We need resolution; we need to resolve to be better, to define who we are as a country, set goals and fearlessly pursue them.

That said, we are not entirely without direction. In the last year we have ended the war in Iraq, tactfully supported revolution in the Middle East, and are attempting to streamline the defense budget and rebuild our anemic diplomatic resources. In the words of President Obama at the release of the Department of Defense’s new goals for 21st Century Defense—“our nation is at a moment of transition.” We need to seize this moment to decide what we want to represent to the world. And that is what I had hoped to hear last Tuesday.

Instead, the President stuck his head further into the sand, declaring that anyone who believes America is in decline “does not know what they are talking about.” Again, not to be tactless, but we have a Congress that was unable to complete one of its fundamental purposes (to pass a budget) and gave the rest of the world the impression that we have been practicing pluralism as long as the new Afghani parliament. Additionally, as a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for the last ten years we have been a nation that represents secrecy, invasion, and violence to the rest of the world. How can we expect to negotiate with Russia, North Korea, and Iran with our recent track record? How can we help nurture new democratic regimes when we pass legislation like section 1031 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2012? How can we return to a “normal” relationship with Pakistan, if we were never able to establish one in the first place?

To achieve our diplomatic goals, I propose that as a country we resolve to return to our revolutionary roots. I am not espousing a return to a reckless neoconservative agenda bent on forcing democracy on any and all who oppose us, but pleading for us all to recognize that we are in decline and that decline is the result of a fractured American identity. Until we decide on who we are as a country, we will not be able to devise a successful foreign policy—how can you plan an itinerary without knowing the destination? Our founding mothers and fathers fearlessly fought against a seemingly unbeatable foe to win their freedom and independence. We need to eliminate the doubt and paranoia epitomized in the NDAA 2012 and proudly declare we are Patrick Henry’s country of “give me liberty or give me death,” not another country that tells its citizens to “shut up.” It is my hope that armed with such an identity we can elect more responsible leadership, proudly present ourselves to the international community with a strong sense of our goals and values, and retake our position as “the one indispensable nation in world affairs.”

Mr. Seidemann, a legal expert on Palestinian-Israeli relations in Jerusalem, has spent the past twenty years lobbying senior-level officials in Washington, Paris, London, Moscow, Cairo and both halves of Jerusalem to broker a two-state compromise which would, if not cure the cancerous conflict eating away at Middle East relations, at least put it into remission.

Cause of Death

“A surge of settlement activity the likes of which we have not witnessed since the early 1970s,” Mr. Seidemann explained, has enabled me “to project with a fair degree of authority what the map of Jerusalem will look like in two years time.”

From that projection two “unprecedented” conclusions can be drawn, he said. First, “the map of Jerusalem will be so Balkanized geographically and demographically that a political division of the city will no longer be possible.”

Second, the White House is for the first time in history completely beholden to Israeli leadership. “During the last six months, my Prime Minister Netanyahu has said in word and in deed, ‘President Obama you have no leverage over me on this issue. I know and you know you will not engage me publicly and probably not privately on these issues until probably after the November elections. I am at liberty to act with impunity.”

The United States’ February 18, 2011 veto of “its own language” on a Security Council resolution condemning settlement activity, together with the defunding of UNESCO a day after Palestine achieved full statehood membership there, reflect Washington’s “colossal trend of self-marginalization” in the peace talks, he said.

Next week, Mr. Seidemann plans to tell President Obama in person that if he chooses to cow to Israeli pressure and ignore the settlements issue until after the November elections, “by the time you get back there may not be anything left to talk about.”

But “short of catastrophe,” he added, “there is not going to be any engagement from Washington until after the elections. And maybe then none.”

A War of Rebirth?

“What I have described here is a state of acute disequilibrium in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” Mr. Seidemann said while calling attention to the brewing war next door in Syria. “Having two states of disequilibrium simultaneously creates pressure along the tectonic plates. These things correct themselves in one of two ways: either a new robust political paradigm – which is not in the cards over the next several months – or an armed conflict. I have a feeling that there is a war waiting to break out there to realign things. It just hasn’t decided where it will break out and over what.”

Photo courtesy of REUTERS/Ammar Awad (A general view of a Jewish settlement known to Israelis as Har Homa and to Palestinians as Jabal Abu Ghneim is seen near Jerusalem November 16, 2011. Israel said on Tuesday it will invite bids soon for constructing 814 homes in occupied land it considers part of Jerusalem, pursuing a decision to speed up building in settlements after Palestinians won full membership in the U.N. cultural agency).

REUTERS/Deborah Gembara – Detainees participate in an early morning prayer session at Camp IV at the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay

On New Year’s Eve, President Barack Obama signed into law the post-9/11 practice of detaining terrorist suspects indefinitely without charge. Shock and awe waves rippled through the blogosphere in response to the move, not least because Obama had threatened to veto an earlier version of the bill. Other grumbles included its lack of temporal or geographic limitations, which signaled to some the potential for military detention of anyone, anywhere, anytime.

But despite congressional approval of the well-worn practice, most rights wonks don’t expect any significant change in the frequency or type of indefinite detentions going forward. They do, however, maintain that the practice breaches international humanitarian law and undermines counterterrorism efforts.

One such expert, Martin Sheinin, professor of international law and UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism from 2005 to 2011, spoke with me about the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and its potential to derail US counterterrorism efforts.

The War on Law

To put the controversy in context, Mr. Sheinin explained why Washington supports indefinite detention:

“The NDAA builds upon the well-established rule in international humanitarian law (law of armed conflict) that during an international armed conflict combatants, i.e. soldiers of one of the states involved in the war, can be detained as prisoners of war until the end of hostilities. When there is an international armed conflict and when someone is a combatant, then such detention does not amount to arbitrary detention that would violate international human rights law.”

When the “global war on terror” was waged following 9/11, he said, the possibility of indefinite detention was extended to terrorism, “far beyond genuine situations of international or even non-international armed conflict. And it extends indefinite detention to persons who are not combatants. For instance, persons who are held to have provided substantial support to terrorism would be subject to indefinite detention.”

Against that background, Mr. Sheinan suggested several ways in which violating human rights in the course of countering terrorism can “backfire.” Rights violations can “add to causes of terrorism,” he said, “both by perpetuating ‘root causes’ that involve the alienation of communities and by providing ‘triggering causes’ through which bitter individuals make the morally inexcusable decision to turn to methods of terrorism.”

Further, “these kinds of legal provisions are always open for bad faith copying by repressive governments that will use them for their own political purposes.” Though such copying was found to be less common than expected, “repressive governments may do so for their own political purposes.”

“It is hard to see any practical advantage gained through the NDAA. It is just another form of what I call symbolic legislation, enacted because the legislators want to be seen as being ‘tough’ or as ‘doing something.’ The law is written as just affirming existing powers and practices and hence not providing any meaningful new tools in the combat of terrorism,” he concluded.

With Washington simultaneously fostering democratic transitions across the Middle East and North Africa and gambling on military exits from Iraq and Afghanistan, such “backfires” may well hamper development of the rule of law and respect for human rights when they are needed most.

I have certainly come to view the end of the year with some degree of dread. Earthquakes, tidal waves, and a slew of other worrisome events seem to make appearances just when we think we are done with the year, and 2011 has not disappointed. The sudden death of Kim Jong-il and the rise of his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, as his successor left US analysts scrambling. NYTimes correspondents astutely observed that 48 hours after Kim Jong-il died at 8:30 am on Saturday, neither South Korean nor American intelligence knew anything about the death. This is the second major intelligence failure of 2011 (remember Egypt?) and just one of many intelligence failures when it comes to US analysts keeping tabs on the goings on inside the DPRK. However, unlike the failure of US intelligence to predict the Arab Spring, I do not believe the unexpected death of Kim Jong-il and subsequent American ignorance of the event will cost US diplomacy the advantage.

The questions have been flying. Where does this leave bi-lateral negotiations for a resumption of six-party talks? Will the US continue its dialogue on food aid? What should we be hoping for in this transition? There are a number of articles, good and bad, available, which provide in-depth analysis on all these questions (here, here, and here). Yet, I believe there are some fundamental truths about the current situation in the DPRK that make complicated analysis unnecessary.

The Monday after the announcement of Jong-il’s death, reporters pelted State Department Spokeswoman Victoria Nuland with questions about the condition of the bi-lateral nuclear negotiations. While Mrs. Nuland tactfully answered “we have not made any decisions inside the U.S. Government on that question, nor have we made any decisions inside the U.S. Government on the question of another round of U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks.”

The truth of the matter is that for probably the next six months or more, nuclear negotiations have been “over taken by events” and any talks would not only be unrealistic but dangerous. Un needs to demonstrate to the military that he is a strong leader, especially when it comes to dealing with the United States.

If Un agrees to come to the table too soon, he might be perceived as weak by military leaders and be removed from power, especially if they believe he is moving towards any of the goals the United States has in mind.

One of the best things the United States could do for stability in the region is to continue its dialogue on food aid. The citizens of the DPRK are starving and Un will be looking for a way to prove to the ruling political military elite that he can deal successfully with the United States. Getting the United States to agree to provide food aid might help solidify his grip on power. This way, Un would demonstrate that he can successfully navigate negotiations with the United States, and if the United States provides the kind of aid discussed in a recent article in the Washington Post, the people who need the food most will more than likely receive it. Additionally, this could be a bridge between the US and Un in future negotiations.

What should be we hoping for in this transition? For now, hoping for a thaw on the nuclear issue would be foolhardy. The best we can look for in the short-term is a peaceful and stable transition, keeping a good distance during North Korean mourning (read power transition here). One of the worst outcomes for the United States would be a split in governance in the DPRK between those loyal to Un and a military ruling group. In the context of a nuclear DPRK, the possibility of two groups claiming power would be a nightmare scenario. As any negotiator can tell you, if you have two groups claiming legitimacy “spoiling” becomes a major concern. “Spoiling” occurs when a group seeks to hinder, delay, or undermine negotiations while at least one other party is actively engaged in settlement. If the international community was forced to deal with a fractured DPRK, nuclear negotiations would almost certainly be subject to this type of behavior. Who controls the facilities? Who controls the scientists? Etc etc. And though it is repugnant to support a leader whose father has been “routinely described as a belligerent dictator who is not interested in the welfare of his own people, in fact has killed and jailed millions of them,” it is in the best interest for all of us that Kim Jong-un’s accession to power be peaceful, stable, and secure.

The management of South Sudan’s political dynamics will be a vital indicator in measuring the country’s democratic progress. The SPLM, once Sudan’s political opposition movement with a military branch known as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), fought against the government in Khartoum for more than two decades. The SPLM is now the ruling party of South Sudan.

The SPLM enjoys broad support throughout the country. According to a September poll conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI), 91 percent of people who belong to a political party belong to the SPLM. Furthermore, 84 percent of respondents view the SPLM either “very favorably” or “favorably.” Such support is not surprising. South Sudanese view the SPLM/A as their liberators in the long struggle against the north, and according to some experts, it is considered treasonous to speak ill of the SPLM.

While the majority of respondents expressed favorability for the SPLM, their views regarding the necessity of political parties were less definitive. Thirty-eight percent of voters agreed with the statement that political parties create division and confusion and are unnecessary in South Sudan. This is compared to a small majority (53 percent) of respondents who believe political parties are needed to make sure the South Sudanese have a say in who governs them.

While the poll does not reveal the reasoning for this division, it’s clear that the South Sudanese majority is content with the SPLM and is divided on the necessity of political parties. Confident with broad public support, the SPLM-led government has made few efforts to encourage the organization of political parties. South Sudan’s administrative system of governance has remained unchanged since liberation, and the SPLM dominates cabinet positions and nongovernmental institutions across the country. The political parties that do exist are not well known, and some have failed to transition from a revolutionary platform to one that works within the democratic process. While South Sudan’s interim constitution includes political parties in the governing process, critics warn that the constitution is skewed to favor the SPLM and preserve its hold on power.

The United States, a lead mediator during the creation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, is a major investor in South Sudan’s government. Since 2005, the U.S. has spent $10 billion for humanitarian relief in support of the peace process and U.N. peacekeeping operations. In an interview with Voice of America, Susan Page, Washington’s first ambassador to South Sudan, emphasized the need for South Sudan to create “a democratic space to allow other political parties to openly express their views.” A major component of this will be enshrining the rights of political parties in the new constitution. The United States must urge South Sudan’s government to encourage a vibrant civil society via political activity. Having an engaged and active electorate puts pressure on the government to respond to the country’s needs. American NGOs such as IRI, which have had success in assisting political party growth in Africa (e.g. Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change), can facilitate this.

A crucial element of democracy is leaders’ acceptance of defeat when they have lost the confidence of the people. Too often in Africa, rebel groups have been successful in overthrowing autocracies, only to fall into the same pattern as their predecessors. Having amassed significant goodwill from the international community, South Sudan has the potential to be a success story. This opportunity must not be wasted.

“Human Security Is The Primary Purpose Of Organizing A State In The Beginning.”
– Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN

In the wake of the Arab Spring, and in light of the ongoing global economic disorder, world leaders would be well advised to examine their understanding of national security. Recent events paint a picture of national leaders who are wildly out of touch and hopelessly behind the principal national challenge of the 21st century – human security.

(Source: Newsweek)

In 2011, the world witnessed the sudden and total political implosion of a handful of states that up until recently were firmly in the hands of their autocratic rulers. There was much debate about how the warning signs and red flags were missed. Clearly, N. African leaders were out of touch and not able to sense the social fissures and stress points that indicated popular rage.

Though one of the core lessons of the Arab revolts is that super angry citizens now have virtual meeting grounds to vent, meet, organize and to act, the most memorable lesson of the revolts is that governments must provide for the legitimate needs of their people or face ouster. Authorities must quickly learn that protecting their people from state on state conflict or homeland attacks (i.e. Freedom of Fear), must be balanced with the human requirement for the basics, or what social scientists call “Freedom of Want” (think shelter, food, clean water etc.). In most societies, this need is satisfied when people are productively employed in the economy and basic goods/services are made available through a combination of social programs and a healthy private sector. Mubarak, Gadaffi, and other modern day pharaohs simply failed to effectively work with the ‘whole of society’ to deliver on their respective “Freedom of Want” promises.

From Pharaoh to Prisoner (Source: Newsweek)

As we prepare to start a new year, basic food prices across the globe remain at historically high levels and although great strides have been made in the anti-poverty fight, the numbers are still staggering.

• Approximately 9.2 million children under the age of 5 die each year, mostly from preventable diseases. That’s approximately 25,000 children each day.
• 69 million children are out of school around the world, a figure equivalent to the entire primary school-aged population in Europe andNorth America.
• Food prices have risen 83 percent since 2005, disproportionately affecting those in poverty who spend a higher percentage of their income on food.
• Daily disasters. HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria—all treatable diseases—claim the lives of over 8,000 people every day in Africa due to lack of access to health care.
• More than 800 million people go to bed hungry every day…300 million are children.

(Statistics are from the World Bank and the ONE Campaign)

To make matters worse, the global economic recovery continues to stall with very little sign that industrialized nations have a solid game plan to get the ball closer to the goal line. Sadly, even with this bleak economic reality, developing nations today account for the majority of arms purchases in the world, buying arms supplied mainly by the permanent UN Security Council members—the USA, UK, France, Russia, and China. Yes, I know what you’re thinking.

So while the international community and mainstream media focus their collective attention on containing the nuclear genie, nations that can least provide human security for their people purchase conventional weapons from the countries that claim to want world peace and social development.  Perhaps all should heed a warning from Thomas Jefferson who once said, “When the people fear the government, there is tyranny. When the government fears the people, there is liberty”.

Presidents and Prime Ministers — Fear And Respect Your People!

Under Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, women were, broadly speaking, given equal treatment. They were entitled to receive an education, pursue a career, dress as they pleased, smoke and consume alcohol. While Tunisian women who are less educated and financially well-off tend to be more conservative, many middle-class women make an important contribution to the country’s professional elite. Despite the rights afforded to women, Tunisia’s government was plagued by rampant cronyism, widespread corruption, and a president who looked only to tighten his grip on power. We saw how that turned out.

Now that Tunisia, the initiator of the “Arab Spring,” is in a governmental transition, many women are nervous that their freedom will be usurped by the new government. The constituent assembly elections held in October resulted in the success of al-Nahda, Tunisia’s Islamist party. Claiming 89 out of 217 seats, al-Nahda was the clear winner. However, as al-Nahda did not receive enough seats for an absolute majority, it formed a coalition government with the secular Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol parties.

A Tunisian casts her vote in la Marsa near Tunis, Sunday Oct. 23, 2011 (Credit: AP Photo/Hassene Dridi)

Under the Ben Ali regime, Tunisia was a secular state and political Islam was suppressed, often brutally. Following the regime’s demise, many welcomed a moderately Islamist government. In a poll conducted last May by the International Republican Institute, 54 percent of respondents approved of a secular government whereas 40 percent disapproved. Given the valued role religion plays in the lives of Tunisians, the election results are hardly surprising.

Rachid Ghannouchi, the Secretary General of al-Nahda, has pledged that his party will not restrict the rights of women and will pursue a moderately Islamist system of governance, much like that of Turkey. However, in a region where pledges of democracy and freedom often go unfulfilled, skepticism is warranted.

Following the collapse of the regime, Tunisians welcomed the political activity. Out of this rose the Salafist group Ansar al-Sharia (AST). Founded last April, AST promotes a radical interpretation of Islam without explicitly endorsing violence. AST has refused to engage in the democratic process, which it characterized as a violation of God’s primacy.

In the past few months, hardliners have taken their purist interpretation of Islam to universities. A few weeks ago, Salafists stormed a university in Tunis demanding that women wear the niqab (a full face veil) and that classes be segregated. Additional reports indicate that Tunisia’s new openness has encouraged radical Islamists to become more vocal in their ideology.

As one oppressive regime is ousted, Tunisians are free to be more politically active. A vibrant civil society is one of the main characteristics of a democracy, and Tunisians have rightfully taken advantage of opportunities for political engagement. However, the embrace of new liberties should not come at the limitations of others. Tunisia’s new government must ensure that for democracy to thrive, all Tunisians must be treated equally under the law.

As any student of the region will tell you, throughout its history, Afghanistan as a country has never been more than a loose confederation of competing tribal factions and ethnic groups. As a crossroads between Central Asia and the Middle East, Afghanistan has seen its share of invasions from Alexander the Great to our present U.S. forces, and served as a chessboard for the British and Russian empires of the 19th and early 20th centuries in their “Great Game.” Yet, in all that time, the people of Afghanistan united only when it became necessary to do so, in order to throw off the yoke of its foreign invaders. This then begs the question, are we on a fool’s errand?

During this election cycle, the topic of foreign policy has been featured in a number of Republican debates. Time and again, two major threats to U.S. and global security have been underscored–Iran and Pakistan. Afghanistan’s neighbor to west, Iran’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric and attempts to secure nuclear arms pose a growing area for concern. Bordering Afghanistan to the east, Pakistan already possesses nuclear arms and a chaotic decentralized government. Both countries exhibit either open hostility or marked indifference to the U.S. Both countries harbor extreme Islamic factions willing to use any means to advance their causes. Like it or not, Afghanistan appears poised to once again serve as a strategic chessboard.

In 2004, I served as the U.S. Department of State representative on a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in central Afghanistan. The job of the PRT was to bring some sense of order and stability to the region. To accomplish this, the PRT instituted a number of building and regional improvement projects, all the while meeting with local warlords in an attempt to get them to lay down their arms. My job was to sell the idea of central government to them. I soon learned how the Afghan people had survived for so long in the face of so many foreign invasions–they were the ultimate opportunists, saying whatever we wanted to hear in order to receive our largesse. All along, their allegiances never wavered from their tribes and ethnic groups. Central government meant nothing to them in their daily struggles.

Why then, do we think this latest attempt to form a national government will succeed? Hopefully, the generals in the field and policy-makers in Washington know the answer–it will not. History shows us the opportunistic culture of the Afghan people has served them well over the eons and despite our best efforts, chances are the Afghans will continue to do what serves them best. Any thoughts that the Afghans will not cozy up to whoever offers them the best deal after the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan, are naïve at best. Iran and Pakistan despite their bellicose natures, are still sovereign states subject to pressure from the international community. If we allow Afghanistan to again devolve into a lawless tribal region, this will allow those radical elements in Iran and Pakistan that we are so concerned with, to play out their nefarious machinations in an area free from any international leverage. We are damned internationally if we leave Afghanistan, and damned domestically if we do not. I only hope the current and any future administrations read their history books before deciding whether U.S. forces should remain or withdraw from the new Great Game.

Tunisia. With a homogeneous and well-educated citizenry, distaste for Islamist extremism, and recent free and fair elections, Tunisia stands the most to gain from the “Arab Spring.” A year ago in January, the Tunisian people disposed of former dictator Zine Abidine Ben Ali and, with some difficulty, set up a transitional government. In October, Tunisians took their first step toward democracy and voted in the national assembly elections, with the Islamist Al-Nahda party winning the most seats. Less than a month after the elections, Al-Nahda formed a coalition with the center-left and secular Ettakatol party and began to shape the interim government. In the new year, Tunisia’s primary objective will be the re-writing of the constitution and the transition from an interim government to one that will, after a quarter century, reflect the will of the Tunisian people.

Morocco. Despite widespread protests early this year, Morocco’s opposition movement was unsuccessful in transitioning Morocco from a constitutional to a parliamentary monarchy. Last July, King Mohammed VI introduced constitutional reforms, including the appointment of the prime minister from the political party with the most seats in parliament and giving the prime minister new powers, including the ability to dissolve parliament and make appointments. Last month, Morocco held parliamentary elections and, like Tunisia, the Islamist party—the Justice and Development Party (PJD)—was the clear winner. The PJD succeeded in claiming 107 out of 395 seats, considerably short of an absolute majority. As a result, the PJD will form a coalition with the nationalist Istiqlal party. Many in the opposition movement remain frustrated as they believe that this will force parliament to compromise meaningful democratic change. While some protests may continue into next year, the monarchy is still widely popular.

Bahrain. A Shia-majority country ruled by a predominantly Sunni government has resulted in major sectarian divisions. Last February, Bahrain’s youth-led opposition movement took to the streets, demanding democratic reforms. Their calls were quickly overshadowed by the country’s leading Shia opposition movement, al Wefaq and related entities. Bahraini security forces responded by violently suppressing the opposition, leading to dozens of deaths.

Crown Prince Salman has attempted to negotiate with the opposition movement on several occasions but has been quickly rejected. Al Wefaq refused to engage in July’s National Dialogue and in the special elections last October, which filled the seats vacated by al Wefaq members earlier in the year.

In November, the government-directed Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry gave a detailed account of the effects of the crackdown earlier this year. Bahrain is processing these recommendations and has pledged meaningful reform. The opposition has characterized the government’s vows to reform as meaningless.

Considering past attempts to overthrow the government—encouraged by the regime in Tehran—Bahrain’s opposition movement is likely to maintain momentum well into 2012 unless the government follows through on its reforms and ensures that they have a positive and noticeable impact on the Bahraini people.

Egypt. Amid weeks of violence and protests against Egypt’s military-led transitional government, Egyptians headed to the polls last week to cast their ballots in the country’s first free and fair elections. Since the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak last February, the military—credited with protecting protesters against regime brutality—has used a ham-fisted approach in restoring governance to Egypt. Promises for a speedy transition have not been kept, and the military has attempted to reserve special influences for itself, particularly over budgetary matters.

Last week’s first round of parliamentary elections took place among an explosion of violence when police cracked down on protesters in Tahrir Square. Despite this, 62 percent of eligible voters (9.7 million) cast ballots, making it the largest voter turnout in Egypt’s history. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party won 36.6 percent of the vote, while the hard-line Salafi Al Nour Party won 24.4 percent. The next round of elections will take place next week and the last round the first weekend in January. If the Islamists continue on their current trajectory, it is likely that they will control parliament. While the Muslim Brotherhood has pledged a moderate Islamist approach toward governance, women and minorities are fearful that the government will reduce their rights.

Libya. Experiencing one of the bloodiest uprisings in the “Arab Spring,” Libya witnessed a civil war that started in February and ended with Colonel Muammar Qadhafi’s death in October. When the Qadhafi regime began the widespread killing of opposition activists, the Obama Administration felt compelled to act—but only with the approval of the United Nations. In March, the U.N. adopted Resolution 1973 authorizing a no-fly zone over Libyan territory. After taking the initial lead in implementation, the Obama Administration quickly pawned the mission off on NATO, with the U.S. claiming the nonsensical role of “leading from behind.”

After a long summer of fighting that saw the opposition vacillate between gaining and losing ground, the opposition liberated Tripoli in August and captured and killed Qadhafi in October. As the Transitional National Council looks toward elections and the formation of a central government, it will face numerous security challenges, including spoilers looking to hijack the political process, weapons proliferation, and armed militias that operate independently of the interim government. The country’s interim leaders hope to hold parliamentary elections as early as June. As a country that has not held elections in more than four decades, the interim government is starting from scratch on election procedures. While 2011 saw the liberation of the Libyan people, 2012 will represent the success or failure of the new Libya.

Syria. Facing poor socioeconomic conditions and political oppression as in other Arab Spring countries, last winter, Syrians revolted against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. On February 4, Syrian activists initiated the country’s uprising against with a “day of rage.” However, it wasn’t until March when a government crackdown in Dara’a fueled the full mobilization of the opposition.

With widespread unrest throughout the spring and summer, the Assad regime has lost significant support from its neighbors and in the international community. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, though slow to denounce his former friend, has called upon Assad to step down and has provided significant support to the opposition. Last month the Arab League followed the United States and the European Union in levying sanctions against the regime. Currently, the Arab League is in negotiations with Assad to allow observers to investigate the brutality inflicted upon protestors. According to the U.N., up to 4,000 people have been killed.

The Assad regime is quickly losing influence, as many of its once-reliable partners have turned against it. The Sunni merchant class, which once profited off the regime, is starting to feel the impact of the sanctions and could soon abandon Assad. If the regime falls, the Syria’s once-suppressed Muslim Brotherhood is likely to fill the power vacuum and is considered by many as the heir to the regime. Despite its claims of moderate Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood is prone to double-speak. It’s unclear as to how a Shiite-dominated government would treat the minorities in Syria, particularly Christians, who often fare better under authoritarian regimes. It is becoming increasingly likely that in 2012 Syria will undergo a government transition. With power dwindling rapidly, the Assad regime is running out of options.

Yemen. Yemen’s uprising has escalated to the brink of civil war. Divided according to tribe, the country is split between loyalists to the regime and an opposition movement supported by General Ali Moshen, leader of Yemen’s First Armored Division and a regime defector. Despite President Ali Abdullah Saleh handing over authority to his deputy, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, last week, Saleh retains influence and maintains control over the regime’s security forces.

Since February, Yemen’s opposition movement has called for Saleh to step down. An attack on the presidential compound in June resulted in a wounded Saleh fleeing to Saudi Arabia. While away, protests continued but declined in momentum. In September, Saleh’s unexpected return reignited protests. Despite the embattled leader’s pledge to vacate power on three separate occasions, he continued to thwart the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) transition deal. It wasn’t until last month, when the GCC threatened with sanctions and the freezing of family assets, that Saleh agreed to a transition. While the GCC deal empowers Hadi to take over as interim leader effective immediately, it permits Saleh to keep his title until February’s elections. The opposition movement, which was not included in the formation of the deal, adamantly rejects it, as Saleh and his family were offered immunity from prosecution and the government will not be overhauled. In addition, Saleh still controls the security forces.

Yemen’s governmental instability has distracted attention from the growing terrorist threat. In September, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) occupied Zinjibar, the capital city of Abayan province. Forces are currently combating militants and have pledged to retake the city. The U.S. has acknowledged Yemen’s increasing attractiveness to terrorist activity. In October, Anwar al-Awlaki, the infamous AQAP propagandist and a high-value target, was killed with the assistance of Yemeni forces. While President Obama applauded the new transition deal, it is far from ideal and offers no guarantees to Yemen’s stability. With elections scheduled for February, Hadi stands as the only candidate and, according to the GCC deal, will run the country as a transitional figure until the next elections. With continued crackdowns, the opposition movement has made it clear that it will continue with its protests well into next year.

This project also implies transitioning to closer coordination in economic and currency policies in the Customs Union and CES and establishing a full-fledged economic union…Its natural resources, capital, and potent reserve of human resources will combine to put the Eurasian Union in a strong competitive position in the industry and technology race, in the struggle for investors, for the creation of new jobs and the establishment of cutting-edge facilities. Alongside other key players and regional structures, such as the European Union, the United States, China and APEC, the Eurasian Union will help ensure global sustainable development.

(Credit: New York Times)

Putin may want the bloc to be that competitive, but the conditions for it are simply not right. Here’s how several organizations assessed the would-be member states of his Eurasian Union against some of the other markets he identifies:

• Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index ranks government corruption in 178 countries around the globe. The average ranking of the five hypothetical Eurasian Union countries is 141. By contrast, the average ranking of the twenty-seven EU countries is 34, and just for comparison, the U.S. ranked 22nd.
• The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom ranks 183 countries according to their respect for various freedoms that support economic freedom and prosperity. The average ranking of the five hypothetical Eurasian Union countries is 117. The average ranking of the EU countries is 39, and the U.S. ranked ninth.
• The World Bank’s Doing Business report measures the ease of starting and operating a business in each of 183 countries. According to its rankings, the average rank for the five hypothetical Eurasian Union countries is 87. The average EU ranking is 37, and the U.S. ranked fifth.

The plague of corruption and bad governance alone is too great for the bloc to credibly challenge the likes of the EU or U.S., and there is no reason to believe that greater economic and political integration or internal competition within the bloc will lead to reform given that the component states all struggle with these issues similarly. Who in a Eurasian Union would be in a position to reform and encourage other members to improve their governance? It would have to be Russia given its power relative to the other states, but that is just not something the Russian government seems interested in doing.

Which brings us back to Russia and its troubled economy. Russia needs foreign investment and technology to develop its economy but is predicted to lose about $50 billion in capital flight this year out of an economy of about $2.2 trillion due to its poor business climate. In a great piece in the Financial Times, Philip Stephens blames this unfortunate situation on the backwards-looking tendencies of Vladimir Putin:

Russia is richer now, the beneficiary of soaring energy prices during Mr Putin’s first spell in the presidency. On every other economic measure – foreign investment, technology, the pattern of trade, the condition of the national infrastructure, or educational attainment – the clouds have darkened. Russia’s population is shrinking fast.

 

There were moments when it looked as if things might change. Dmitry Medvedev, who has kept the Kremlin warm for Mr Putin’s return, seems to have grasped the challenges of an economy defined by hydrocarbon riches, obsolete technology and capital flight. The good intentions have come to nought. Mr Putin is many things but he is not a moderniser.

Stephens rightly warns that the West should not revel in Russian decline since it would be far better off if Russia were an economically healthy and cooperative partner in global affairs. A weak Russia, he argues, will seek out new enemies to blame for its condition, sowing instability both abroad and domestically. This is an important observation because unlike the Obama Administration’s “Russia Reset” policy, it correctly identifies the internal condition of Russia and the politics of Putinism as the biggest sources of friction in the U.S.-Russian relationship, not American diplomatic style.

The takeaway from all this is that the U.S. should temper its expectations somewhat when it comes to U.S.-Russian relations. Grand concessions will probably not be returned in kind, and personal relationships are unlikely to produce meaningful benefits, but progress may continue to be possible in some areas, including commercial and security-related issues. There is room for growth from there, but that potential will depend upon how big a bogeyman Putin wants the West to be.

The tribute to the U.S. president symbolizes the Czech Republic’s respect and gratitude for the U.S. Czechoslovakia’s first president, Tomáš Masaryk modeled the country’s first constitution after the United States. According to former Czech President Vaclav Havel, Masaryk “sought to emulate America’s democratic experiment in his own country.”

While Nazism and Communism no longer pose existential threats to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the U.S. maintains close security relations with partners in the region. The U.S. was a major supporter of the Czech Republic’s membership to the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and has continued to maintain close military ties. In 2008, the Czech government signed a missile defense agreement with the U.S. that was expected to establish a radar shield in the Czech Republic. The missile defense system was part of the Bush administration’s attempt to counter the nuclear threat from Iran and North Korea. With missile interceptors based in Poland and a radar shield in the Czech Republic, American assets and our allies in Europe would be protected should the region be attacked.

Under the Obama administration, the Czech-U.S. relationship cooled. Washington’s resetting of relations with Russia has taken priority over strengthening security relations with NATO allies, particularly in CEE. President Obama’s middle of the night phone call to Prague in 2009, announcing his reversal of his predecessor’s missile defense system came as a shock and disappointment. According

Statue of the U.S. President Wilson returned back in front of the Prague main railway station.

to Sally McNamara, senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, the move was “a diplomatic loss and a major loss for America’s prestige on the world stage.” As Russia adamantly opposed the U.S. missile defense system, many in Poland and the Czech Republic felt their security was being traded for America’s warmer relations with their former foe.

The Czech Republic’s rebuilding of the Woodrow Wilson statue shows that warm sentiments between the allies still exist. However, the Obama administration must work to win back the trust of its Czech friends. Sending senior level administration officials (apart from the ambassador) would have been a smart diplomatic move. Unfortunately, this was overlooked. The Obama administration should not take its European partners for granted. Rather than resetting relations with his unreliable new friends in Moscow, President Obama should return to long-standing American partners in Europe.

It’s no secret that representing the U.S. abroad entails both risks and rewards. Ambassadors though are rarely in the news and rightly so- they are sent to represent their country, not make a name for themselves. I’m sure most people would be hard-pressed to name any ambassadors. If they are in the news it usually means something went very wrong or very right. Two recent news reports this week caught my attention, they show in stark contrast the variety of experiences our ambassadors face as they are out in the world. In the first, an American ambassador is thrown into a violent and potentially life-threatening situation. In the second, an American ambassador is sent to his ancestral homeland and creates a stir by showing them something very different than the stereotype they were expecting.

The U.S Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, is facing a difficult challenge. He must represent the U.S. to a regime that has lost legitimacy in the eyes of much of the world. The Arab Spring has sent thousands of Syrians into the streets demanding change and the government sent tanks to suppress the demonstrations. The ambassador, while careful to not overtly cross the government, has signaled American support for change by meeting with protestors. This, as you can imagine, has provoked a response. In the most recent example, the Washington Post reports that the ambassador faced an angry mob and was trapped for a time in a building:

Supporters of President Bashar Assad stoned the convoy of the U.S. ambassador to Syria as he arrived for a meeting with a leading opposition figure on Thursday, then pelted him with eggs and tomatoes and tried to break into the building while he was inside, the opposition activist and a U.S. official said. The American envoy was trapped in the office for three hours by the angry mob outside. Ambassador Robert Ford, an outspoken critic of Assad’s crackdown on the 6-month-old anti-government uprising, was unharmed and eventually escorted out by Syrian security forces, who showed up more than an hour after the attack began.

The attack, and the tardy response by Syrian security forces, is a sure sign that American encouragement for the protestors is not much appreciated by the Assad government. Despite the risk, the ambassador appears determined to press on.

In the second example, the U.S. Ambassador to China, Gary Locke, has impressed his Chinese hosts with his understated style and his willingness to draw on his own family history as a descendent of Chinese immigrants to represent melting-pot America. His quiet repudiation of the trappings of both office and ego have sparked debate in a Chinese society ever more aware of status  and inequality. As the Washington Post reports:

Gary Locke has been praised for his down-to-earth manner since becoming the first Chinese-American ambassador to Beijing. He’s also been denounced as a showboater, a neocolonialist tool and a traitor to the Chinese race. China’s bipolar reactions to Locke since his appointment last month are partly due to an unease among Chinese authorities — accustomed to lavish official trappings and distance from ordinary folk — toward a man who gets his own coffee and carries his own luggage. They also display often contradictory sentiments about race, nationalism, and what it means to be a person of Chinese ancestry.

Ambassador Locke is a living example of the American dream and offers the Chinese (ostensibly an egalitarian society) a unique example of American values.

These two ambassadors, sent to very different parts of the world, demonstrate the unpredictable nature of foreign affairs and the difficulties and opportunities they face as they represent the U.S. to the world.

Image Credit: Wikipedia – Hans Holbein the Younger: The Ambassadors, 1533

The gist of it seems to be that success in toppling Ghaddafi is being understood by some to retroactively validate Obama Administration policy in a few ways; one of these ways is that it is being seen as an example of the wisdom of not having a foreign policy doctrine. This is an unusual argument, so I’m going to examine it here in some detail.

We can begin with the words of The Guardian’s Michael Tomasky, who thinks that differences in the Obama Administration’s approaches to Libya, Egypt, Syria, etc. reveal a special insight into the workings of international relations:

Call it the doctrine of no doctrine: using our power and influence but doing so prudently and multilaterally, with the crucial recognition that Egypt is different from Libya is different from Syria is different from someplace else. According to the foreign-policy establishment, if you want to have a self-respecting big-D doctrine, you’re not supposed to recognize differences. The doctrine must guide all cases. But that is exactly the kind of thinking that has led—always—to tragedy…If the Obama Doctrine is nothing like those, so much the better.

For the record, it is Tomasky who thinks Obama’s foreign policy is trending towards relative greatness. David Remnick (who, among other things, authored Lenin’s Tomb, which is a really great book about the end of the Soviet Union that I recommend) made a similar case in a recent New Yorker piece:

Part of Obama’s anti-doctrinal doctrine is that it insists on the recognition of differences in a way that Bush’s fixed ideas did not. Complex as Libya was, and remains, Syria is infinitely more so. Qaddafi had been despised in the Arab world for decades; support in the region for his removal was hardly impossible to conjure. Bashar al-Assad is proving himself no less a despot, but Syria, because of its relationship with Iran, has ties to countries on the Security Council (Russia, for one) that Libya did not. Obama has tried to embolden the opposition; he has urged countries like Turkey to cut off trade, and pushed for tougher sanctions, to make it clear that displays of tyranny will not be without cost.

What is a doctrine? It’s not precisely clear how Tomasky and Remnick are defining the term, but from their arguments it can contextually be derived that they understand it to mean some sort of formal outlook that groups related challenges together and results, intentionally or not, in a standardized course of action for resolving them. This can be concluded by working backward from the fact that they think the principal problem with doctrines is that they prevent policymakers from “recognizing differences” between similar-but-subtly-different challenges, leading to cookie-cutter approaches to issues that require unique solutions. Tomasky’s and Remnick’s specific arguments are somewhat different, but they share this assumption.

The trouble is that this is not actually what a doctrine is or does. A much better description is furnished by Michael Green who discussed the subject in response to a similar article by Fareed Zakaria:

There is a difference between doctrine and strategy. Doctrines articulate aspirations for strategy and are therefore arguably expendable. Strategy is not. Small powers can go without grand strategies. Great powers cannot. Either the United States seeks to shape the direction of key regions like the Middle East and Asia, or it perpetually reacts to the initiative of revisionist powers and forces within those regions until friends and allies lose confidence and American preeminence is undermined. (Emphasis mine.)

Take an instructive historical example. President Harry Truman laid out his doctrine in a single sentence during an address to a joint session of Congress in 1947:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

Note how general this statement is. It doesn’t actually commit the U.S. to any specific course of action or suggest that all free peoples must be supported, although he did specifically request – and critically later received – Congressional support for aid to the Greek and Turkish governments in this speech. What it does do is delineate what the U.S. is for (free people) and against (attempted subjugation of free peoples by armed minorities or by outside pressures), and it is intentionally left general in recognition of the fact that every case is different, not in spite of it as Tomasky suggests.

What about the supposedly-rigid Bush Doctrine? In his memoir, Decision Points, Bush defines his doctrine in four points:

First, make no distinction between the terrorists and the nations that harbor them – and hold both to account. Second, take the fight to the enemy overseas before they can attack us again here at home. Third, confront threats before they fully materialize. And fourth, advance liberty and hope as an alternative to the enemy’s ideology of repression and fear.

Note here that the language is somewhat more restrictive than in the Truman case but still leaves extensive latitude to tailor policies to specific challenges. The U.S. is opposed to terrorists and their supporters and for liberty and hope. But there are many ways that idea can be actualized. What does it mean to “hold to account” a nation that engages in terrorism or harbors terrorists? In Afghanistan, it meant toppling the al Qaeda-friendly Taliban. In Libya, it meant negotiating an agreement with Gaddafi to abandon terrorism and his WMD program in exchange for normalized relations – an example of rewarding good behavior. In Pakistan, it meant accepting what counter-terrorism help the government was willing and able to provide and regularly pressuring it to do more. What does it mean to “confront threats before they fully materialize?” In Iraq, it meant toppling Saddam. In Iran, it meant uniting with the other four Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and Germany in a diplomatic effort to stop the regime from enriching uranium. Globally, it meant innovations like adding “strategic interdiction” to the DIMEFIL toolbox for countering WMD proliferation, and domestically it meant augmenting legal regimes and the capabilities of law enforcement to track threats within the U.S. borders. What does it mean to “advance liberty and hope as an alternative to the enemy’s ideology of repression and fear?” It meant promoting democracy in the Middle East in some cases, but it also meant launching a historic anti-HIV/malaria/TB initiative in Africa to help stabilize those crises, improve the continent’s future prospects and, in doing so, reduce its susceptibility to extremism. For all their concern about nuance, I’m not sure Tomasky and Remnick fully appreciate how flexible the Bush Doctrine was in theory or in practice.

There just isn’t any evidence to support this anti-doctrine argument that Tomasky, Remnick and others are advancing. It’s true that there have been differences between the Obama Administration’s treatment of Libya, Syria, Egypt and so on, but the same was true of each of its predecessors; there is nothing novel about this. What I think we are seeing here is that the supposed “success” of the Libya campaign is being used as a starting point for reframing the history of Obama Administration action on the Arab Spring uprisings as a series of calculated successes that resulted in the toppling of unpopular dictators when, in reality, things were quite a bit more haphazard than that at the time, and the events themselves are still in flux. The risk in all this is that it may create the impression that the U.S. mission was accomplished when the dictators fell when, in reality, it’s really only the end of the beginning. And that is why I put “success” in quotation marks above.

Ambassador Bosworth’s statement shows promise but also reflects an overarching problem in US Foreign Policy, best described by the lyrics of an Adele song: “if I can’t have you the way I want you, I quit.” It is often the diplomatic strategy of the United States to cease or drastically reduce dialogue with states that do not behave according to its expectations; until the US decides it wants something from that state. This is what US did during fifty years of relations with Pakistan and what it continues to do with North Korea.

Dr. Robert Carlin of CSIS captured this pattern perfectly in his March testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations committee:

“Our problems dealing with North Korea are not confined to one administration or party. In the deepest sense, they reflect our national inability, intellectually and emotionally, to understand how states work…Our difficulties are compounded by the fact that public discourse about the North in the US has long been crippled, condescending, irrelevant, and, like heartburn, episodic.”

In combination with domestic factors, the US’ approach has lead to a highly suspicious, defensive, and unresponsive North Korea.

If the events of the last year are any indication, it is clear the United States needs to change the way it approaches diplomatic relations with intractable cases like North Korea. Another portion of Ambassador Bosworth’s remarks on July 29 points toward a smarter approach. According to the Ambassador, if North Korea is ready for “improved relations with the United States and greater regional stability” then the United States is open to talks.

Creating an open dialogue is key for the future of the US’ relationship with North Korea. By finding overlapping interests to begin a dialogue the US can start to build a relationship, if not trust, with North Korea. Creating a stable dialogue would help solve one of the greatest obstacles the US faces in its dealings with North Korea—a lack of intelligence on the conditions within the DPRK. This is not to say that the US should discontinue the six-party talks; it should continue to pursue a non-nuclear North Korea. If there is no dialogue, then there is no chance for even modest progress. However, it is important for US negotiators to realize that at this point nuclear weapons are too important a part of the North Korean foreign policy strategy to give their weapons up any time soon.

In sum, the US should seize this opportunity to begin to build a new dialogue with North Korea. While it might be “talking for talking’s sake”, creating a channel for exchange will increase the US’ knowledge of North Korean thinking and build a basis for negotiations in the future. Hopefully, this will prove an effective model for US diplomacy and the US can move away from its current approach of “if I can’t have you the way I want you, I quit.” It might work for interpersonal relationships, but lets hope our nation can advance past the diplomatic strategy of twenty year-olds.

Operation Unified Protector, NATO’s mission in Libya met its initial objectives of grounding Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi’s air force and hindering its capabilities to harm civilians, but it has highlighted the alliance’s most exposed weaknesses. As former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates pointed out in his speech in Brussels, “While every member of the alliance voted for [the] Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission.” Secretary Gates laments, NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance, and as witnessed in Afghanistan there is a distinct division between those allies who sacrifice blood and treasure in combat operations and those who sit and watch.

In his comments to BBC Radio 4, Rasmussen acknowledges that while Operation Unified Protector is a European led operation, it could not be carried out without the support of the United States. Both Rasmussen and Gates emphasize that much of this is owed to drastic defense cuts taken by European allies. As it currently stands only the United States, United Kingdom, France, Albania and Greece spend the 2 percent of GDP benchmark on defense.

European defense cuts have clearly weakened Europe’s security infrastructure. However, as Secretary Gates decries Europe’s military downgrade, the US must be careful not to follow its European friends to the precipice of military decline. Currently, United States plans to cut billions in military spending. Proposed cuts according to James Carafano, Ph.D. and Jim Phillips at the Heritage Foundation, include stealth aircraft, carrier battle groups, and amphibious capabilities—precisely the assets that made conducting the mission in Libya possible. The US message to Europe must not be one of “do as I say, not as I do.” The US must not scold Europeans for their inadequacies and then follow in the same lemming-like pattern.

The United States was a reluctant leader at the beginning of the NATO mission to Libya, and many resent NATO’s European allies for their lack of leadership and commitment. These have always been challenges of the alliance. However, in the midst of a poor economic environment and the operation in Libya, these challenges are exposed and prove worrying for international security. There are few alliances that can boast NATO’s record of success and it is the key mechanism that binds transatlantic security. However, in order for this alliance to work, members must commit the resources to seeing its future success.