For those who have not yet read Andrew Sullivan’s Newsweek piece on Obama, published this past week, take note: it should be required reading for all U.S. voters as the country continues its journey toward the 2012 presidential election. Self-identified as a conservative-minded independent, Sullivan takes on the liberal, conservative, and moderate critiques of Obama’s term in office with dexterity — slashing some of the most pervasive arguments from both parties and all sides as fallacious, overblown, and often even factually or internally inconsistent — and maintains that the President’s character, record, and promise remain “grossly underappreciated.” But his main point is this: Obama has been pragmatic from the start, never focused on making short-term gains for which he can immediately and loudly take credit, but instead taking a long view strategy that entails slow, deliberate, unprovocative persistence and makes the changes he achieves more durable.

The point of Sullivan’s piece is not to deify Barack Obama. It is to ground an assessment of the President’s work in reality, which he does quite well. And it can remind Cuba watchers (myself included) of the character and nature of the man we’re considering when we discuss Cuba policy and Executive capabilities and actions.

First, it can help us to remember and recognize the sheer number of challenges the President faced when he took office. The economy was swirling lower into recession, with employment tumbling and our financial system threatening to pull the country into a true depression without swift and decisive action by the Executive and Congress. The U.S. global image was tarnished by our record on torture and by our bloated military presence and arrogant rhetoric. Yet still, not long into his time in office and even as he focused largely on addressing these and other pressing issues, President Obama fulfilled the only concrete campaign promise he made with respect to Cuba policy: he granted Americans unrestricted rights to send money to and visit family in Cuba. Even this small step was met with criticism, and attempts have been made in Congress to roll this policy back. But Obama has held his ground — quietly but firmly — threatening executive veto in order to make sure that his policy remains.

Second, we can recall the number of actors involved in affecting policy, which include, of course, not only the President and his administration but also the legislative branch and nongovernmental actors like lobbying groups, Cuban-American constituencies, think tanks, and others. The Executive seldom acts alone to change policy except, as we have seen, in situations deemed (correctly or not) particularly urgent and crucial to national security. Whatever the merits of changing U.S. policy toward Cuba, it simply does not fall into this category. And he does not yet have Congressional consensus on Cuba.

Third, we are reminded that Obama was not elected as a liberal crusader, but as a pragmatic, unifying reformist. Cuba policy may be ripe for change, but should the President unilaterally decree a set of changes called for by Cuba watchers, think tanks and other nongovernmental actors, he would have to willfully ignore a Congress that has been determined to avoid such changes. This is not his style. Ultimately, the repeal of “don’t ask, don’t tell” came from the President working with top military and defense leaders, and they (including Admiral Mike Mullen) came forward and made the case for doing away with the policy. Had Obama acted unilaterally, the repeal would no doubt have taken more heat than it did, would have met with more resistance, and might not have been durable in the long run. We can expect to see the same with further change to U.S. policy toward Cuba, or any changes put in place will be at risk of immediate opposition, counter-attack, and retaliation or repeal. Remember: pragmatic, unifying reformist, not crusader.

And finally, we are reminded that for Washington, Cuba has always been a long game. The basic tenets of our current policy toward the island have been around for half a century without yielding any measurable “success”. Any movement in broad perception, understanding and opinions has been glacial, but we are, however slowly, moving as a population toward a different consensus than that under which current policy was designed. And as more Americans learn about and visit Cuba under the current people-to-people travel regulations, the consensus can be expected to grow.

All of this does not have to make us more patient about seeing additional changes in long-standing U.S. policy toward Cuba. But it could help us see the long view. And perhaps the President is on track.

This year in Cuban history will be viewed as a significant one, having seen more economic change and reform on the island than some entire decades. But Washington’s response over the course of a year has proven insignificant.

Let’s start with a brief summary of the past year. In January, the executive branch of the U.S. government announced and published new travel and remittance rules with respect to Cuba, which increased possibilities for people-to-people travel. The effect has been gradual (OFAC in the Treasury is under-staffed and really quite slow), but greater numbers of cultural travel groups have received their necessary licenses and are leading trips to the island because of the new rules. February and March saw the trial of the infamous violent Cuban exile Luis Posada Carriles, and a historic step in the United States to prosecute him for terrorist acts in Cuba (he was later acquitted, to the chagrin of many). Alan Gross, the USAID contractor who remains in jail in Cuba, was sentenced in March to 15 years in prison — a relationship-damaging development that has continued to be a point of great contention between Washington and Havana. In April, the Cuban Communist Party held their Sixth Party Congress and reviewed the terms of a great number of economic reforms, which have proceeded in implementation during the rest of the year. Yet in October we stood nearly solo at the United Nations as the world voted against the U.S. embargo on Cuba. We put Cuba again on our list of “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” though the evidence to support the designation has withered. And here we are in December with President Obama still apparently convinced that the release of political prisoners in Cuba and the drastic economic changes underway are not enough to qualify as the “change” that would merit a significant bilateral discussion.

Asi es la vida for Cuba-watchers. The most unexpected event of this year was not a “happening” at all: it is the lack of movement forward in Washington on Cuba issues, and the continuing age-old tendency to cater to the conservative Miami Cuban-American base — a demographic that is changing and adapting its views to new developments in Cuba more so than Congress and the current administration, it seems. We expected more this year, despite the myriad of other global challenges faced by the United States. Washington has found time recently to take a fresh look at Myanmar, but still not at our close neighbor Cuba.

With all of the events of the last year, here in the United States the individual whose name has received the most airtime — and who therefore receives our designation of person of the year – is Alan Gross. Mr. Gross has been held in Cuba since December 2009 for distributing communications equipment illegally on the island; his sentence of 15 years in prison for crimes against the Cuban state was upheld by the Cuban Supreme Court in August. U.S. officials have tried unsuccessfully to argue for his unilateral release: many experts have suggested a prisoner swap (modeled off of the Israel-Hamas prisoner exchange of Gilad Shalit for hundreds of Palestinians — but in this case just one for five), but this has not gained traction in Washington. Mr. Gross remains imprisoned.

The forecast for 2012 is unfortunately only a tick higher than bleak in terms of the U.S.-Cuba relationship. This is unlike me; I know. But 2012 is an election year, and Cuba policy remains contentious politically. There is frankly very little reason for an administration seeking re-election to take the kind of political risk that drastic (necessary) Cuba policy changes entail. But the island’s future looks positive, at least for the moment. The population is testing out new economic reforms, the reforms are pressing ahead to the long-run benefit of a troubled economy, and foreign businesses and investors remain interested in Cuba despite recent crackdowns on corruption that have affected foreigners as well as Cubans.

We’ll be here as this all develops.

I was rather surprised to see a Cuba headline make it to the front page of the New York Times recently.

The surprise is not because the placement is unmerited: indeed, such attention is quite timely and relevant. It is due to the fact that Washington still seems to be deaf to all of the changes occurring this year in Cuba. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced her intention to visit Burma on December 1 and 2 to meet with government and opposition leaders: she will be the first Secretary of State to visit the country in 50 years, and is doing so as a risky diplomatic bet, saying that she wishes to “test what the true intentions are [of the regime] and whether there is a commitment to both economic and political reform.” Tim LaRocco takes a look at these reforms here, by the way, and readers are quick to point out the fragility of the current positive international perspective on the nation.

But whether they’re fragile, overblown, on-target or off, Secretary Clinton is going in to check it out. Hey, Secretary! Take a look closer to home, too!

The broad, sweeping economic reforms in Cuba are having what appears to be an impressive impact. Rhetoric is converting at long last into concerted action. Not only have real estate and automobile sales been legalized, and private farmers authorized to sell directly to hotels and tourist industries, but Cuban authorities are rooting out long-entrenched corruption in many sectors in favor of reform.

A fight against corruption is of course a necessary element in the overhaul of an economy fraught with redundancies and inefficiencies. And despite the fact that Cuba continues to be in desperate need of foreign investment, Raúl is taking a principled stance: the crackdown on corruption scrutinizes and punishes foreign offenders, as well as Cuba officials. His Attorney General, Dario Delgado, insists that: “This is not a campaign, what is happening in the fight against corruption… This is permanent. This is systemic.” Havana is changing the rules of doing business, and doing so with great gusto with an eye to the future, even in a difficult economic time.

It is worth noting that many onlookers are skeptical about the nature of the crackdown, and the fairness (or unfairness) with which it is being executed. Foreign small businesses operating in Cuba are reporting their fear of being particular targets. But for years, any corruption arrests were practically limited to Cubans. The current more comprehensive review as conceptualized is vital, even if it ends up deterring some foreign investment.

My advice, and a perspective shared by some of the top economists on the island (including Omar Everleny Perez): the government must simultaneously encourage increased foreign investment and make the rules of operating in Cuba quite clear — and then maintain those rules of the game — to bolster the positive economic impact that the many reforms coming into effect will have on the island and mitigate the otherwise negative impact that a corruption crackdown scare will have. It is not clear yet whether Havana recognizes this need.

Cuba is known for having many of its drivers using refurbished and rebuilt classic American cars from the 1950s driving alongside Cold War era Ladas across the entire island. Anyone who has visited Cuba often would have enjoyed a ride in both types of vehicles. Since the end of September 2011, Cubans can now buy and sell any type of car whereas previously only cars purchased pre-1959 would be able to be sold, and a licence would be needed to purchase other newer vehicles. This licensing regime was not simply for a driver’s licence, but a license to purchase an automobile. A car in Cuba was often treated as a lifetime investment due to the high costs for such items and the difficultly in obtaining licensing to purchase an automobile. It will be interesting to see how exporting and selling cars to foreigners might take hold in Cuba as many of Cuba’s classics would be of great interest in the United States, and the embargo and still standing restrictions between trade and investment between Cuba and the US have not entirely degraded, although Americans now can visit Cuba if they desire.

The announcement today on the ability for Cubans to now sell and purchase private property is of greater interest as the previous barter system restricted the flow of investment in private property and limited the rights of full ownership of their property apart from the state. The basis of capitalism was always the ownership of property and recognition of those rights, and while Cuba’s government remains committed to the ideals of socialism and the Revolution, the opening of Cuba’s property to all of its citizens is an important milestone indeed. Regarding the ownership of property by foreign nationals, the details have yet to be set in stone, but it seems that the tradition of partial ownership by Cuban nationals in conjunction with the foreign national as seen in many Latin American countries could become the norm in Cuba. The exceptions to ownership will be limited to designated areas more open to increased foreign investment, and perhaps other locations restricted to foreign investment. Indeed when the new property rules become active on November 10th 2011, a new era in Cuba’s post-Revolutionary era will change the island nation forever.

Today, however, I spent a frustrating day getting into the details.

It began without much fanfare. We decided to look into sending a small delegation of our Board members to Havana for meetings with high level officials and NGO leaders, economists and academics, U.S. Interests Section representatives, and so on. The idea is a good one. This kind of exchange is worthwhile and necessary, and promotes greater understanding on both sides.

I knew from following travel developments closely that this kind of travel should be licensable. Certain I would be able to work through the license process quickly, I jumped into a review of OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) policies and began to comb through recent interpretations of the changes announced in April by the Obama administration.

But for some reason, I could not make what I was seeing in the regulations correspond to what I was reading from analysts and other Cuba watchers. Where was the clause that said my delegation could pursue a people-to-people license?

The disconnect was infuriating. The legal jargon was mind-numbing. I became certain that my group simply would not be allowed to travel. For the first time, these travel regulations seemed to have placed an actual roadblock before me.

Only after hours of reading and sifting and reasoning about how I could make this work for my delegation did my very kind colleague John McAuliff finally save me by pointing out that the document here on the OFAC website (to which the site links throughout the application process) is out of date. THIS is the one I should have been looking at all along.

And what a huge difference it made! For my special case, the language shift is dramatic in 515.565(b), from referring only to students in accredited U.S. institutions to developing an entirely new clause to include my group:

OFAC may issue a specific license to an organization that sponsors and organizes programs to promote people-to-people contact authorizing the organization and individuals traveling under its auspices to engage in educational exchanges not involving academic study pursuant to a degree program.

Hallelujah! So the new “loosening” did appear to have some beneficiaries.

… But apparently we beneficiaries are in for a logjam: the approval process. We may fit within the regulations, but so do thousands of others that have applied in the past several months and whose applications remain pending at OFAC.

Cuban media finally published the outcome of last month’s Communist Party Congress: a list of 313 “guidelines” to shape economic reforms in Cuba. The items include mention of changes across a number of sectors and important issue areas—from ration books (and their gradual retirement) to private sector employment (not far beyond barbers but including family restaurants), and from enabling the sale of houses and cars to expanding the ability of Cubans to travel abroad.

The published items still do not describe methods for implementation, but they display the broad set of intentions that color Havana’s vision for the future. These intentions alone indicate and confirm a willingness for change that has now been clear for quite some time from Raúl Castro and Cuban leadership.

The last item (expanding the ability of Cubans to travel abroad) is of particular interest, as we’ve been tracking for months many of the other outlined reforms. This last is rather new on our radar. The Congress apparently agreed “to study a policy that will allow Cubans resident in the country to travel abroad as tourists.” No further details are given, and there is no mention of the infamous carta blanca (“white card”), the exit visa required and often denied to Cuban residents attempting to travel abroad. Under the current system, travel abroad is not illegal technically, but the series of requirements to depart prevents most Cubans from doing so.

So our immediate questions would be:

• What will happen to the carta blanca?
• What is the projected timeline for implementation of such a reform?
• What economic benefit does the Cuban government hope to take from this reform?

The benefits are not immediately clear. In fact Oscar Espinosa Chepe, one of the first Cuban economists to respond to this item, was skeptical: he argued that it could create similar chaos to the beginning of the Castro era when many Cubans were leaving the island. A lot of Cubans would depart for good, he argues, because of the current economic challenges in Cuba.

But it is no doubt more reasonable to accept that one cannot keep an island of people in lockdown.

(AFP/Getty photo)

The patriotic displays this weekend in Havana (military marching through the streets, fighter jets flying over, Cubans participating in parades and celebrations) marked the 50th anniversary of the Cuban victory at the Bay of Pigs—or as Cubans call it, Playa Girón—in 1961. The Bay of Pigs invasion is, of course, the infamous failed attempt by CIA-trained Cuban émigrés to attack the island and overthrow Fidel Castro. Their attack was easily quashed, and the defeat became a thorn in the side of Washington and Miami as the victory for Havana evolved into something of a national myth. It was the tangible success to which the Cuban government could point and laud the strength of the revolution and its ability to stand up to the island’s imperialist neighbor.

The story remains so, and on Saturday the country retold the story. Playa Girón was the fulfillment of a national dream, Cubans know, as the socialist revolution stood up to imperialism and won.

On the U.S. side, the recollection is a completely different stripe. While Havana celebrates the defeat of an imperialist’s mercenaries, in Miami the survivors of the 2506 Brigade reconvene to commemorate the day Cuban patriots fought against a tyrant in the name of democracy and freedom.

The divide is wide.

But beyond all this, the bigger story is going on in Havana’s Sixth Communist Party Congress, where President Raúl Castro opened the gathering with a speech heralding a new era in Cuba. Politicians, he proposed, should be limited to two 5-year terms (himself included). Castro admitted that his generation had failed to prepare a new generation of leaders, and this would assist in achieving that end. He called to eliminate Cubans’ monthly ration books, as this was a drain on the state budget, though he promised to maintain free health care and education. But freer private enterprise and entrepreneurship, within the greater socialist system, will help to boost Cuba’s troubled economy, he argued. The parameters of changes are yet to be defined; the goal of the Congress is to outline these plans to make the economy more efficient.

And so Cubans are trying to reconcile a celebration of the success of the revolution at Playa Girón with a simultaneous Congress designed to enact the most significant overhaul of the Cuban system in over fifty years, because the system as it stands—the system they are celebrating—actually is not working. Amid the parades and speeches there is recognition of that great paradox, and worry and wonder of what comes next.

It’s a long way off, sure.

But Jimmy Carter seems to be the guy for it.

The former US President began a visit to Cuba yesterday at the invitation of the Cuban government. Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez, in fact, was there to meet Carter on the runway when his plane arrived. Carter is the only president—sitting or former—to have visited the island since Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, so his visit is indeed remarkable, and even more so because this is his second visit. In 2002 Carter flew in and Fidel Castro himself was there on the runway to greet him and take him on a tour of Havana. Fascinating.

On this visit, Carter is observing and holding meetings under the auspices of the Carter Center to “learn about the new economic policies and the upcoming Party Congress, and to discuss ways to improve US-Cuba relations.” He has already met with leaders of the Cuban Jewish community and with Cuban President Raúl Castro. He is expected to meet with Fidel Castro, as well.

But wait; there’s more.

Carter is also meeting tomorrow with members of the Cuban dissident community. He’ll see all of the individuals we’ve regularly noted here, including Yoani Sanchez, members of the Ladies in White, and individuals recently released from Cuban prisons. He has specified that he is not in Cuba to have Alan Gross released, by the way, though he’s apparently raised the issue with Cuban officials. He is there, he says, to contribute to an improvement in US-Cuba understanding and US-Cuban relations.

Allow me to repeat that Carter is visiting by invitation of the Cuban government. In the past (and not so distant past), meeting with dissidents has been considered an attempt to undermine the Cuban state; meeting with both government officials and dissident groups while visiting Cuba has been frowned upon and has generally irritated the government. In fact, foreign visitors almost never meet with the Cuban opposition in order to avoid angering the government. But Carter does not seem to be upsetting Havana in the same way that others have. The rules do not appear to apply to him, or perhaps he’s been more transparent with his hosts about his intentions. On his previous visit in 2002 (which, in terms of US-Cuba relations, was even colder), Carter also met with 20 dissidents.

So…

How about a US envoy to Cuba?

(Photo credit: Annemarie Poyo/The Carter Center)

Twelve and a half (12.5) – in years, the period spent in prison thus far by the Cuban Five, known in Cuba as “Los Cinco Héroes“, who are serving life sentences in Miami for espionage (in other words, working for Cuba as spies with the aim to—you guessed it—bring down the U.S. government). Havana argues that the Five should be released immediately and unconditionally.

1,696,141 – the number of Cuban Americans in the United States.

0.55 – the percent of the total U.S. population that identifies as Cuban American.

250,000 – the number of Cubans abroad that visited the island in 2009.

Forty-nine (49) – in years, the time since Cuba and the United States have had normal diplomatic relations. Today, Havana holds a U.S. Interests Section and Washington holds a Cuban Interests Section, but these are very different from the Embassies that would otherwise exist.

Fifty and a half (50.5) – in years, the time some form of the U.S. embargo against Cuba (el bloqueo) has existed. The embargo was partially enacted in 1960, later solidified in 1960, and officially codified into law in 1992 with the Cuban Democracy Act. The U.S. embargo against Cuba is the most enduring trade embargo in modern history.

6.87 – the percent of total Cuban imports provided by the United States. This is despite the embargo, of course, and makes the United States Cuba’s fourth largest supplier of imports, after Venezuela, China and Spain.

Fifty-two (52) – in years, the period that the Castros have been in power in Cuba.

One hundred sixty-three (163) – the combined age of the Castro brothers, who are, respectively, 84 (Fidel) and 79 (Raúl) years of age.

677 – days until the end of President Obama’s term. The history of the neuralgic US-Cuba relationship is long and the years are daunting, particularly when compared to a short four-year term that’s already more than half over.

According to US Census data, Miami is home to the largest Cuban community outside of the island nation; the New York metropolitan area is in second place, with a population of over 141,000 Cubans. So New York City’s embrace of Cuban culture is no surprise, but the city’s ability to put on the upcoming “¡Sí Cuba!” Festival is reasonably notable. Without the changes made to travel restrictions and people-to-people exchanges since the days of George W. Bush, this Festival would not have been likely to occur. Indeed, ¡Sí Cuba! will be the largest Cuban arts festival ever held in the United States.

The Festival will take place against a still troubled backdrop, but one that continues to show hints of change. The latest travel changes were announced by the Obama administration only a few weeks ago. And yesterday, two more Cuban dissidents were released from prison, lowering the total number of dissidents imprisoned since the notorious Black Spring crackdown of 2003 (when 75 were arrested and jailed) to seven. Although these two prisoners were cited widely to have been released “against their will,” requesting that all other prisoners be freed before them, the Cuban government is very clearly and deliberately following through on its agreement to release—one by one—each of these individuals.

Progress does not, however, appear to have been made on the case of Alan Gross, the US government contractor that Cuban prosecutors now plan to demand spend 20 years in prison. Speculation in the United States continues on this case as Gross has now spent over a year in prison: some opined that the US government should have sent the infamous Cuban Five back to the island in a rough “prisoner exchange” for Alan Gross. Others question the Obama administration’s relative silence on the issue, calling inaction a “Gross mistake” and Cuba’s treatment of Gross “A Blow to Obama’s Soft Cuba Policy.”

On the Cuban side, of course, the long-standing embargo and the imprisonment of their cinco héroes is enough to say that relations with the United States remain strained.

And yet the Festival will go on, and for the advocates of increased people-to-people contact, cultural exchange, and open travel: that is something.

The Festival will be a two-month marathon of art and culture from Cuba, beginning on March 31, 2011.

(Photo: Cubillos/AP)

The President’s annual State of the Union Address traditionally focuses largely on domestic issues, and this year’s was no exception. But every speech the Executive gives is carefully crafted to touch upon a wide range of issues and, to some extent, to gracefully address contentious issues that are the source of party divisions. Although Cuba was mentioned a total of zero (0) times in the State of the Union, we can still break down a few of the President’s comments and analyze their content in the Cuba context.

Our success in this new and changing world will require reform, responsibility, and innovation. It will also require us to approach that world with a new level of engagement in our foreign affairs…

Indeed: in a lot of ways over the past two years, the United States has looked inward. Cuba policy has been allowed to languish in order to focus on more urgent issues, mostly domestic, like the financial crisis. But now, President Obama tells us, we will again actively engage with the world.

Just as jobs and businesses can now race across borders, so can new threats and new challenges…

The challenges we face as a nation are often transnational in nature, and must therefore be addressed by cooperation between nations. We’ve addressed several of these in the past year as opportunities (and pressing necessities) for US-Cuba cooperation: including on ocean and environmental issues, particularly in the context of the BP oil spill; on immigration and human trafficking issues; and on drug trafficking issues.

No single wall separates East and West. No one rival superpower is aligned against us…

The Cold War is over, and the policies of that era are no longer appropriate for new circumstances in a multipolar world. Our Cuba policy was designed to respond to Cold War dangers; changing circumstances call for changing policies.

This is just a part of how we’re shaping a world that favors peace and prosperity. With our European allies, we revitalized NATO and increased our cooperation on everything from counterterrorism to missile defense. We’ve reset our relationship with Russia, strengthened Asian alliances, built new partnerships with nations like India… This March, I will travel to Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador to forge new alliances across the Americas.

This administration is set on improving the US diplomatic standing in the world after an administration that did damage to America’s image abroad. We’ve “reset” our relationship with a number of countries, including non-democracies like China, but have not done the same with Cuba. In this hemisphere, many nations consider Cuba policy to be an easy way to improve favor in Latin America; most countries have normalized relations with Cuba and frown upon the US stance toward the island. The intent to engage with the world is there; in practice in the case of Cuba, it remains imperfect.

I had the privilege on Friday of attending a Pacific Council on International Policy luncheon discussion with US Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg, a thoughtful and intelligent State Department appointee who holds the position of Hillary Clinton’s top deputy. In the discussion a guest asked the Deputy Secretary an interesting question: why did the changes recently announced by the administration simply not go far enough, particularly for humanitarian organizations?

First, a bit of context. Last week, as many have already heard, the White House announced changes to regulations and policies governing certain travel to Cuba and non-family remittances to the island. The press release was titled “Reaching Out to the Cuban People”—no doubt an attempt to preclude Congressional opponents from claiming that the changes might be evidence of a soft stance against the Castro government. Democrat John Kerry, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, commended the decision, saying:

“These measures, expanding people-to-people relations between the United States and Cuba and allowing Americans to send funds to Cubans for private economic activity, open the way for the good will of citizens of both countries to forge deeper ties that are in our national interest today and in the future. This is an important step. If governments cannot solve the problems between them, at least they should get out of the way and let citizens work toward finding solutions.”

So that’s something.

The individual asking the question above had a point, however, as he explained that his organization—which has operated for years in Cuba offering humanitarian aid—has to receive approval from the Treasury, the State Department, and who knows who else every time they head to the island. For him, it’s a bureaucratic nightmare that does not change at all with the new announcement.

The Deputy Secretary’s answer was defensive. He reasoned that the administration had made several improvements to Cuba policy since President Obama took office, and that Havana had made no effort to return the gestures of good faith. The stalemate since then (and the reason for not having gone further with the current policy changes) Steinberg attributes to lack of reciprocation on the Cuban side.

Another guest then took the floor. He countered Steinberg’s comments, arguing that amending our Cuba policy is not, in fact, something that should require reciprocation to proceed. He even guessed that the Obama administration itself recognized this.

Following the session, a fellow guest wondered aloud to me: Who had the stronger point? I responded by email as follows:

[Guest one] is correct to some extent: the trouble he has to go through to provide humanitarian aid in Cuba, a goal fully aligned with US government intentions, is laughable (except that it isn’t terribly funny). But his snippy anger with the Deputy Secretary and Obama is perhaps misplaced, as much of the regulations that affect his processes are in place due to congressional legislation that the Executive and the State Department really do not have the power to tear down. Obama is taking a few of the moves he can take without the support of Congress (not all, so as not to upset Ileana Ros-Lehtinen into noncooperation on other issues, but some), but there remains in place an embargo that complicates all dealings with Cuba and that the executive can do little to affect.

[The Deputy Secretary], to some extent, is also correct: the Obama administration made very public and considerable gestures to Cuba in lowering the restrictions on travel between the two countries. And they called for a signal of reciprocation and were spurned by Havana. The Cuban government’s argument, basically, was that lowering of travel restrictions is not a sign of good faith when it is something that should have been done years ago — “a day late and a dollar short”, if you will — and as long as the crippling embargo remains in place they don’t see that a small country like Cuba owes a gesture in return. So [Steinberg]‘s argument is a little misleading. Sure, we can say that the US did something and Cuba did not actively try to reciprocate, but that’s missing the point. They’re not so much trying to spurn us as they are trying to tear down the same embargo they’ve fought for years and thus far have no reason to believe it will be loosened.

[Guest two] has the strongest argument, if I interpret his comment correctly. There are long-standing policies that have done the United States no good and have affected zero political change in Cuba, and the Obama administration fully admits this yet will not tear them down. That is what [Guest two] was saying: that in the case of some of the long-standing Cuba policies, no reciprocal action by Havana should actually be necessary. The United States simply needs to improve its policy, do away with that which is anachronous, and approach Cuba in a new way, regardless of what Cuba is doing (but certainly made easier by the fact that Cuba is indeed pursuing important economic changes and has been steadily releasing political prisoners for the past seven months).

In the end, then, we continue to be headed in the right direction, we just have not gotten very far.

Even as Washington refrains from commenting substantively on recent developments in Cuba, Fidel Castro continues to provide timely reflections on occurrences in the United States (not to mention internationally), underscoring his persisting importance as a public figure. The juxtaposition is striking: the open, transparent, democratic administration of the United States sneakily avoids the topic of Cuba and thus avoids addressing the inconsistencies in its Cuba policy, while the historically undemocratic Cuba seems to speak relatively openly about what goes on within its northern neighbor’s borders and beyond, and routinely highlights its solidarity with the American people and global populations.

The most recent of these commentaries was published today (written and dated yesterday) as one of Fidel’s Reflections, titled “An Atrocious Act,” reacting immediately to the Saturday shooting in Tucson of Representative Gabrielle Giffords and killing of several others, including John M. Roll, the chief judge for the United States District Court for Arizona. In his piece, Fidel condemns the shooting and compares it to something that might have happened in a war zone: “Any sensible person should ask themselves whether something like this happened in Afghanistan or in an electoral district in Arizona.” He further remarks that even those who do not agree politically or philosophically sincerely hope that no child, judge, congressperson, or citizen of the United States will be submitted to such a tragic death.

His words transcend the current tragedy and place the shooting in the larger context of a planet where “absurd and injustifiable” deaths occur by the millions—whether by war, poverty, or hunger—issues on which Fidel calls upon the Obama administration to share the world’s concern, including just across the border in Mexico.

The Obama administration retains the ability to similarly respond productively (at least in word if not in deed) to developments in Cuba and their larger context, but thus far appears to believe that “no comment” is the better policy.

(Photo: Reuters)

2010 was a year of ups and downs on the island, and in the US-Cuba relationship. Cuba watchers held their breath when US and Cuban officials met for discussions on migration and direct mail service, and when the two countries cooperated in the Haiti disaster relief effort. We began the year in a rush of optimistic fervor. But we let out our breath in a frustrated sigh when Washington again placed Cuba on its State Department shortlist of state sponsors of terrorism, when the hunger-striking dissident Orlando Zapata Tamayo starved to death in the Cuban prison where he was held, and when Cuba travel ban legislation with broad support died in Congress.

Cuba began to prepare for inevitable political succession, and to make higher-profile economic changes, particularly in the latter half of the year. The changes, along with the regime’s agreement with the Church to release a number of jailed individuals considered to be political prisoners, indicate important shifts in policy that have received no public response from the Obama administration. But neither has one of the sticking points of this year for Washington — the detention of U.S. citizen Alan Gross in Havana — been resolved. Indeed, it is not apparent whether any progress has been made in that case, and with the new balance in Congress and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen taking over Howard Berman’s seat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, it could well be a stalemate on both sides for another… who knows how long?

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Most Unexpected Event

In a socialist state, the inefficiencies and redundancies produced by guaranteed employment are old news. We’ve seen them in Cuba for years, perhaps intensified following the fall of the Soviet Union, but long apparent. That the regime would act swiftly and decisively to eliminate these redundancies — practically at the expense of one of the pillars of the socialist system — well, that was unexpected. Cuba began a process of laying off redundant workers this fall. Raúl’s point: “Without people feeling the need to work to make a living, sheltered by state regulations that are excessively paternalistic and irrational, we will never stimulate a love for work.” So the ‘love for work’ socialist axiom wins out over the ‘guaranteed employment by the state’ socialist ideal, the effect being a broadening of private sector opportunities. Fascinating stuff.

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Person of the Year

I was tempted to give this to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (person of the year indicates importance to the issues at hand: it is not a reward for good behavior). Ileana managed to crush the hearts of Cuba watchers in the United States following the November midterms as she strolled into the Berman position as Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, thus scrapping any chance of getting through some new Cuba legislation at the end of the year.

… Or indeed, next year.

But actually, Person of the Year in 2010 has to go to Fidel for his surprising reappearance and return to high relevance both in global debates and in domestic affairs in Cuba. He became a big political figure again, after he had been hidden from the public eye for years since serious illness nearly killed him. Over the summer he made media appearances, strolled around in public at schools and aquariums, and generally made his presence known again.

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What to watch in 2011

As we head into the New Year, we’ll continue to have one eye on Washington and the other on Havana. Will the Obama administration make moves independent of Congress? (Frankly, not likely. In order to be sure that Ileana cooperates on other issues, the administration is anxious not to upset her on this one). Will educational and cultural exchanges continue to expand beneath the radar? What will the new economic overhaul, to be debated and approved at the Communist Party Congress in April, bring to Cuba in the coming year? And how will the expanding private sector fare under these new circumstances?

We’ll be here. And we hope you will be, too.

Cuban President Raúl Castro has called the sixth-ever Communist Party congress—the first in thirteen years—to be held this coming April 2011 (when it will coincide with the anniversary of the battle of the Bay of Pigs, a complementary source of Cuban patriotism). So what can we expect from this congress? And what should we not expect?

In fact, the sole item on the agenda for the congress is a strategic reorientation of the Cuban economic model; such a singular agenda indicates broad recognition of the importance of economic reform to the island’s future. The Cuban government has circulated a five-year economic reform plan that can be expected to gain approval and ratification during the April meeting, and which emphasizes that preserving socialism on the island will be dependent upon opening the economy to more market incentives and non-state activities. This means greater levels of self-employment, but it also means that state and non-state actors will be more broadly able to determine production plans, resource allocation, financing and overall decision-making, all of which are now mostly determined by the state. These more active state roles in their activities will be replaced in favor of regulation and close monitoring.

But the 30-page document does not go into specifics, and without a particular path to follow, ratification in April will not mean swift nor coherent implementation of the plan’s tenets subsequently. Thus far we’ve only seen isolated, stop-and-go implementation of economic reforms in Cuba: greater consumer goods freedoms a few years ago, amendments to ration books last year, encouraged selective entrepreneurialism earlier this year, and the more recent broad state layoffs of redundant workers. We have little indication of how a large-scale transformation of the economy would look, and this new up-for-ratification document describing “guidelines for economic and social policy” does not provide blueprints.

We might have also expected that this first Party congress in thirteen years would address the issue of leadership succession, as Party leadership is the remaining official function Fidel has not formally passed to Raúl. Furthermore, many of the highest posts in the Party are held by individuals in their 70s and 80s, and this generational challenge cries out to be addressed. But questions of political leadership will be tabled for perhaps later in the year; this congress will cover only the economy. This underscores the fact that any planned and/or ratified economic changes cannot be mistaken for political changes, and this will not likely be lost on the Obama administration nor the hard-liners in the U.S. Congress.

(Photo credit: STR/AFP/Getty Images)