the golden dome and the minarets were restored and the shrine reopened to visitors in April, 2009, The New York Times reported at the beginning of June, 2012:

Controversy over control of a religious shrine where a 2006 bombing set off waves of sectarian killings took a new violent turn […]when a suicide car bomber struck an important Shiite religious office in central Baghdad.

The strike against the Shiite office was the deadliest single attack in the capital in nearly three months. It occurred as a dispute escalated between Sunnis and Shiites over control of the Askariya Shrine in Samarra, a largely Sunni city north of Baghdad. (Emphasis mine.)

It’s important to remember that the Askariya Shrine is claimed as holy by both Shi’a and Sunni Muslims. It also exists as a distinct source of pride and commerce for many of Samarra’s Sunni citizens.

Now, rumors are rife that the government may have had some part to play in the recent bombings.  That said, violence targeted at members of the government-backed awakenings councils may be viewed as retribution.

Regardless, the violence and pain caused by initial destruction of the Askariya mosque continues to fan flames of sectarian conflict in Iraq. Recent attacks hint at an unfortunate throwback to the dark days of 2006 when the country seemed on the edge complete failure.

All the while, national unity and a necessary commitment to peaceful political dialogue seem to be slipping back into the brink.

The Holy Shrine of Imam Moussa al-Kadhim and his Grandson Imam Muhammad al-Taqi. Source: alhikmeh.com

Early Wednesday morning, nearly seventy people were killed and more than 100 wounded in a flurry of road-side bombings targeted against Shi’a pilgrims. A redoubtable Sunni insurgency launched the coordinated wave of attacks as tens of thousands of their countrymen participated in a religious festival marking the anniversary of the death of the eighth century Imam Moussa al Kadhim, the seventh of the twelve Imams. The worst attack took place north of Baghdad, in Kadhimiya, where a great crowd had gathered to observe the occasion–but bombings in the Baghdad neighborhood of Karada and the town of Balad also claimed lives.

The fact that this attack occurred on the festival day of Moussa al Kadhim compelled me to learn a little bit more about the man; perhaps to see if any lessons from his life and times could shed light on present day Iraq.

To start with, I knew little more about him other than that he lived and died during the rise of the Abbasid dynasty, which decimated the Umayyad caliphate with the help of the Shi’a before turning their backs on their confessional cousins and assassinating the descendants of the Prophet. A preliminary search informed me that Moussa al Kadhim, himself, was murdered by the Abbasids. Both his son and his father met the same fate. He bore two prominent children–Ali ar-Riza–the eighth Shi’a Imam, and a daughter, Fatima, who remains revered for her grace and piety.

There was once a sect of Islam–the Waqifites–who believed in the Mahdism and occultation of Moussa al Kadim himself, although they split into a number of subgroups regarding his death and ascension to heaven. According to a website dedicated to the life and teachings of his son, the Imam Reza (A.S.) Network, the Waqfites were organized under suspicious circumstances relating to monies gathered in his name of Imam al Kadhim, while he was imprisoned by the Abbasid ruler. According to their historical investigation, Ali ar-Riza demanded a share of the tithes collected upon his father’s death, but the agents charged with collection denied his passing and refused payment–instead, they put the money to their own use and spread rumors of his occultation to justify their decision to keep the cash.

Consider the following, also from their website:

Imam Reza, peace be on him, condemned the Waqifites for their creeds. One of his followers (Shï‘ites) had written to him and asked him about them, and he, peace be on him, replied: “The Waqifite has deviated from the True Religion and persisted in his evil deed. If he dies for it, then his abode is hell; and evil is the resort.”

The Waqifites maintained their beliefs for quite some time, but the disappearance of their sect was ultimately obliged when they were convinced by Ali ar-Ridha that his father had died.

While his occultation was called into question, and ultimately invalidated, Imam Moussa al Kadhim’s legacy lives on in his teaching and sayings. The quote of his I found most relevant to his life and times, and present day Iraq, is taken from what I believe is the third section of the al-Kafi fi ‘Ilm al-Din (a Twelver Shi’a-specific collection of hadithic narrations): “The world is soft and beautiful like a snake, but there is a fatal poison inside.”

Given his assassination and the recent violence that plagued the holy march of pilgrims to his grave site, sadly, these remain words to live by.

Iraqi Prime Minister beginning his first visit to Kirkuk. Source: Marwan Ibrahim/AFP/Getty Images

Over at the Huffington Post (via AP), Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Brian Murphy raise an interesting point regarding the political crisis currently gripping Iraq’s fragile parliamentary patchwork.

They note leadership in Iran is desperately clinging to their power proxy in Baghdad – Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, and his factional allies in the Iraqi National Alliance. Their ruling coalition is critically hemmed to shaky support from Muqtada al Sadr’s bloc. (If you recall, this ultimate marriage of political convenience was built upon the ashes of hot conflict between ISF troops, and al Sadr’s Mehdi army back in 2008.) However, that support seems to be wavering. Just Sunday, al Sadr suggested al Maliki “do the right thing,” and resign – now the firebrand cleric is being pressured by his allies in Iran stand down, in deference to political status quo.

As noted at HuffPo:

A collapse of al-Maliki’s government would be a potential stinging blow to Iran’s ruling system, which is already nervous about the future of its other critical Middle East ally, Syria’s embattled President Bashar Assad. It also presents a rare convergence of interests between Tehran and Washington, which also views the wily al-Maliki as perhaps the only viable Iraqi leader for the moment.

To be clear, criticism of al Maliki doesn’t end with the Sadrists. Iraq has suffered a succession of deeply tangled political crises that began back in mid-December. Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiyya list initiated accusations that al Maliki was assuming dictatorial control of the state, anchored in confessional lockstep with his fellow Shi’a in parliament. These crisises were tied, in no small part, to the arrest warrant issued for fellow Iraqiyya lister, Tariq al-Hashemi, (a Sunni) who was accused of fielding a hit squad tasked with the murder of Shi’a government officials.

Messrs. Maliki (left) and Sadr (right) in happier times…

Iraqiyya exists as the formal, parliamentary opposition in a calcified legislature that has failed to pass any substantial legislation other than its budget. While this probably says something altogether lousy about the shape of our representative democracy here in the States, Iraqi governance risks fracture if al Sadr’s tenuous relationship with Mr. Maliki can’t hold.

As I wrote for The American Spectator nearly a year ago, al Sadr’s decision to withdraw his party’s support for al Maliki’s ruling coalition would constitute the political demolition of the Iraqi parliament – more damaging than anything his Mehdi Army might have accomplished.

Mere months ago, analysts were suggesting that al Maliki had emerged from a series of potentially destabilizing political crises wielding even more power over his government, and more popularity within his strictly Shi’a constituency. Present circumstances challenge those presumptions.

According to an interesting report by NPR’s Peter Kenyon, the PM’s adversaries are numerous, and they all share one thing in common – fear of a man who’s assuming a Saddam-esque stature.

The Kurds are convinced he’s ready to attack them as soon as the Americans deliver promised F-16 fighter jets to the Iraqi air force.

The Sadrists are convinced he’s planning to evict them from the ruling coalition, and [Baghdad analyst Ahmad al Abyadh] believes another Shiite group in Maliki’s bloc, known by the acronym ISKI, could be wavering.

Of course, all this spells trouble for al Maliki, who has stacked his cabinet and the national bureaucracy with political allies, but may ultimately lack parliamentary support to maintain his ruling coalition. No matter, to him – I suppose – if he’s truly committed to parroting the last dictator that ruled Iraq from Baghdad.

As ever, a collapse of the democratic experiment on the Tigris looms large. Too soon to tell if the current PM will survive this political crisis, but faced with the hardening of autocracy vs. the disintegration of parliament, this undoubtedly spells “B-A-D-N-E-W-S” for the Iraqi people.

What else is new?

Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad, Hassan Danaiifar, explained that merely hosting the talks demonstrated a historic chapter in the history of Iraq. But what does the event actually mean for leadership in Baghdad?

Well, it’s difficult to surmise. According to Iranian officials close to the negotiations, “Iraq will not participate in the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 permanent members of the UN security Council, plus Germany – but on the sidelines of the meeting will help bring the views of the two sides closer.”

I’d question whether this is even possible. As I wrote at The American Spectator, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei has tapped Saeed Jalili as his personal emissary and chief negotiator. It will be Jalili’s task to stare down the EU’s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, who will be representing the 5+1 powers.

Jalili presents an interesting study. A bonafide ideologue and institutional hardliner, he left half his right leg on the front lines of the Iran-Iraq War. Perhaps even more intriguing is his doctoral thesis in political science, which discussed the relevance of the Prophet Muhammad’s seventh century hadithic traditions to present day foreign affairs.

He’ll prove a tough representative – and intractably loyal to his higher-ups in Iran’s political stacking chart. The sudden removal of his predecessor, Ali Larijani, was premised on his personal frustrations with an ever-hardening Iranian stance regarding its nuclear standoff with Western powers. Jalili demonstrates no such ambivalence when it comes to his dealings, as witnessed in previous rounds of negotiations.

Maliki and Jalili share a laugh in 2010. Source: Google Images

It’s also worth noting that a devastating sandstorm may delay the 5+1 delegates from reaching Baghdad in time for the start of the dialogue. Iranian dignitaries haven’t experienced the same hassles en route to the Iraqi capital. In fact, Iran’s official news agency suggested that Saeed Jalili and his team had arrived early to talk shop with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and President Jalal Talabani regarding “mutual, regional and international issues.”

Of course, the very fact that Iraq’s erstwhile enemy asked its fellow majority Shi’a government to host these negotiations demonstrates how far these two states have come. As the BBC’s James Reynolds notes, there’s a strange irony to the fact that US soldiers once fought their way into Baghdad, on suspicions of weapons of mass destruction – now diplomats have now returned to discuss the same subject. That the topic of discussion is squarely focused due east of Baghdad suggests a strange twist of fate.

Iran’s clerical leadership is likely pursuing the sort of nuclear deterrence that eluded lesser despots in Iraq and Libya. America’s invention of “democracy” in Iraq guaranteed increased Iranian influence. Some napkin-math should have alerted the architects of American invasion that the creation of a representative demos in one of four simple majority-Shi’a states on the planet might prove problematic.

Now, Iraq’s next door neighbor, and confessional cousin, has extended home-field advantage to the shores of the Tigris. Let’s see where that gets us in the next round of nuclear talks.

As he writes:

Iraqi Shia clergy are already resisting Iranian influence as the Najaf Hawza (the world’s oldest learning centre for Shia) tries to reclaim its prominence, overshadowed by Qom’s Hawza in Iran since 1979. Najaf and Qom deeply differ on the concept of clerical leadership. It is safe to say that the differences between Shia and Sunni Muslims over caliphate (on who should have succeeded the Prophet) are as deep as the differences among Shiites on imamate (who can lead Muslims).

As Hassan notes, Najaf is considered “hawza samitah” – in clerical terms, this connotes a “quietist” seminary. “Quietism” compels a passive political posture on the part of the clergy. In contrast, the prevailing logic in Qom suggests a cleric can lead the faithful until the return of the promised Mahdi, who’s currently tucked away in occultation. Of course, this is the line of thinking that led to Khomeini’s revolution and Iranian theocracy, by writ of vilayat e-faqih.

Khomeini divined this sacred custodianship as his major contribution to Shi’a Islamic theology. It’s an expansive, post-“Age of Mahdi Occultation” theory unique to Iran that presumes “guardianship” of Islamic jurisprudence is represented by a “supreme” clerical leader. This doyen is to be supported by his devotional lieutenants in other critical realms of governance – most notably the Assembly of Experts (all whom must boast clerical bona fides), the Council of Guardians (of whom, half must be ordained), the courts and state-appointed leaders of Friday prayers.

Hassan notes an important new figure, now emerging on our collective Western radar. The higher-ups in Qom are reportedly grooming cleric Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi to lead Iraq’s Shi’a after the death of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. At present, Sistani serves as the highest ranking Twelver marja in Iraq, the de facto leader of the world’s Shi’a population (outside of Iran) and an important opponent of Khomeini’s vilayat vision for politico-Islamic guardianship. However, he is advanced in years, ailing in health and likely not long for this world.

If Shahroudi were to inherit Sistani’s position atop the clerical stacking chart, this could draw Iraq’s Shi’a population closer to their neighbors in Iran. While Sistani is Iranian by birth (and speaks his Arabic with a pronounced Persian accent), Shahroudi is an Iraqi transplant to Qom, and a powerful member of Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamanei’s inner circle. But he won’t become the next spiritual leader of Iraq’s Shi’a majority without the blessing and funding of leadership in Tehran.

Former Foreign Service office Peter Van Buren (who writes an excellent blog over at wemeantwell.com) notes a recent meeting between Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and Shahroudi could be one of the most overlooked, yet critical stories we missed this past week.

He writes:

Speaking privately, a senior official in Baghdad described the meeting as ”extremely significant”, revealing at least tacit support by Mr Maliki for an Iranian plan to have Ayatollah Shahroudi replace the ailing Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani as spiritual leader of Iraq’s Shiites.

Reidar Visser, an Oslo-based analyst of Iraqi affairs, sees formidable obstacles to the Shahroudi bid, but warned: “By visiting Shahroudi, Maliki did nothing to kill the rumours about some kind of Iranian design on the holiest centre of Iraqi Shiism. “If Shahroudi should succeed … those arguing that Maliki is moving towards even greater co-ordination with the Iranian clergy would feel vindicated – and rightly so.”

Put plainly, the clerical “closening” between these two states will prove vital to consider as Iraq entrenches an ever-deepening alliance with Iran.

Absent allusions to America’s Democratic Party, in Kurdistan, the donkey is a beloved beast. So says Donkeys’ Party secretary general Omar Kalol, who hopes the statue will serve the Kurdish people as a friendly reminder to treat their domestic animals more kindly.

Karol went on to say:

“The donkey played a very distinguished role in the Kurdish armed liberation movement … and it was the only friend of the Kurdish fighters in the mountains of Kurdistan during the struggle for Kurdish rights,” he said, referring to decades-long guerrilla war in northern Iraq and Iran.

It’s not every day political imagery ties animal rights to armed resistance, but AFP reports the bronzed effigy attracted the attention of a number of Kurdish artists, intellectuals and political thinkers.

Since its foundation in 2005, the Donkey Party has worked hard to meet the measure of its namesake – administrative structure is based around the life of the donkey, while headquarters and district branches are named after the various barns and sheds that house the animal.

AFP further reports the party has demanded regional government provide financial support to open a district radio station named “Zarin,” which translates – incredibly loosely – in English to “Hee-Haw.”

To this I say, “Donkeys, well met.” Here’s to a party that aims to gain ground through honest politicking, savvy messaging and the touching recognition of the traditionally humble but hard-working engine of social and economic life.

They’re already off to a grand start.

For his part, the Iraqi prime minister has been sporting his best “good neighbor” impression, in recent months – likely in hopes of impressing fellow Iraqis and Arab leaders, alike, that he’s ready to shove past the strongman schtick that’s defined his premiership. However, Maliki’s decision to postpone the extravagant resolution conference proved a sour pairing with his vigorous defense of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. The call to support the embattled Alawite happened to coincide with Saudi endorsement of support for Syrian rebels at a US-backed gathering of “Friends of Syria” in Istanbul. Now, Maliki’s contrarian message threatens to further endanger rapidly deteriorating relations between Iraq and the Arab world.

One must consider the alarming notion that failure to reconcile sectarian squabbles in Iraq, and the persecution of Sunni leaders such al-Hashemi, is a powerful prompt to Sunni Arabs that Maliki remains a complicit cats-paw, tucked deep in Persia’s pocket. In reality, I don’t believe this is the case, although I recognize an attachment based on Shi’a culture and faith – not a preconceived desire to be controlled by Iran. However, social maltreatment and political disenfranchisement of Sunnis in Iraq has reached a fever pitch since Maliki wrenched the prime minister’s post from Ayad Allawi’s cross-sectarian coalition – with a little, timely help from his neighborhood Sadrists.

Taken in context of his forceful support for Tehran’s proxies in Damascus, and a rapidly calcifying authoritarian political structure in Baghdad and there is cause for concern. Particularly if you’re a Sunni Arab monarch staring down the barrel of a resurgent Shi’a crescent.

But let’s keep this in context. Despite outward appearance, the power struggle between Arab Sunnis and Arab Shi’as in present day Iraq exists between two sectarian groups that are, in fact quite similar. Although portrayed in the Western media as a gaping ethno-cultural or religious divide, violent ruptures are more likely caused by a struggle over the right to control political power and the substance of Iraqi nationalism.

Moreover, the determination of Shi’a strongmen – such as Maliki – is centuries in the making, and the product of ancient provocation. The fundamental dispute between Sunni and Shi’a sects is indicative of a historically decisive conflict. A minority Sunni population has ruled Iraq’s Shi’a majority, and have discriminated against them. Mesopotamian Shi’a never had the opportunity to play a role proportional to their numbers, and despite their best efforts in both the 1920 and 1958 revolutions, continued to occupy the role of the underprivileged majority. Naturally, Iraq’s Shi’a share a common history of political marginality with co-religionists across the Arab world and South Asia.

However, with Iraqi Sunni political leadership on the run, national unity talks crumbling and a Persian push for nuclear relevance, it’s no surprise Sunni neighbors are once again peddling the thesis of a Shi’a crescent rising from Iran to Lebanon…however preliminay the indicators.

More to come…

Kassim Al-Himidi with the body of his wife, Shaima Alawadi, during a memorial service. (Nelvin C. Cepeda / Associated Press via LA Times)

America is in a state of public mourning for a young man by the name of Trayvon Martin, whose death at the hands of an over-zealous neighborhood watch volunteer – and under suspicions of racial profiling – has sparked a national dialogue on race.

His shooting death has prompted outrage across with country, with dozens of rallies dotting the social landscape. President Obama remarked that if he had a son, the young man would bear an uncanny resemblance to the murdered Martin, in an executive homage to the alleged homicide.

Largely absent the conversation is another name – Shaima Alawadi – a 32 year old Iraqi national, whose family fled her native soil amidst Saddam Hussein’s brutal crackdown on the Shi’a uprising in the wake of America’s first invasion of Iraq. She settled in suburban San Diego, growing up in one of the largest enclaves of America’s expatriate Iraqi society. She wore the traditional hijab, and volunteered at her neighborhood mosque.

And then, like Trayvon Martin, she was found savagely murdered. Only she was found within her modest home, beaten to death, with a threatening note beside her body. According to her daughter, it read, simply: “Go back to your country, you terrorist.” Alawadi’s family reportedly told the police that they had received a note similar to one left at the murder scene a week prior.

So while Twitter and Facebook have blown up with user-created hashtags and pages in honor of Martin’s now-signature hooded sweatshirt and penchant for Skittles candy – all on the immediate heels of feigned e-outrage over #kony2012 fiasco – one wonders why an Iraqi national, targeted for wearing a Muslim headscarf, hasn’t enjoyed the same sort of instant obsession. One needs not even mention that both her brothers and her husband worked with the U.S. Army as cultural advisors in training soldiers to be sent to the Middle East.

If there’s a silver lining to this story, it’s that Alawadi has been spared the indignity Martin’s family is now experiencing at the nexus of national, racial scrutiny. Conservative pundits have counterpunched against allegations of inequity by summoning injuries done a 13 year old white boy from Kansas City, who was doused with gasoline and lit on fire last week while walking home from school. Their obtuse suggestion implies the lack of media attention is due to the color of the victim’s skins…and the color of the criminal assailants. Police have described the perpetrators of the criminal assault as black 16-year olds, and the act a “hate crime.”

Although her murder has garnered international acclaim – including a call for justice from the Iraqi parliament – its tones are considerably mellowed. But perhaps Alawadi’s family can take some solace in the fact that those who care about their daughter, sister and mother — not to mention her murder — do so absent the hysterical polemics of national fascination – preferring to remember her with the heartfelt thoughts of a grieving, Iraqi community, abroad.

Her body will be flown to Baghdad, said Iraq’s foreign minister Monday.

If you’d like to read the piece…and I hope you will…please have a look here at the link: http://spectator.org/archives/2011/06/28/an-iraqi-time-bomb