John R. Bradley

From John R. Bradley, the Middle East correspondent and writer who correctly predicted the Egyptian revolution, comes a new message about the Arab Spring: “everything we have been told about it is wrong”. John R. Bradley sat down with Reza Akhlaghi, Senior Writer at FPA, to discuss his latest book: ‘After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts’
Published by Palgrave Macmillan

Your book paints a bleak picture of what is coming the Middle East’s way following the Arab Spring. Much of what you say in your book runs counter to Robin Wright’s overarching argument in her acclaimed book ‘Rock the Casbah’, in which she essentially says that Arabs increasingly defy religious extremism and the doctrines of Islamic fundamentalism as espoused by Bin Laden and Ayatollah Khomeini. Whereas in your book, in sharp contrast to Wright’s, you argue that what will emerge from current developments in the region is Islamic extremism and wholesale defeat of the liberal and intellectual class in the Arab/Muslim world. Can you elaborate on this central argument?

I wouldn’t dispute the assertion, however odd it might be, that “Arabs increasingly defy religious extremism and the doctrines of Islamic fundamentalism as espoused by Bin Laden and Ayatollah Khomeini.” In fact, I would argue–and always have argued in my books–that the vast majority of Arabs have never had any interest in being terrorists, and that it’s patently absurd, to the point of being offensive, to suggest otherwise even rhetorically. Moreover, what exactly did Bin Laden and Khomeini have in common? Precisely nothing as far I can see. In any case, even to accept that argument does not by default mean we should assume Arabs are embracing the classic Western values of liberalism, pluralism, and freedom of expression. That’s an almighty conclusion to jump to, and it has no basis in logic. It’s like saying because they believe the sky is blue they, by extension, believe that sand is orange. Moreover, the argument is just hot air anyway, because it’s not justified by any of the facts on the ground.

For a start, these revolutions–or more accurately these lousy failed revolutions and military coups–were not motivated by a thirst for free-and-fair elections, but by economic desperation and the question of personal dignity. Now, obviously, no one wants to be tortured for speaking his or her mind, whether they are in Paris or Tunis. But to suggest that people of other cultures who speak other languages and have other belief systems and distinct social and political histories merely want to be like us in the West is far too simplistic, and to me smacks of cultural imperialism of the kind that the likes of Robin Wright are always guilty of. Why on earth wouldn’t they want to be just like us? But they don’t. And perhaps, just once in a while, we should have the humility to ask: why on earth should they?

In Tunisia you will find almost no one who has a bad word to say about Habib Bourghiba, the authoritarian post-independence leader who ruled from 1956 to 1987. And in Egypt, Gamal Abdul Nasser–who, like Bourghiba, restricted freedom of the press and democratic and civil institutions–is widely adored. I’ve lost count over the past two decades how many ordinary Tunisians and Egyptians I’ve asked about this, and their responses have always been the same: they are loved because they respected the dignity of their people and were not personally corrupt, and during their rule it was not difficult to bring food to the table. The question of whether or not they were elected has never entered into the discussion.

You argue that democracy, not its values, is a great friend of Islamists who may have no regard for democratic values but can greatly benefit from them particularly in the form of strong voter turnout who, based on your assertion, are the most active segment of the electorate in the Arab world. To quote directly from your book “In the Arab world, when the gift of democracy is unwrapped, it is the Islamists who spring out of the box”. Once in power, why should Islamists disregard democracy and derail the democratic process in their respective countries with no fear of socio-economic consequences particularly in an interconnected world and an increasingly interdependent global trade system?

I don’t argue that there is a contradiction between political Islam and the democratic process. I don’t in fact see any contradiction at all between the two. Have democratic elections not been a reality in Iran for the past three decades? A less frequently asked, but far more pressing, question is whether liberalism and creative dissent, the lifeblood of any culture worth living in, can survive the democratic triumph of Islamist fundamentalism. And the answer, as the case of Iran also tells us, is equally and categorically: no. The Arab Spring marks the last, tragic gasp of any hope for free expression and legal protection of personal liberties in the Arab world, as we understand those concepts in the West. The Islamists are for democracy as a system of government and a method of change but–and here comes the conversation stopper–only insofar as it is compatible with Islam. The Quran remains the sole authoritative basis for legislation, whose earthly manifestation are the scholars who interpret it so that the state’s function is essentially executive in nature. To put it in a nutshell: Islam is the answer to everything, the final authority, and the sole source of legitimacy of government.

So ask the Islamists anything about maintining close ties to the West and peace treaties with Israel and they’ll tell you just what you want to hear. But Islamicizing their societies from below, not reassessing foreign policy or banning elections, has always been their top priority, and while they accept for the most part the deomcratic process, they put in safeguards that no legislation can be introduced which contradicts the Sharia (however it is interpreted). On the question of freedom of expression and personal behavior, there is, therefore, always the massive qualifier of “local customs” and “Islamic norms” from the committed Islamists. Consider, for example, the response of Rachid Ghanouchi, the leader of Tunisia’s notoriously moderate Ennahda party, to the violent attacks on secular artists in his country during the past year. “Art is linked to the values and traditions of each society,” he said, “and no one should take away freedom of expression through art, as long as it reflects those traditions (my emphasis).” In other words: provided they do not bulge, or threaten to bulge, or threaten to lead to behavior that bulges, out of the cultural straitjacket of whatever he and self-appointed scholars like him think of as Islam.

Hazem Saleh Abu Ismail, a Salafi presidential candidate in Egypt and vocal supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, at least did us all a favor last month by cutting through the nonsense. When asked to elaborate on the importance of personal liberties and individual rights in countries governed by Islamic law, he was gobsmacked: “If you claim that Allah considers your personal freedom, show me your reference,” he said. “Nobody has ever said that—except for people who have no understanding of Sharia.”

Why do you think that the Arab/Muslim youth care little for democratic values and that the only reasons they took to the streets were poverty, hunger, and lack of access to descent jobs? Do you think they will get that from the Islamists whom you argue will be ruling them in a new post-Arab Spring Middle East?

Let’s look at what’s actually happened during the last year. When the first deadline for voter registration passed in July, a paltry 16 percent of Tunisians had bothered to register. We were constantly told that there was an 80 percent turnout for the elections, but that was 80 percent of the 50 percent who eventually registered after the deadline was extended. In other words, there was a 40 percent turnout. In Egypt in March, there was a turnout of just 41 percent for a crucial referendum on a new constitution that would determine the country’s future. Again, that’s 41 percent of registered voters, meaning–because millions of Egyptians aren’t registered–only about 20-25 percent actually turned out. An extensive study by researchers at Oxford University last month found that only 16 percent of Libyans are now in favour of Western-style democracy, as opposed to 60 percent who prefer authoritarian rule.

There are two reasons this reality is not reflected in the Western media’s appalling coverage of the so-called Arab Spring. The first is that, because of the continued influence of Edward Said’s Orientalism, no one wants to sound like some reactionary old Orientalist labeling the Arabs as culturally and politically distinctive, because it easily lends to charges–however unfounded–that they are being labeled inferior. The second is that the Western “experts” like Robin Wright home in on a tiny little band of English-speaking bloggers, activists, human-rights campaigners and so on. The Muslim Brotherhood always dismisses this group as “an out of touch, irrelevant, Westernized elite;” and while I don’t usually have much time for what the Muslim Brotherhood has to say, on this question they are absolutely right. In Egypt, for example, the parties set up by the revolutionaries got just 2 percent of the vote, as opposed to 77 percent for the Islamists–25 percent of which went to the Salafi party,Al-Nour, that openly campaigned on the promise of doing away with elections if they were voted in.

In the face of all this overwhelming evidence to the contrary, how much longer can the absurd happy-clappy, Facebook, picnic-in-the-park narrative of the Arab Spring continue? I suppose until all the pundits who got it completely wrong from the outset have no choice but to admit the fact. And that means it will likely continue forever. But now that it’s obvious the revolutions have created a security vacuum and clearly failed to alleviate the economic woes and human rights abuses that spawned them—indeed, in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, quite the opposite—the Islamists offer something seductive in the absence of meaningful solutions: a simple answer, Islam is the solution. The Islamists certainly don’t have viable economic policies. But nor do those in charge of Western democracies.

In Tunisia and Egypt before the Arab Spring, youth unemployment was about 30 percent. But in Spain it was 50 percent, and in Greece, Italy and Portugal it was 45 percent. How then was a quick and messy transition to democracy ever going to solve that problem, whoever was elected? The Islamists instead offer solace in the face of these frankly insurmountable problems. The terrible price that the ordinary people of these countries will have to pay for that solace will only gradually become evident to them, as it did to the historically very liberal and tolerant Iranian people.

I guess this could be called the $4 billion question, both literally and metaphorically. What was the rationale for the Saudi leadership, as you claim in your book, to give $4 billion to the new post-Mubarak military regime in Cairo? You also assert that this infusion of cash was followed by “indirect threats” to the interim military regime. What were some of those “threats”?

Actually, while they promised $4 billion, only about $500 million has materialized. There’s nothing odd in that. Only about 10 to 20 percent of aid ever pledged by any donors for whatever cause ends up being sent. The Saudis were only interested in gaining leverage, and one way of doing that is by holding out the carrot of economic aid for the bankrupt military to run after. Then, as you suggest, there’s the stick. This mainly came in the form of threatening to change the kingdom’s labor laws in a way that would have resulted in the expulsion of millions of Egyptian expatriate workers from Saudi Arabia, which would have had an immediate and devastating impact on the Egyptian economy. That didn’t happen, either. In any case, the Saudis can now relax: the Egyptian military clearly is not in any way itself revolutionary, and the Wahhabis have installed, through extensive funding, their Muslim Botherhood and Salafi proxies in Egypt’s new parliament. One thing we can be certain of is that they will not offer a peep of criticism of the Saudi regime. They never have.

In the new evolving Middle East to be soon dominated, based on your assertion, by Islamic fundamentalists, will and should Israel’s strategic objectives and security calculus change?

At the beginning of the Arab Spring, Israel breathed a sigh of relief. Tunisia doesn’t matter geopolitically one way or another, but Egypt of course does. And in Egypt there was a military coup. The Egyptian military is very pro the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, and its army is funded, trained, and equipped by America. The triumph of the Islamists in Egypt’s parliamentary elections doesn’t change things much vis-à-vis Israel, at least not in the short term. The parliament has limited powers, and all this talk about the Muslim Brotherhood taking on the military to push them to hand over to civilian rule is nonsense. With real power comes responsibility and accountability, and while the Muslim Brotherhood may be many things, one thing they certainly are not is stupid. As I’ve already suggested, with the cleanest, most efficient government the world has ever known, it would take a generation or more to cleanse the country of its corruption, brutality, poverty, illiteracy, chronic unemployment, nepotism, and so on. This is one reason the Brotherhood are more interested in forming a coalition with the liberal block in the new parliament than with the Salafis: that way, when the next elections come round, they can blame the liberals for the ills that still plague their nation. And the Brotherhood will avoid direct confrontation with the military because their first priority is not the defense budget or launching wars but imposing Islamist dogma on the Egyptian society, and that is what will preoccupy them during the first parliamentary session.

More generally, Israel is putting all its hopes on its undeclared and bizarre, but very real, alliance with Saudi Arabia, which, despite spewing anti-Semitic venom of the kind not seen since the Nazis, poses no military threat to the Jewish state. The Saudis are also aligned with Washington and hate the Iranian mullahs like the plague. Along with Qatar, Saudi Arabia has led a region-wide counterrevolution, shoring up pro-Western Persian Gulf monarchies as well as those of Jordan and Morocco, and backing the Muslim Brotherhood and its franchises in Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen. The question we can’t answer at this stage is whether the Saudis, through their funding and Wahhabi doctrine, will be able to control the Islamist groups taking power everywhere in relation to their relations with the West and Israel, in the same way the House of Saud has more or less been able to control their own Wahhabi religious establishment.

Do you think a new Middle East dominated by Sunni Arab governments will experience a Sunni-Shiite conflict?

On the government level yes. The main reason Washington has backed the Saudi-led counterrevolution, which is to say the move by Sunni Islamist parties to fill the post-Arab Sring vacuum, is to contain Iran. But ordinary Arabs have little time for such distinctions, despite the anti-Shia propaganda campaigns they have been bombarded with over the past five or so years. If Israel and America attack Iran, ordinary Arabs will side with the latter. It will be interesting to see how the Saudi- and Qatari-aligned Sunni parties throughout the region will try to box themselves out of that corner.

What, in your opinion, would it really take to see Kant and Sartre being taught at Saudi universities?

A miracle of the kind the world has never seen before.

The effects of egress have been most pronounced in Nineveh Province – the Iraqi governate borders Syria and once served as served as home to as many as 800 al-Qaeda operatives.
Violence is down in the capital city of Mosul and the rest of the province. Of course, the same can’t be said for Syria, where artillery bombardment silenced peaceful protest before the advent of armed resistance.

The chief of US national intelligence, James R. Clapper, suggested last week that al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria may have been responsible for two rebel attacks on Syrian military installations – including January’s highly publicized suicide bombings in Damascus and two previous attacks in Aleppo.

The anti-Assad movement has become increasingly violent in recent months as defections from Assad’s military have bolstered the frustrated opposition. We’ve now witnessed assassinations of loyalist officers within the capital, while Syrian government has claimed that some 2,000 security forces and soldiers have been slain since the uprising began last year.

What’s most unfortunate about the [potential] emergence of al-Qaeda in Syria doesn’t relate to the long term calculus of the political landscape. For the time being, questions of democratic development remain distant on the horizon. Rather, these reports give credence to claims made by Assad that Syria’s revolt is the handiwork of violent radicals and “terrorists.” Of course, it’s one thing for a man or woman to defend his or her home from a foreign occupier or an illiberal and illegitimate despot – it’s quite another, when extremist mercenaries hoist their fight from one country to another, while simultaneously exaggerating objections to a broadly shared raison d’etre of revolution.

On the other hand…to paraphrase Mudhir al Janabi – a member of the Iraqi Parliament’s security committee offended by suggestions that Iraqis are among those going to fight in Syria – Iraq had no history of extremism before 2003.

If those who came from other countries and brought the violence want to march on Damascus, perhaps it’s not inconceivable that they’re simply heading home. Reports of sky-rocketing prices for assault rifles and the realities of a 400 mile long common border suggest weapons and combatants could be hot commodities.

An alarming phenomenon to consider before wading into this mess.

As we mourn Anthony’s loss, we hope his legacy will remain a great source of inspiration for all those who aspire to write and report on that complex place called Middle East. We invite you all to visit Anthony’s personal website to explore more about his great works and fabulous journey in journalism: http://anthonyshadid.com

God bless Anthony’s soul.

Reza Akhlaghi

As I write these words, demonstrations are unfolding in the public squares of Syrian cities and towns, as they have done every Friday for the last eleven months, since the people of Dir’a first took to the streets to manifest their discontent at the indignities imposed upon them by the Asad regime.

Grainy scenes of crowds heaving, swaying, chanting slogans, singing revolutionary songs flash across the screens of Arab satellite channels, scenes of jubilant defiance and anger.

And, as I write, the violent repression of these protests continues. The London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and al-Jazeera (in Arabic) report that 25 individuals have been killed already in the besieged city of Homs and the countryside of Damascus. Another 83 died yesterday across Syria, according to the Observatory, while the Local Coordination Committees put the figure higher still, at 126 – 107 of them in Homs alone.

Overnight, army tanks entered the Insha’at neighbourhood of Homs, prompting fears of a broader ground assault, to follow the week-long artillery campaign on the city, which activists estimate has led to the loss of more than 400 lives.

Reports emerging from the city testify to the use of long-range shells and mortar to pound the residential neighbourhoods of Baba ‘Amr, al-Khalidiyya, al-Insha’at, and Bayyada, and to a worsening humanitarian situation. Human Rights Watch reports that hospitals are unable to cope with the number of casualties, while Al-Jazeera’s Beirut correspondent Rula al-Amin reports that medical supplies and food are running dangerously low (see links above).

There is no doubt that armed contingents of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are present in several neighbourhoods of Homs. However, these deserters number no more than a few hundred or thousand men – a stark reminder of the deep asymmetries of power between these dissident forces and the Syrian regime, which has insistently claimed that it is faced an uprising by “armed bands” (‘isabat), while using to the fullest its military superiority.

In other places, including the coastal cities of Banias and Latakia, in the ‘Alawi heartlands, and the Damascus suburbs of Duma and Daraya, troops have deployed to prevent demonstrators from congregating after Friday prayers.

Meanwhile, several car explosions went off in the northern city of Aleppo, killing 25 and injuring more than 175 according to Syrian state television, which has blamed the attacks on “armed terrorist gangs”.

The General Council for the Syrian Revolution, for its part, has accused the regime of plotting the attacks to foment unrest. This claim was echoed by an activist in the city itself who, citing “suspicious activity by security personnel” in the moments before the explosion, told the BBC that “we hold the Syrian regime entirely responsible for this action”.

Further confusion has arisen from the conflicting claims of different contingents within the FSA. While one officer reportedly told Al-Jazeera’s Beirut correspondent Rula al-Amin that the FSA was responsible for the attacks, the Syrian National Council has issued a statement from the FSA in which it categorically denies any role in the attacks.

This latest blast will only increase the virulent controversy in the blogosphere between supporters of the regime, who see in them confirmation of government claims that the protests of the past year are born of a “terrorist” “conspiracy”, and its opponents, who believe that they are one more cynical act of official violence, designed to keep the populations of first Damascus, and now Aleppo, quiescent.

Syria, it is clear, has entered a vicious spiral of violence. The spectre of instability, which the Baathist regimes of Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad have long boasted of holding at bay while neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq were consumed by internecine strife, is now at the door.

Many within the country, of course, had already resigned themselves to protracted unrest before the failure of the UN Security Council to reach agreement on a Draft Resolution supporting the Arab League’s efforts to secure a negotiated transition of power in Syria on the Yemeni model.

However, it does seem that the decision of Russia and China to veto this Draft Resolution has galvanized both the regime and the opposition to ramp up their activities.

While the regime has seen this veto as a license to continue in its repression, the continuing division of the international community on the vexed question of Syria has only added to the intransigence of many activists; despairing at their enforced isolation, they have become more obdurate still in their desire not to give in.

Thus, in a video message circulated on social networks on 6 February, the Humsi activist Khalid Abu Salah allied a call for assistance with a message of resilience. After appealing to “every noble human being to save us here in Baba ‘Amr, to save the children and the women in Baba ‘Amr”, he turns away from the camera for a brief moment, as gunfire resounds outside, and the clip seems to draw to an end.

Then, turning back, he addresses words of defiance to the Syrian president: “Ya Bashar, don’t think we’re going to surrender, if you killed all of us we wouldn’t surrender … if you killed all of us we wouldn’t surrender.”

Khalid Abu Salah’s “Appeal to the Free World”

There is no doubt whom Syrian opposition activists blame for the lack of support they receive. While the Local Coordination Committees have in the past berated the general inaction of the international community, naming one of their Friday demonstrations, in a sharp rejoinder to the international community, “Your silence is killing us”, they have chosen to call this Friday “Russia is killing our children.”

Russia has responded in kind to this deliberately emotive message. In a statement issued earlier today, its Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, accused the West of being “accomplices in the process of inflaming the crisis”, and insisted that the opposition’s refusal to enter into talks with the regime of Bashar al-Asad meant that it “bears full responsibility for improving the situation”.

It is clear that Russia feels stung by what it regards as a deliberate manipulation of the Security Council to prosecute regime change in Libya, and many critics of intervention have echoed its claims that any international action in Syria would be ruinous.

In a particularly caustic piece, the Columbia professor Joseph Massad has claimed that intervention of one kind or another would only serve what he calls “American imperialism in the Middle East”, berating the “exile opposition” for having “hijacked the popular uprising against the Asad dynasty.”

But such claims overlook two crucial factors.

The first is that there exists no stark divide between opponents of the regime within the country and those in the Syrian mahjar, or diaspora. Opposition activists certainly disagree on key issues – not least that of international intervention – but the schism does not run along geographical lines.

The Syrian National Council itself, despite repeated assertions to the contrary, is not simply an exilic organization with few ties to those within Syria. While its figurehead, Barhun Ghaliun, has long been settled in France, other members of its executive committee, like Samir Nachar, have only very recently left Syria.

In a note posted on its Facebook page a few weeks before the official announcement of its formation on 1 October 2011, the SNC itself claimed that while 60% of its members were abroad, another 40% remained within Syria itself.

Moreover, it is clear that the SNC, far from the pipe-dream of ambitious émigré schemers, developed from reformist trends within Syria in the early to mid-2000s, such as the Damascus Declaration of 2005.

The second is that Russia and China, by blocking the proposed resolution, have themselves intervened in this internal conflict. Though some have justified their claims by pointing to the need to respect the sovereignty of the Syrian state, the notion that the West is, alone, contemplating intervention is harder to countenance.

To intervene, one need not put troops on the ground, nor send fighter planes or frigates – though, of course, Russia has already done just that, having despatched a naval flotilla led by the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov to its own naval base in Tartus in November 2011, in a show of support for the regime of Bashar al-Asad…

Houshang Hassan-Yari sat down with Reza Akhlaghi, senior writer at Foreign Policy Association, to answer the above questions and discuss what’s in store for the greater Middle East.
Dr. Houchang Hassan-Yari is Professor of international relations and strategic military studies at Royal Military College of Canada.

In the current geopolitical climate involving Iran and the West marked by loud and reciprocal threats, intensifying sanctions, non-dollar trade paradigms, and an apparent shadow war, what do you think is in store for the region as it pertains to Iranian-Western rivalries?

Hassan-Yari: I think the current situation cannot continue for too long. If there is no peaceful solution in the nuclear issue of Iran, the cul-de-sac will be opened in another way. The war will be the most plausible. Iran is very much isolated in the region.
The United States and Israel have been successful in creating an association between the Iranian nuclear program and nuclear weapons. They were also able to join the vast majority of Arab countries to their perception of the danger that Iran poses to stability in these countries. The sum of U.S. efforts and concerns of the militarily weak Arab regimes have resulted in the necessity to contain a dangerous Iran. If there is a rivalry between Iran and West in the Middle East, it is clearly favourable to the West.

Iran has recently conducted a number of naval and air drills in the Persian Gulf in the course of which it has put on display new surface-to-sea and surface-to-surface missile capabilities. It has also threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. How do you assess Iran’s military capabilities in countering U.S. Navy presence in the Persian Gulf and in closing the Strait of Hormuz? What do you think would galvanize the U.S. and its allies into concrete military action against Iran?

Hassan-Yari: In this climate of distrust and suspicion which prevails in the Persian Gulf, a miscalculation by the parties involved could lead to a war that nobody wants. The threat of Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, a threat that is taken lightly by the Iranian authorities, will lead to war.
Any aggression aiming international navigation in the Strait may trigger hostilities. It seems to me that the majority of the Persian Gulf Arab countries want to settle once and for all the “Iranian issue”. The problem is that they are unable to do so themselves. This is where the utility of American military power comes in. In other words, Arabs are pushing Americans to a war they want but cannot perform. Israelis also are in a similar situation.

Since taking office, and in particular during his second term, the policies of President Ahmadinejad and his administration have been synonymous with the rise of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iranian politics and economy. Given the prominence of the IRGC in the socio-political and economic management of the country, has it been an effective and capable force in formulating various policies and in executing those policies?

Hassan-Yari: President Ahmadinejad is only one factor that facilitated the rise in the status of the IRGC. The indispensable actor that greatly opened the door to the predominance of the IRGC in all aspects of Iranian life is the leader himself. The latter could not do so under Mohammad Khatami because of the popularity and the resistance of the reformist president. We should not forget that Ahmadinejad is one of them and owes his presidency largely to the intervention of the IRGC in the electoral process of 2005.
The multifaceted IRGC is not a homogenous force. Nor is it a force formed to formulate and implement policies for the common good. The main concern of the Force is to protect the leader and the revolution as it intends to do. Everything it does in the field of security, political, economic and social serves this purpose. In other words, its allegiance is first and foremost the Leader.
Dependency of political power to the military force of the IRGC has forced the former to give exclusive mega contracts to latter in all economic sectors. But as the Guardians do not have expertise in all these areas, they often fail to deliver a good quality product. However, the poor quality of their work was never an obstacle to prevent the IRGC to receive new contracts worth billions of dollars.
Their imprint is deeply engraved in all aspects of life from sport to aviation to missile technology to nuclear programme of Iran.

Recent statements made by former high-ranking officials and parliamentarians (Hossein Alaei of IRGC and Emad Afrough of Majles) appear to be part of a new paradigm in directly challenging the clerical establishment. Do you think these statements signify a new rupture in Iran’s power structure? If that is the case, how could this new rupture play itself out in the upcoming Majlis elections?

Hassan-Yari: What Alaei, Afrough and other rightwing moderates (Principalists /Ossoulgarayaan) pose as a question today are after-shocks of the popular protests of 2009 and the tremors of the recent Arab awakening. These individuals are also very sensitive to preserve intact the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini which is fast eroding since the coming to power of Ahmadinejad and the unconditional support he received from the Leader. They attempt to salvage the Islamic Republic by returning to the values of the 1979 Revolution. They directly challenge the entourage of the Leader and indirectly the Leader himself who has created a propitious environment for the growth of political immorality and toadyism.
This new phenomena is certainly a break with the established order since coming to power of Ayatollah Khamenei in 1989. It is expected to expand gradually as the gap in the conservative camp is widening, a situation that Khamenei is incapable of controling effectively.
A number of scenarios for the outcome of Majles election could be envisaged. If the elections are carried by the camp of Ahmadinejad, the status of the leader will be further weakened and the consequences could be fatal to the Republic as we know it today. A possible victory by the leader’s entourage should not be interpreted as the return to normality.
I think that a return to the former situation when the leader was not objectionable is impossible without resorting to brutal force. Even then, the lull is only temporary. The sanctity of the Leader is broken and with it the unchallenged position of the clergy close to the government. It is quite possible that we witness a return of the clergy in its religious schools leaving power to the ‘civilian’. In Iran, people break the personality before breaking the person.

Iran and Israel seem locked in a strategic rivalry that has gone through different stages, each stage with its own narrative. What are the key aspects of this strategic rivalry that have made the U.S. an indispensable player in it? Do you envision a point at which security establishments from the U.S., Iran, and Israel would decide to negotiate (most likely secret negotiations) as a way out of the current atmosphere of brinkmanship to avert a potentially large-scale regional conflict and save the global economy from spiralling down a path of sever instability?

Hassan-Yari: First, on Iran-Israel rivalry. From the perspective of the Iranian political elite in power, this rivalry has a clear ideological pronouncement. It goes back to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s epoch and the pre-1979 revolutionary romanticism when Iranian islamists received their military training in Lebanon and sympathized with the Palestinian cause. For them, Israel is a colonial creation, artificial and usurper. It is an illegitimate entity, so to disappear. For Israel, Iran was an opportunity to lessen the Arab pressure.
Since the advent of the Islamic Republic in Iran, this rivalry has taken on new dimensions. Israel remains not only as an ideological enemy, but also a military obstacle that challenges Tehran’s supremacist claim on the regional leadership. In addition, since the Israeli danger to Iran’s nuclear program has become more pressing, Tehran uses its Lebanese and Palestinian allies to keep Israel concerned about its own safety and away from the Iranian border.
On the other hand, Iran is the only country in the Middle East that poses a challenge to the qualitative predominance of Israel’s powerful military machine in the region. In the final analysis, if Israel can live with a non-militant Iran, Tehran cannot co-exist with a ubiquitous ‘Zionist danger’ in the region. This is where the United States enters into the equation as a moderating force. While Washington would prefer a more cooperative Iran, it seeks to remain the final arbiter of the regional game. It seems that neither Iran nor Israel want their regional importance overshadowed by the American omnipotence.
In regard to a possible “ménage à trios”, Iran-Israel-U.S., in the field of regional security, this hypothesis seems very unrealistic under current conditions. If the United States and Israel can provide manageable compromise to Iran over its security considerations without losing face, the latter, on the contrary, has everything to lose by entering into this game that goes against its identity as “defender” of the dispossessed. The only situation, in which the Islamic Republic will make painful compromise, is if it concludes that its own survival is at risk by persisting in its belligerent posture in regional and international security issues.

Russian officials have repeatedly made it clear that they are fiercely opposed to any military confrontation between the West and Iran. From geo-political and geo-energy perspectives, what are at stake for Russia? Do you think a political tilt by Iran toward the West would change the geo-political equation in Eurasia/Middle East?

Hassan-Yari: Russian resistance to any military intervention in Iran is not a matter of principle, nor is it aimed at preventing another catastrophic war in the region. The Russian calculation is based on geopolitical considerations. Russia is still looking for the lost place of the Soviet Union on the world stage. Any U.S. military intervention in the region further isolates Russia. It is also in this context that we must understand the resistance from Moscow to any foreign military intervention in Syria. For Russia, this is a zero sum game. In addition, an isolated Iran strengthens the position of Russia as an intermediary between this country and the West. Iran’s isolation and demonization has helped Russia develop advanced military and commercial relations with Iran. The same is true for China, with more emphasis on the economic relations with Iran.
A dominant U.S. presence in Iran could compromise Russian’s not too comfortable authority in the Caspian Sea basin. One of the reasons for creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was to counterbalance the U. S. presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The fall of the Islamic Republic could revive the spectrum of Soviet containment through a new security belt connecting Europe to Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

This year Russia and Iran started doing trade in their respective national currencies, replacing the U.S. dollar and Euro. Similarly, trade has been taking place between Iran and China in Chinese Renminbi and between Iran and Japan in Japanese Yen including for the sale of Iranian oil. Do you think the exclusion of U.S. dollar and Euro from trade by these trade partners could hold geopolitical implications? If so, in what ways?

Hassan-Yari: Since the day after the revolution Iran has tried to to break free from the yoke of the dollar, without much success. The currencies of Russia and China are not convertible, which reinforces the dependency of Iran on Russians and Chinese. It’s an ironic situation because Iran claims to want to break from the grip of the U. S. dollar and to free itself of turbulence of American imperialism by creating more dependency on secondary powers like Russia and China. In its business dealings with Moscow and Beijing, Iran is forced to buy Sino-Russian merchandise. However, the quality of those goods does not meet consumer expectations in Iran. The continuation of this trade policy increasingly limits Iran to two or three unreliable suppliers who put their own national interests ahead of Iranian welfare in any dispute with Americans. Russia in particular has demonstrated that it is not a feasible partner. There is no other country in the world that has hurt Iranian interests as much as Russia since the 19th century.
The recent currency crisis that deeply hit the value of Iran’s Rial showcased the significance of dollar as a safe currency for ordinary Iranians. During the crisis, no one was looking for Russian or Chinese currency. It is also ironic that some ministers in Iran use the dollar as reference when they talk about their non-petroleum exports, the value of the national economy or foreign investment. The language that the average Iranian better understands is that of Dollar, not the Rouble, or the Yuan. In addition, the Central Bank of Iran often manipulates the value of dollar to regulate the amount of liquidity in circulation.
The exclusion of U.S. dollar and Euro from trade by Iran and its trade partners could hold geopolitical implications if Euro Zone dismantles itself and if China decided to dispose its massive dollar reserve. Among some other possibilities one can invoke the unlikely scenario of the Arab oil producers to join the Russia-China-Iran trio in replacing dollar by other currencies. Iran’s economy is too small to have a geopolitical impact on the dollar.

How stable is the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria? How Iran could be impacted by Assad’s fall?

Hassan-Yari: Assad’s regime is extremely weak. It has reached a point of no return and condemned to disappear. Its fall will have major implications for the safety and security of the Islamic Republic as well as the rest of the Middle East. The survival of the Syrian regime is so crucial to the Iranian theocratic system that it forced Tehran to denounce the Syrians protesting against Damascus as agents of Zionism and imperialism while praising Arabs in other countries as Islamist followers of Iran’s Islamic revolution. This position has highlighted the contradiction in the official discourse of the Iranian leadership by substantially weakening its claim to the universality of the Islamic revolution.
Syria is the only strategic ally of Iran in the Arab world. It also acts as a bridge between Iran and Lebanon. It gives Iran direct access to Israeli territory through the Hazbollah and some Palestinian groups. The fall of the Assad regime will also weaken the position of Shiite militants in the region. A regime change in Damascus further limits Iran’s ability to intervene on the regional scene. It will deprive Islamic Iran of a vital window to breathe. Finally, it will make Iran even more vulnerable in facing a possible foreign military attack. Within Iran itself, it will strengthen the resolve of opponents of the Islamic regime.

The Saudi government has made significant military hardware purchases from the United States. The Saudi diplomacy has been also active in countries impacted by the Arab Spring. How do you assess the future of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and in light of Arab Spring, what are the chances of having a more representative leadership in Saudi Arabia?

Hassan-Yari: The Islamic Republic is not the only country embarrassed by the Arab awakening. The United States and Saudi Arabia have also taken contradictory positions to events in Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere.
The future of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia depends largely on the Kingdom’s internal dynamics. A democratic Saudi Arabia will be more independent in its foreign policy. It will also have much less appetite for accommodating dictatorships in surrounding countries.
But since we are not there yet, I cannot envisage any strategic change in the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship, even if there is a few sporadic surmountable bumps.
As for democratic changes in Saudi Arabia, they will be introduced very gradually in the absence of a popular revolution. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can not remain immune to the political and military changes that inflame its neighbourhood. The question is the degree and level of change that the descendants of Al-Saud are forced to introduce.

The sudden changes in the region have been reflective of an immense buildup of frustration, distrust, and cynicism among an increasingly connected and well-educated Arab youth, who have lost faith in political and economic management systems they see fraught with corruption. Their continuous rage against Middle East’s incumbent dictators brings a key question: Will the new emerging governments become democratic or will they be aligned mainly with religious extremists whose political movements and participation in public life have been suppressed under decades-old Western-back military and monarchical dictatorships?

What started as hopeful developments in North Africa against lifetime presidential dictatorships and leaderships of Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Gadaffi, is slowly and clearly shaping as a great victory for Islamist parties with chances of success for secularism on the wane. Whether or not the domination of Islamist groups and parties over Middle Eastern politics will be a long-term trend is clearly questionable, but their successful emergence as key power brokers in a new Middle East appears to be assured.

In Tunisia, where the first post-uprising and free elections were held in late October, the Ennahda, believed to be a moderate Islamist party, won over 40% of the vote, securing over 90 seats in the country’s 217-seat parliament. Since then Ennahda has formed a coalition government with two other secular parties.

In Egypt, where the post-Mubarak political jolt has been followed by continuous aftershocks against the ruling military elite, the December 15 elections have resulted in a landslide victory for Islamists, securing over 72% of seats in the parliament. The two key winning parties are the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Al-Nour (“The Light”) Party, Egypts largest Salafist party that was born out of Al-Daawa Movement in Alexandria. The Salafists are believed to enjoy great financial and logistical support from the House of Saud. The Saudis are also active in Egypt’s publishing industry, sponsoring and subsidizing publications that promote their extremist version of Islam (Vahabism).

In Libya, where the revolution became possible with significant support from NATO’s military muscle, the post-Gadaffi political power structure under the National Transitional Council (NTC), is still being shaped with elections set for June or July 2012 and presidential elections slated for 2013. Libya’s Islamist groups, including Al-Qaeda sympathizers, were heavily involved in the armed resurrection against Gadaffi, so their presence, and subsequent success, in the elections is expected to be heavy given their brutal suppression and treatment under Gadaffi’s rule.

And as to Syria, the country seems drifting toward full-blown civil war with significant logistical support to dissidents first and foremost by Turkey and the Saudis. More on Syria in a bit.

Emerging New Rivalries

In 2011 the Middle East became witness–vis-à-vis the Arab Spring–to a brewing rivalry that seeks to claim the leadership torch in the region. Turkey and Saudi Arabia are two key power brokers active in cementing new relationships with newly established governments born out of Arab Spring. Qatar is another emerging player, bent on raising its regional and international profile.  Qatar has used its financial muscle to pressure dictators like Gadaffi and Assad into succumbing into demands of their people while silently condoning the repression of pro-democracy protesters in Bahrain. Qatar, however, is part of what could be a slowly emerging new bloc of Sunni governments in the region with potential to become a counter balancing act against Iran.

Turkey, whose “zero problem” foreign policy doctrine was debunked by the Arab Spring, spent much of 2011 repositioning itself in the new Middle East as the region’s incumbent dictators with whom Ankara enjoyed increasingly close ties were removed from power one after another. Turkey is currently the chief power broker behind efforts to topple the Assad regime. The Syrian National Council was announced in Istanbul in early October and senior defectors from the Syrian army conduct military planning and operations from the Turkish border city of Hakkari against the Assad regime. Turkey has been also sending trade delegations to Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, promoting trade ties with the new leaderships of these countries. While Turkish efforts and diplomacy, particularly with regard to Syria, have raised eyebrows in Tehran, Tehran needs Turkey. Iran is becoming increasingly reliant on Turkish trade routes as international sanctions against Tehran become more forceful and biting.

For Iran 2011 was a year marked with economic and diplomatic failures as well as intensification of economic sanctions that are set to get hardened over the next few months, raising further tensions between Iran and the West. The intensification of sanctions against Iran could have two outcomes. The first outcome could be continued intransigence on the part of Iran and the West as Iran views tough sanctions as bullying by the West and the West, for its part, views Iran uninterested in diplomacy even under economic pressure. This outcome, unfortunately, could set the ground for an inevitable military confrontation.

The second outcome that the West could be seeking from sanctions is intensified factional infighting and internal strife as Iranians feel the heat of economic sanctions and find the government’s foreign policy responsible for their economic woes, leading to the emergence of a new political force in Iran, in the form of a coup d’état, by a specific faction within the ruling elite say the Revolutionary Guards. If the latter were to take place, it is expected that chances of military confrontation with the West will be dimmed significantly.

Israel and Regional Uncertainties

With Islamist parties on ascendancy and religious sentiments expressed without the fear of repression, Israel’s security becomes a pressing question for policy makers in Israel. One question remains whether the prevailing anti-Israeli sentiment in Arab societies will translate into official policy by the newly established Islamist governments with potential for confrontation with the Jewish state.

Israelis have lost one of their key regional allies (Turkey) and been involved in efforts to contain and slow Iran’s nuclear program and its impact on the security and geopolitical standing of the Jewish state. In this environment, Israeli policy makers would find the emergence of an Arab bloc primarily made of Islamists particularly worrisome. For Israel accommodating Middle East’s new Islamists could be a challenge that requires astute diplomatic maneuvering on multiple fronts.

Best Books on Middle East & Person(s) of the Year

I was asked by the Foreign Policy Association to name some of the best books on the Middle East and name the region’s person(s) of the year. Some of the best books on the Middle East that I had a chance to read and would highly recommend are as follows:

The Shah, by Abbas Milani,
Palgrave Macmillan: 488 pp.

A detailed biography of the last Persian emperor who was toppled in the Iranian revolution of 1979. The book is written in a captivating prose by Dr. Abbas Milani of the Iranian Studies Program at Stanford University. It offers a portrait of the Shah and his life and policies and the implications they had for the Shah, the Peacock Throne of Persia, and the region. I think it should be a required reading for anyone who wants to develop an in-depth understanding of today’s Middle East. The book is free from personal and ideological biases, making it all more interesting a read.

Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World by Robin Wright,
Simon & Schuster: 320 pp.

Written by the preeminent Middle East reporter, who is presently a fellow at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the U.S. Institute of Peace, Robin Wright offers a different side of the new Middle East in which extremism is being rejected and women have decided to demand for their rightful place in Muslim societies. Wright makes the voice of those Muslims heard that we hardly get a chance to hear.

Assassins of the Turquoise Palace by Roya Hakakian,
Grove Press 322 pp.

A book by Roya Hakakian, Iranian-American poet/journalist, that puts on display the Mykonos restaurant affair, a true story about the assassination of four members of an Iranian opposition group in Berlin. The Mykonos affair led to the subsequent arrest of suspects and their prosecution by German prosecutors, whose tireless and fearless efforts culminated in the indictment of Iran’s top leadership in the assassination. The book reads like a riveting international thriller that keeps the reader glued to its pages irrespective of the reader’s knowledge of Iranian affairs.

I think the persons of the year are undoubtedly the incredibly brave protestors in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, and Bahrain who fearlessly opposed truly brutal dictators and overcame fear as an impediment to their fight for freedom. As Islamist parties come to the fore of Arab politics, a key question in the mind of many in the region and beyond begs for answer: Once in power, will the Islamist parties respect the democratic process and value human dignity and women’s rights?

2011 was in many ways a milestone in modern Turkish history. First, the Arab Spring not only shook the Western influence in the region, it also ended the post-colonial period in the Middle East, marked by authoritarian-suppressive regimes, which in their way mirrored and reflected their perception of their countries experience with post-World War I imperialism and colonialism. In that sense, Turkey returned back to the Middle East for the first time since the Middle East slipped away from its fingers with the 1916 Arab Revolt, at a time when the countries of the Middle East are rising against the by-products of their separation from the Ottoman Empire.

Turkey’s return back to the Middle East game of course, brought with itself endless references to an improperly defined ‘Ottoman past’ and rather unfortunate taxonomy of ‘neo-Ottomanism’ (traditional ‘Ottomanism’ has never been associated with foreign policy in Ottoman imperial history; it defines a constructed citizenship identity during the Tanzimat period. In that, neo-Ottomanism is really a nonsensical term). Many Turkish government officials and over-excited Western observers portrayed this as a sensationalist ‘Turkey reconnects with its history’ and-or ‘rise of the Ottoman Empire’ themed analyses, which didn’t really explain what kind of Ottoman experience we are talking about and which aspect of its Ottoman history Turkey really connected with.

Looking at Turkey’s foreign policy in 2011, one observes unprecedented Turkish popularity, not only in the Middle East, but also in Africa, Caucasus and the Balkans, every country or group constructing Turkish influence in a different (and sometimes conflicting) way. In that, 2011 will go down to history books perhaps not as Turkey’s discovery of its past, but rather its invention of a constructed marketing idea in foreign policy, which sells in Kosovo as well as it sells in Bengazi. If we were to survey the Arab Spring countries about why they thought Turkey is so popular, they would identify Turkey with the thing that they desire, and not necessarily with what Turkey really offers to the region.

The ever-elusive concept of the ‘Turkish model’ has become a successfully created brand that is currently being mass-consumed via the Arab Spring. And nobody can really define what that ‘Turkish model’ is. Marketing genius.

The Most Unexpected Event

Earthquakes in Van. The first one took place on October 26 and took everyone by surprise. Turks demonstrated excellent cohesion by launching numerous aid campaigns, but as the relief efforts dragged on, government’s capacity to coordinate aid efforts took a lot of flak by the people in the region. With the secondary earthquake of November 9, some of the buildings that were deemed ‘safe’ by the government collapsed as well. Together with the government’s reported reluctance to deal with the local Kurdish mayor and officials to deny the Kurdish BDP any political success, which seriously disrupted the governments effectiveness in transferring aid to the remote villages and towns, the ruling Justice and Development Party’s popularity took a plunge. Even though the government consistently claimed that it has been successful in relief efforts, daily media broadcast of the continuing humanitarian situation around Van made the public think otherwise.

One must remember that the 1999 earthquake in Izmit had exposed Turkish state agencies’ inability to deal with a disaster, creating a series of political events that had led to the rise of the Justice and Development Party in 2002. Earthquakes and other natural disasters have the power to expose a government’s power and a state’s capacity to protect its citizens; in that they can damage the popularity of a government to a great deal. While Turkish PM Erdogan was making heated speeches about how the world failed to deliver in Somalia, his government’s inability to deal with Turkey’s own disaster had restrained his ability to pressure foreign governments in the Somalian case.

People of the year.

I’d nominate two. First, Professor Barry Buzan of the London School of Economics, whose Regional Security Complex Theory explains the post-Arab Spring dynamics of the region and the rise of historical and cultural ties as the primary determinant of regional affairs better than any other theory and approach. His work is surprisingly neglected in the American scholarship and it is difficult to understand why. Second, I’d perhaps nominate Professor Gary A. Fuller, who had introduced the idea of the Middle East youth bulge back in 1989 and published a CIA manuscript in 1995 on how this poses a long term challenge to the United States. He argued that if the population growth in the Middle East continued with the 1989-95 pattern, by 2010, the region would fall to unemployed youth demonstrations in a domino effect. He effectively predicted the Arab Spring 21 years in advance.

Forecast of 2012

If systemic influences remain the same, I expect more Turkish involvement in the Middle East. There may be an assassination attempt against Assad in 2012. Some trigger-happy circles might want to get rid of the Syrian situation in a quick way by plotting an assassination of Assad, without properly calculating that the regime will still fight for its survival even if he’s gone.

I also expect an Israeli action against Iranian nuclear sites. This perhaps won’t take the form of an explicit air-strike but assassinating or kidnapping nuclear scientists, cyber attacks against the computer network controlling Iran’s nuclear reactors (especially the one in Qom) are likely actions.

I also expect growing pressure on Turkey to act in Syria without a substantial NATO backing, given the fact that especially European members of NATO don’t really want to commit financial resources on military adventures while their economies are in crisis. This might quite surprisingly bring Turkey and Israel together as allies, but Turkey will most certainly stand back from any action involving Iran.

With the American withdrawal from Iraq, Iran will push for influence in the Shia south and Kurdish north. Turkey will also prioritize cutting Iranian-Syrian link, as well as pursuing a non-sectarian policy in Iraq to counter Iranian influence. This will often take the form of supporting Sunni-Arab and Kurdish groups and fighting a proxy war with Iran through militant organizations. This effectively will bring back the Ottoman-Safavid heritage of conflict in Iraq and will likely take a sectarian Sunni-Shia confrontation.

Finally, I expect U.S.-Turkish relations to reach a new high in the first half of 2012. With the growing security challenges in the Middle East, which target Turkish and American interests and a withdrawal from Iraq, there will probably be an unprecedented level of cooperation between Ankara and Washington. Last week, US Congressman Robert Wexler commented on Turkish PM Erdogan’s speech about Syrian sanctions by: ”I felt like listening to the US President”.

Turkey and the US is on the same page with many issues in the Middle East currently and I expect this trend to continue in 2012.

Banner of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad hangs in Damascus / Reuters

An interview with the embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad appeared in the Sunday edition of the London newspaper The Daily Telegraph, the President’s first with the foreign press since protests broke out across Syria some eight months ago.

In his exchange with the English journalist Andrew Gilligan, Assad mounted a defense of his own rule in terms that have become familiar over the last few years.

Contemptuously brushing aside the recently-formed Syrian National Council (in Arabic), whose claims to “really represent Syrians” he queried, Assad portrayed the regime over which he presides as the only available choice for Syria.

Asserting the role of his family as guardians of secularism, engaged in a longstanding battle with the forces of religious obscurantism, he described the current stand-off between opposition and regime as the product of a decades-old “struggle between Islamism and pan-Arabism.” As he put it, “We’ve been fighting the Muslim Brotherhood since the 1950s and we are still fighting with them.”

Worse still, he insisted any attempt to remove the Assad regime would result in a ruinous regional conflagration. As he explained, in words that echoed the longstanding Baath party line that Syria is the “beating heart of Arabism,” “Syria is the hub [...] in this region [...] It is the fault line, and if you play with the ground you will cause an earthquake.” Addressing a West wary of war and still worried by the threat of terror, he asked “do you want to see another Afghanistan, or tens of Afghanistans?” and insisted that “any problem in Syria will burn the whole region. If the plan is to divide Syria, that is to divide the whole region.”

These are familiar claims, and ones that – as Assad well knows – play to both Western and Middle Eastern audiences.

On the one hand, they resonate with US, European, and Israeli fears that any change to the status quo in Syria might upset a precarious regional balance – and allow resurgent Islamists to gain the upper hand in any post-Baath power vacuum.

On the other hand, they strike a chord with Arab suspicions of a long line of Western interventions in the region, from the conflicting commitments and territorial schemes of Britain and France in the Great War, to the 2003 occupation of Iraq.

It is no coincidence that Assad should have spoken of the “division” of the region. His words are a deliberate echo of those of allies like Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizballah, who has repeatedly spoken of a nefarious “project for the new Middle East,” in which the region would be divided up into confessional statelets, the better to accommodate the continued existence of Israel as a Jewish state.

There is no small paradox in this. For Assad, on the one hand, scorns the idea of a Middle Eastern state system founded on confessional distinctions, presenting himself as the champion of a secular nationalism that pays little heed to sectarian difference.

And yet, on the other, he portrays himself as the arbiter of a society riven by ethnic and religious divisions, and held together only by the will of a state benevolently extending its protection to its minorities.

This is a vision that echoes old Orientalist conceptions of the East as a mosaic of irreconcilable creeds and peoples. It is one all too willingly accepted by both Western observers who portray Syria as an island of tolerance in a sea of secular animosities, and by those among Assad’s own citizens who fear the prospect of Syria becoming another Lebanon or Iraq, engulfed in the flames of sectarian war. As one person interviewed by Gilligan in the streets of Damascus told him: “I don’t like Assad, but I am worried that what follows could be worse.”

For all its internal contradictions, Assad’s message remains unambiguous. Like an old regime monarch, he declares “après moi le déluge;” leave me in power, or face the parlous consequences…

But not all was sound and fury in Assad’s statements. The Syrian president combined his imprecations with a note of apparent contrition, noting that the Syrian security services made “many mistakes” in the early stages of the protest movement.

This admission of wrong-doing is not quite what it seems. Not only do Assad’s words somehow suggest that any bloodshed was inadvertent, an unfortunate breach of ordinary procedure. They also seek to create the impression that the regime has now mended its ways, and that its actions are currently aimed only at cracking down on a minority of “terrorists” seeking to destabilize the country. And, finally, they absolve Assad himself of all blame, suggesting that any responsibility lay with the country’s proliferating security apparatus, rather than the President himself, who had remained steadfast in his commitment to peaceful reform.

Portraying himself as a natural moderate, intent on overhauling the regime he inherited from his father, Hafiz, he insisted that he had avoided the “road of stubborn government,” commencing “reform” “six days after [the protests began].”

To buttress these claims, he presented himself as every bit the blue-jean wearing everyman, a Syrian David Cameron or Barack Obama. Receiving Gilligan in what the latter described as a “relatively small house in a normal – albeit guarded – street,” Assad declared: “I live a normal life. I drive my own car, we have neighbors, I take my kids to school.” In doing so, he drew an implicit contrast between what Gilligan called his “modest lifestyle” and the grandiose, vulgar, ways of deposed Middle Eastern rulers like Muammar al-Qaddafi, Husni Mubarak, Zinedine Ben Ali and, indeed, Saddam Hussein, with their private jets and ostentatious palaces.

Together, Assad claimed, his modesty and readiness for reform were what made him “popular” among his own people. As he put it, “people were skeptical that the reforms were an opiate for the people, but when we started announcing the reforms, the problems started decreasing… This is when the tide started to turn. This is when people started supporting the government…” But, just as important, he insisted, was his “personal life.” This, as he put it, was the “first component of popular legitimacy;” it is the “Syrian style” to live modestly, Assad explained to Gilligan, and his people appreciated his adherence to their ways.

This “popular legitimacy,” not “legitimacy according to elections,” is what really matters, Assad insisted; “if you do not have popular legitimacy, whether you are elected or not you will be removed – look at all the coups we had,” he went on, referring to the turbulent years that followed Syria’s independence from France in the 1940s.

This was not just a nod to the pro-regime demonstrations organized in Damascus in recent weeks, which some have seen as a spontaneous response to the rise of opposition violence elsewhere in the country, and others as orchestrated by a regime that has hardly proved averse to such grandstanding propaganda in the past.

It was also a way of suggesting that the demands of the protesters in Hums, Hama, and other cities across Syria, and their Western supporters, for democratic elections and a multi-party system were ill-founded.

Democracy, Assad intimated, mattered little in Syria. What really counted was the support of the populace – and that, the president retained.

There was little point, Assad explained to Gilligan, in hoping for a Western-style democratic system of government in Syria. One needed to understand that his country simply did not bear comparison with Britain or the United States. To compare his mode of governing with that of these states “was like comparing a Mac with a PC:” “both computers do the same job,” as he put it, “but they don’t understand each other.”

Belying with this analogy his earlier life as the head of the Syrian Computer Society, Assad did not let slip which side he favored in the great Mac vs PC debate, showing little inclination to support Steve Jobs’ Syrian background.

But he did show an Orientalist insistence upon the differences between Syria and the West. Stretching his computing analogy to its limits, he reiterated: “if you want to analyze me as the East, you cannot analyze me through the Western operating system, or culture. You have to translate according to my operating system, or culture.”

With these words, Assad echoed familiar tropes of the irremediable distinctions between the West and an Orient whose mysterious ways elude European understanding, and which operates according to conventions utterly alien to observers misguided enough to believe that it might one day achieve modes of government comparable to those that prevail elsewhere in the world.

His message to the West was clear: best not to meddle with something you don’t understand, if you want to avoid ruinous consequences. Democracy is not for everyone; for some, a President who does the school run and wears jeans on Fridays is enough, so let me deal with my people the way they expect, and I know.

As he has been doing since his accession to power in 2000, Assad sought in his remarks published Sunday to prevaricate, reassuring Western observers that change will, eventually, come – and that he is the only figure capable of steering Syria towards reform.

But, as time wears on, the toll of fatalities rises, and the prospect of an end to the deadlock seems ever more elusive, these are words which ring increasingly hollow. In the terse words of one opposition member from the city of Hums, which has become the epicenter of the protest movement in recent months: “killing people is not an act of reform.”

Credit: Reuters

Wounded Patients in Syria’s Hospitals are Tortured, Along with Medical Staff Suspected of Treating Injured Protesters, Says New Amnesty International Report:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e4cF7XhOnSQ&feature=player_embedded

Human Rights Organization Documents Cases of Injured Protesters Being Beaten by Security Agents in Hospitals

Contact: Suzanne Trimel, 212-633-4150, strimel@aiusa.org

(New York) — The Syrian government has turned hospitals into instruments of repression in its efforts to crush opposition, Amnesty International said today in a new report that documents the torture of injured patients and of medical professionals suspected of treating wounded protesters.

Afraid of the consequences of going to a government hospital, many people have chosen to seek treatment either at private hospitals or at poorly equipped makeshift field hospitals.

Doctors at the National Hospital in Homs told Amnesty International that the number of admissions for firearms wounds has dropped significantly since May, in contrast to the spiralling toll of deaths and injuries on the streets outside as a result of the uprising.

The 39-page report, “Health Crisis: Syrian Government Targets the Wounded and Health Workers,” documents how wounded patients in at least four government-run hospitals have been subjected to torture and other ill-treatment, including by medical workers.

Hospital workers suspected of treating protesters and others injured in unrest-related incidents have themselves faced arrest and torture.

“It is deeply alarming that the Syrian authorities seem to have given the security forces a free rein in hospitals, and that in many cases hospital staff appear to have taken part in torture and ill treatment of the very people they are supposed to care for,” said Cilina Nasser, Amnesty International Middle East and North Africa researcher.

“Given the scale and seriousness of the injuries being sustained by people across the country, it is disturbing to find that many consider it safer to risk not having major wounds treated rather than going to proper medical facilities.”

Amnesty International found that patients have been assaulted by medical staff, health workers and security personnel in national hospitals in Banias, Homs and Tell Kalakh and the military hospital in Homs.

The organization’s researchers interviewed 40 people for the report, including 30 people who witnessed the events described firsthand.

One doctor at Homs military hospital told Amnesty International he had seen four doctors and more than 20 nurses abusing patients.

”Ahmed” was delivered unconscious to the National Hospital in Tell Kalakh on August 22 after being beaten by security forces. A witness saw him in the emergency room:

“There were around seven or eight security men, some carrying rifles, and nurses wearing white robes crowded around him. He opened his eyes and said: ‘Where am I?’ They all suddenly jumped on him and started beating him and hitting him.”

Patients have also been removed from hospitals. On September 7, security forces looking for an alleged armed field commander opposed to the government raided al-Birr wa al-Khadamat Hospital in Homs. When they did not find him, they arrested 18 wounded people.

A health worker present during the raid told Amnesty International he saw at least one unconscious patient having his ventilator removed before he was taken away.

Because blood supplies in Syria can only be obtained from the Central Blood Bank, which is controlled by the Defense Ministry, private hospitals are faced with a terrible dilemma. One medic who had worked a private hospital in Homs told Amnesty International:

“We faced a dilemma every time we received a patient with a firearm injury and an urgent need of blood: if we send a request to the Central Blood Bank, the security would know about him and we would be putting him at risk or arrest and torture, and possibly death in custody.”

Medical workers have themselves been targeted by security forces, some for treating injured people, others on suspicion of attending demonstrations or filming protesters.

On August 7, around 20 soldiers and security forces raided a government hospital in Homs governorate, arresting seven hospital workers. One of the group told Amnesty International about his interrogation, during which some of his colleagues were badly beaten:

“[The interrogator] asked: ‘Do you want to be tortured or do you want to talk?’ … He accused me and my colleagues of treating the wounded without reporting them to the authorities, and asked me for the names of the wounded.”

Amnesty International called on the Syrian authorities to give strict and clear instructions to all hospitals to accept and treat all wounded patients without delay, and to prioritize the needs of patients over all else..

“Syrian medical workers are being placed in an impossible situation – forced to choose between treating wounded people and preserving their own safety,” said Nasser.

Amnesty International is a Nobel Peace Prize-winning grassroots activist organization with more than 2.8 million supporters, activists and volunteers in more than 150 countries campaigning for human rights worldwide. The organization investigates and exposes abuses, educates and mobilizes the public, and works to protect people wherever justice, freedom, truth and dignity are denied.

Syria’s 1.8 million Kurds (10% of the population) have arguably been the most quiescent of the Kurdish populations of the Middle East as a result of the hard hand of the state and the tentacles of its security apparatuses.

They have also experienced some of the most restrictions on their political and cultural rights in an Arab nationalist state that denies their identity. At best they are second class citizens, at worst persona non gratis.

However, the general uprising in Syria against the regime of Bashar al-Assad has been a game changer and the Kurds have entered the protests on the side of reform, calling for the ouster of Assad and the recognition of their political and cultural rights.

“The Kurds were the first to demonstrate in 2011, as they have demonstrated in January 25th in Hasakeh and were locked up, while their areas in Aleppo were under heavy military presence,” notes Syrian dissident Ausaman Monajed.

According to Christian Sinclair, Assistant Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Arizona who has studied the Syrian Kurds, “There is a vast network amongst Kurdish youth, connecting them with Arab youth groups, to organize demonstrations. These ‘local coordination committees’ operate clandestinely, and are all over the country. Protests have been a regular feature in Qamishli, Amude, Efrin, etc, for months now.”

However, the Syrian Kurds are divided into over a dozen illegal Kurdish parties that have been unable to organize and agree amongst themselves, much less between a fractured Arab opposition in Syria and the diaspora.

The Assad regime has been able to play the proverbial Kurdish card, stoking fear amongst Arabs of Kurdish separatism while trying to divide the Kurdish opposition. There is even suspicion the regime has infiltrated some of the Kurdish parties.

All this would suggest that just as the Arab street is at the forefront of the protests, so too are their Kurdish counterparts.

“For the moment, at any rate, the Kurdish parties in Syria are on their own. They have before them the task of reconciliation with the Arab opposition, with each other and, most important, with the Kurdish street,” concludes Sinclair in the recently published “The Evolution of Kurdish Politics in Syria.”

The Syrian uprising comes at a particularly difficult juncture in Turkey’s own Kurdish problem. First announced in 2009, the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) “Kurdish Opening” – which aimed to deemphasize the security focus of the state’s Kurdish policy in favor of the expansion of Kurdish political and cultural rights — has come to a standstill.

The government has reached a political impasse with the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) following the June 12th election. The BDP is boycotting parliament over the arrest of six elected MPs for their alleged membership in the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), claimed to be the urban arm of the PKK.

Reinforcing the Turkish state’s security-focused policy towards the Kurds is the rising violence between the PKK and Turkish security forces. This summer the conflict has claimed the lives of over 40 Turkish soldiers, in addition to nearly 160 PKK guerrillas.

All this bodes poorly for the soon-to-open negotiations on writing a new civilian constitution that many observers expect to resolve some of the foundational issues between the state and its Kurdish minority.

In Syria, Ankara is concerned over the PKK and its links to the Syrian Kurds, most notably through the PYD (Democratic Union Party), an offshoot of the PKK in Syria.

“The PKK is active in Syria under the guise of the PYD, with an extensive network and a lot of clout amongst the Kurdish population in Syria. New PKK members are regularly recruited in Syria and then smuggled across the borders [of Iraq and Turkey],” says Sinclair.

Instability in Syrian Kurdistan could open space for the PKK to operate, posing a particularly difficult challenge for Turkey – including the use of the Syrian Kurds or the PKK as proxies in the inter-state rivalries of the region and the struggle for influence in Syria.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Syria was the PKK’s largest patron and harbored the PKK’s leader Abdullah Ocalan. However, Syria ended its support for the PKK in 1998 following Turkish threats of military intervention. Since then Syria and Turkey have co-operated against Kurdish nationalism, driven in large part by mutual concern that Kurdish political gains in post-Saddam Iraq would have a spill-over effect on their own Kurdish populations.

Indeed, as the pace-setters of Kurdish nationalism the gains of the Iraqi Kurds in post-Saddam Iraq have had an influence on the Syrian Kurds. In 2004, riots broke out between Kurds and Arabs in Qamishli after the Iraqi Kurds declared autonomy. In the ensuing crackdown Syrian security forces killed 34. The regime has since kept a tight lid on all Kurdish political, cultural and social activity.

However, as the Syrian uprising enters its seventh month the lid on the Kurds has boiled over. This has caused concern in Ankara over what the regime’s end-game may look like as well as the nature of a post-Assad Syria and the position of the Syrian Kurds within it.

The problem for Turkey is that the Syrian Kurds, like their brethren in Turkey, demand language rights, constitutional recognition of the Kurds as an ethnic group and, for some, autonomy.

While these demands may have been muted under the iron fist of the Assad regime and the fractured nature of Syrian Kurdish politics, they are now coming to the fore, pitting Syrian Kurds against Arab nationalism, and possibly the Turkish state.

If the Kurds are unable to attain their demands vis-à-vis the Arab opposition this could lead to the conflict the spilling over into Turkey. At the same time, Ankara is especially wary of any kind of autonomy for the Kurds in Syria and how this would influence Turkey’s Kurds. According to Sinclair, rather than “a spill over in the physical sense, there is a concern for any power the Kurds may gain in a new Syria and then the influence of that spilling over.”

Washington D.C. — The World Affairs Institute has selected thirteen young Egyptians and Tunisians to participate in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Democracy Fellows Program. The Democracy Fellows will arrive on October 1 to begin their two-month internships in Congress and media outlets in the nation’s capital.

The group includes young activists and journalists who are on the cutting edge of the democratic transformations underway in Egypt and Tunisia. Among the selected fellows are 8 Egyptians and 5 Tunisians.

The MENA Democracy Fellows Program, launched on June 30, aims to provide emerging leaders with the practical experience and skills needed to establish a more open, inclusive and transparent democratic system and process. The program is also designed to promote communication, dialogue and cooperation between the region’s new leaders and their American counterparts.

Organizations wishing to support or partner with World Affairs and the MENA Democracy Fellows Program are encouraged to contact Caroline Lalonde at(202) 349-8554 or CLalonde@WorldAffairsJournal.org.

The MENA Democracy Fellows Program is sponsored by the World Affairs Institute, a non-partisan and non-profit Washington, D.C.-based organization. The initiative is conducted in cooperation with several organizations, including the House Democracy Partnership Program. The activity is guided by a distinguished advisory board that includes Congressman David Dreier (R/CA and Chairman of the Rules Committee), Congressman David Price, and Congressman John Larson (D/CT, and Chairman of the Democratic Caucus), as well as leading journalists, authors, and policy analysts from the US and abroad including Christopher Hitchens, Tom Gjelten (NPR), former Ambassador Eric Edelman, Joshua Muravchik, P.J. O’Rourke, Jim Sciutto (ABC), and best-selling author Alaa Al Aswany.

The World Affairs Institute also publishes the bimonthly international affairs journal World Affairs, which was founded in 1837.

The selected MENA Democracy Fellows are named below.

Mouheb Ben Garoui is a founder and the president of I-Watch, a Tunis-based advocate for governmental and political transparency and accountability — serving as an anti-corruption government watchdog. Mr. Ben Garoui is an accredited elections observer and trainer. He received his degree in International Relations and English from the Higher Institute of Human Sciences in Tunis.

Jamel Bettabieb is a teacher and trade unionist from Sidi Bouzid, where the 2011 Tunisian revolution began. He teaches German and is active in the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) and the Trade Union Rights and Freedoms Organization. He is a recipient of the NED’s 2011 Democracy Award. He has a degree in German Language and Civilization from the University of Manouba. He is the father of a 4-month-old daughter.

Aya Chebbi directs the Tunisian National Organization for Children, which aims to improve the lives of children. Following Tunisia’s revolution, she joined the Global Change Makers, a group of young people who promote the right and responsibility to vote. She is also a member of Junior Chamber International, which offers training on human and political rights. She has a degree in English from the Higher Institute of Human Sciences in Tunis.

Neama Ebaid is a member of Egyptian Dreams, a community development group that promotes civil society and raises civic awareness. She is a founder of Glow and works with other student and community development groups at the American University in Cairo. Ms. Ebaid spent a semester at the University of Chicago and has a degree in Business Administration and Economics from the AUC.

Menan Farag works for the Library of Alexandria’s Dialogue Forum Department, which supports youth initiatives, entrepreneurs and a network of international civil society organizations. She volunteers for Alexandria 2020, which aims to improve Alexandria’s quality of life, as well as attract foreign investment. She has a degree in Political Science from Cairo University.

Maged Maher Gabra is a co-founder of the Egyptian Initiative to Protect the Gains of the Revolution, an organization that advocates for human rights, democracy and civil society. He earned a MA in Applied Developmental and Educational Psychology with a focus on social justice and community psychology from Boston College, as well as degrees in Public Health from Alexandria University and in Science and Education from Helwan University.

Asma Ghribi reports on political/social issues at Tunisia’s first English language news website, www.tunisia-live.net. Following the collapse of the Ben Ali government, she worked with foreign media outlets — Al Jazeera, The National, and others. She has contributed to radio and online magazines. Ms. Ghribi has a degree in English Language, Literature and Culture and a MA in Cultural Studies from Manouba University.

Sana Karray is a doctoral student researching social capital and transgenerational value creation in family businesses. She lectures at the University of Economic and Management Sciences in Nabel. She is an active member of the political party Al Moubadara.

Amira Rahman supervises the foreign desk at Al Masry Al Youm, Egypt’s largest independent daily. She reports and comments on domestic and international affairs. She has covered the Middle East, and has reported from Gaza during the Israeli withdrawal in 2005 and from the Annapolis Peace Conference in 2007. She was a television reporter for Egypt TV. Ms. Rahman holds degrees in English Literature and Parliamentary Studies from Cairo University.

Mina Rezkalla received a Law degree from Ain Shams University and studied non-violence and advocacy strategies at the Arab Academy for Non-Violence Studies. Mr. Rezkalla is a legal researcher for the Egyptian Union of Liberal Youth (EULY), a Cairo-based non-profit organization that promotes classic liberalism among Egyptian youth. He supervises a program within EULY on the status of Coptic Christians in Egypt.

Dina Sadek was a fixer and translator for the Sunday Telegraph during Egypt’s revolution and later worked from Benghazi and the front lines in Libya’s rebellion for the Telegraph and the Agence France Presse (AFP). She works for the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review and contributes to the online magazine EMAJ and the Goethe Institute in Cairo. She has a degree in English Literature from Ain Shams University.

Mahmoud El Sawy is a founder and the executive director of the Horya Center for Human Rights, a Port Said, Egypt-based democracy-promotion group. Mr. El Sawy was among the first to call attention to the Khaled Said torture case — a catalyst for Egypt’s January 25, 2011 revolution. Mr. El Sawy is a former member of the El Ghad Party and founded its Port Said chapter.

Magdy Samaan is a correspondent for Al-Shrouk Al-Gadid, an Egyptian daily, reporting on public policy, politics and international affairs. He is also a reporter for Al Jazeera and has previously written for Al Masry Al Youm, Egypt’s largest independent daily, reporting on politics, religious minorities, and US-Egyptian relations. He has contributed to the Daily News Egypt and Cairo Times. He holds a degree in Mass Communications from Cairo University.

MEDIA CONTACT:
Caroline Lalonde
CLalonde@WorldAffairsJournal.org
202. 349. 8554

The following is a contributing piece from guest writer Ladan Yazdian. Ms. Yazdian is a foreign affairs and Middle East specialist. She holds a BA and an MA in political science. She is currently a Ph.D. student at Virginia Tech, working on global security, foreign policy, international relations, and human rights.

In the wake of the spate of recent Arab uprisings, Iran has tried to reframe these movements as Islamic awakenings inspired by its own 1979 Islamic revolution. Strategically, it is logical that the Islamic Republic would be watching the latest developments with concern, due to potential regional instability that could force Iran to change its geopolitical calculations. More importantly, just as the effects of the Iranian uprising resonated throughout the Arab world, so too will the Arab-inspired events of the region undoubtedly have a marked influence on the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people.

Iran’s diverse civil society and non-violent resistance, which reached its peak in the aftermath of the disputed 2009 presidential elections, are still the most fundamental threat to the regime’s existence. These concerns manifest themselves in the Islamic Republic’s inconsistent political postures towards the countries in turmoil, most notably Yemen, Bahrain, Egypt, and Syria.

The Arab uprising will naturally force Iran to reshape its foreign policy calculations in the Arab world and the greater region from a geopolitical perspective. Iran is concerned that any freedoms gained by the nations in surrounding countries will spur its own people into rejuvenating their own resistance. Iran’s foreign policy is considered by Western nations and neighboring countries to be aggressive due to Iran’s history of supporting non-state actors and pariah regimes that operate outside the accepted bounds of international law as well as those that are deemed more susceptible to Iran’s influence. Let’s look at key states in the region that are experiencing internal revolt.

Yemen – Iran’s priority in Yemen has been centered around countering and reducing Saudi Arabia’s influence. In the absence of a strong leadership in Egypt and Iraq, Iran finds a powerful rival in Saudi Arabia and the alliances it creates with the West and GCC countries. The latter have been active in resolving Yemen’s eight-month old conflict.
The crisis in Yemen has become more complicated as Ali Abdullah Saleh remains in Saudi, recovering from wounds caused by an explosion in his presidential compound. The Pro-government forces, Yemeni Republican Guards, are battling on at least two fronts; against protesters around the capital city of Sanaa, and against armed separatists and Al-Qaeda jihadists in and around the southern province of Abyan. Suicide bombings in the south have turned some tribes against Al-Qaeda, which is currently operating in Yemen under the name Ansar Al-Sharia, or the Army of Islamic Law, with the intention of establishing an Islamic state in Yemen. Aside from Al-Qaeda, anti-government opposition parties, not seemingly united in their demands, have nonetheless attempted to form a council with the intent of pressuring Saleh into relinquishing power.

Meanwhile, it appears as though Iran prefers that the Yemeni opposition groups, anti-Saleh tribes, and youth movement groups form a coalition with the Al-Houthi against Saleh’s American-backed government. Iran may feel that it has sufficient influence on the Al-Houthi and other youth opposition groups, and can nudge them towards the formation of a national council and present a serious unity government before possible return of Saleh into power or his potential replacement.

Uniting the opposition, however, has thus far proven unsuccessful as the council was rejected by more than half of its members as well as by the separatist groups in the south and the Al-Houthi Shia group in the north.
Supporting the Yemeni opposition would help Iran exert influence over the strategic Straight of Bab-el-Mandeb in the Red Sea; undermine the role of Saudi Arabia and the United States; and make up for any loss it might experience with Syria and Bahrain, should the Syrian regime collapse.

Bahrain – Inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the opposition in Bahrain took to the streets to demand better political representation and government concessions for the country’s Shia community. Bahrain’s royal family and the government attributed the unrest to extremists and accused the protesters of having a sectarian agenda supported by Iran. From the very onset of the unrest, the Islamic Republic’s media outlets, such as Press TV and Al-Alam, as well as pro-government Farsi websites, strove to keep the spotlight on Bahrain’s uprising.

Similar efforts have been made to undermine talks between the Sunni-led government and the majority Shia opposition bloc. Major opposition group Al-Wifaq, which had previously agreed to participate in the talks, later reneged, increasing speculation that the Islamic Republic is intent on sabotaging the national dialogue backed by the United States.

In Bahrain, Iran has sought to make the American presence costly while seeking influence within the opposition under the mantra of protesting injustice against the Shia community, which would be expected from Iran. The Islamic Republic has long had issues with the territorial and political leaning of the island’s royal family. In recent years, the Bahraini leadership has complained about Iran’s attempts at fomenting unrest within its Shia community for Iran’s own political gains aimed at countering the Saudi influence.

Egypt – The uprising in Egypt has been instrumental in inspiring the people of Libya, Syria, and Bahrain, but it has thus far failed to bring about closer diplomatic ties between Egypt and Iran. Despite the interim Egyptian government’s initial interest and the friendly response from Iran’s foreign ministry, the Egyptians have been reluctant to normalize relations with the Islamic Republic following the fall of Hosni Mubarak.

The unprecedented passage of two Iranian naval ships through Egypt’s Suez Canal into the Mediterranean Sea last year has not helped in raising the confidence level between the two countries. In the current political climate, Egyptians seem to try to keep their close ties with the Arab world rather than entering into an uncertain relationship with the Islamic Republic. Egypt’s ambivalence stance in restoring full–scale diplomatic relations with Iran comes amid accusations that the Iranian embassy has been actively seeking to open communication channels with all Egyptian political groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. This has fueled speculations that Iran may be attempting to promote the type of political Islam that many feared would govern the post-Mubarak Egypt.

Syria - More than five months into the uprising, the conflict with the Assad regime has turned into a bloody stalemate. The resilience of the Syrian people has forced world leaders to recalibrate their positions towards Syria. According to Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Ramin Mehmanparast, however, for Iran “Syria is an exception”. With two security pacts currently in place, Syria is Iran’s key strategic Arab ally in the region. In exchange for its role in the partnership, Syria has received political and economic benefits and support during the massive uprising that has engulfed the country. There has been significant military cooperation between the two countries in addition to bilateral support for proxy elements in Lebanon.

Iran has been accused of advising Syria on repression methods aimed at crushing dissent. This in turn has angered Syrian activists, who during the protests, demonstrated their displeasure towards the Iranian government by burning Islamic Republic flags and pictures of Ayatollah Khamenei.

Iran’s main objective in keeping the Syrian regime in power, besides having an ally and supporter, is to maintain access to the Levant region and Israeli borders via Hezbollah. Iran is aware, however, that the fall of Assad would have serious regional repercussions. Knowing that it cannot indefinitely buttress a weakened Assad regime, Iran has asked the Syrian regime to listen to the demands of its people, while discrediting the opposition, labeling them as agents of the West.

The Islamic Republic’s foreign policy has been held hostage by its perpetual anti-Western stance, which has considerably limited its ability to actively participate in the global arena. The double-standard seen in Iran’s policy toward the Arab Spring is not new. The political ideology to which the Islamic Republic subscribes does not deter it , for example, from taking the side of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, or remaining silent when there are mass killing of Muslims in China or Chechnya. Such actions, combined with sectarian meddling and the perception that Iran does not promote peace in the Middle East, has, according to a new IBOPE Zogby International poll, seriously damaged Iran’s reputation in the Arab world.

The Islamic Republic is correct in viewing recent events in Arab countries with trepidation and concern. These uprisings may very well pose a fundamental problem for the core of the Iranian regime and raise hopes that the era of autocracy is over as Arabs across the region struggle to participate in their political affairs. In addition, the resilience of the Arab people can energize and inspire the citizens of other countries in the region in their struggle against dictatorship and totalitarian regimes.

In this new wave of Arab awakening, every country that has risen against injustice has its own unique set of circumstances. Taken as a whole, however, even if these movements do not lead to democracies, they raise hope for ushering in a new era of increased participation and greater government accountability, a prospect that the Islamic Republic is not ready to accept.

In light of President Obama’s recent call for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down, The Foreign Policy Initiative Executive Director Jamie M. Fly and 32 other signatories have signed a letter urging President Obama to take additional, common-sense steps to further pressure the Assad regime and thus make clear that the United States stands firmly on the side of the Syrian people.

August 19, 2011
The Honorable Barack Obama
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear President Obama:

We commend you for your administration’s statement that “the future of Syria must be
determined by its people, but President Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way… For the sake
of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.”
We are concerned, however, that unless urgent actions are taken by the United States and its
allies, the Assad regime’s use of force against the Syrian people will only increase and the
already significant death toll will mount.
As you have stated previously, the Arab Spring presents an opportunity to “pursue the world as it
should be” rather than continuing to “accept the world as it is.” There is perhaps no place where
this is truer than Syria.
The regime of Bashar al-Assad and that of his father which preceded him, have brutally
repressed the Syrian people for decades, imprisoning, torturing, and killing those who attempted
dissent. In recent years, Syria has formed increasingly close ties with Iran, jointly supporting
terrorist groups with funds and weaponry used to terrorize American allies in the region. For
years, the Assad regime pursued a covert nuclear program with North Korean assistance, which
could have led to a disastrous cascade of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Finally, by
facilitating foreign fighters’ transit through Syrian territory, the Assad regime contributed to the
death and injury of thousands of American troops serving in Iraq over the last eight years.
The tactics used by the current regime make clear now more than ever that a post-Assad Syria is
in America’s interest. We commend you for adding your uniquely powerful voice to the chorus
of foreign leaders in calling for Assad’s departure. We appreciate the executive order issued
today that freezes Syrian government assets in the U.S.’s jurisdiction and prohibits new
investment in Syria by U.S. persons or the exportation or sale of any services to Syria by U.S.
persons. We commend you for freezing imports of Syrian petroleum products and prohibiting
U.S. persons from transacting business related to Syrian-origin petroleum products. The actions
send a strong message of support to the Syrian people in their quest for freedom.
We believe there is more than can be done. Specifically, we urge you to:
 Work with our European allies to tighten the sanctions regime against Syria. Particular
attention should be paid to potential multilateral energy sector sanctions as well as the
passage of energy sanctions bills recently introduced in the House of Representatives and
Senate.
 Encourage Germany, Italy, and France, which are the main buyers of Syrian oil, to
terminate their purchases of Syrian crude; forcefully urge energy trading firms from
Switzerland, Holland, and elsewhere to stop their sales of refined petroleum products to
Syria; and pressure European, Russian, Chinese, and Indian companies to freeze their
investments in Syria’s energy sector and the transfer of any energy-related technology,
goods, and services.
 Sanction any person assisting Syria in the development of energy pipelines as well as
insurance firms, shipping companies, financing entities, ports managers, and other
persons active in supporting Syria’s energy sector.
 Implement measures against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps individuals and
entities doing business in Syria. Expand sanctions against Syrian persons who are
involved in human rights abuses, support for terrorism, and supporting Syria’s
proliferation activities. Sanction those international companies doing business with these
designated Iranian and Syrian individuals and entities.
 Sanction the Syrian Central Bank in order to freeze the Assad regime out of the global
financial system and inhibit the ability of the regime to settle oil sales and other financial
transactions. It is important to ensure that the Central Bank of Syria does not facilitate
trade for any sanctioned Syrian banks, businesses and persons.
 Work with our European allies to follow your lead in sanctioning the Commercial Bank
of Syria and the Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank.
 Sanction international persons involved in the purchase, issuance, financing or the
facilitation of Syrian sovereign debt, including energy bonds, which the Assad regime
may use to circumvent investment-related sanctions in order to raise capital for its energy
sector.
 Engage Syrian opposition figures outside the country and ensure that all available aid and
assistance, including secure communications and Internet circumvention technology is
being made available to these groups.
 Leverage the International Atomic Energy Agency’s referral of Syria to the United
Nations Security Council for its violation of its nonproliferation obligations to press for
additional sanctions against Damascus.
 Recall Ambassador Robert Ford from Damascus unless he is clearly charged with aiding
the transition to democracy in Syria.
Mr. President, the opportunity presented by recent developments in Syria and the broader region
is momentous. As you said in May, “we cannot hesitate to stand squarely on the side of those
who are reaching for their rights, knowing that their success will bring about a world that is more
peaceful, more stable, and more just.” Supporting Syrians to rid themselves of Assad’s yoke
would also have broader game-changing implications on peace and stability in the Middle East.
It would deny Iran the use of its major ally as a proxy for terrorism, stem the flow of Syrian arms
to Hezbollah, reduce instability in Lebanon, and lessen tensions on Israel’s northern border.
This is a significant moment where many of our allies and partners in Europe and the region are
in agreement that the Assad atrocities must stop now. They are poised to act. Now is the time to
continue placing the United States firmly on the side of the Syrian people. We urge you to grasp
this opportunity and increase your administration’s efforts to ensure that the brave people taking
to the streets in Syria are soon able to enjoy the fruits of freedom that we in the West hold so
dear.
Sincerely,
Khairi Abaza, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Ammar Abdulhamid, pro-democracy Syrian activist
Hussain Abdul-Hussain, Kalimah Institute
Fouad Ajami, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Amr Al-Azm, Member, Executive Committee, Antalia Committee and Professor, Shawnee State
University
Tony Badran, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Bassam Bitar, Former Diplomat in the Syrian Embassy (Paris)
Max Boot, Council on Foreign Relations
Toby Dershowitz, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Michael Doran, Brookings Institution
Mark Dubowitz, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Michael Makovsky, Bipartisan Policy Center
John Hannah, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
William Inboden, University of Texas-Austin
Frederick W. Kagan, American Enterprise Institute
Robert Kagan, Brookings Institution
William Kristol, The Weekly Standard
Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University
Tod Lindberg, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Jamie Fly, Foreign Policy Initiative
Reuel Marc Gerecht, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Bashar Lutfi, Northwest Medical Center
Clifford D. May, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Honorable Robert C. McFarlane, Former National Security Advisor
Jonathan Schanzer, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Randy Scheunemann
Gary Schmitt, American Enterprise Institute
Lee Smith, Foundation for Defense of Democracies and The Weekly Standard
Henry Sokolski, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Kenneth R. Weinstein, Hudson Institute
Ambassador R. James Woolsey, Former Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Robert Zarate, Foreign Policy Initiative
*Organizations provided for affiliation only.

Suzanne Trimel, Media Relations Director
Amnesty International USA

New York – Amnesty International today called the United Nations Security Council response to the bloodshed in Syria “completely inadequate” and “deeply disappointing” and pressed the Council for a “firm and legally binding” position imposing an arms embargo, freezing President Al-Assad’s assets and pursuing an international investigation of crimes against humanity.

The Security Council condemned the Syrian government’s deadly crackdown on protesters in a statement Wednesday and called for an end to violence but the statement is not legally binding.

“The U.N.’s response is completely inadequate,” said Jose Luis Diaz, Amnesty International’s representative to the United Nations. “After more than four months of violent crackdown on predominantly peaceful dissent in Syria, it is deeply disappointing that the best the Security Council can come up with is a limp statement that is not legally binding and does not refer the situation to the International Criminal Court.”

“President Assad has allowed his security forces to carry out another bloody attack on civilians, with dozens killed in the city of Hama in recent days. It’s crucial that a U.N. Human Rights Council fact-finding mission to Syria is able to investigate the situation as soon as possible. Unfortunately, the Security Council has also failed to provide support for such a mission,” he said. The Syrian authorities have so far not allowed the U.N.-fact-finding delegation into the country.

““The UN must act now, with a firm and legally binding position. At the very least, its position must include imposing an arms embargo, freezing the assets of President al-Assad and other officials suspected of responsibility for crimes against humanity, and referring the situation to the ICC Prosecutor,” he added.

Amnesty International has received the names of more than 1,500 people believed to have been killed since pro-reform protests began in mid-March.

Many of them are reported to be protesters and local residents shot by live ammunition from the security forces and the army. Thousands of others have been arrested within the context of the protests, with many being held incommunicado at unknown locations.

Families are reportedly afraid to seek information about the whereabouts of detained relatives and Amnesty International fears they may have been subjected to enforced disappearances. Many are reported to have been tortured or otherwise ill-treated in custody, in some cases resulting in death.”

The crimes committed in Syria by government forces amount to crimes against humanity as they appear to be part of a widespread, as well as systematic, attack against the civilian population, Amnesty International said.

The organization has repeatedly called on the UN Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court, as it did with Libya’s government in February, following the violent repression of protests there.

Suzanne Trimel
Media Relations Director
Amnesty International USA
5 Penn Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10001
212-633-4150
917-815-5964 (mobile)