After all, it is rather gratifying to see the dignified Hindu getting down and dirty with the more boisterous Times. In a recent series of much-discussed ads, The Hindu wittily takes on the Times’ penchant for sensational and tabloid-centric news, urging readers to “stay ahead of the times.” The adverts sharply smack Times of India’s readers for being clueless about everything except inane Bollywood gossip.

Yet, the ads are another sign that South India’s grand old paper itself is finally catching up to the times. Established in 1878, and run by the family-owned Kasturi & Sons, The Hindu is one of India’s oldest English-language newspapers. Generations of South Indians have woken up to the paper’s steady, staid and reliable coverage of the news. Describing the paper, Jawarharlal Nehru once wrote that it reminded him of an “old maiden lady, very prim and proper, who is shocked if a naughty word is used in her presence. Not for it the shady side of existence, the rough and tumble and conflicts of life.”

Source: The Hindu

That steadiness has worked in the paper’s favor for well over a century, making it South India’s preeminent daily and India’s third largest English newspaper with a circulation of over 1.5 million. Yet, that preeminence is slowly being threatened by a new readership that perceives the paper as being overly conservative and orthodox. Unlike the West, India is enjoying a boom in print media circulation rates. The paper was already facing competition from less-priced dailies like The Indian Express and the Deccan Chronicle when the Times of India (TOI) decided to make its South Indian debut by launching in Chennai in 2008. Though TOI – published by Bennett, Coleman and Co. Ltd (BCCL) – has long enjoyed the widest circulation across India, with a readership of over 7 million, it has traditionally avoided the South Indian market. Since 2008, however, the paper has been slowly making inroads into The Hindu’s turf in the states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Over the last three months, TOI has bombarded its Southern rival with a fantastic ad that accurately hits The Hindu for its soporific treatment of the news.

For The Hindu, this external threat has been compounded by internal issues that have roiled the newspaper’s management. As a family-run establishment, the paper has traditionally been run by the extended members of the Kasturi clan, with the top leadership positions, including editor-in-chief, going to family members. Last year, however, the paper’s most visible face – its indomitable editor-in-chief, N.Ram – ran into significant family opposition when he attempted to “professionalize and contemporize” the paper by choosing a non-family member to succeed in his place. Court battles ensued, dirty linen was washed in public, and accusations and counter-accusations flew fast and furious. Circumstances have finally forced the old maiden to enter the rough and tumble and conflicts of life.

The dust has finally settled, with a few unhappy family members and a new (non-family) editor-in-chief, Siddharth Varadarajan, on board. The new chief is already getting kudos for his emphasis on journalistic standards. He recently apologized to readers when a Delhi edition of the paper carried a full-front page ad extolling Congress chief, Sonia Gandhi. Writing on (where else?) Facebook, he said that “this sort of crass commercialisation compromises the image and reputation of my newspaper.”

Journalistic standards or not, the newspaper is apparently sharpening its claws in response to the TOI threat. Insiders promise “more photos, sharper content and definitely fewer events coverage that Hindu is kind of known for.” It is a smart strategy, and it is gratifying to know that the paper isn’t dumbing down its news in response to the Times threat, but rather is being smarter about its substantive coverage of the news.

Salman Rushdie’s effigy is burned in Mumbai

Just in time for Republic Day, which commemorates the adoption of a post-colonial constitution on January 26, 1950, a series of events lays bare the limits on freedom of expression in India.

Foremost among these is the raging controversy surrounding Salman Rushdie’s scheduled appearance at the Jaipur Literature Festival, a saga that neatly encapsulates both the virtues and vices of the Indian polity. The gathering has fast emerged as the largest and most prestigious literary event in Asia, and it is a fine example of the soft power strengths India brings to the competition with China for influence in the region. This year’s installment attracted some 250 writers from South Asia and beyond (including talk show maven Oprah Winfrey, new age guru Deepak Chopra and Joseph Lelyveld, whose book on Mahatma Gandhi was greeted with a blast of invective from the Indian political class last year) as well as 70,000 visitors. Yet the imbroglio over Rushdie, who was supposed to be the main attraction at this year’s festival, has tarnished India’s credentials as emerging Asia’s brightest exemplar of democratic freedoms.

Rushdie, who was born in Mumbai to a Muslim family of Kashmiri descent, is the author of the 1988 novel, The Satanic Verses, which inflamed Muslim sentiment throughout the world and lead Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s supreme leader, to issue a notorious fatwa against his life. Concerned about the potential for upheaval among its sizeable Muslim population, the Indian government quickly banned the book, part of its familiar but disgraceful ritual of proscribing books that touch on sensitive issues or arouse passions in certain quarters. Rushdie, who continues to live under the threat of death, has traveled to India without incident numerous times in the years since, including an unannounced 2007 visit to the Jaipur gathering that is credited with putting it on the world’s cultural map.

But his headline participation at this year’s event brought forth a torrent of umbrage and intimidation. Muslim clerics started things off, including those at Darul Uloom Deoband, an influential Islamic seminary in Uttar Predesh, India’s most populous state which will hold legislative elections next month that many believe are critical to the survival of the Congress Party-led national government in New Delhi. Another seminary issued a fatwa calling for protests against the visit and a number of Muslim groups warned of “unprecedented protests” and burned Rushdie’s effigy.

Predictably enough, politicians soon took up the cudgels, many of them Congress Party leaders fearful of losing the allegiance of Uttar Pradesh’s large bloc of Muslim voters, who formed about a fifth of the state’s electorate. Ashok Gehlot, chief minister of Rajasthan, the northwestern state where the festival takes place, and a former general secretary of the All India Congress Committee, reportedly pressed the organizers to rescind their invitation to Rushdie and appeared indifferent to the threats being made against Rushdie’s safety. Chandrabhan Singh, head of the Congress Party’s Rajasthan unit, declared that “Rushdie has hurt the sentiments of many Indians. He must not be allowed to come to India.” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Sonia Gandhi, the party’s national leader, maintained a studious silence, while one of Singh’s Cabinet members pronounced that Rushdie’s “presence is not desirable.”

In contrast to the poltroon instincts of the political class, India’s boisterous media leapt to Rushdie’s defense. The Times of India accused the Congress Party of playing identity politics and argued that “by catering to such intolerance, the Congress has further contributed to creating an increasingly illiberal atmosphere in the country.” The Hindu called the affair “a national shame” and charged that “India has again betrayed its heritage of providing sanctuary to persecuted individuals and ideas, not to speak of its Constitution.”  Manu Joseph, editor of OPEN magazine, condemned it as another dispiriting example of the Indian government choosing “the cowardice of practicality over the courage of morality.”

If the saga had ended at this point, it would have amounted to an embarassment to the country’s liberal reputation. Instead it unexpectedly morphed into an outrage against free expression. On the eve of the festival’s opening, Rushdie suddenly withdrew when the Rajasthan police warned him of an assassination plot being hatched by a Mumbai underworld boss who has close ties to the Pakistani security establishment. Media outlets, however, soon reported that the death threat was concocted by authorities to scare him away. When Rushdie made plans to address the gathering via video link, Rajasthan officials attempted to throw up new impediments. In the end, the video conference was abruptly cancelled by the venue’s owner following police warnings about the risk of violent protests.

In solidarity with Rushdie, four Indian writers at the gathering staged an impromptu reading of passages from The Satanic Verses, a prohibited act that drew quick police notice. Advised by legal counsel that they had unwittingly opened themselves up to criminal charges, the writers hastily departed Jaipur and, in some cases, the country.  (Hari Kunzru, one of them, defends his actions here.)

Unfortunately, the Rushdie affair stands out for its prominence but not its singularity. Currently, the Delhi High Court is considering a petition that seeks to hold Google and Facebook liable for not censoring content that might offend the sensibilities of Hindus, Muslims and Christians. The judge overseeing the matter ominously warned that if the companies could not police their own sites, “like China we may be forced to pass orders banning all such websites.” Prime Minister Singh’s government has lent its imprimatur to the petitioner’s cause.

Late last year, Kapil Sibal, a Harvard-educated lawyer who serves as Mr. Singh’s telecommunications minister, likewise threatened to censor social networking sites for objectionable content (here and here).  Similar to the rhetoric directed at Rushdie, he argued that “religious sentiments of many communities and of any reasonable person is [sic] being hurt because of content which is on the sites.” Last June’s death of M. F. Husain, the most acclaimed painter of modern India, also recalled how he had been hounded into self-exile by Hindu nationalist groups incensed at his nude depictions of Hindu deities. Prime Minister Singh called Husain’s passing in a London hospital “a national loss” but he did nothing to dampen the mob culture that caused Husain to spend the last years of his life outside of India.

Indeed, over the last two years, India’s illiberal tendencies have been in particular bloom:

• A fictionalized biography of Congress Party supreme Sonia Gandhi was banned;
• Government officials helped put the kibosh on plans to make a movie based on Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire, a non-fiction book that sheds light on Jawaharlal Nehru’s furtive relationship with the wife of the British Raj’s last viceroy;
• An outcry organized by the family of Bal Thackeray, a Hindu nationalist politician, forced the University of Mumbai to drop Rohinton Mistry’s novel, Such a Long Journey, a finalist for the prestigious Man Booker Prize, from its English-language syllabus;
• And Arundhati Roy, a perennial bete noire to the political establishment and a Man Booker Prize-winner for her 1997 novel, The God of Small Things, was charged with sedition for her remarks on the Kashmir dispute.

All democracies are continuous works in progress. But this year’s Republic Day reveals just how far India still remains from the ideals of free expression.

But the India-China narrative in 2011 was more about strategic competition than economic collaboration. Two events over the last month or so signify how long-standing disputes along their Himalayan frontier have increasingly come to the fore. The first is the abrupt cancellation of border talks due to Beijing’s concerns about the Dalai Lama’s activities inside India. The second is the alarm sounded in the Indian parliament by Mulayam Singh Yadav, a former defense minister, that China is on the verge of launching an attack.

New Delhi’s strategic activism in East Asia and the reactions it has elicited in Beijing were also on display this year. During his state visit last year, President Barack Obama urged India not only to “look East” but also “to engage East” for the sake of enhanced security and prosperity throughout Asia. Secretary of State Hillary Rodman Clinton echoed this message during her own trip to India this past July.

The advice was seemingly taken to heart when the Indian government, in defiance of explicit Chinese warnings, proceeded with hydrocarbon exploration in the South China Sea, an area Beijing assertively claims in almost its entirety. New Delhi also moved to solidify security relations with Vietnam, a Chinese nemesis, and to strengthen its influence in Myanmar, which China and India have long regarded as an arena for geopolitical jousting.  Last week’s visit to New Delhi by Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda capped off a year that saw a tightening strategic partnership between the two countries.

Central to the “Delhi disillusionment” that now prevails in Washington are questions about whether the nuclear cooperation accord has succeeded in invigorating U.S.-India geopolitical cooperation in the face of a rapidly growing and more assertive China. But events over the last month demonstrate that a strategic entente focused on Beijing is slowly coming together. The United States, India and Japan in mid-December held their first trilateral meeting on security issues in East Asia. Nirupama Rao, the Indian ambassador in Washington, has stated that New Delhi will use this dialogue to bolster its engagement in the region.

A trilateral security effort (here and here) also seems to be congealing among the United States, India and Australia, even if New Delhi remains wary of a formal arrangement. And within its strategic backyard, India has started a tripartite security dialogue with Sri Lanka and Maldives that has China as a focus.

As a previous post noted, 2012 will not be a year of grand initiatives in U.S.-India relations. But officials in Washington and New Delhi should use the next 12 months to focus on two eminently accomplishable projects:

• A revival of quadrilateral security cooperation among the U.S., India, Japan and Australia that briefly flowered in 2006-2007. This initiative grew out of the cooperative efforts by the four navies after the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, but lost momentum following the collapse in late 2007 of the Shinzo Abe government in Tokyo and the John Howard government in Canberra. In view of the renewed geopolitical stirrings among the four capitals, the time seems opportune for putting this “Asian Democracies” initiative back on the agenda.
• Washington’s sponsorship of New Delhi’s entry into the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Given India’s rising military and economic profile in East Asia, its absence from this grouping is a serious omission that ought to be rectified.

(An earlier version of this post appeared at http://www.usinpac.com)

Reports of political scams and corruption continued to surface throughout 2011. 2G allocation, hoarding of black money and illegal mining at Bellary were some prominent ones.

Telecom Minister Kapil Sibal claims, 2G allocation caused no loss to exchequer

Karnataka CM J.Reddy had to step down following charges of illegal mining

Pandora's Box: The Black Money issue in India

The media and public focus on corruption had two important fall-outs:

1) Some prominent leaders involved in corruption scandals were arrested

A.Raja, Suresh Kalmadi, M. Kanimzohi, J. Reddy, K.S. Naidu, Amar Singh have graced Tihar Jail with their presence in 2011

2) Anna Hazare, the Gandhian leader proposed and continues to wage agitation for anti corruption JanLok Pal Bill

Anna Hazare threatens another fast for institutionalizing the JanLok Pal

At the regional level, West Bengal, Telangana and Gujarat captured headlines. Assembly elections in 5 states resulted in some interesting surprises

Legislative Assembly elections took place in April- May 2011 to elect legislatures in Assam, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Pondicherry.

Trinamool Congress Party leader Mamata Banerjee made history by toppling the 34-year-old Left Front rule in West Bengal.

UPA continues flip-flop on bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh to create separate state of Telangana

Public verdict vs. judicial process: Gujarat CM, Narendra Modi's role in 2002 riots remains undecided.

UPA Government’s populist announcements coupled with halfhearted policy changes were widely criticized. The seems to be focusing on short-term political gains by avoiding difficult decisions and long-term planning. 

Rising inflation threatens India's economic growth potential

The promise of reforms is yet to be delivered

Indecision and political drama over Foreign Direct Investment continues

Aakash Tablet: bridging digital divide or enhancing class divide?

Freedom of speech, expression and personal choice were curtailed or threatened in numerous ways during 2011

IT Minister Kapil Sibal urges for screening material on Internet

Traditional councils in villages continue exerting social control through edicts that govern everything from marriage to property disputes.

Aarakshan, a film highlighting caste divisions in India was baned in some states

The high-points of 2011 for Indians were:

1) The World Cup victory by India’s men in blue

The nation erupted in celebration as Team India lifted the Cricket World Cup

2) Civil society outrage against political corruption

India Against Corruption mobilizes youth across the country

President Obama’s state visit to India in early November 2010 appeared to impart new dynamism to a bilateral relationship that had been listless since his inauguration. The trip offered an effective tonic for Indian concerns that he had forsaken New Delhi in pursuit of G-2 collaboration with Beijing. The president spoke of India as “an indispensable partner of the 21st century” and dramatically endorsed its long-standing bid for permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council. Reporting on his giddily-received address to a joint session of the Indian Parliament, the Times of India noted that the “audience lapped it up, with no less than 25 rounds of applause in a barely 45-minute speech. The cherry on the cake, of course, was the ‘Jai Hind’ [Hail India] with which he concluded.”

But the promise of re-energized partnership quickly dissolved as leadership capacity in Washington and New Delhi dramatically frayed. In retrospect, the trip’s maladroit timing and messaging should have been a tip-off. That the president’s Democratic Party received an electoral “shellacking” just days earlier meant that he arrived in India a much diminished political figure – a condition that became increasingly evident as time progressed. The White House also put out the word that the trip was essentially a jobs-hunting mission rather than one connected to grand strategy, telegraphing how domestic economic anxieties would continue to take attention away from the foreign policy agenda.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also was about to undergo his own political dimunition. A week after the state visit, the multi-billion dollar 2G telecommunications scandal exploded, igniting a crisis of governance and corruption that continues to engulf Mr. Singh’s administration. For the past year, Singh has been forced to deny that he is a lame duck even as his Congress Party colleagues openly pine for his replacement by Rahul Gandhi and his coalition partners – especially Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress – feel increasingly free to defy him. As 2011 unfolded, it became more and more clear that Singh’s government was adrift and ineffectual.

The leadership void has contributed to the “Delhi disillusionment” that is now a staple of Washington’s foreign policy conversation as well as the transactional approach some advocate vis-à-vis India. Experts now debate just how steadfast this “indispensable partner” really is. Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns even felt it necessary to make a rhetorical nod to this discussion with this title to a recent address: “Is There a Future for the U.S.-India Partnership?”

Whatever its technical merits, New Delhi’s rejection of Boeing and Lockheed Martin’s bids in its lucrative fighter aircraft competition – an issue on the Obama administration lobbied aggressively – was handled so ineptly that it reportedly hastened Ambassador Timothy Roemer’s departure from New Delhi. Indeed, many discerned a deliberate snub of Washington. Ditto for the stringent nuclear liability law that is so divergent from international norms that it effectively locks out U.S. participation in India’s nuclear power sector – something that the nuclear cooperation agreement was suppose to bring about. Last week’s debacle on retail sector liberalization underscored U.S. concerns that New Delhi has permitted domestic political concerns to impede closer economic interactions, while the WikiLeaks revelations about the Indian debate over the nuclear accord further undermined confidence in New Delhi’s credibility as a serious strategic partner.

All of these episodes only sharpened questions in Washington about whether New Delhi is as compelling a geopolitical collaborator as the Bush administration had envisioned. They also help explain why the Obama administration took six months to nominate Roemer’s successor.

To be sure, the Indians have valid reasons to complain about the paucity of American leadership. President Obama’s announcement of an accelerated disengagement from Afghanistan – a decision driven more by the exigencies of domestic politics than by a careful assessment of U.S. security objectives in South and Central Asia – affects India’s security interests in unpalatable ways. Looking towards the exits, Washington does not seem overly concerned about the exact details of a possible political endgame while New Delhi is all too focused on how the strategic terrain in its neighborhood is shifting to its detriment. This lack of solicitude explains why, according to one analysis, “few tears are being shed in the top levels of the Indian establishment over the state of ties with the US.”

Yet beyond the top-level ructions, the past year also witnessed the growing density of bilateral affairs, especially the accelerating pace of economic interactions. Even with the global economy in the doldrums, 2010 was a banner year for the trade relationship, with two-way goods exports surging nearly 30 percent to $48.8 billion. Merchandise exports were also up significantly in the first half of 2011 compared to the same period last year. All told, India is now America’s 12th largest goods trading partner and one of the fastest-growing destinations for U.S. exports. This is a welcome trend, as increased private-sector linkages are key to limiting the risks that today’s political and diplomatic frictions could escalate and disrupt the overall partnership.

Notwithstanding the disappointments over the fighter competition, the United States has also become a critical player in the ambitious military buildup India is undertaking. New Delhi was the third largest buyer of U.S. weapons this year, with purchases amounting to $4.5 billion – a level ahead of such long-time American allies as Australia, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Japan. Indeed, over the past year or so the Indian government has either purchased or taken possession of a number of key weapons systems: the AH-64D Apache attack helicopter, the C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft, and the C-17 Globemaster III strategic transport aircraft.

Finally, as the constant parade of Cabinet officers and senior officials between the two capitals attests, bilateral relations have acquired a scope and depth that were unimaginable less than a decade ago. Among other things, Washington and New Delhi now hold regular consultations on policy vis-à-vis China, Deputy Secretary Burns has just concluded talks in New Delhi about strategic and economic cooperation, and a trilateral U.S.-India-Japan security dialogue will meet for the first time next week. Indian foreign policy elites are growing more comfortable with the notion of strategic intimacy with the United States. And the expansion of Chinese strength will undoubtedly push New Delhi to tighten its security relations with Washington in the years ahead, though the process will neither be as smooth nor as speedy as many Americans would like.

All of these factors are contributing to the steady accumulation of bilateral bonds. The key question for the approaching year is whether Washington and New Delhi will exhibit the constancy of leadership needed to capitalize on these favorable developments. Alas, the prospects do not appear promising. With 2012 shaping up to be one filled with turbulent politics in both countries, the focus of President Obama and Prime Minister Singh will continue to remain inward.

(An earlier version of this post appeared at http://www.usinpac.com)

From India’s increasing presence in the disputed waters of the South China Sea to the duel over diplomatic influence in Myanmar, developments in recent months amply illustrate how India and China will bump into each other as they grow in power and aspiration. But events last week illustrate that the true fault line in bilateral relations remains the 60 year-old acrimony over the Indo-Tibetan frontier. The border area was the site for the month-long war between the countries in 1962, as well as serious military crises in 1967 and 1987. It is the only place where the outbreak of armed conflict is a realistic possibility, as well as the focus for much of India’s expansive plans for military modernization. And the chances are good that the frictions here will only intensify in the years ahead.

The border was to be the stage for an act of India-China cooperation last week, when high-level talks were to convene in New Delhi aimed at managing the increasing quarrels along the Himalayan boundary. The meeting was also intended to prepare the way for a visit to India early next year by Xi Jinping, China’s vice president who is heir apparent to Hu Jintao. But the Chinese side abruptly pulled out of the talks after failing to persuade New Delhi to prevent the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader who is much reviled in Beijing as a separatist, from giving the valedictory address at an international Buddhist conclave that was meeting in the Indian capital at the same time.

The border talks will likely be rescheduled in the coming weeks. Both governments were circumspect in their official comments about the postponement. Notably, the Global Times, a Beijing-based tabloid that is an unfailing tribune of bemusing jingoism including recent fulminations aimed at New Delhi, reacted cautiously. In an editorial titled “China and India mustn’t go for the throat,” it counseled that:

“Both sides must keep the border issue from worsening by focusing on keeping good will talks alive and being mindful of the consequences of a sudden breakdown.”

A high-level defense dialogue between the two countries will also go ahead as scheduled in New Delhi this week. With the United States becoming more strategically assertive in East Asia – punctuated by President Barack Obama’s tour in the region last month – Beijing has high incentive to stabilize relations with India while it turns its attention to the challenges raised by Washington. The Global Times underscored this priority when it noted that even though India “appears to be highly interested in facing off with China,” the rivalry with New Delhi “is not the primary focus of Chinese society.”

With its own plate piled high with economic and governance challenges, not to mention the multiple insurgencies underway in its northeastern region, India also is keen to tamp down border ructions. Indeed, in deference to Chinese sensitivities, Pratibha Patil, India’s president who was supposed to inaugurate the Buddhist assembly, cancelled her participation, while Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, also scheduled to make an appearance, likewise stayed away.

But events are conspiring to upend each side’s preferences. As last week’s contretemps demonstrate, the border dispute is not simply a matter of contested claims over real estate. It also is bound up with the increasingly volatile issue of Tibetan nationalism. It is no coincidence that Beijing in recent years has turned up the volume about its territorial claims on the northeastern Indian states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh (the latter of which China has taken to calling “South Tibet”) at the same moment that the ethnic Tibetan population inside China has become more restive. Beijing views the agitations as the handiwork of the Dalai Lama, who has been especially effective in making Tibet an international cause célèbre, as well as the Tibetan government-in-exile. Both the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan exile core are based in Dharamsala in northern India.

Adding to the combustible mix is the location of Tawang Monastery, a revered site in Tibetan Buddhism that is just inside the Indian side of the contested border. The monastery is close to the birthplace of a 17th-century Dalai Lama who remains an immensely popular historical figure among Tibetans. Its significance has greatly increased after the current Dalai Lama stated that he might be reincarnated outside of Chinese-controlled territory and that the selection process for his successor might break with precedent, such as being hand-picked by him or chosen by popular acclaim. With Tawang likely to play an important role in the selection, Beijing is keen to assert control over it.

Beijing’s apoplexy over the Dalai Lama, once again on display last week in New Delhi, is a measure of its insecurity on the Tibet issue. This hypersensitivity has impelled the People’s Republic, officially an atheistic party-state, to entangle itself in deeply into the affairs of Tibetan religious institutions, including absurdly banning the current Dalai Lama from being reborn anywhere but inside China and insisting that it alone has the definitive word on the selection of his successor. It drove Beijing in 1995 to kidnap a six year-old Tibetan boy who the Dalai Lama proclaimed as the Panchen Lama, the second-ranking figure in Tibetan Buddhism. The boy’s fate remains unknown; Beijing has promoted its own candidate as the true Panchen Lama. While many Tibetans see this person as a pretender, he provides Beijing a key opening to manipulate the selection for the next Dalai Lama, since the Panchen Lama traditionally has a central part in the process.

China has also embarked on a charm offensive (here and here) to win the hearts and minds of the international Buddhist community, including plans to build a multi-billion dollar pilgrimage and tourism complex at the Buddha’s birthplace in Lumbini, Nepal, which is right on the border with India. New Delhi is counter-punching by sponsoring Buddhist gatherings, including the one last week that raised Beijing’s ire and which in one of its final acts decided to create an International Buddhist Confederation that will be headquartered in the Indian capital.

Given the volatility of the Tibetan issue, one could envision without much imagination scenarios that result in a military confrontation along the frontier. One might involve the outbreak of serious unrest within Tibet, leading to a Chinese crackdown that spills into India. Beijing could bring military pressure on New Delhi to clamp down on the Dalai Lama and his compatriots in Dharamsala, setting off a dangerous spiral of misperception and miscalculation. Alternatively, the passing of the Dalai Lama, who is now 76, could spark a tumultuous search for his successor, leading China to seize Tawang so it can control the outcome.

Unfortunately, there is ample historical precedent for such scenarios. Indian support of the abortive Tibetan uprising in 1959, for example, colored Beijing’s perceptions in the lead-up to the 1962 border war. And in the mid-1980s, an isolated incident in the Sumdurong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh led to a serious military stand-off in early 1987. As one of the WikiLeaks dispatches from the U.S. embassy in Beijing reported, some Chinese observers believe that policy on Tibet is even more inflexible than toward Taiwan, where Beijing at least tolerates some U.S. interference. And concern among Chinese leaders over internal discontent is rising.

A New York Times article has called Tawang “the biggest tinderbox” in relations between India and China. Expect to hear more about it in the coming years.

(An earlier version of this post appeared at http://www.usinpac.com)

Based on initial reviews, the tablet is slow and the ‘resistive’ touchscreen implies that fast paced typing is challenging. Innovation does not imply lowering the quality of technology to lower the prices; social innovation involves making up-to-date technology readily available to larger segments of society. The three hour battery life implies over-dependence on erratic power supply, especially for people in the rural areas. Most importantly, the device will have very limited usability given the weak Wi-Fi network in India. Potentially, Aakash can connect a student to the world of information available on the Internet but access to Internet is still a huge problem in India. The argument that Aakash is simply the first step and the government will gradually work on making improvements for accessibility and usage is reflective of short-sighted decision making. It’s like saying that we’ll first manufacture world class cars and then plan on building roads and parking lots.

The challenge is not that Aakash is not comparable to the top end devices; technical specifications can be upgraded. The disturbing development is the attempt by Minister Sibal to project Aakash as the panacea for socially induced educational and digital gaps in India. Rather than accepting that Aakash as an experiment that would be technologically improved over the years, Mr. Sibal ridiculed any critical evaluation by stating that, tech watchers might mock the device but Indians should say this to naysayers: “It is not the device that is crude, it is your comments that are crude.” Given the room for improvement in Aakash and the fast paced nature of technological change, the Minister’s attitude appears unhelpful. Rather than an attempt to enhance the quality of education, Aakash is simple gesture at scoring political points and adding another bullet point on the Government’s list of achievements.
Aakash’s technological imperfections are defended by insisting that the market segment of this tablet are the ‘marginal and deprived’ in India. This sounds confusing. Large segment of this ‘marginal and deprived’ population does not have access to basic education and Aakash is to be distributed by the Government at the subsidized cost to graduate students. I doubt that many graduate students in metropolitan centers will want to identify with brand Aakash, while youth in the remote area will encounter internet connectivity issues. During the launch, Mr. Sibal so strongly asserted that Aakash was meant for the ‘deprived’ segment of society that instead of making the tablet a symbol of empowerment he has turned it into a symbol of the owner’s poverty. Given the ‘brand sensitivity’ among Indian youth, owing Aakash will be much like displaying a hi-tech BPL (Below Poverty Line) card. Rather than showcasing the technological prowess of the device, Mr. Sibal focused on its ‘cheapness’. The goal, according to Mr. Sibal is to reduce the prices to $10; qualitative improvements to the product don’t feature on his agenda. Aakash is not based on market trends but on political necessity. DataWind needs bulk orders to keep costs low and as a result Government of India is expected to buy 8 to 10 million units of the device by March 2012. What if the market demand for Aakash is lower than that? How will the government exhaust the inventory?
The rationale behind Aakash made complete sense – to make technology available for all segments of society. But by its very nature technological innovation is dynamic and competitive; mixing it with politics and projecting innovation as political achievement is dangerous. Taking criticism of Aakash as criticism of Government is likely to make the device obsolete. Technological innovation is successful and sustainable only when it meets the market demands and not simply because something new and cheap is made available.

By failing to craft its own narrative on Af-Pak ever since the US troops went into Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, New Delhi has allowed the West, and increasingly Pakistan, to dictate the contours of Indian policy towards the region.

India should give up its over-dependence on the soft power approach and make some difficult choices in order to be a relevant player in the Afghan endgame.
India’s projects in Afghanistan -the Delaram-Zaranj Road, transmission line providing Uzbek electricity to Kabul, hydro-electric Salma Dan and construction of new Parliament building – are showcased as emblems of India’s good neighbourly approach. There is hardly any mention of the delays and cost overruns of the projects in addition to some ruffling of local sensitivities. India’s design of the Parliament inspired by Gandhara motifs did not curry favour with the Afghans, who demanded that the structure reflect Islamic heritage. The Delaram-Zaranj highway project was not only delayed by 2 years but the costs also doubled. The reason, according to Border Roads Organization chief Lieutenant-General K. S. Rao, is the security situation. India miscalculated in assuming that security and reconstruction in a conflict zone can be strictly segregated. India hoped to win laurels by undertaking development work while the U.S. shouldered the dirty job of dealing with violence and working on political solutions. India may make lofty declarations about contributing to Afghanistan’s reconstruction but there are not many construction companies and engineers in India willing to undertake the challenge. New Delhi’s Central Public Works Department had not received a single response for the multi-million-dollar Parliament project in Kabul for over a year.
The problems encountered by India in implementing development projects in Afghanistan strengthen the case for deploying hard power resources; a clue continually overlooked by Indian policy-makers. No major construction projects have started in the past 2 years. Indian charity Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), which promoted economic independence for Afghan women, has pulled all staff from Afghanistan. India’s medical mission has operated sporadically due to security threats. Targeted kidnappings and bomb blasts are huge disincentives for Indian NGOs, medical personnel and construction workers from undertaking assignments in Afghanistan even if the Indian Government offers lucrative incentives.
India needs to stake its claim to the endgame in Afghanistan by employing hard power resources. The alternative is to loose ground to the extent that it becomes impossible exercise soft power. Given India’s aversion to overtly interventionist approach, two options for deeper engagement appear feasible. These options are not part of India’s traditional choice spectrum and would require some skilful diplomacy and poignant change. Recent change in India’s approach to initiating negotiations with Taliban indicates the willingness to make necessary policy transitions.
First, India should contribute in every way possible for strengthening the Afghan National Army (ANA). General Abdul Rahim Wardak, Minister of National Defence of Afghanistan, during his visit to India in June 2011 welcomed defence cooperation from India to train its security forces. India is currently training about 100 Afghanistan officers and non commissioned officers in India but there is much more that can be offered. Experts say that Afghanistan has been very keen to establish Security relationship with India but India has been very shy of establishing any sustained relationship given the presence of international forces in Afghanistan. Military expert on Afghanistan, Brigadier (Retired) Arun Sahgal is of the opinion that

India should take advantage of this opportunity and supply whatever military equipment communication equipment, vehicles and other non lethal equipment to the Afghanistan National Army.

The ANA is poorly trained and would be largely responsible for Afghanistan security after the withdrawal of ISAF. India’s involvement through providing resources and training facilities and conducting joint exercises with ANA will substantially contribute to Afghanistan’s security and make India a main player in discussions on Afghan security without getting militarily involved.
Second, a close observer of geopolitical interests in Afghanistan can recognize two camps: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China on one side and U.S. India, Iran and Russia on the other. It augurs well for India to create a stronger network among the countries that share its geostrategic concerns in the region. India shares good working relations with Iran, U.S. and Russia and is uniquely positioned to create a network. Nitin Pai, founder and fellow for geopolitics at Takshashila Institution has made some astute observations in this context:

Imagine how profoundly the geopolitics of Asia will change should Iran and the United States were to co-operate, even if it is in the limited context of Afghanistan. Remember, the Iranians collaborated with their “Great Satan” ten years ago, in the aftermath of 9/11, to get rid of the nearer Satan to their east. Since improved ties between Iran and the United States are in India’s interest, we should wonder why New Delhi doesn’t do anything to lubricate a rapprochement.

Instability in Afghanistan would be national security nightmare for India. Rather than retrospectively blaming U.S. policies and Pakistan’s opportunism it makes sense for India to project its power and use the available opportunities strategically. India can make a stronger case for its regional leadership by more directly contributing to Afghanistan’s security and investing in networks that help to sustain these gains. India’s soft power in Afghanistan will bear fruit only when India makes some hard choices.

The respective security roles that the United States and India traditionally play in East Asia seemed to switch last week.  By deciding not to supply Taiwan with the new fighter aircraft it has requested, the U.S. appeared to defer to China, which had cautioned that the sale was a “red line” that must not be crossed.  In contrast, New Delhi’s determined sally into the South China Sea, in deference of Beijing’s explicit warnings, exemplified the strategic assertion that the Obama administration has been urging on India.  The dichotomy offers a glimpse of the shifting power dynamics now underway in Asia and, perhaps, a preview of what the regional security order might look like beyond the horizon.

The U.S. decision to refurbish Taiwan’s aging F-16 fleet rather than provide it with more sophisticated versions of the aircraft is taken by some in Asia as the latest sign of China’s ascent and America’s subsidence in the western Pacific, an area long thought of as a U.S. lake.  The Associated Press reported that Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin sees the decision primarily as a function of Beijing’s growing financial leverage vis-à-vis Washington.  “It has a large debt and if China will try to apply pressure, the U.S. can end up in trouble,” he said.  “The U.S. has to temper its relations with Taiwan for China.”  The report also quoted a South Korean defense analyst as saying that some in that country have reached the conclusion that it would be better to bandwagon with China than continue to adhere to the decades-old security alliance with the United States.

By striking coincidence, a similar storyline was being replicated last week in another part of the world in which Washington has long exercised sway.  Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner put in an unprecedented appearance at a gathering of European finance officials called to address the region’s burgeoning debt crisis.  His presence was intended to signal U.S. concern about the spillover potential of Europe’s financial woes.  But some in the audience did not take kindly to his telling them what to do.  Both the Austrian and Belgian finance ministers tartly questioned how the Americans could presume to dispense advice when their own fiscal house is in such visible disarray.  One media commentator observed the proceedings underscore that “in the wake of the debt-ceiling debacle, Geithner has lost a significant amount of international heft.”  The Europeans, on the other, are much more interested these days in China’s views.  With Beijing sitting on top of the world’s largest pile of foreign exchange, regional leaders have started to look to it as a potential financial savior.

India’s actions last week, in contrast, were the very definition of foreign policy steadfastness.  On a visit to Vietnam, Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna announced that the overseas arm of India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) would proceed with hydrocarbon exploration activities in the South China Sea, an energy-rich area that in claimed in almost its entirety by Beijing and in which India has heretofore been a low-key presence.  China has been increasingly brusque in asserting its claim of “indisputable sovereignty” over the waters, which it last year elevated to a “core national interest.”  The marker Krishna laid down comes two months after Beijing warned New Delhi against involving itself in the area and after an unusual incident between the INS Airavat, an amphibious warfare vessel, and the Chinese navy off the coast of Vietnam.

New Delhi’s temerity sparked a passionate reaction in the China Times, a nationalist tabloid affiliated with the Communist Party.  It lashed out in a lead editorial that India was engaged in “a serious political provocation” that constitutes a major challenge to China’s national resolve.  It urged the Chinese leadership to use “every means possible” to reverse Indian actions.  And in what seemed to be a retaliatory move, Beijing quickly announced that it would expand seabed explorations in the southwestern Indian Ocean.

Media commentary in India saw things differently.  A Times of India editorial averred that “India has done well to hold its ground” and termed the ONGC move as a befitting response to the infrastructure projects China is conducting in the disputed territory of Kashmir.  In a similar vein, Harsh V. Pant, a well-known foreign policy expert, noted that if “China wants to expand its presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, New Delhi’s thinking goes, India can do the same thing in East Asia.”  And M.K. Bhadrakumar, a former Indian diplomat, called India’s actions “a historic move,” arguing that “India’s ‘Look East’ policy acquires swagger.  The Sino-Indian geostrategic rivalry is not going to be the same again.”

Observing the train of events, Time magazine’s “Global Spin” blog asked “Is This How Wars Start?”  Of course, a booming bilateral economic relationship gives New Delhi and Beijing strong reason to moderate impulses toward outright military conflict.  Indeed, the two countries held their inaugural strategic economic dialogue this week, with the aim of doubling two-way trade to $100 billion by 2015.  But as both countries continue simultaneously to rise in power and prestige, dynamics of competition and one-upmanship will inevitability deepen.  This pattern is already evident in their Himalayan border area, in Burma and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean region and as far afield as Africa.  And as last week’s events demonstrate, the South China Sea is now emerging as a new arena for strategic rivalry.

Pundits in Washington who doubt the prospects for the United States and India conjoining in a coalition directed against China should take note.  The meteoric rise of Beijing’s power and the assertiveness in which it is exercised will ineluctably draw Washington and New Delhi even closer together.  As a former U.S. official once predicted, “we don’t need to talk about the containment of China.  It will take care of itself as India rises.”

(An earlier version of this post appeared at http://www.usinpac.com)

Source: Wall Street Journal

In his critically acclaimed book on the Indian Ocean last year, author Robert Kaplan warned that with growing Sino-Indian rivalry, the “the Indian Ocean and its adjacent waters will be a central theater of conflict and competition.”

It seems that Kaplan’s prophetic claim was made none too soon. Last week, an editorial in the Global Times, China’s main political mouthpiece, warned Indians against moving forward with their plans of exploring two offshore blocks in the South China Sea off the coast of Vietnam. China alleged that the joint project between the Indian and Vietnamese state-owned oil firms included sections that were under China’s jurisdiction. According to Reuters,

“The report said that if Vietnam and India pursued any joint interest that damaged relations with China “as well as the stability and peaceful economic development of the entire South China Sea region, the losses will outweigh the gains.”

India is seemingly ignoring the rebuke and pushing forth with its plans to drill in the region. New Delhi maintains that the blocks are well within the territory of Vietnam and adhere to all international rules and conventions. Similar sentiments were echoed by Vietnam, which said that such joint projects were “within the sovereign rights and jurisdictional rights of Vietnam.”

The Chinese warnings on Indian involvement in the South China Sea have slowly been escalating over time. In July, an Indian vessel leaving a Vietnam port was contacted by the Chinese navy and cautioned that it was now entering Chinese waters. While the Indian government has played down any talk of confrontation, the Indian Foreign Minister was quick to make a friendly visit to Vietnam – a move that could be construed as a not-so-subtle message to China that India was not backing away from the alliance.

The ongoing drama probably has every realist and balance of power theorist salivating at the prospect of witnessing the 21st century’s version of the ‘Great Game’ in real-time. India has slowly been strengthening her military and economic ties with Vietnam and other South East Asian countries as a buffer against a rising China. As China increases her influence in South Asia – namely, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, New Delhi fears being encircled by the Asian hegemon.

This fear is actively shared by China’s neighbors, including Vietnam and Philippines, who are wary of Beijing’s expansive territorial claims on the South China Sea – an area rich in natural resources, including oil and gas. As the Washington Post recently reported in an article describing the rising feud between the Philippines and China, “China’s insatiable thirst for energy has injected a highly combustible new element into long-running quarrels over cartography, arcane issues of international law and ancient shards of pottery that Beijing says testify to its “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea.” Beijing would prefer bilateral agreements to settle claims with each of its neighbors, but many are smartly holding out for regional settlements. What Beijing really doesn’t want happening is India nosing around in these already troubled waters and complicating matters.

While the Indian government is standing firm, the view of Indian defense experts seems to vary on the appropriate Indian response. In a lengthy commentary on the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, R S Kalha, a former Secretary with the Ministry of External Affairs, warned against antagonizing China too much, especially since India lacked the military capacity to take on China if push came to shove. Kalha opined:

“Given the present predicament of the US, Indian policy planners would do well to pay due heed to caution when dealing with a potentially explosive situation that might develop in the South China Seas. There is no point in acting with bravado when we do not have the necessary military capacity to take on the Chinese in the South China Seas.”

On the other side, writing in the Wall Street Journal, Harsh Pant, a professor of defense studies at King’s College in London, urged India to continue her defiant stance. A firm India and Vietnam, according to Pant, would “force Beijing to moderate its expansionist claims on the South China Sea and adopt a more conciliatory stance on other regional matters.”

While Mr. Pant’s view may seem overly optimistic, perhaps there is still some value in countries standing firm against China. While China may be increasingly playing the role of the school yard bully, it has much to lose economically in the event of an armed conflict. One can only hope that as China notices that its territorial claims are straining its relationship with all its neighbors, some type of introspection will ensue.

Having made the calculation that America’s security and prosperity would be enhanced by partnership with India, the United States over the last decade has promoted New Delhi’s admission into global governance structures.  For the Bush administration, this meant doing the heavy lifting required to enroll India into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an informal cartel governing the global nuclear regime whose original purpose of existence was to exclude New Delhi from its ranks.  The Obama administration similarly helped usher India into the Group of 20 forum on the international economy and, most recently, endorsed its long-standing bid for permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council.

The time has now come for Washington to sponsor New Delhi’s entry into another international institution from which it has been barred for much too long.  India for decades has desired formal involvement in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which engages over half of world gross domestic product and a large fraction of global trade.  But its application has continuously been passed over due to a lack of consensus inside the grouping, which currently numbers 21 members.  Some APEC countries have expressed concerns that the institution is too unwieldy as it is and cannot accommodate India or the dozen other interested countries lined up at its door.  Others argue that India is not really a Pacific Rim country and is therefore outside of APEC’s geographic parameters.

But with India poised to become one of the world’s top economies in the years ahead, its absence is a serious lacuna for the organization.  New Delhi already participates as a full member in regional leadership groups like the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, both important venues for political and security discussions.  It is also a full ASEAN dialogue partner.

Southeast Asia has historically been an area of deep Indian trade and cultural influence but was neglected diplomatically during much of India’s independent existence.  Seeking to make up for lost time, New Delhi launched the “Look East” policy in 1992.  It has proved to be a very successful initiative, paving the way for significant and rapidly-growing economic and diplomatic linkages in the region.  The ten member-countries of ASEAN now constitute India largest export market.  Southeast Asia takes in more than half of Indian exports, up from around 40 percent just a decade ago.  Indeed, India’s total trade volume with East Asia now exceeds that with the United States or the European Union.  And New Delhi’s trade diplomacy has been on a tear recently in Asia, with major economic agreements being signed with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia.  It has commenced negotiations with Indonesia to boost the $12 billion in trade the two countries conducted in 2010.

India has also emerged as a major security player in East Asia and is fast becoming a key factor in the region’s geopolitical calculus.  A landmark India-Japan security accord was signed in 2008, and important strategic partnerships have been established with Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore.  Indeed, Tokyo and Singapore lobbied for New Delhi’s membership in the EAS, over Beijing’s objections, in order to counterbalance Chinese influence in the organization.  The United States and India now hold regular consultations on Asia-Pacific policy and a trilateral U.S.-India-Japan security dialogue will be instituted next month in Tokyo.

The Indian navy has been conducting exercises with its U.S. and Japanese counterparts for a number of years now in the Pacific Ocean, and as the brief encounter two months ago between the INS Airavat, an amphibious warfare vessel, and the Chinese navy off the coast of Vietnam demonstrates, the navy is becoming a regular presence in the region’s waters.

APEC’s membership moratorium expired last year.  With Washington currently holding the forum’s chairmanship, the Obama administration should be preparing the diplomatic groundwork to place India’s admission on the agenda of the APEC Summit that will take place in mid-November in Honolulu.  To avoid interminable negotiations about whether other countries should be let in at the same time, the U.S. might repeat its persuasive line about New Delhi’s entry into the global nuclear order: India is simply so important that it merits a special dispensation.

As a previous post argues, New Delhi’s membership in APEC should be part of an overall agenda for advancing U.S.-India economic engagement.  But it would also pay major strategic dividends.  In his address to the Indian parliament last November, President Obama urged India not only to “look East” but also “to engage East” for the sake of enhanced security and prosperity throughout Asia.  Secretary of State Hillary Rodman Clinton underscored this theme in her visit to India two months ago.  Speaking in Chennai (formerly Madras), a port city that has significant economic ties with Southeast Asia, Clinton urged India to take on a larger role in shaping the regional architecture for the Asia-Pacific.  Reiterating Mr. Obama’s formulation, she stated that “we encourage India not just to look East, but to engage East and act East as well.”

(An earlier version of this post appeared at http://www.usinpac.com)

Courtesy: The Hindu

Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi’s role in the 2002 riots has been an emotive issue in India. Conviction of Modi is viewed by his critics as the only form in which justice can be accorded to the victims of Gujarat riots. Modi’s supporters cite his performance as an administrator and development of Gujarat (the Muslim population in particular) as proof of his commitment to public welfare. For the judicial system in India the challenge is compounded because each side has rigid and pre-conceived notions of justice in this case. The legal outcome of this case is expected to have profound political consequences. This context made the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the case on Monday afternoon particularly interesting.
The Supreme Court has directed the Gujarat trial court to examine the case by referring to reports of the Special Investigation Team (SIT) and the amicus curae’s review of that report. The trial court is then expected to pass a judgement on Narendra Modi’s involvement/ non-involvement in the riots. Though both reports were to be confidential, the SIT report was allegedly leaked in February this year fuelling rumours. According to the leaked SIT report, Modi was given clean chit. SIT’s findings came under cloud as senior IPS officer Sanjiv Bhatt, who had accused Mr. Modi of misusing State machinery during the post-Godhra riots, turned the sword on the SIT by emphasizing that someone from within the SIT was leaking sensitive and confidential details related to investigations conducted by it to Additional Advocate General Tushar Mehta. The matter was further complicated as it was alleged that amicus curae, Raju Ramachandran’s report had raised doubts on the SIT Report and hinted at neglect of crucial evidence.
These confusing and contradictory compilations of reports are now to be examined by the trial court for determining the involvement or innocence of Modi in the Gulbarg society massacre. Gulbarg society was a largely Muslim society situated in the middle of Chamanpura – a Hindu majority area in Ahmedabad. On February 28 2002, one day after rioting had begin in Gujarat, eye witnesses say that a Hindu mob had gathered outside the Gulbarg society and begun shouting slogans. As the crowd began to get increasingly aggressive many of the residents sought refuge in the home of Ehsan Jafri, ex-Parliamentarian from Congress Party. Survivor accounts state that Jafri had called for help repeatedly, but nothing was done – even when the mob began attacking the perimeter of the society at around noon. Unchecked, the mob then broke into the society, torched houses and began attacking residents. Ehsan Jafri himself was dragged out of his house, hacked and burnt alive. Another 30 people were declared ‘missing’ after the incident. In 2009, K. G. Erda, a deputy Superintendent was arrested on charges of dereliction of duty and for tampering of evidence. Survivors allege that Erda not only allowed the Gulbarg society killings to happen but also helped rioters to burn the dead bodies.

There is difference between delivering justice and the perception that justice is delivered. During the Gujarat riots, several innocent citizens lost their lives. This had led to shock and concern among other citizens across the country. In a sense, justice in the case was not limited to victims; it was not simply meant to punish those who killed civilians in Gujarat in 2002 but was expected to reinforce confidence among citizens across the country that the state respects and duly enforces the citizens’ right to life. After so many special investigations and confidential reports, after so much debate over desirability of Supreme Court monitoring the case and after so many years, the citizens don’t perceive that justice is delivered. These citizens are not only the direct victims of the riots but the thousands who saw it on their televisions sets and read about it in the newspapers. Citizens are not interested in discerning how Gujarat 2002 was different from Delhi 1984 – they simply want an assurance that no matter which party is in power, the state apparatus will be mobilized to save their lives. Many citizens don’t identify with the Jafri family or inmates of the Gulbarg society, for them justice in Gujarat riots case would be a vindication of their faith in the ability of the state. Who cares about the SIT reports or amicus curae’s interviews in Gujarat; citizens simply want to hear punished or acquitted; punished or acquitted not only in case of Chief Minister Modi but for all those implicated in the case.
India’s judicial system has so complicated the process of delivering justice that it has become incomprehensible for the common man. Supreme Court’s pronouncement on Monday is being hailed by Modi supporters as vindication of his innocence. Tanvir Jafri and Testa Setalvad view it as the victory of those who want to see Modi punished for his crimes. In the midst of such claims and counter claims it is impossible for the common man to discern if justice has been done. Similar confusion ensued after the Babri Masjid decision in October last year. Courts in India rarely make decisions on crucial or controversial cases; what come out from the courts are propositions for interested stakeholders to re-orient according to time and need. It is the Da Vinci code justice in India; de-code as you will. Court decisions add more to confusion rather than to dispensation of justice.

The world focused on the Northern areas of Pakistan to capture or kill the al-Qaeda or Taliban operatives. But the harsh reality is that even if these operatives are eliminated, there are other outfits in the rest of the southern part of Pakistan that have the same aims, will and training as that of al-Qaeda or Taliban.

After 2001 Pakistanis were spoon fed the propaganda that the violence in Pakistan is due to America’s presence in Afghanistan. As a result, many hate the U.S. intervention and see Islamists as the defenders of Pakistani sovereignty. Those who support the Islamists for their religious beliefs are relatively few in number, but they are better organized. The arrests of extremists depends on the willingness of Pakistan’s secret agencies and/or the influence of the Saudi government.

The dual policy of keeping the U.S. happy while supporting the terrorist outfits was charted out by the then-President of Pakistan Gen. Pervez Musharraf. He half-heartedly banned some 23 organizations but failed — deliberately — to bring their sponsors to justice.

The story of Southern part of Pakistan is much scarier than the Northern part. Just as the ten-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks approached, those “banned” outfits were on the rise, exploiting the anti-Americanism in the country and misusing the name of religion.

Jaish-e-Muhammad, the group blamed for an attack on the Indian parliament, is the second largest jihadi group in Southern Punjab. It carries out regular public gatherings and has strong influence in the U.K., Europe, Dubai, Saudi Arabia and even in the U.S. Libya’s Moammar Gaddafi was their financial patron-in-chief at one point. Another major financer is Saudi Arabia.

JeM changed its name a few times because of the “ban.” It went from Khudam-al-Islam to Al Rehmat Trust International to Usman Trust. Currently it is operating under the banner of Al Shafi Islamic Medical. Its publications were never out of print.

The failed Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, spent much of his time at a JeM madrassa in Karachi. He was transported to the North later by Laskhar-e-Jhangvi for further training.

LeJ’s parent organization — Sipah Sahaba Pakistan — changed its name from Millat-e-Islamia to International Quran Movement to Ehle Sunnat wa Jamaat. Its propaganda organ publications were available to the masses outside mosques and various market places.

The LeJ formed and operated its new wing, also known as Lashkar e Jhangvi al Almi (LeJ International). With its headquarters in Pakistan, it covers Europe and the U.K. The LeJ is organized into small cells of around eight cadres each, who operate independently of the others.

LeJ leader Malik Ishaq told an Urdu newspaper about his involvement in the killings of 102 people. He was allowed a stipend and provided a mobile phone in jail. Ishaq was released this year after the courts found no evidence against him.

Gen. Musharraf’s government carried out just one operation against the Islamic fundamentalists, under pressure from the Chinese government, when he ordered the Red Mosque Siege. Pakistani intelligence officials said they found letters from Osama bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to the leaders of the mosque, directing them to conduct an armed revolt. One of the leaders was released by the courts later.

The LeJ, JeM and Harkat ul Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) formed a common front called Lashkar-e-Umer with countrywide branches for close cooperation and pooled resources. These groups still support each other in one form or another.

The Karachi-based Al Rasheed Trust, was “banned” and listed as a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department on September 22, 2001. The group is still operating and its chief was one of the few who had direct access to bin Laden.

Similarly, another group, the Falah-e-Isnaniyat Foundation (FIF) is linked with Lashkar and Jamat-al-Dawa and protected by the security establishment. These groups are also supported and funded by the Saudis.

The freehand operations of these groups have radicalized Pakistani society. Anti-Americanism spreads while Arabization has taken hold.

There are more and more mosques in each city, many run by such outfits. In some places three separate mosques of different sects are built next to each other. The sermons delivered there go unchecked and ultimately fuel the hatred and twisted ideology of dividing Muslims and bringing ‘sharia’ of their liking to the world. Public Billboards promoting jihad and hatred of America are everywhere cloaked as appeals for “charity.”

Pakistan’s internal crises include a deep cynicism that has seeped into every nook and cranny of everyday life. Politically, the army continues to run the popular narrative. Socially, if liberals talk about rapprochement with India, they’re accused of being controlled by RAW, the C.I.A. or the Zionists — or all three. The radical view that it’s acceptable to kill Shi’a, Ahmadis, Hindus and Christians and destroy their places of worship is widespread.

Because of this chaos, ordinary Pakistanis who want to travel, work and study abroad are finding it harder to do so. In the eyes of many immigration officials around the world, to be Pakistani is synonymous with being a criminal.

It’s been said many times that 9/11 changed the world. After the attacks, Afghanistan and Pakistan felt the heat.

Ten years later, the diseases that had been contained in Pakistan metastasize more rapidly than ever. Pakistan’s militants, all of them, are a threat to international peace. If the West’s strategy for combating radicalism continues on its present parochial course, the world will feel the heat.

—
The piece was first published at The Huffington Post

Bangladesh’s accomplishment is highlighted in a new report by Jonathan Anderson, the chief Asia economist for UBS, the global financial services company.  Mr. Anderson argues that, due to rising wage pressures, labor-intensive light manufacturing has begun migrating out of China to elsewhere in Asia, principally Bangladesh,Vietnam and Indonesia.  One result has been a great boost for the apparel and footwear industries in Bangladesh.  Anderson also finds that India, despite its vast reservoir of low-skilled workers, has been left out of this shift. 

The different outcomes between the two neighbors are worth noting.  Much of India’s future will turn on whether it – like China in recent decades – can fully exploit its comparative advantage as a labor-abundant economy.  But the trend lines are not promising.  The contribution of the manufacturing sector to the overall economy is strikingly low given the country’s stage of development.  Indeed, despite India’s remarkable economic rise over the last two decades, the current share of manufacturing to GDP is essentially where it was in 1991.  The share of manufacturing in India’s merchandise exports has actually declined from 72 percent in 1991 to 63 percent in 2008.  Manufacturing makes up less than one-fifth of national GDP, whereas in China it comprises a third.  In 2010, India contributed 2.2 percent of world industrial output, compared to China’s nearly 20-percent share. 

All told, less than 9 million Indians work in the organized manufacturing sector, an astonishing small figure for a country with such a gargantuan population.  And for all of the global accolades showered on the technology and business-services sector, it only employs 2.5 million workers, a minuscule faction of the overall workforce. 

To be sure, India is not without its manufacturing success stories, starting with the northwestern state of Gujarat.  With five percent of the country’s population, Gujarat accounts for around 15 percent of its industrial output and capital investment, as well as nearly a quarter of its exports.  The Ford Motor Company this week broke ground for a $1 billion factory in the state and French automaker Peugeot has just announced plans to build its own billion-dollar facility.  Given its rapid pace of industrialization, Gujarat is becoming known as the “China of India” and some hope it can play the same role in catalyzing Indian manufacturing as Guangdong Province did in China.

In Tamil Nadu, the southern city of Chennai (formerly Madras) has likewise emerged as a fast-growing hub for automotive production, so much so that some call it the “Detroit of Asia.”  Seven of the 20 top global automakers have a presence there.  India is also ranked second (behind China) in the 2010 Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index compiled by the Deloitte consulting firm, and outside of Japan it has the largest number of winner of the Deming Prize, which recognizes major advances in quality control and management.

Important, too, the Indian government is about to launch its first national policy on manufacturing, which aims to boost manufacturing’s share of GDP to 25 percent and create at least 100 million new jobs by 2025.  The initiative would do this by establishing a small number of special zones within the Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor that runs through six states.  Manufacturing companies will have tax and regulatory incentives to set up in the zones, each of which is 200 square kilometers in size; the government has also committed to creating world-class infrastructure in these areas.  Anand Sharma, the commerce and industry minister, promises that this initiative “will help unlock the true potential of manufacturing in India.”

But the creation of these zones is dependent upon the enactment of a national policy governing land acquisition for industrial development.  Land issues have become a political hotwire, however.  Rahul Gandhi, scion of the Nehru-Gandhi political dynasty and widely assumed to be prime minister in waiting, is currently exploiting a land-use controversy to advance the Congress Party’s electoral prospects in Uttar Pradesh, the country’s most populous state.  Social activist Anna Hazare, fresh from his popular anti-corruption crusade that fixated India last month, also may now turn his sights to land issues.  Prime Minister Singh’s government has just submitted a much-awaited land reform bill but its fate is uncertain given the business community’s criticism and the bitter divisions within Parliament.

Yet even if the legislation passes, much of the resulting manufacturing gains will be in the skills- and capital-intensive sectors that are unsuited for significant job creation in a labor-surplus country like India.  Instead, major emphasis needs to be given to greatly expanding the number of factories employing the low-end labor India has in such abundance – enterprises like the ones that are now calling Bangladesh home.  Only these industries will be able to absorb the 200 million workers, mostly impoverished and under-educated, who will join the labor force over the next two decades.

Goldman Sachs estimates that, in order to employ all the new workforce entrants over the next 10 years alone, the manufacturing sector will need to create some 40 million jobs.  This will be next to impossible, however, without momentous reforms in India’s highly-restrictive labor laws.  According to the World Economic Forum’s 2011-2012 Global Competitiveness Index, India ranks 81^st in terms of labor market efficiency among a sample of 142 countries (China’s score is 36^th place.)  This rigidity is the result of onerous socialist-era labor regulations and policies reserving many manufacturing activities to small firms.  One consequence is that nearly 90 percent of manufacturing jobs are in small enterprises that as a whole account for only a third of total factory output.  Much of the industrial sector is unable to reap gains from scale economies and remains largely skill- and capital-intensive – a disconcerting anomaly given India’s raw demographic bounty.

A lot is riding on the manufacturing issue.  If the prodigious numbers of unskilled young workers now coming online are unable to find gainful employment, India’s societal stability will be in jeopardy.  And unless the country turns itself into a manufacturing dynamo, it will never fulfill its global ambitions.  Whether the political class in New Delhi can muster the requisite will to develop an industrial sector suited to India’s demographic profile is a perilously open question, however. 

The festival was marred in controversy from two fronts. Many literary figures objected to the emphasis on “apolitical” nature of the festival. Art and literature is inspired by the context and it would be wrong to expect that Kashmiri artists and writers can disconnect their work and discussions from the current state of affairs. Many saw this emphasis on “apolitical” as a conspiracy of the Indian state and an attempt to promote a false image of normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir. Some others, like Gull Wani, were open to the festival without the needless emphasis on its political orientation. No matter what the objective of the festival read in fine print, it was an opportunity where many locals, who can’t make it to international seminars due to visa issues or economic constraints could engage with the best minds on home turf. Many literary figures and artists may have refused to participate in the festival to avoid getting identified as part of the state sponsored conspiracy but more than their reputations, Harud was a rare availability of space! A space, which no matter how it was defined is a blessing for people who live in the midst of barbed wires and metal detectors. For Indians in other parts of the country, the neighbourhood paan shop or parking lot of the mosque may offer this space (and thus we are oblivious to its importance) but for the people of Kashmir this space is rare.
My anguish flows from the fact that many young people in Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh have been robbed of this space by a few thousand users of social media. I respect the personal decision of many writers and artists who disassociated themselves from the festival but the forceful closure of this rare space for those who were eager to participate is painful. I don’t see this as the democratic power of social media but its constraining impact.
According to a piece in Tehelka,

A Facebook page calling for the boycott of the event attracted several thousands of members and became a site for the angry exchanges. Around 5000 people, mostly youth, have visited the page with many of them denouncing the event on the wall pages. “We need to unite, raise our voices and fists. Say no to this event. Make Kashmir resonate with the cries of No to `Harud- The Autumn Literature Festival,’” says the info page.

The Facebook campaign assumed a disturbing dimension when the wall posts on the Page opposed participation of Salman Rushdie in the festival. The organizers came out candidly to declare that the news of Rushdie’s participation was a rumor and that there were no plans to invite him. Online opponents of the festival over-looked the clarifications and continued with the campaign to discredit the event. For the protestors Facebook provided a space to amplify their voice but it is sad to see that they used it to curtail the possibility of a similar space beyond the internet, where they could not only give voice to their despair but also their aspirations and showcase their talents. The inability of protestors to offer constructive criticism or viable alternatives to Harud festival demonstrates that theirs was a campaign of sabotage not of democracy.
I am hoping that someone in Kashmir starts another Facebook page calling for resumption of Harud festival and is able to gather more than 5,000 supporters!