The United States (US) Committee on Foreign Affairs is set to convene a congressional hearing on Wednesday (February 8), for an exclusive discussion on Balochistan.

The extraordinary event has generated great interest among followers of Pakistan-US relations, as the allies’ mutual relationship seems to be deteriorating. The powerful House of Representatives committee oversees America’s foreign assistance programs and experts believe it can recommend halting US assistance to Pakistan over human rights violation in Balochistan.

Calls for ‘independence’
While Islamabad has strictly treated Balochistan as an internal matter, the debate on such a divisive topic by the powerful committee has highlighted the level of American interest in Balochistan and its support, if any, for the nationalist movement. On its part, Pakistan has kept Washington at arm’s length on the Balochistan issue, by refusing to grant it permission to open a consulate in Quetta.

A Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, who recently co-authored an article with Congressman Louie Gohmert expressing support for an independent Balochistan, will chair the hearing.

“Perhaps we should even consider support for a Balochistan carved out of Pakistan to diminish radical power there (in Pakistan),” Rohrabacher wrote in his piece.

According to Asia-Pacific Reporting Blog, “it is expected that the hearing will tackle issues related to whether or not the US Congress should tie human rights issues in Balochistan to Pakistani aid.”

Witness box
Another area of interest is of the controversial witnesses who will testify before the committee. The three-member panel comprises of defence analyst Ralph Peters, Georgetown assistant professor, C. Christine Fair and Ali Dayan Hasan, Pakistan Director of the Human Rights Watch.

Ironically, the panel on Balochistan does not include a Baloch representative, an issue which has disappointed the Baloch diaspora in the United States, who fear the misinterpretation of their stance by people they view as unfamiliar with the Baloch conflict.

One of the witnesses, Ralph Peters, attracted scathing criticism by right-wing Pakistani strategists in June 2006, when his article Blood Borders was published in the Armed Forces Journal with a map of Free Balochistan. Peters, 59, a former US army officer, is expected to support in his testimony the idea of an independent Balochistan comprising of the Balochistan provinces in Pakistan and Iran and parts of Afghanistan.

On the other hand, Dr Christine Fair is known as a passionate supporter of Pakistan with an anti-India stance. The Pakistani media quoted Dr Fair in March 2009, for allegedly linking India with the Baloch insurgency. She was reportedly questioned the role of the Indian consulates in Afghanistan and Iran.

“Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan,” she told a roundtable organized by the Foreign Affairs magazine, “I can assure you they (Indians) are not issuing visas as their main activity.” Later on, however, she told Outlook, an Indian news magazine, in an interview that the Pakistanis had blown her comments out of proportion.

On Twitter, a week ahead of the hearing, Dr Fair called Ralph Peters, the fellow witness, a “nut” and asked “WHAT does he know?” On Saturday, she also irked the Balochs by questioning their majority status in Balochistan while in another Tweet she warned the separatists not to “expect me to support an independent Balochistan”.

Public debate
Dr. Akbar S. Ahmed, Pakistan’s former high commissioner to the United Kingdom, told Dawn.com that the congressional hearing was a “significant step” in highlighting Balochistan’s problems. “The information provided in the event,” he said, “will not only be used by members of the US Congress but will also be picked up by the world media.”

“The shocking stories of torture and murder in Balochistan will become part of the public debate. It is in the interest of Pakistan to quickly and effectively resolve the situation in Balochistan bringing back the Baluch with honor, respect and dignity,” said Dr Ahmed, who is currently the Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies at the American University in Washington DC.

Dr Ahmed, who served in 1980s as the Commissioner of three districts in Balochistan, says the hearing can potentially create a great deal of negative publicity for Pakistan.

Close watchers
In the United States, the conflict in Balochistan has been gaining remarkable attention of late. While some officials from the government and non-governmental organizations have only expressed concern over the situation, other individuals, including former army soldiers, State department officials and members of the US Congress, have now begun to publicly assert support for an independent Balochistan.

For instance, on January 15, Victoria Nuland, the State Department spokeswoman, expressed America’s “deep concern” over the ongoing violence in Balochistan, especially targeted killings, disappearances and human rights violations.

“This (Balochistan) is a complex issue. We strongly believe that the best way forward is for all the parties to resolve their differences through peaceful dialogue,” she said.

Last year on November 16, the State Department deputy spokesman, Mark Toner, had also observed during a press briefing, “You know, more broadly, we do have concerns about the situation in Balochistan. We’ve addressed those concerns with the government of Pakistan.”

Nationalist view
Baloch nationalists are cautiously monitoring Wednesday’s hearing.

“To be honest, we are not very optimistic about this meeting,” Sardar Akhtar Mengal, a former chief minister of Balochistan, told Dawn.com, “but both support and attention from the US are significant because the presence of the US cannot be overlooked in South East Asia. It is essential that the US gives attention to Balochistan, as the aid that is given to Pakistan in the name of war against terror is being spent to commit atrocities in Balochistan.”

A political expert in Washington DC, who requested anonymity, said during the election year, the Republicans are likely to bring up the Balochistan issue to castigate Democratic President Barrack Obama for deliberately keeping quiet against Pakistan, an ally in the war on terror, for allegedly misusing American assistance to fight the secular Balochs instead of quashing the Taliban.

After the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, many American policymakers have become disillusioned with Pakistan and now some of them propose an independent Balochistan to fight religious extremism. Last month, Louie Gohmert, another Republican Congressman from Texas, suggested that the US should, “talk about creating a Balochistan in the southern part of Pakistan…they love us. They’ll stop the IEDs (improvised explosive devices) and all the weaponry coming into Afghanistan, and we got a shot to win over there.”

Sardar Mengal, who leads the largest Balochistan National Party (BNP), says the hearing does not mean that the Washington is going to support the Baloch cause in the future.

“What the US can do for us is to care for the Baloch as human beings. Since Washington is apparently a committed supporter of human rights, it is obligatory that the US should stop the genocide of the Baloch nation by the authorities as it has done in other parts of the world, supporting their right of self-determination.”

M. Chris Mason, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, who recently retired from the US Foreign Service, has emerged as another ardent proponent of free Balochistan in the United States.

In an article, Mason, who lecturers at the prestigious National Defense University, argued an independent Balochistan would solve many of the [Af-Pak] region’s most intractable problems overnight and would create “a territorial buffer between rogue states Iran and Pakistan.”

“The answer to the current Pakistani train-wreck is… recognizing Balochistan’s legitimate claim to independence… to help the Baluchis go the way of the Bangladeshis in achieving their dream of freedom from tyranny, corruption and murder at the hands of the diseased state,” he wrote.

Routine matter
Hassan Abbas, a scholar based in Washington DC who until recently was Quaid-i-Azam Chair Professor at Columbia University in New York, seriously doubts if the US will officially support Baloch nationalists at this time as this will complicate US-Pakistan relations.

“I think the hearing is a routine matter as all security related issues in Pakistan are being analyzed in the policy world with keen interest as well as concern. The hearing will discuss human rights issue as well as politics,” says Abbas, who is also a Senior Advisor at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, “but the hearing itself will not create any serious diplomatic row. The US Congress must listen and understand that there is a variety of perspectives on the subject.”

Dr Ahmed, meanwhile, attributes the deepening crisis in Balochistan to Islamabad’s failure to understand that time is running out for it.

“The leaders of Pakistan are so focused on the power struggles in Islamabad that they seem to have little will or imagination to deal with the urgent issues that concern the country’s largest province of Balochistan.”

How will Islamabad respond to the hearing?

“Pakistan’s establishment is quite sensitive about the Balochistan crisis and they will follow the hearings closely and sceptically,” says Hassan Abbas, whose book, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, was published in 2005.

According to Abbas, hawkish elements in Pakistani media are likely to create a lot of hue and cry over the hearing. Yet he cautions, “They will serve Pakistan better by focusing on projecting the concerns of the ordinary Baloch people, who are disenfranchised, distressed and increasingly getting disenchanted.”

Sardar Mengal of BNP, who was detained in Karachi for several months during the Pervez Musharraf regime, predicts there would be a definite reaction from the government.

“They can only display their superiority to the ones who are weaker, and in this case, the Baloch are the weaker ones,” he says and warns, “But if there is a reaction from Pakistan toward us, this time it will be once and for all. Either the Baloch will swim across or sink as a nation.” (Courtesy: Dawn, Pakistan)

Congressman Ron Paul at the Republican Leadership Conference – 2011

Is it just me, or are seemingly incessant GOP debates the past few months allowing President Obama’s lack of public exposure to seem more and more like solid leadership? The Republican lineups simplistic, square and reactionary focus on “Anti-Obama” rhetoric especially on foreign policy has highlighted a resoundingly hawkish stance on Iran with little attention to our current engagements in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And while it may be expedient amongst a certain political base to try and one-up each other in aggressive foreign policy talk, only Ron Paul challenges the party line on Americas role in the world.

When it comes to Pakistan, compared to Democrats Republicans have a consistent history of preferring to work closely with the military establishment in Islamabad. While there is a level of bipartisanship post 9/11, (case in point is Obama’s continuation of Bush era drone use with little debate), Republicans have through the Cold War and beyond preferred dealing with the military establishment rather than focusing on democratic, or liberal institution building. Which is not necessarily an entirely erroneous policy; part of the rationale is that state building is expensive in blood, toil, time and treasure and rarely feasible. Further, there are an endless number of constraints and uncertainties that profoundly hinder institution, or democratic state building in a place like Pakistan, rendering Republican policies simply pragmatic.

Which brings us to current policy: the bipartisan endorsed “Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act” (S. 1707) enacted in 2009 has yet to bear tangible fruit. Granted the aforementioned that institution building is time exhaustive, the fact remains that Pakistan has deteriorated politically, in the realm of security and economically. And having watched everyone from Gov. Romney, Sen. Santorun, Gov. Perry, Rep. Bachmann and yes even the soft spoken Gov. Huntsman, reiterate hawkish foreign policy while refusing to acknowledge a need for meaningful improvement, only Rep. Ron Paul’s extreme calls for an isolationist posture offer some semblance of change. And because his prescriptions have yet to be tried, the utility of his ideas have yet to be tested. But now may be a time to consider his stance since they call for exactly what the Pakistani public wants.

Referring to our Pakistan policy as nothing short of “Bombs for Bribes” Ron Paul acknowledges the nobility, yet inherent futility in calling for democratic institutions in all places of strategic engagement. He understands that we are already engaged in “130 countries” with “700 bases around the world” and in this speech against the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, he bluntly explains:

“the way we treat our fellow countries around the world is we tell them what to do and if they do it, we give them money. If they don’t we bomb them. Under this condition we are doing both. We are currently dropping bombs in Pakistan and innocent people get killed. If you want to promote our good values and democratic processes, you can’t antagonize the people”

Ron Paul Opposes “Bombs and Bribes” – 9/30/2009 - VIDEO

He goes on to suggest dialogue and trade as alternatives to current policy. And although his statement is simplistic and was made in 2009, it highlights Ron Paul’s isolationist, more economically focused prescriptions on foreign policy that seek to reduce our military footprint abroad based on pragmatic constraints, like military and fiscal overstretch. And these calls seem more reasonable than before, especially when it comes to Pakistan and the fact that our aid has yet to yield satisfactory results. So while the Obama administration continues engagement and GOP candidates refuse to acknowledge much concern over current policy to Pakistan, can Ron Paul really be the only alternative available?

Someone once considered completely out of left, excuse me, right field, could be the reminder we need to moderate our engagement with countries of interest. Because what is interesting is that current rhetoric in Pakistan is very much in line with Ron Paul’s ideas. Ron Paul isn’t touting conspiracy theories, nor does he echo far left foreign policy thinkers like Noam Chomsky. Rather, his past statements on our engagement in Pakistan as “inadvertently causing chaos” and “violating security and sovereignty“ are exactly what the average Pakistani seems to feel and hears about in their mainstream TV, and print media. Takeaway for us means, it’s a perception that is realistic; perhaps more so than current policy reflects.

In fact, legendary cricket star turned politician Imran Khan’s recent surge in popularity is in large part due to his highly critical foreign policy rhetoric that vociferously calls for D.C. to adopt a more isolationist stance so Pakistan might reclaim lost autonomy. Imran Khan steadily built support for his party on the continued observation that America’s “War on Terror” has intensified insecurity and his subsequent promises to curtail American involvement is a first step in alleviating Pakistan’s problems.

Imran Khan at Davos –  Winning Hearts & Minds; the War on Terror – VIDEO

He underscores Ron Paul’s sentiment that perceptions urgently matter in a climate where American intervention is increasingly received hostilely. While there may be issues of concern with Ron Paul’s overall foreign policy prescriptions, both politicians insistence on winnings hearts and minds does render the congressman’s ideas in relation to Pakistan worthy of consideration. Imran Khan’s recent ascendency and Governor Paul’s gradually increasing support marks a convergence in shifting to a direction of a less militarized approach to engaging Islamabad. Two men once considered out of the realm of political viability now increasingly resonate in their respective publics; policymakers ought to take note.

Many Pakistanis will remember 2011 as the year of infamy. Those who supported Islamic terrorist groups, including elements in the military, the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound that killed him on May 2^nd, was an embarrassing exposure of Islamabad’s double-game. Those who passionately insisted upon more time, rather employing diplomatic pressure, on Pakistan to “do more” were caught in the middle of tough questions in capital cities across the globe.

Bin Laden Raid

The world was appalled, if not totally flabbergasted, to learn on May 2^nd that Osama bin Laden, the most wanted terrorist in the world and the founder of Al-Qaeda, had been hosted either officially or unofficially by Pakistan, a supposed front-line state in the war on terrorism. Bin Laden, the architect of 9/11 attacks which killed around 3000 people, had been hiding in the same town which houses Pakistan’s version of West Point known as the Pakistan Military Academy.

Unembarrassed over providing shelter to the Al-Qaeda chief, Pakistan protested against America’s unilateral strike which killed bin Laden. For Pakistanis, it was a breach of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. For Americans, it was a brazen breach of trust and norms of strategic partnership. Bin Laden’s killing put forward more difficult questions: Was the Pakistani military complicit in sheltering the Saudi-born militant leader or was it incompetent to trace him remains a blend of mystery and open secret.

ISI-Lobbyist

The Pakistani thought that the Americans had made up their minds to further humiliate the ISI when the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) arrested Ghulam Nabi Fai, a Washington-based lobbyist accused of illegally working for the ISI. Fai, the FBI said, had received approximately $500, 000 to 700,000 annually from the ISI without registering under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) to, what political experts believed, promote Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir against its next door enemy India. Pakistan’s embassy in Washington said it had ‘no knowledge’ of the case involving Fai.

Raymond Davis

The Abbottabad raid escalated tensions between the United States and Pakistan following the earlier arrest of a CIA contractor, Raymond Davis, on charges of killing two personnel of Pakistan’s spy agency, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, in the historic city of Lahore on January 27, 2011. Although Davis was eventually released after paying compensation worth $2.3 million, shooting at the ISI personnel, who had been chasing Davis’ car, triggered massive waves of anti-American sentiments among the Pakistani public as well as the army.

Haqqani Network

On September 22, Washington officially blamed Pakistan’s ISI for supporting Taliban’s Haqqani Network which was responsible for an attack on the US embassy and NATO headquarters in Afghan capital, Kabul, on September 13. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, termed the Network, a “veritable arm” of the ISI as he testified before Senate’s Armed Services Committee. Pakistan’s former President General Pervez Musharraf billed Mulle’s remarks “diverged from reality’ while his successor General Ashfaq Kayani begged that “singling out Pakistan was “neither fair nor productive.”

An extraordinary meeting of Pakistan’s army commanders was immediately convened which expressed concern over the ‘negative statements emanating from (the) US.”  While senior generals did not promise to take action against the Haqqani Network, the newly inducted charismatic yet hawkish foreign minister, Hina Rabani Khar, said she was ‘quite sure’ that the CIA also had links with “many terrorist organizations around the world…this particular Network [the Haqqani] …was the blue-eyed boy of the CIA for many years.”

Drone Strikes

In 2011, Pakistanis almost ran out of patience with America’s continued drone strikes in the Waziristan tribal region. Although this year, according to the New America Foundation (NAF), witnessed fewer (70) drone strikes against 2010 (70), Pakistanis vociferously vented their disapproval inside the national parliament, official meetings, street protests and newspaper columns. The NAF research database shows 283 drone strikes have killed “approximately between 1,717, and 2,680 individuals, of whom around 1,424 to, 2,209 described as militant in reliable press accounts.”

“Despite the drone program’s shortcomings, it is likely to continue — put simply,” wrote Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann in their August 2011 Foreign Affairs article, “Washington has no better military options for combating the anti-Western militants who have made their home in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Pakistan’s army has proved itself unwilling or unable to clear out the Taliban and other insurgent groups from North Waziristan, where around 90 percent of last year’s drone strikes took place.”

NATO Attack/ Bonn Conference

NATO helicopters killed 25 Pakistani soldiers on November 25^th by attacking a military check post in Mohmand Agency bordering Afghanistan. In reaction, the Pakistan army warned of “serious repercussions” of the “latest attack by Nato forces on our post.”

Both, NATO and Pakistan, accuse each other of initiating fire first.

Consequently, Pakistan blocked supplies to NATO troops stationed in Pakistan as a reaction and issued an ultimatum to the United States to vacate Shamsi Airbase in southwestern Balochistan which has been used for unmanned drones to attack Taliban insurgents in Pakistan’s tribal region.

In a clear move of no-cooperation with and hysterical fury, Islamabad also boycotted next week’s Bonn Conference II.

In an article in the Atlantic, Joshua Foust, a fellow at the American Security Project, described Pakistan’s boycott as “more or less a death-blow to the conference.”

“Without Taliban participation, the conference’s utility was going to be severely limited. But missing the Taliban’s primary sponsor and support, in addition to the Taliban, and possibly the only other regional player with sufficient clout to alter Afghan politics… there is little hope for Bonn II to be anything other than an expensive piece of theater that will do little to advance or save the country.”

Memogate

In 2011, Pakistan’s military staged an indirect but extraordinary comeback in the country’s politics. The army has not only directly and publicly dealt with key foreign affairs but it has also put in jeopardy and uncertainty the very survival of the civilian government headed by the Pakistan People’s Party’s of the assassinated former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

In what the Pakistanis phrase as the Memogate Scandal (inspired by America’s Watergate Scandal), the country’s overly pro-US and staunchly anti-military Ambassador stationed in Washington DC, Husain Haqqani, was forced to resign. Haqqani, a former Boston University associate professor, was accused by a hitherto unknown Pakistani-American businessman, Mansoor Ijaz, of dispatching a memo to Admiral Mike Mullen asking for assistance to prevent the Pakistani army and the ISI from toppling the democratic government.

Pakistan’s Supreme Court has now asked President Asif Ali Zardari, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani and the Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to submit their evidence over the memogate scandle. Former Ambassador Haqqani has been replaced in Washington with a pro-military journalist-turned-former minister, Sherry Rehman. Trendy Haqqani, who communicates with the media via Twitter, has been warned by the court not to leave Pakistan until the memogate probe is complete.

Floods 2011

Pakistan’s floods in 2011 remained largely unnoticed for two reasons.

First, the nuclear-armed Muslim nation made front page headlines several times in 2011 but this attention was mainly for political reasons, terrorism and the country’s worsening ties with Washington.

Secondly, many individuals, media outlets and even foreign governments confused this year’s disaster the floods of summer 2010 which killed 1600 people, besides affecting 20 million people.

In 2011, Pakistan experienced further devastation in 2011 because of massive floods.

According to a September 2011 UN report Pakistan; Rapid Response Plan, this year’s floods have affected 5,4441,869 people; damaged 665,821 houses and destroyed an area of 1,595,052 acres of crops in Sindh province while damages in the largest province of Balochistan could not be estimated yet.

Millions of Pakistani flood victims of two back-to-back floods still await assistance. International donor agencies and individual philanthropist barely trust Pakistan’s unquestionably corrupt, inefficient and untrustworthy government. While the United Nations has requested $356.7 million assistance for Pakistan’s flood affected people, the uphill task will take many years or perhaps decades to compensate the damage the floods caused.

MFN Status for India

If there was one good news story from Pakistan on the foreign policy front then it came in November when Islamabad decided to grant India the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. As original members of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now known as the World Trade Organization) both the countries should have granted this status to each other as early as 1948. India gave Pakistan the MNF status in 1996, which took Islamabad 15 years to reciprocate.

Hence, the two neighboring countries intend to enhance their existing trade, which is between $2 and $3 billion to $ 14 billion in 2014.

Terrorism

Pakistan failed to protect its civilians from homegrown religious terrorism as the country recorded the highest number of civilian causalities (2463) since 2003. The country seemed to be losing its battle against insurgents. In 2011, according to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the second highest number of soldiers and army men were killed by terrorists. Furthermore, Pakistan scored its worst marks in three years in terms of killing terrorists. This year, Pakistan killed only 2527 terrorists/insurgents as compared to killing 7435 in 2010, 11704 in 2009 and 6715 in 2008.

The heartening news for the people of Pakistan, the real victims of terrorism, is the steady decline in suicide bombings. Fewer people (606) were killed in fewer (39) suicide bombings in 2011 as compared to 49,76 and 57 for the years 2010,20109 and 2008 respectively which killed 1167, 949 and 893 respectively.

Press Freedom

Pakistan remained the world’s deadliest country for the second consecutive year for journalists. In spite of a statistical difference between the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters Without Borders, which have documented the killing of 7 and 9 reporters respectively, PBS Newshours says Pakistan accounts for the highest number of slain reporters.

According to the CPJ, Pakistan has remained in the list of top five most unsafe countries for journalists since 2005 where reporting was confirmed as the motive of killing of 39 journalists since 1998. The CJP, however, does not document many stringers and reporters working in rural Pakistan who often get killed because of their professional activities. For example, the CPJ database does not include a prominent journalist from Balochistan, Munir Ahmed Shakir, who was gunned down this year.

Pakistani cable operators, supposedly with the guidance of the military, banned the service of BBC World Service in November and continued blocking the Baloch Hal, the first online newspaper of the conflict-stricken Balochistan province. Authorities in Karachi detained and eventually deported Italian journalist Francesca Marino after discovering that her name was blacklisted among the “unwelcome journalists.”

Balochistan

On November 16, the deputy spokesman of the US Department of State, Mark Toner, expressed concerns over the situation in Pakistan’s gas and oil-rich province of Balochistan. For the past eight years, Islamabad has brutally crushed the secular Baloch nationalist movement for calls for self-determination.

Relatives of the missing Baloch persons claim Pakistan has subjected around four thousand political activists to enforced disappearance among whom the bullet-riddled dead bodies of at least 150 have been found.

In February, the Amnesty International described the phenomenon as ‘kill and dump operations’ and called upon the Pakistani government to “provide accountability for rising atrocities in Balochistan”.

“The victims’ relatives and Baloch groups blame the “kill and dump” incidents on Pakistani security forces, particularly the Frontier Corps and intelligence agencies. Many of the victims were abducted by uniformed Frontier Corps soldiers, often accompanying men in plain clothes, in front of multiple witnesses,” the global human rights watchdog said.

Rise of Imran Khan

Pakistan’s analysis of year 2011 will remain incomplete without discussing the emergence of a relatively unknown political leader (at least in the United States and Europe) who has decided to challenge the ruling Pakistan People’s Party and former prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League. Imran Khan, a former cricket skipper under whose leadership Pakistan won the world cup in 1992, was reported by the Pew Research Center as Pakistan’s most popular political figure with a favorable rating of 68% against Nawaz Sharif (63%) and President Zardari (11%).

Here is why the West, including the United States, must fear Mr. Khan.

Mr. Khan, who heads Pakistan’s Justice Movement, owes his dramatic political rise largely because of his anti-US provocative speeches which galvanize a remarkably huge young audience. Political experts in Pakistan say Mr. Khan enjoys absolute support from the ISI so that they pit him against President Zardari and opposition leader Sharif.

The ISI has had a long history of meddling into Pakistani politics and churning out radial politicians who mainly blame the United States for all troubles in their country.

Imran Khan is either loved or hated but today he has risen as someone who cannot easily be  ignored. It is tragic for the Pakistani politics that only anti-US sentiments, not issues pertaining to bad governance and corruption, could lead to the rise of an alternative political force to challenge the status quo.

Most Unexpected Event

The killing of Osama bin Laden in the garrison town of Abbottabad plunged Pakistan in a state of shame and guilt. It even compelled the domestic supporters of the Pakistani army to seek an explanation. In the United States, it equally became difficult for the friends of Pakistan to defend latter’s commitment to the war on terror.

“[The US military] … are angry with the Pakistani military for playing both sides against the middle. They are aware that if you’re an American soldier and the Afghan Taliban who are shooting at you are actually the ones being supported and trained in Pakistan. So, there is real anger with the Pakistan army over this double game,” said Stephen P. Cohen, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Person (or group of people) of the Year

Three people departed from Pakistan in 2011 with food for thought about the future of the country.

Salmaan Taseer, a liberal politicians who governed the powerful province of Punjab, was shot 26 times with a submachine gun by his own security guard in the nation’s capital on January 4^th.  Malik Mumtaz Qadiri, Taseer’s twenty-six year old assassin, a religious zealot, defended his act in the name of Islam because the governor had called for reforming Pakistan’s controversial Blasphemy Law which is often misused against religious minorities.

Two months after Taseer’s murder, Pakistan’s sole minority minister Shahbaz Bhatti, a Roman Catholic, was killed on March 2 in Islamabad. The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for this killing the minority minister, citing ‘blasphemous remarks against the Prophet of Islam’, totally the same reason the Governor’s guard used to justify shooting his boss.

A leading investigative journalist, Syed Saleem Shahzad, 40, who exposed links with Al-Qaeda and elements inside the nation’s military, was kidnapped on May 29^th, also from Islamabad, and found dead on June 3. The Obama administration and the Human Rights Watch both blame the ISI for killing the Asia Times journalist to muzzle criticism against the military and Islamists.

Forecast for 2012

As the military in Pakistan has almost regained control over the driving seat on policy matters, it is most likely to push the country into further isolation. Pakistan is back to 1990s where it will improve relations with Taliban and care less for the future of its relationship with the US. For good or bad reasons, some elements in the Pakistani army love Afghanistan more than the Afghans themselves.

Therefore, Pakistan will increase contacts and cooperation with Taliban and radical groups in order to upstage India in the future Afghan set-up.

The army seems to have forgiven President Zardari this time over the memogate, a similar ‘mistake’ in the future will, however, not be tolerated. The possibility of a military coup in Pakistan in 2011 is still an exaggerated fear but the ISI will continue to groom Imran Khan and lure more PPP and PML leaders, such as the former foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, to join Mr. Khan’s pro-military party.

For Pakistan’s silent yet educated and moderate population, there are “direct and clear lessons” in the killing of the three men, whom we have featured as the persons of the year, to know learn the price of challenging the status quo.

In 2012, Pakistan is likely remain more diplomatically isolated, politically unstable, militarily defiant and intellectually restricted.

As the debate over the post-2014 Afghanistan gains more attention, observers fear a ‘political earthquake’ in the country where the US troops’ withdrawal coincides with the next Afghan presidential elections. With the exit of the United States, Afghanistan’s economy and sources of financing the government in Kabul are likely to come under supreme challenges, they maintain.

In an interview with Dawn.com, Vanda Felbab-Brown, a Foreign Policy Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC shares her thought on how prepared Afghanistan is for the transition. With a Ph.D. in political Science from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and a B.A from Harvard University, Ms. Brown is an assistant professor at Georgetown University. She has extensively researched on Afghanistan, Pakistan, civil wars, terrorism, drugs and illicit economies. Her book Shoot Up analyses the relationship between insurgent groups and the drug trade in Colombia and Afghanistan.

Q. Why has the American leverage over Afghanistan decreased in the past decade?

A. The security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. Many parts of the country still remain hard to manage. The level of public optimism is much weaker today. The US announcement to pull out most of the troops by 2014 has left the people wondering as to what extent the Taliban would be undermined before the withdrawal. Washington has also lost leverage over President Hamid Karzai. The relationship with Karzai has not been totally unproblematic but now he is hedging on all sides.

Q. Can the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police manage the post-2014 situation?

A. The story on the Afghan National Army (ANA) is more positive than the Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANA has received extensive training; increased the number of personnel and partnered with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The question now is how capable it will be to stand against Taliban , the Haqqani Network in the East and other rogue militias. This year, in some areas, the ANA will be required to fight mainly on its own with little ISAF support. The ANA is confronted with ethnic imbalance because the commanders from the north dominate it while a very small number of Pashtuns joined the force. We do not know if the army will come under pressure to breakup ethnically after 2014 if violence escalates and signs of civil war arise.

The Afghan National Police (ANP) is sort of the bigger problem because it is confronted with ethnic issues and a lack of accountability. The people view ANP as abusive, corrupt and often complicit in crimes. Besides these two forces, the Afghan Local Police (ALP) was raised from the local population in areas where the ANA and ANP presence is very weak. They are extremely susceptible to far greater abuse of power.

Q. Islamabad complains about the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) having strongholds in eastern Afghanistan while Washington and Kabul grumble about the Haqqani Network using Pakistani territory as a safe haven. Why does such ‘unfaithfulness’ exists between the key allies in the war on terror?

A. Historically, the porous Af-Pak border, which is extraordinarily difficult to seal, has been a part of the problem. There is a big difference between the Pakistani complaints and the US grievances. Pakistan complains that the TTP uses Eastern Afghanistan for safe havens. If the US receives intelligence reports, they are far more motivated to go to take action against these groups.

On the other hand, the US believes Pakistan has not shown any motivation to tackle the Haqqani Network but instead systematically allowed it to flourish. This is despite of the fact that it is the deadliest of all the networks which is also responsible for the attack on the US embassy.  From the US perspective, there is not a bigger irritant than Islamabad’s continued tolerance of the Haqqani Network.

Q. Isn’t it ironic that the Afghans complain about Pakistan’s influence over their country but they also refuse to recognise the Durand Line as an international border so that both the countries fence parts of the border to avoid infiltration from both the sides.

A. Although Pakistan had suggested fencing some parts of the border, the offer has extremely annoyed President Karzai because he does not recognise the Durand Line. Plus, Pakistan is not popular in Afghanistan for historical reasons and because the Afghans view Pakistan as a country that is currently supporting Taliban and the Haqqanis. Karzai is vulnerable to domestic pressure which makes it hard for him to concede to the Pakistani proposal.

Q. How potential are Afghanistan‘s internal ethnic conflicts?

A. Besides the issue of religious extremism, ethnic unrest has historically remained a major challenge for Afghanistan. The Hazaras have been the most oppressed. The Tajiks are the second most important group followed by the Uzbeks. In each group there are sub-clans. For instance, the Pashtuns are sub-divided among the Durranis and the Ghilazais. The Durranis from Kandahar city have ruled Afghanistan for centuries and suppressed the Ghilzai Pashtuns without giving them access to power at local or national level.

Much of the Pashtun movement in 1990s drew support from the Ghilzai Pashtuns and appealed the groups that had been underprivileged. The Pashtun complexity is overlapped by the relationship between the Tajiks and the Durrani Pashtuns. The Tajiks have historically perceived themselves as oppressed who had no access to power in Kabul until 2001 when the government headed by a Durrani Pashtun, President Karzai, was dominated by northern Tajik commanders was formed. That balance of power changed in mid-2000s when more Pashtuns came into the government. Thus, the possibility of negotiations with the Taliban stirred ethnic tensions and raised questions as to who will gain power after 2014. Tensions will also rise about the number of commanders in the ANA and ANP as most of the commanders are non-Pashtuns from the north.

Q. Is there a post-2014 strategy on the cards to ensure uninterrupted funding for ANA, ANP, ALP?

A. This is part of the process of transition. Clearly, the bill for Afghan national security forces cannot be paid by the Afghan government. A transition strategy needs to be developed as how to generate revenue for Afghanistan so that it can pay for its security. It’s a long-term process. No matter how many troops the United States pulls out in 2014, no one is actually hopeful that the Afghan government will be capable of paying for its security afterwards. It is very much expected of the United States and the international community to continue to pay for Afghanistan’s national security. We do not know how much budget they will commit.

Q. Does Washington still view Karzai as ‘indispensable’ for Afghanistan?

A. That is one of the big questions surrounding Afghanistan. President Karzai had said that he does not intend to run for a third term. Also, the Afghan constitution bars a candidate from becoming the president for more than two terms.  Karzai may change his mind as elections near.  If he decides not to run then the field will be open for different candidates like Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Amrullah Saleh, Ashraf Ghani and others. But we do not know who the future candidates would be until Karzai makes a final decision.

Q. What are the prime concerns for 2014 presidential elections?

A. We need to worry how high ethnic tensions will get during the elections and to what extent the security forces will be capable of preventing the Taliban from spreading violence during the election process. We also have to wait and see how much consensus will be developed among the candidates about the future president?

Q. What trend do the killings of Ahmed Wali Karzai and Burhanuddin Rabbani indicate?

A. Both these killings illustrate the vulnerability of the Afghan elite and power-brokers. The motivation behind the killing of Ahmed Wali Karzai is still unclear. Majority of Afghans do not believe that the Taliban were behind his killing. On the other hand, in Rabbani’s case, it is clear that the Taliban ordered the killing but what remains inconclusive is whether it was the Haqqani Network or the Quetta Shura that killed him. Another question the Afghans are asking is whether Pakistan and the ISI authorised and directed that killing.

Wali’s killing has significantly undermined President Karzai’s support base in Kandahar and raised concerns about his safety. One lesson Karzai learned from these killings is that negotiations with Taliban will not go as easy as he had thought earlier.

Q. Why is it so difficult to keep Afghanistan’s neighbors away from interfering in its domestic affairs?

A. Outside forces have had a very detrimental effect on Afghanistan. One important source of outside influence is Pakistan which is paranoid about the possibility of being encircled by an India-friendly government in Afghanistan. The recent signing of the strategic agreement between Kabul and New Delhi surely did not assuage Pakistan’s fears.  Pakistan has always tried to cultivate actors to gain influence over Kabul. Pakistan has almost always done this with the exclusion of the northern groups and with the support of the Pashtuns. It is ironic because Pakistan’s own Pashtun population has historically received harsh treatment or neglect. Many Pashtuns, at the same time, strongly resent Pakistan’s cultivation of proxies inside Afghanistan because they view this as interference into Afghanistan’s affairs.

India has tried to cultivate its proxies and supported non-Pashtun groups. During the civil war of 1990s, Iran supported the Hazaras for ethnic and religious reasons.

Ironically, Russia was supporting the Northern Alliance although they had fought against the Soviets during the Cold War.

Today, we are seeing efforts to re-cultivate those proxies because we don’t know at this point if post-2014 Afghanistan will be stable.

Q. Who do you think is the right authority to address Pakistan‘s concerns in Afghanistan?

A. It would be easier to do so if we had only one actor in the region. For Pakistan, the relations with US means to get an assurance that India will negotiate over Kashmir while for India it is primarily linked to getting Pakistan ceasing cooperation with Islamic groups inside Kashmir. Thus, the problem will not be solved only through Pak-Afghan engagement. Kabul wants to cultivate India as a proxy in case its relationship with Pakistan worsens. The signing of the recent strategic agreement was precisely a move in frustration because of the Rabbani killing and the attack on the US embassy.

There was a time when India and Pakistan had nearly reached an agreement on Kashmir during Musharraf’s term but the Indian government was not capable of delivering. Later on, Musharraf lost his influence in Pakistan but it showed that India and Pakistan were both capable of resolving their problems without the major involvement of the United States or China.  There is much of a possibility for both the countries to move forward if they liberate themselves from the constrains of history.

If India-Pakistan issues are not resolved, Pakistan will continue to frustrate the US in Afghanistan by not taking action against the Haqqani Network which will further poison the relationship because US troops are getting killed as a result of the ISI-Haqqani nexus. If some more American soldiers are killed in Afghanistan with the support of Pakistan, the fallout would be huge. The US Congress has become extremely anti-Pakistan because it views Pakistan as complicit in terrorism against the United States.

Q. What do you think will happen if security situation worsens in Af-Pak after 2014?

A. I can imagine some very disastrous outcomes for Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States in the region. A post-2014 major civil war in Afghanistan will further destabilise Pakistan.  Some of the trends in Pakistan are extremely worrisome. It is a country where institutions are not capable of delivering to the public, be it education, energy or safety. The civilian government has abdicated responsibility to the military and the military has proven itself unable to address many of these issues. The level of militancy in South Punjab is very intense and the military does not feel it can do much about it. Pakistan has huge internal problems. If secessionist and militant movements gain momentum, then the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear program will also become worrisome. (Courtesy: Dawn.com)

Taseer’s murder offered everything that drama and tragedy required. A multimillionaire and westernized entrepreneur, Taseer was shot dead by his own security guard on January 4, 2011 in Islamabad. The smug murderer publicly defended his action. In his words, Mr. Taseer “deserved” death because he had committed “blasphemy” by criticizing certain Islamic legal provisions that punish any ‘blasphemous’ remarks about Prophet Muhammad.

Last week, an Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) sentenced to death Mumtaz Qadari, the twenty-six year old self-admitted killer of the progressive governor.  The judgement, seen as a bold one in a country plagued with Islamic extremism, has sparked a massive wave of protests in major cities to denounce the verdict. Besides threatening to kill the judge who awarded death sentence, hardliners have pledged to overthrow the government if President Zardari does not declare the judgement null and void.

Urdu newspapers, which have a widespread readership, are endlessly glorifying Taseer’s murder and depicting him as a “hero”.

Nawa-e-Waqat, the nation’s second most widely circulated Urdu newspaper, flaunted in a front-page story that “religious leaders” in Pakistan had “widely appreciated” its coverage of pro-Qadri protests and regretted electronic media’s lack of interest in the unfolding developments.

A newspaper from the federal capital,  Daily Ausaf, published five photos and the same number of stories on its front page in an attempt to present Qadri as a hero and condemn the verdict.

“Qadiri fulfilled his religious obligation by killing Taseer,” wrote Ausaf in an editorial, “he bravely defended his decision in front of the court. Our law punished him because it [the law] does not give importance to people’s religious sentiments… The lovers of the Prophet are such people that even they proudly tell the courts that they committed murder. Their lawyers beg them to at least once deny the charges but they continue to confess their involvement in the killings because they view this [murdering a blasphemous person] as a great honor for themselves.”

The paper further defended the protests, “people’s reactions are intense. They are expressing their feelings against the judgement.”

Daily Ummat, another right-wing newspaper, has been publishing special colorful editions since the verdict was given  in order to  facilitate Qadri’s release and encourage violent protests by his supporters. On October 2, the paper interviewed Qadri’s supporters, who said charges of  terrorism against Qadri “had not been proven” yet and the judge had given a hasty decision. The newspaper  quoted Taji Khokar,  an Islamabad businessman, who offered “as much money as desired”  by the slain governor’s family in exchange for forgiving the murderer.

The newspaper further reported that Qadri, soon after hearing the verdict,  had suggested his father should distribute sweets [a mark of joy] among the people because he had been punished for a “good reason,” i.e. protecting the honor of the Prophet of Islam.

“Qadari’s wife says if she has to sacrifice her eleven-year old son, Mohammad Ali, for the honor of the Prophet of Islam, she will not hesitate from doing so,” reported Daily Ummat on October 3, “Qadri’s brothers are also determined to give the sacrifices of at least 72 more people if it is needed for the cause of the Prophet’s honor.”

Since the killing of Taseer because he publicly defended a Christian woman condemned for allegedly committing blasphemy, the Taseers have suffered immensely. This situation has been very accurately mentioned by Washington Post journalist Pamela Constable in her book Playing With Fire.

“In the days after the shooting, some Pakistanis expressed great emotional satisfaction, as if the killer, a twenty-six-year-old policeman assigned to guard Taseer, had defended a besieged faith and rid society of a moral menace. Lawyers, policemen, and clerics joined in the chorus. Bloggers circulated snapshots of Taseer’s wife and daughters in bathing suites at the beach, citing this as proof of ‘evil.’”

A son of Taseer was kidnapped from Lahore more than a month ago. His whereabouts are still unknown. It is very likely that the kidnappers will seek the release of Qadri in return of the junior Taseer’s freedom. Such fears were also echoed in an editorial of Express Tribune, which billed the judgement “a welcome verdict.”

“There is also the possibility that Qadri’s freedom will be used as a bargaining chip by those who kidnapped Taseer’s son Shahbaz more than a month ago and one hopes things do not come to that.”

Pakistan has become a battleground in the name of religion. An extremist segment promotes hate against non-Muslims in the name of religion while another group of people justifies the killing of ‘not so good Muslims” in a society that has become increasingly intolerant and violent since 9/11.

The journalist Constable aptly summarizes the current situation in Pakistan in the following words:

“A war for Pakistan’s soul is taking place today. It has been called Manichaean struggle between liberal and obscurantist notions of Islam, a contest between Sufisim and Salafism, an existential schizophrenia between South Asian and Middle Eastern ways. It is not only a war of violence, being waged by fanatics  who bomb fashionable hotels or shrines where people come to pray for a saint to cure their cancer.  There are also more subtle forces pulling the society in opposite directions. One set is pulling it forward toward a modern and internationalist  era, the other back toward a traditional and ingrown world.  One model is characterized by technology, analysis and global immersion, as exemplified by Turkey or Bangladesh. The other is characterized by normal absolutism, emotion and isolation, as exemplified by Yemen or Afghanistan under the Taliban.”

Pakistan’s liberal and progressive voices only come from rich and western-educated individuals and families. They only whisper liberal values into each others’ ears rather than ever attempting to reach out to the rural masses. This elite-driven drawing-room liberalism does not reach the common Pakistani.

“Pakistan today needs forces of rationality, humanity and good sense to come together throughout the country to roll back this tide that is threatening the nation as a whole,” stated an editorial in Daily Times, a liberal newspaper that was coincidentally founded by Governor Taseer. “Governor Taseer may not be amongst us today physically but his bold and rational stance for human rights, women’s rights, minorities’ rights and justice remains with us in spirit. Let us pay our tribute to Mr Taseer by realizing his dream of a democratic, secular and pluralistic Pakistan.”

Last week, Admiral Mike Mullen blamed the Haqqani Network of acting as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency. “With ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy,” remarked retiring Mullen who has been known for his soft corner for the Pakistani military.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, on the other hand, insisted in a fresh interview with Al-Jazeera English that she was “quite sure” that the American Central Intelligence (CIA) also had links with “may terrorist organizations around the world… this particular Network [the Haqqani Network] they continue to talk about is a network which was the blue-eyed boy of the CIA itself for many years.”

Pakistan has barely been a reliable partner in the war on terror. Links between the country’s military and Islamic militant groups have already been known to different governments of the world and political experts as well.  What is striking at this point is Pakistan’s public support of a terrorist network. The civilian government and the powerful military, which have had a long and bitter history of animosity and mutual mistrust, have publicly said that they are absolutely determined not to accept further American ‘dictations’.

While de facto head of Pakistan General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani called an impromptu meeting of the top military commanders to renounce the American “allegations”, the relatively powerless prime minister Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani of the Pakistan People’ Party has summoned an All Parties Conference (APC) on September 29.

Corps Commanders’ meetings and APCs are simultaneously convened in Pakistan under extraordinary circumstances. Such developments are witnessed when the country is in the brink of a war or confronted by ‘external aggression’.

It is difficult to make sense of Pakistan’s politics without knowing a bit of Urdu language. Pakistan’s political narrative is heavily dominated by terms like غیرت(Ghirat or honor/pride), سازش (Sazish — conspiracy) and سودا بازی sodabazi—sell out).

For a long time, Pakistanis have been made to believe through a media that receives dictations from its conservative army that their national pride has been sold out to the United States. Many Pakistanis look at their country as a US colony. In addition, some of them also think that the US enjoys limitless influence on their country. The Pakistani masses earnestly believe that a bird can’t fly or a prime minister can’t get elected inside Pakistan without Washington’s prior approval.

Why do they think so?

Pakistan is a country badly divided between the extremely rich&powerful and the extremely poor living in rural areas. The country barely has a middle class. There is hardly any contact between the ordinary people and the corrupt ruling elite. It is the paradox of Pakistan where anti-American sentiments may run extremely high but the common man in the streets still looks at the US with naive expectations that it can bring down inflation in the country and punish corrupt politicians.

Hence, anti-American politics serves the interests of the corrupt politicians and also provides the common people a common enemy to blame for their domestic mess.

We know why Islamabad will not take action against the Haqqani network because it does not want to lose a potential partner in a post-American Afghanistan in 2014. Pakistan sees the Network close to its interests to counter India’s influence in Afghanistan. Furthermore, if Pakistan takes stern action against the 15,000-Haqqanis, who have a strong base both in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan, then the latter is likely to face the heat of more Taliban attacks on its military and civilians as a reaction to the government support to the Americans against the network.

In Pakistan the future belongs to any individual or institution (such as the army) who restores the country’s “national pride’ and gets Pakistan rid of its longstanding “American slavery.” Pakistani politicians, including the Prime Minister, are confident that a “bold stance” against the United States will further popularize them not only inside Pakistan but in neighboring countries like Afghanistan, Iran and many countries of the Muslim world where anti-American sentiments are appallingly high.

Lastly, Pakistanis also know that the Americans have played their stint in Afghanistan and the time has come for Islamabad to assert its regional interests loudly and clearly even if they clash with Washington’s interests.

The world focused on the Northern areas of Pakistan to capture or kill the al-Qaeda or Taliban operatives. But the harsh reality is that even if these operatives are eliminated, there are other outfits in the rest of the southern part of Pakistan that have the same aims, will and training as that of al-Qaeda or Taliban.

After 2001 Pakistanis were spoon fed the propaganda that the violence in Pakistan is due to America’s presence in Afghanistan. As a result, many hate the U.S. intervention and see Islamists as the defenders of Pakistani sovereignty. Those who support the Islamists for their religious beliefs are relatively few in number, but they are better organized. The arrests of extremists depends on the willingness of Pakistan’s secret agencies and/or the influence of the Saudi government.

The dual policy of keeping the U.S. happy while supporting the terrorist outfits was charted out by the then-President of Pakistan Gen. Pervez Musharraf. He half-heartedly banned some 23 organizations but failed — deliberately — to bring their sponsors to justice.

The story of Southern part of Pakistan is much scarier than the Northern part. Just as the ten-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks approached, those “banned” outfits were on the rise, exploiting the anti-Americanism in the country and misusing the name of religion.

Jaish-e-Muhammad, the group blamed for an attack on the Indian parliament, is the second largest jihadi group in Southern Punjab. It carries out regular public gatherings and has strong influence in the U.K., Europe, Dubai, Saudi Arabia and even in the U.S. Libya’s Moammar Gaddafi was their financial patron-in-chief at one point. Another major financer is Saudi Arabia.

JeM changed its name a few times because of the “ban.” It went from Khudam-al-Islam to Al Rehmat Trust International to Usman Trust. Currently it is operating under the banner of Al Shafi Islamic Medical. Its publications were never out of print.

The failed Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, spent much of his time at a JeM madrassa in Karachi. He was transported to the North later by Laskhar-e-Jhangvi for further training.

LeJ’s parent organization — Sipah Sahaba Pakistan — changed its name from Millat-e-Islamia to International Quran Movement to Ehle Sunnat wa Jamaat. Its propaganda organ publications were available to the masses outside mosques and various market places.

The LeJ formed and operated its new wing, also known as Lashkar e Jhangvi al Almi (LeJ International). With its headquarters in Pakistan, it covers Europe and the U.K. The LeJ is organized into small cells of around eight cadres each, who operate independently of the others.

LeJ leader Malik Ishaq told an Urdu newspaper about his involvement in the killings of 102 people. He was allowed a stipend and provided a mobile phone in jail. Ishaq was released this year after the courts found no evidence against him.

Gen. Musharraf’s government carried out just one operation against the Islamic fundamentalists, under pressure from the Chinese government, when he ordered the Red Mosque Siege. Pakistani intelligence officials said they found letters from Osama bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to the leaders of the mosque, directing them to conduct an armed revolt. One of the leaders was released by the courts later.

The LeJ, JeM and Harkat ul Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) formed a common front called Lashkar-e-Umer with countrywide branches for close cooperation and pooled resources. These groups still support each other in one form or another.

The Karachi-based Al Rasheed Trust, was “banned” and listed as a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department on September 22, 2001. The group is still operating and its chief was one of the few who had direct access to bin Laden.

Similarly, another group, the Falah-e-Isnaniyat Foundation (FIF) is linked with Lashkar and Jamat-al-Dawa and protected by the security establishment. These groups are also supported and funded by the Saudis.

The freehand operations of these groups have radicalized Pakistani society. Anti-Americanism spreads while Arabization has taken hold.

There are more and more mosques in each city, many run by such outfits. In some places three separate mosques of different sects are built next to each other. The sermons delivered there go unchecked and ultimately fuel the hatred and twisted ideology of dividing Muslims and bringing ‘sharia’ of their liking to the world. Public Billboards promoting jihad and hatred of America are everywhere cloaked as appeals for “charity.”

Pakistan’s internal crises include a deep cynicism that has seeped into every nook and cranny of everyday life. Politically, the army continues to run the popular narrative. Socially, if liberals talk about rapprochement with India, they’re accused of being controlled by RAW, the C.I.A. or the Zionists — or all three. The radical view that it’s acceptable to kill Shi’a, Ahmadis, Hindus and Christians and destroy their places of worship is widespread.

Because of this chaos, ordinary Pakistanis who want to travel, work and study abroad are finding it harder to do so. In the eyes of many immigration officials around the world, to be Pakistani is synonymous with being a criminal.

It’s been said many times that 9/11 changed the world. After the attacks, Afghanistan and Pakistan felt the heat.

Ten years later, the diseases that had been contained in Pakistan metastasize more rapidly than ever. Pakistan’s militants, all of them, are a threat to international peace. If the West’s strategy for combating radicalism continues on its present parochial course, the world will feel the heat.

—
The piece was first published at The Huffington Post

A widely respected expert on South Asia, Ambassador Schaffer spoke exclusively with Dawn.com about Pakistan’s negotiating style with the United States.

Q. The United State and Pakistan have had three ‘marriages’ and two ‘divorces’. Are the interests that lead to an eventful marriage and factors which caused divorce always the same or do they keep changing with every new partnership?

A. The immediate impetus for the three marriages came from factors external to Pakistan such as the Cold War and Afghanistan. What caused the two divorces is different.

The first divorce came in 1965 during the Pakistan-India war when Pakistan used US-supplied weapons which Washington had warned were not supposed to be used against each other.

Pakistan’s nuclear program caused the second divorce. In the 1980s, the US restored a large aid program to Pakistan, but to get the aid through Congress, it also had to pass the Pressler Amendment. In 1990s, the US could no longer certify that Pakistan possessed a nuclear explosive device because of which its assistance had to be cut-off.

In both cases, divorce was the culmination of Pakistan’s unwillingness to accept US terms and conditions.

Q. What would you describe as the striking findings of your study about Pakistan’s negotiating style with the United States?

A. There are three big influences on Pakistan’s negating style with the United States. The first is Pakistan’s view of its place in the world with India as the perpetual enemy and the US as an unfaithful ally. The second is the supreme importance of personal connections in the Pakistani culture. The third influence is the complicated structure of the government and complex relationship between the military, civil administration and the bureaucracy.

Pakistan tries to put the United States on a guilt trip and has been remarkably successful in doing that.

Q. The United States has historically personalised rather than institutionalise relations with Pakistan. How much has that benefitted both the countries?

A. Both the sides have personalised the relationship. Without some degree of personalisation you are not going to get anywhere with a Pakistani leader. But by allowing the personal relationship to substitute for an institutional one, the United States makes itself vulnerable to the guilt trip.

Q. Do you see a dichotomy between the objectives of a US-Pakistan strategic alliance and expectations of both the countries from each other?

A. Yes. This is the real challenge of US-Pakistan relationship. The assumption during all three alliances was that our strategic interests were the same. In fact, they had some points in common, but were not the same. The key to these differences in each case has been India.

For Pakistanis, India is the long-term existential threat. For the United States, India is not an enemy. In Afghanistan, Pakistan’s prime objective is to minimize Indian influence but the US goal is to minimise the al Qaeda influence. These are not the same.

Q. How much is the growing US-India alliance going to influence US-Pakistan ties?

A. I have no doubt that the US-India relationship makes a lot of Pakistanis uncomfortable. They see this as inconsistent with US-Pakistan relationship. If you had a real economic revival in Pakistan at rates comparable with India, you would see the balance of Pakistan’s interests changing in such a way that the US-India relationship would seem less threatening to Pakistan.

Q. Why has the United States rephrased the term “Indo-Pak” and categorised Pakistan into the newly coined term “Af-Pak”?

A. I hate the term Af-Pak. It sounds demeaning in Pakistan. The term and the bureaucratic structure are the products of the decision by President Obama and Secretary Clinton to bring in Richard Holbrooke as the envoy.

Richard Holbrooke was a man of enormous talent. I think the term was his because he meant you can’t only talk about Afghanistan and forget Pakistan. He was trying to convey the message that Afghanistan was sitting next door to Pakistan.

There was a lot of speculation whether Ambassador Holbrooke’s mandate should include India. From the American point of view, the decision not to include India was correct, because a special envoy whose chief responsibility is Pakistan cannot effectively broker with India.

Q. Why is the United States reluctant to play the role of a mediator between India and Pakistan on Kashmir dispute?

A. The US believes that without the strong support of both India and Pakistan no such effort could succeed. India hates the idea of third-party intervention. The US has urged both countries to work things out directly on their various problems, including Kashmir.

Q. In your book, you mention the element of lies in diplomatic relations. Do both the countries lie to each other? What have been the biggest historic lies told to each other?

A. In American court rooms when you are sworn in as a witness, you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth or nothing but the truth. “Nothing but the truth” is the easiest standard to meet while “the whole truth” is the hardest standard to meet. Neither of the governments has met the standard of telling the whole truth. We have, on a number of occasions, withheld things from one and other.

Sometimes, Pakistan has also fallen short of the standard of “nothing but the truth.” For example, when President Musharraf came to the United States and was asked about Daniel Pearl, he said he was “sure” that Pearl was alive. Afterwards, it became clear that Daniel Pearl was already dead and it seemed likely that Musharraf actually knew this. He may have considered that as the right thing to do in protecting Pakistan’s security interests.

We need to understand the impact lies have on both sides. An American official who believes he has been lied to takes this as a real insult to his intelligence and friendship with the other side.

Having lived in Pakistan, I would say it is almost impossible that no one in the army knew that Osama bin Laden was living in Abbottabad.

Q. Are there any phases in the US-Pakistan relation where you find Pakistan successfully influencing American policies?

A. Yes. Pakistan achieved some of its objectives by applying American cultural traits. One instance is Pakistan’s success in 1999 in obtaining a refund of the money it had paid for F-16 aircraft. The Pakistani diplomats based their argument to the United States on the concept of fairness —- which is very important in US culture— and hired a lawyer to file a lawsuit against the US government. Everyone accuses the Americans of being overly legalistic but this time the Pakistanis turned the tables. They used their understanding of US procedure and culture to obtain a result that was very important.

Q. Which US government in the history would you rate as the most Pakistan-friendly?

A. There are a lot of governments which have done really important things for Pakistan. The whole China connection for President Richard Nixon was something that fit in his strategic framework. George W. Bush initiated the big aid program for Pakistan which was carried over by the Obama administration.

Q. What do you think are the causes of growing anti-Americanism in Pakistan?

A. Some anti-Americanism is the inevitable byproduct of the United States being the most powerful country in the world, which makes it a magnet for discontent. Anti-Americanism has become much stronger now because there is a widespread perception in the Islamic world and particularly in Pakistan that the Muslims are being treated with injustice by the west in general and the United States in particular.
This is intensified by the message that is being put out not just by the Islamic militant groups and right-wing parties but also by the government of Pakistan suggesting that Pakistan’s present troubles are entirely the fault of the United States. I don’t agree with that statement. I think frankly no country can blame its entire troubles on anybody else.

If enough important people in Pakistan pointing fingers at the United States for its domestic troubles then it becomes easier to believe that than to search for the roots of homegrown problems.

Q. Pakistanis complain that the Americans do not sufficiently acknowledge and appreciate their contributions in the war on terror.

A. The Americans value Pakistan’s contributions but they also feel betrayed by some of the moves Pakistan is making particular by continuing the relationship with insurgent groups in Afghanistan which are killing American soldiers. Both sides have some reasons to complain that the other side is not respecting their sensitivities. In order to achieve an American policy that is in some sense more responsive to Pakistan’s need, you also need a Pakistani policy that is more responsive to US needs.

Q. Will Pakistan and the US be able to avoid a third divorce this time?

A. I hope so. We have always tried to develop a strategic relationship in which the Americans and Pakistanis know that they are both together for long term. That is desirable but not feasible at the moment. A lot of damage has been done since the beginning of 2011. The fallout from the Raymond Davis case and the aftereffects of the bin Laden raid have left the army feeling embarrassed and the Americans feel betrayed. This is not a good recipe for both the sides embracing each other. What we need now is to have some smaller, more specific successes, and build on those. Perhaps the recent arrest of Al-Mauritani will be a good beginning. (Courtesy: Dawn.com)

This week, the Pakistani secret services and the Frontier Corps (FC) acted only when the American intelligence sources urged Islamabad to take action against a key Al-Qaeda leader Younis al- Mauritani whom the organization’s slain chief Osama bin Laden had entrusted the responsibility of targeting the economic interests of the United States, Europe and Australia.

Al- Mauritani was incarcerated from Quetta, the capital of the largest Balochistan province, with two other associates.  For many years, the Afghan and American governments had been urging the Pakistanis to take action against  the rogue Quetta Shura which is headed by Taliban’s spiritual leader Mullah Omar. The Shura presumably moved to Quetta soon after the exit of Taliban from power in 2002. Since then, Pakistan has denied the presence of key Taliban or Al-Qaeda leaders in Quetta. When the US administration became impatient with Pakistan’s lack of cooperation, it threatened to extend the drone strikes to Balochistan.

The recent developments have come at a time when the Pakistani army is still striving to recover from the embarrassment caused by the killing of bin Laden from its backyard. At the moment, the Pakistanis are in a weak position. Instead of provoking the United States to ask the tough question as to why Al-Qaeda leaders still find Pakistan a safe heaven, they prefer to comply with demands to take action against some of the leaders to remind that they have not fully unsubscribed to the war on terror.

Many in Pakistan call the war on terror as “America’s war”.

The recent arrests of three Al-Qaeda operatives is a delayed move to restore trust and repair almost broken ties between Islamabad and Washington. The United States and Pakistan will require a lot to restore mutual confidence and trust to continue to cooperate as partners. The Americans are still clung with the hope that Pakistan will one day provide a truthful and honest account about  Osama bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad. On their part, the Pakistanis strongly feel unappreciated by the Americans for whatever cooperation they offer to fight extremism. There is extraordinary resentment toward the drone strikes which the Americans argue target Al-Qaeda terrorists while  the Pakistanis criticize for civilian causalities.

What we don’t know with certainty,  at this point, how many more Al-Qaeda leaders are still hiding in Pakistan.

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani version of  Taliban connected to Al-Qaeda, avenged Monday’s arrests of three Al-Qaeda leaders with two massive suicide bomb blasts in Quetta. A twenty-one year old young Afghan national, as reported by the Pakistani officials, attacked the residence of a senior officer of the Frontier Corps (FC), which carried out the raid to detain Younis al- Mauritani, killing more than twenty people.

“The attack [which killed a top colonel of the FC and the wife of a senior officer] was intended to punish the FC for taking action against “our Mujahid brothers,” said a TTP spokesman.

The battle against Al-Qaeda continues as we prepare to mark the one decade anniversary of the tragic events of 9/11. While the Afghans were almost prepared to face the heat of the post-Taliban era, Pakistanis, on the other hand, had never predicated such a deadly fallout of the war on their land. They are very well-versed in providing statistics about the number of murdered civilians; drone strikes and the description of major terrorist events which rocked their country since 9/11. The Pakistani military, after ten years of deliberations, is still not fully convinced if there is a world without  ‘good Taliban” .

They await for the US forces to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. Afterwards, Pakistan seems confident that at least the “good Taliban” from these Islamic groups will eventually become its friends and agree to cooperate to counter any direct Indian influence in Afghanistan.

While Shahbaz Taseer, Taseer’s abducted son, lived in low-profile after his father’s assassination, his sister Shaherbano Taseer, a journalist, has emerged in Pakistan and overseas as a liberal celebrity. She has defended her father’s views on the controversial Blasphemy Law which prosecutes religious minorities in the Muslim majority nation.

Lahore is Pakistan’s second largest city and the capital of Punjab, the most populated province.

The Taseers say militant Islamic groups had been threatening them since the killing of the secular governor whose murder, ironically, drew plaudits from majority of the orthodox Pakistanis,  educated lawyers and journalists mainly those hailing from middle class families.

“Lets not spew hate against a nation of 180m ppl bcz of cruelty of a few.We love Pakistan.Inshallah my brave beloved brother will B home&safe,” Tweeted Shehrbano Taseer. In a second Tweet, Shahbaz’s optimistic sister said, “We have not lost faith. We love our country and are not going anywhere. Inshalla my brother will be home soon.”

Punjab has recently come under spotlight because of the rise of local militants known as Punjabi Taliban. The ruling Pakistan Muslim League of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif is not only known to have a soft corner for the Punjabi Taliban but it has also reacted angrily to the use of this term by terming it derogatory. Shahbaz Sharif, the province’s chief minister, once went to the extent of publicly begging the Taliban to spare his province because he said, “we share a common stance.”

“There is no such thing as Punjabi Taliban,” said Sharif, whose older brother, an orthodox Muslim industrialist,  is currently the country’s most popular opposition leader.

A prominent scholar Dr. Mumtaz Ahmed, who presides over Islamabad’s International Islamic University, says both the ruling Pakistan People’s Party of President Asif Ali Zardari as well as the Pakistan Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif covertly support the Islamic hardliners because of political compulsions. According to him, at least twenty-eight members of the current parliament belonging to both the parties were elected with the help of the votes offered by militant Sunni group Sipha-e-Sahaba.

No group has accepted responsibility for the fresh kidnapping, although the Taseers have registered a case at a police station in Lahore against ‘unknown’ people. Police in Lahore say the abduction does not seem to be  linked with kidnappings related to ransom because the kidnappers did not take away the victim’s car, laptop and i-pad.

Pakistan’s tiny minority of liberals, which predominantly comprises of the western educated rich urban families,  has faced the heat of the wave of Islamic radicalization that has engulfed the post-9/11 Pakistan. Besides Taseer’s murder, the liberals in Pakistan were further shaken after Islamic militants killed Shahbaz Bhatti,the only non-Muslim minister because of his support for the rights of the religious minorities.

A prominent investigative journalist, Saleem Shahzad, who leaked reports about Al-Qaeda’s penetration inside some sections of the Pakistani Navy was also kidnapped and murdered.  Many blamed the  rogue Directorate of  Inter-Services Intelligence for the reporter’s killing.

When the BBC asked the younger Taseer soon after his father’s murder if his family intended to leave Pakistan, he said, “We will live in Pakistan even if they [the extremists] kill us a hundred times. This is our country and we will continue to live here.”

Pakistanis do know that they have an image problem. They have a unique way of addressing this tough challenge. Many in Pakistan have historically believed that electing and appointing women to key posts can help improve the country’s unpopular international image. At a time when Islamabad’s diplomatic ties with Washington have reached their lowest ebb, Pakistan appointed its first female foreign minister, Hina Rabbani Khar. A former Minister of State on foreign affairs, Ms. Khar, 34, is the youngest foreign minister in the history of a country whose hostile foreign policy has backfired at home and created a mess in its neighborhood.

In the past, Pakistan had elected Benazir Bhutto as the first prime minister of the Islamic world. Likewise, Dr. Fahmida Mirza of the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was elected as the first female Speaker of parliament in the Muslim world. Ms. Khar is an addition to the precedent of electing women to present a softer image of the nuclear-armed Muslim nation. However, what makes these cosmetic changes unappealing for the people of Pakistan is the fact that all these women come from elite political families. Had Benazir Bhutto’s father, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, not founded the PPP in 1967 and served as Pakistan’s President and Prime Minister, Bhutto would perhaps never have become the first female Prime Minister. Similarly, had Ms. Mirza’s husband, Dr. Zulfiqar Mirza, not been a crony of President Asif Ali Zadari and the Interior Minister of the Sindh province, she would not have been elected to the coveted post of Speaker of Pakistan’s 342-member National Assembly.

The beautiful foreign minister has attracted much attention in the South Asian media for all reasons except for issues pertaining to foreign policy. Many look at her as an extremely inexperienced politician to hold such a significant position at a critical juncture of the the US-Pak and Indo-Pak relations and momentous developments in the Af-Pak region.

Pointing out the weak areas of the newly appointed foreign minister, respected political analyst M. Ilyas Khan of the BBC, noted: “Many doubters point to her young age – 34 – and the fact that she has a degree in hotel management. They suggest she may lack the stature and experience necessary for her new post, given the powerful military’s long history of involvement in Pakistan’s foreign policy. To be fair to her, countless men in this role have in the past failed to challenge the military’s perception of how to run the country’s foreign affairs. Will she fare any better?”

The young and inexperienced foreign minister initially had to face two major challenges. First, to discuss the India-Pakistan relations with her senior counter-part S.M. Krishna. Secondly, to fix the almost frozen relationship with the United States.

In spite of all the pressure and criticism, Ms. Khar did a splendid job during her first assignment in negotiations with the Indians, who agreed to continue the negotiation process with Pakistan. The foreign ministers of bot countries agreed, “to the continuation of the dialogue process and to the convening series of secretaries-level meetings on counter-terrorism (including progress on Mumbai trial) and narcotics control; humanitarian issues; commercial and economic cooperation; Wullar Barrage/Tulbul navigation project; Sir Creek (at the level of additional secretaries/surveyors general); Siachen; peace and security, including CBMs; Jammu & Kashmir; and promotion of friendly exchanges.”

The foreign ministers also agreed to meet in the first half of 2012 to review progress on the dialogue process.

According to the India-Pakistan joint-statement:

“The [foreign] ministers also agreed that people of the two countries are at the heart of the relationship and that issues of people-to-people contacts and humanitarian issues should be accorded priority and treated with sensitivity.

The ministers also emphasized promotion of cooperation in various fields including, facilitating visits to religious shrines, media exchanges, holding of sports tournaments and cessation of hostile propaganda against each other.”

At the end of the day, the success of Ms. Khar hinges upon the support she gets from the military establishment which actually determines the country’s foreign policy. The future of Pakistan’s relations with the United States, India and Afghanistan depend on curbing and containing the Pakistan-based Islamic radical groups, which may, with their terrorist activities, create a situation beyond the control of the young foreign minister.

A veteran diplomat, Ms Wendy Chamberlin was serving as the US ambassador to Pakistan when terrorist struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. A former High Commissioner of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Chamberlin is currently the president of Middle East Institute, a prestigious think-tank based in Washington DC. In an exclusive interview with Dawn.com, Ms. Chamberlin talks about the ups and downs of the Pak-US relationship and the war in Afghanistan.

Editor’s Note: This interview was conducted before the United States’ decision to withhold $800 million aid to the Pakistani military.

Q: Prior to 9/11 attacks, President General Pervez Musharraf was very unpopular with the United States. Post 9/11, he suddenly became Washington’s favorite man in South Asia. At that time, you were serving as the US Ambassador to Pakistan. How did the new relationship with Musharraf develop?

A: I had my first contact with Musharraf over a dinner weeks before 9/11. That summer, there was a terrible drought in Pakistan and a famine was developing in Afghanistan because the Taliban were preventing the United Nations from distributing food. The civil

war and the drought prevented food from reaching the Afghan people. Hungry people (from Afghanistan) were beginning to come into Pakistan and the Pakistanis would threaten to push them back across the border. So, I went to see the situation in a holding camp in the summer of 2001. I felt that Musharraf was a man who always wanted the best for his people.

Q: What were the first contacts like with Musharraf soon after 9/11?

A: I called on him. I was under instructions to ask him to give up support to the Taliban and join the United States with the determination to root out, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and those who support it. Thus, we started the conversation on how we could work together. The goal ahead was what Pakistan could do for us and vice versa. That year, we kept our promises to Pakistan. We lifted the Pressler sanctions and provided $600 million in immediate grant assistance that subsequently qualified Pakistan for World Bank loans, which otherwise Islamabad could not qualify for. Heads of different governments and states visited Pakistan for rest of the year. We agreed to help in the return of Afghan refugees.

Q: Did the dealings at that point take place with a harsh and threatening tone? Musharraf eventually revealed that the United States had warned to bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age if Islamabad did not cooperate in the War against terror?

A: That tone and conversation never occurred with Musharraf. I was not there but I think it occurred with the ISI chief General Mahmud [Ahmed] when he was in Washington DC after 9/11.

Q: Did the US government, at that point, imagine that the strike against Taliban, who had provided shelter to al Qaeda, would transform into a full-fledged war which continues even after ten years?

A: No one ever wants to go to war. However, we did realise (and you would be crazy not to realise) that societies change very slowly. Development is a process that lasts for several decades.

The truth is that Afghanistan has developed enormously since the beginning of the war on terror. No one is starving in Afghanistan today as they were in the August of 2001. Food is abundant, roads, schools and hospitals are built. Millions of children are going to school today in a country where only a few boys attended school. Many good things have happened in Afghanistan. The Afghan army is being trained.

This is not the end, rather only the beginning. The situation in Afghanistan is on right enough of a good direction. Now, we can withdraw our troops. Why should we stay in Afghanistan now?

Q: Do you think the war in Iraq diverted attention from Afghanistan?

A: Yes, it did. Personally, I did not support the war in Iraq. It diverted our attention from Afghanistan until President Barrack Obama got elected and brought our focus again on Afghanistan.

Q: Why did the Americans ditch Musharraf?

A: I don’t think we ditched Musharraf. I, like many Americans, still consider him a personal friend. In fact he has many close friends here. He is welcomed here. We had a reception for him at the Middle East Institute. It was the people of Pakistan who voted against Musharraf, not the Americans. The Americans pushed for democratic elections in Pakistan. But we did not push at all for Musharraf or his party’s (Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam) defeat.

Q: Ten years after the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, what would you consider the major successes gained in the Afghan war?

A: Well, people tend to forget what a sorry state Afghanistan was prior to the war. Our analysts judged that by the beginning of 2002, six million Afghans would be caught in the midst of a famine. Today, Afghanistan has had two elections, although not fully meeting the international standards, a government and its own health and education systems. There is international trade taking place inside Afghanistan. It is a country that has risen from the rubble and we should take all these changes as our biggest collective achievement in Afghanistan.

Q: In an article in Newsweek Pakistan, you had proposed the resolution of the controversy over drone strikes in Pakistan “in a way that recognises both Pakistan’s sovereignty and the national-security threat that extremists operating in northern Pakistan pose to the US and NATO”. Can you elaborate on your suggestion?

A: I support military, police and judicial actions that protect civilians. If and when the drones protect civilians against the people who bring violence to them, then it is an instrument of national security. What I would like to see is the forces of national security as the ones that protect the people of a nation.

President Obama has an obligation to protect his citizens and he is doing so. While, running for the presidential race, Obama had promised to his nation that he would do whatever it took to protect the American people against al Qaeda terrorism. The president kept his promise after his election by dismantling and weakening al Qaeda through drone strikes. He said he would do it and he did it. There was no surprise about his actions, including the killing of Osama bin Laden. In the same way, the Pakistani security forces are responsible for protecting the Pakistani people.

Q: Although the United States has historically granted assistance to Pakistani military and the military rulers, you belong to the breed of American diplomats who staunchly advocate civilian assistance for Pakistan. Why do you particularly demand civil assistance for Pakistan?

A: I think the American government must give balanced assistance in Pakistan. The civilian institutions in Pakistan are under-funded. The health care system and education sector are equally under-funded not only in terms of money but also in terms of knowledge, capacity and technology. The United States should be a part of any assistance that goes to the people of Pakistan to build public institutions.

I believe the American assistance should go to the most destitute and the weakest. My thoughts are always evolving. I think the best way to make use of the American assistance is to create jobs because if you have many businesses, people become employed and they can build their own lives. I am looking for entrepreneurship programs and enterprise funds, for example, that encourage Pakistani middle class instead of the truly wealthy and the military. I would like to see the American funds going in that direction to benefit the ordinary people of Pakistan.

Q: You have called for a “compact relationship” between the United States and Pakistan. What is that supposed to mean?

A: In 2001, the understanding the United States reached with Pakistan while starting a new epoch of cooperation was based on the promise that Pakistan would reverse its policy with regard to the Taliban and al Qaeda extremists. In return, we agreed to lift the sanctions, provide aid and restore military-to-military relationships. Pakistan asked for certain things such as not to deploy [international] troops on the ground. We agreed to this term hoping that Pakistan would not support al Qaeda and Taliban.

Over the years, that trust has been broken and it has been replaced with mistrust for which both the sides are a little guilty of violating that understanding. So, we need to seriously talk about it again.

Q: What do you think both the countries should talk about?

A: We need to reach a clear understanding. We [Americans] are not stupid. We know what is going on [with regard to the support provided to Islamic militant groups].

Q: But the Pakistanis argue that there is no change in America’s policy towards them. President Obama, they complain, is pursuing the same policies initiated by President George Bush vis-à-vis Pakistan by coaxing the latter to “do more”. Many say Washington’s unchanged attitude has compelled Pakistan to become a rebel ally in the war against terror.

A: That is not true. The policy has changed a great deal. For example, during President Bush’s time, Pakistan did not have a Kerry-Lugar Bill nor did it have a civilian aid programme. President Obama has been much more aggressive than President Bush in defending the American interests.

Q: Today, if you were the US ambassador to Pakistan again, what would you do to gain support for the controversial Kerry-Lugar Bill?

A: I would do what our Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, does. He was given eight billion dollars to improve the American education system. Instead of sitting in Washington DC and designing a plan and telling the school systems what to do, he put out a notice saying that he has eight billion dollars and he will spend it on the communities and schools that come up with the best ideas and plans how to spend this money. He called his strategy “Race to top”.

Likewise, I would go to Pakistan with the civilian aid saying that we know you need this aid. You need curriculum reforms so that your schools will lead to jobs. You need a better health system so that your children do not die before reaching the age of five. You need reliable and sustainable energy so that your factories continue production without any interruptions so that you sell your goods abroad.

We share the same objectives but we are not going to tell you how to do it. You should tell us how we can help you. We will partner with local (Pakistani) money on projects that you think are worthwhile or your design to accomplish the goals that we collectively wish to achieve.

Malik Siraj Akbar, a Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow based in Washington DC, is a visiting journalist at the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), a project of the Center for Public Integrity.

Terrorist violence has once more ripped through Mumbai, India’s largest city and its commercial hub.  Three bomb blasts, exploding over a span of 30 minutes in central and south Mumbai during the evening rush hour, yesterday killed at least 18 people and injured more than 130.  The bombings are the latest in a string of major terror attacks in Mumbai over the last two decades, including, most recently, the brazen November 2008 strike by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistan-based jihadi group, that resulted in more than 160 deaths and is often regarded as “India’s 9/11.”  In one way or another, all of these attacks have a connection with Pakistan, and an immediate concern is whether yesterday’s bombings will increase tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad, perhaps plunging South Asia into another dangerous military crisis.

So far, no group has claimed responsibility for the attacks and Indian authorities have not named any culprits.  Based on present evidence, the most likely possibility points toward home-grown Islamic extremists, specifically the Indian Mujahideen (IM).  Believed to be the latest incarnation of the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), IM has taken credit for a gruesome litany of bomb attacks over the last few years: the February 2010 bombing in Pune that killed 17 people; the September 2008 series of five blasts in New Delhi that killed over 30; the July 2008 series of 21 explosions that killed 56 in Ahmedabad; and the May 2008 series of nine blasts that killed over 60 in Jaipur.  SIMI is also implicated in the July 2006 train bombings in Mumbai that killed over 200 and in the September 2006 series of blasts in Malegaon that resulted in 37 deaths.

IM has sworn to avenge the deaths of some 800 Muslims in the February 2002 communal riots that occurred in Gujarat state, an event that remains a subject of acute controversy.  At least two of the explosions in Mumbai appeared to target the city’s prosperous Gujarati community.  Importantly, a day before the blasts, police in Mumbai arrested two alleged IM operatives who had supplied the stolen cars used in the blasts in Ahmedabad, the largest city in Gujarat, as well as in a number of failed bombing attempts in the Gujarati city of Surat a few days later.  According to media reports, Indian intelligence had gotten wind of a possible IM strike that was to occur this month, and the ingredients of yesterday’s blasts are similar to earlier bombings associated with IM.  It might also be noted that the Mumbai bombings fall two days after the fifth anniversary (July 11) of the 2006 train attacks.

IM and SIMI have been linked to the so-called “Karachi Project” (see analysis here and here), an anti-Indian confederacy involving Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, LeT and Indian jihadis.  Important light was thrown on the project by FBI interrogations of David Coleman Headley (formerly known as Daood Sayed Gilani), a Pakistani-American who pled guilty in March 2010 to charges of conspiring with LeT in the 2008 Mumbai attack.

A second, though less likely, possibility exists that the Mumbai explosions were the direct handiwork of LeT itself.  The group is one of the largest and most active jihadi networks in South Asia, and U.S. officials have even claimed that it is capable of attacks in the United States.  LeT was behind the commando-style assaults against the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi in December 2001 and in Mumbai in November 2008, as well as the March 2006 bombings that killed some 30 people in the Hindu holy city of Varanasi.  Intriguingly, yesterday’s explosions occurred on the birthday of Ajmal Kasab, the lone LeT operative captured in the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai and who is now awaiting a death sentence in an Indian prison.  (There was a great deal of media confusion yesterday regarding the actual date of Kasab’s birth, but the Washington Post reports that it is indeed July 13.)

A third, even more unlikely, possibility is that Mumbai’s Muslim-dominated criminal underworld was behind the blasts.  Mafia don Dawood Ibrahim and his lieutenant Tiger Memon are accused of orchestrating the March 1993 series of 13 bomb explosions in the city that killed 257 people and injured over 700.  The blasts are thought to be in retaliation for the Hindu-Muslim riots that occurred in Mumbai in the wake of the December 1992 demolition by a Hindu mob of a Mughal-era mosque in northern India.  Ibrahim and Memon are currently believed to be residing in Karachi, sheltered by ISI.

Whichever of these possibilities plays out, Pakistan will be implicated in some manner.  So, what’s the likely fallout for India-Pakistan relations?  And what is the probability that New Delhi could launch retaliatory military action? 

The December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament triggered a prolonged military standoff between India and Pakistan in which outright war seemed nigh and the possibility of nuclear weapons use appeared ominous.  (Concerned that tensions were reaching a boiling point in June 2002, Washington and London actually evacuated their embassies in New Delhi.)  In the wake of this crisis, the Indian army formulated the “Cold Start” doctrine, which emphasizes the threat of large-scale but calibrated punitive actions in order to deter Pakistani support for terrorist attacks, and has subsequently poured major resources into operationalizing the concept.  And most recently, following the U.S. commando assault against Osama bin Laden, Indian military leaders threatened to undertake their own cross-border raids.

Yet, there is little chance that New Delhi will use yesterday’s attacks as an opportunity to strike out violently at Pakistan.  As earlier posts argue (read here and here), India lacks the military capacity and political appetite for retaliatory operations.  Even as the Indian army and air force chiefs were rattling sabers in the wake of the Abbottabad raid, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh dismissed calls for strikes against terror camps in Pakistan as “a line of thinking mired in a mindset that is neither realistic nor productive.”

Another factor that will bear on Indian decision-making is that Pakistan-based jihadis have now slipped beyond Islamabad’s control and are pursuing their own unsanctioned agendas.  Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer who is an informal adviser to the Obama administration on South Asia policy, raises the possibility that the December 2001 attack upon the Indian Parliament was a jihadi effort to divert Pakistani military attention from the Afghan border precisely when bin Laden and hundreds of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters were fleeing out of Afghanistan following the Taliban regime’s demise.  Likewise, the November 2008 Mumbai assault may have been aimed at derailing the intensive back-channel peace negotiations that India and Pakistan undertook in 2004-07, which reportedly came tantalizing close to fruition.  Similarly, yesterday’s bombings could have been an attempt to disrupt the recently revived peace process between New Delhi and Islamabad.

A final factor inhibiting Indian desires for military vengeance is what Colin Powell a decade ago termed the “Pottery Barn Rule” of foreign policy: If you break it, you own it.  Given the infirmities of Pakistani state institutions, military action may inadvertently bring about their very collapse, begetting a maelstrom of chaos and violence that leaves Indian security even worse off than before.

A more probable casualty from yesterday’s bombings, especially if Pakistan’s hand can be demonstrably proven, is the just-restarted diplomatic negotiations between the two countries.  Prime Minister Singh has waged a lonely battle inside his Cabinet in favor of reaching out to Islamabad.  The next round of talks is scheduled to take place shortly but political pressure may force the Singh government to postpone them.

Has the war in Afghanistan spread into Pakistan? Yes; the circumstantial evidence certainly points to just that. The argument for, and fact of, war rests partly on the strategy through which combat in Afghanistan and Pakistan is being conducted. That strategy is precisely this-counterterrorism, which relies heavily on night raids and drone attacks;that strategy is now being applied in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, simultaneously, with some success. (The more reason to carry on in just that way.)

President Obama’s recent announcement to draw down 33,000 American soldiers out of Afghanistan by the summer of 2012 effectively announced the end of the counter-insurgency strategy championed for the last two years by a revolving set of field commanders and generals who have each slogged through the brutal work of quelling what is fundamentally a civil war. The counterinsurgency driven mission, adopted only in 2009, was nothing less than a broad charge of nation-building in the midst of a civil war-Pashtun tribes against all others– with all the costs and none of the benefits that the concept suggests. In all, 100,000 troops were pushed through into Afghanistan and were concentrated in Southern Afghanistan to help build the fabric of what some hoped would be a lasting peace in Afghanistan and to maintain whatever peace could be scrounged up on the ground there. At the same time the Obama administration re-engaged with Pakistan diplomatically, rearranging U.S. foreign policy toward a more results directed carrot and stick alliance. That alliance has deteriorated without relief, even while the civil war in Afghanistan has flared up without abating.

Now that civil war boiling over in Afghanistan is increasingly breaking out in its Eastern regions, the mountainous stretches of lawless terrain that border Pakistan. As part of their strategy the Taliban are increasingly attacking U.S. assets in the East. Consequently, the combat mission in Afghanistan is shifting to the East of Afghanistan, nearer, and into, Pakistan, the rough tribal villages and towns where the U.S. suspects al Qaeda leaders are hiding.

Consider that counterterrorism–the combat strategy consisting of night raids, human intelligence and drone strikes–is precisely the same strategy that was used in the infamous Abottobad night raid that netted Osama bin Laden. Leon E. Panetta, the man who’s taken on the mantle of U.S. Secretary of Defense, announced on his first visit to Kabul that he will work hard to wipe out al Qaeda. No doubt many of the military missions in pursuit of that end will be conducted inside the sovereign territory of, Pakistan. Given this there can be no question that the counterterrorism strategy will be increasingly operationalized in Pakistan, even if covertly, to find al Qaeda’s remaining leaders. In so far as the war in Afghanistan is a stalkers war, a predators war, the same war is being fought in Pakistan.

The U.S invaded Afghanistan with the mission zeal to find, incarcerate or kill leaders of al Qaeda leaders. Certainly patience in America for the ten year war in Afghanistan has faded. Much of the enthusiasm behind the combat mission in Afghanistan died away with the death of bin Laden. However if, like Osama bin Laden, other top al Qaeda leaders are found in Pakistan, Capitol Hill might strike out in great anger and formidable vengeance. For, even without discomfiting revelations that Pakistan is actively hiding al Qaeda, it is patently clear that the U.S. suspects that Pakistani military and political leaders have long-standing associations with al Qaeda. As a result, the U.S, intends to split the difference between its foreign policy goals and the domestic policy goals of the government in Islamabad, for whom intransigence is apparently the status quo policy.

This war-which will not answer to that name- is increasingly being laid out in strategic circles. The recent news that the U.S. is deferring aid payments to the Pakistani military, also suggests that the U.S. is counting to salutary benefits of keeping the Pakistani military in the dark.

Is this all too much, too wild a flight of fancy, a over-reaching takeoff from the mind of an American writer. Perhaps. But there can be little doubt that the teeming street in Pakistan is waiting for just such a war, fought in just the terms you’ve read laid out.