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	<title>Foreign Policy BlogsTag Archive | Africa | Foreign Policy Blogs</title>
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		<title>Why Obama’s visit is important for South Africa</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/06/10/why-obamas-visit-is-important-for-south-africa/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=why-obamas-visit-is-important-for-south-africa</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/06/10/why-obamas-visit-is-important-for-south-africa/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Jun 2013 21:56:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Scott Firsing</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Barack Obama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Obama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US foreign policy]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=78487</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#160;
As Barack Obama is about to embark on his historic tour of Africa, many South Africans are asking why it should matter to them. There are numerous reasons why a visit from the President of the United States is an historic occasion.
First, the U.S. helps save South African lives. Since ...]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;</p>
<div id="attachment_78488" class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 610px"><img class="size-full wp-image-78488" alt="South African Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs is leading Barack Obama on a tour of the court in 2006 during his visit in SA. Photo courtesy of the American Embassy in South Africa." src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/Obama-in-SA-e1370901079356.jpg" width="600" height="348" />
<p class="wp-caption-text">South African Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs is leading Barack Obama on a tour of the court in 2006 during his visit in South Africa. Photo courtesy of the American Embassy in South Africa.</p>
</div>
<p>As Barack Obama is about to embark on his historic tour of Africa, many South Africans are asking why it should matter to them. There are numerous reasons why a visit from the President of the United States is an historic occasion.</p>
<p>First, the U.S. helps save South African lives. Since 2004, Washington has committed more than $4 billion to combat HIV/AIDS in South Africa, making it the largest American investment for HIV/AIDS worldwide. At one point over the past decade, U.S.-supported NGOs provided treatment for approximately 80 percent of all South Africans on HIV/AIDS drugs, and American programs paid staff salaries for more than 20,000 health workers.</p>
<p>In 2012, money from the U.S. President&#8217;s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) program totalling $500 million provided antiretroviral treatment to 1.7 million South Africans. Moreover, it was U.S. government monetary assistance, combined with funds from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the South African government, that supported scientists in finding two HIV-infected women who produce antibodies capable of neutralizing and killing 88 percent of known HIV strains, which may eventually help lead to a cure.</p>
<p>The U.S. also helps save lives through the training of South African military and law enforcement. The U.S. military frequently trains and supports South African military in various fields like peacekeeping and maritime security. This cooperation will be further strengthened in July when Exercise Shared Accord 11, a joint military exercise, takes place to improve South Africa’s capacity to conduct humanitarian operations. Additionally, Washington contributes $2 million a year in training and support to bilateral law enforcement programs.</p>
<p>Employment is another crucial area where the U.S. assists South Africa. There are more than 550 U.S. companies operating in South Africa, employing thousands of locals and providing more than $9 billion a year in foreign direct investment. The U.S. Agency for International Development also recently contributed to this job creation endeavour by making $150 million in funding available to more than 300 small and medium enterprises, which could potentially create more than 20,000 jobs in South Africa.</p>
<p>We could analyze the economic data until the cows come home, but most importantly total trade between the two countries is around $22 billion, with 97 percent of South African exports entering the U.S. &#8220;duty free&#8221; due to the African Growth and Opportunity Act.</p>
<p>South Africa is a popular tourist destination for Americans as well. Visitors from the U.S. were South Africa’s second biggest overseas market in 2012, after those from Britain, with tourist numbers up by 13.6 percent (to 326,643).</p>
<p>Lastly, both countries understand the power of education and have been working together on this crucial issue since 1994. Last year, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the $500 million Opportunity Grants Program for disadvantaged South African students to study at American universities. South Africa is also a popular &#8220;study abroad&#8221; destination for American students. In 2011, South Africa was the 12th most popular destination for American students studying overseas, with 4,337 enrolled in South African higher education institutions.</p>
<p>With that said, the real future of U.S.-South Africa relations could possibly lie in the energy sector. America already helps supply electricity to thousands of South Africans, but this could grow to millions via $2 billion in credit guarantees for the development of the renewable energy sector, as well as a $805 million loan to Eskom for the purchase of engineering and management services related to a new coal-fired plant.</p>
<p>However, the U.S. is after the &#8220;big boy,&#8221; or the future of South African electricity, via nuclear power. We might have a better sense of their chances after the Nuclear Industry Association of South Africa and South Africa’s DTI complete their industry mission to the U.S. in July. If that proves fruitless, there could be U.S.-South Africa cooperation on the shale gas front. It is a rapidly increasing source of natural gas in America due to availability and improved technology, albeit a controversial one due to environmental concerns. South Africa has a major sedimentary basin containing thick organic-rich shales, making it the fifth largest country in the world in terms of estimated recoverable resources.</p>
<p>The bottom line is that the relationship between the two countries is one that significantly affects the lives of South Africans. Although Obama’s visit is more ceremonial in nature, these trips, like Bush’s in 2003 and Clinton’s in 1998, are a strong indication of the value the U.S. places on its relations with South Africa and help pave the way for a more prosperous future for both countries.</p>
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		<title>Masai Ujiri: The Path to Becoming the First African NBA Executive</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/04/26/masai-ujiri-the-path-to-becoming-the-first-african-nba-executive/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=masai-ujiri-the-path-to-becoming-the-first-african-nba-executive</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/04/26/masai-ujiri-the-path-to-becoming-the-first-african-nba-executive/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Apr 2013 14:35:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Daniel Donovan</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Basketball Without Borders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boko Haram]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Denver Nuggets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Masai Ujiri]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NBA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sharia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zaria]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=76664</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/04/26/masai-ujiri-the-path-to-becoming-the-first-african-nba-executive/masai_ujiri/" rel="attachment wp-att-76748"></a>
Masai Ujiri took an unconventional route to the pinnacle of National Basketball Association (NBA) team management. Now he is watching his Denver Nuggets&#8217;, a team he built in just three seasons as general manager, attempt to make a run at an NBA championship.
Ujiri grew up in the central northern region of Nigeria, in the ...]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/04/26/masai-ujiri-the-path-to-becoming-the-first-african-nba-executive/masai_ujiri/" rel="attachment wp-att-76748"><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-76748" alt="masai_ujiri" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/masai_ujiri-e1366986850198.jpg" width="600" height="400" /></a></p>
<p>Masai Ujiri took an unconventional route to the pinnacle of National Basketball Association (NBA) team management. Now he is watching his Denver Nuggets&#8217;, a team he built in just three seasons as general manager, attempt to make a run at an NBA championship.</p>
<p>Ujiri grew up in the central northern region of Nigeria, in the city of Zaria, <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201210260589.html" target="_blank">a city that has seen its fair share of violence</a> as the ultra-conservative group Boko Haram has been blamed for killing several ethnic Igpos in an attempt to enforce sharia law in the area.</p>
<p>The meteoric rise of Ujiri is a testament of his perseverance, sacrifice and passion for the sport to ascend through the ranks of NBA executives.</p>
<p>While growing up in Nigeria, Ujiri, like many of the other youths in the country, maintained a passion for soccer. However, at the age of 13 he discovered basketball and never looked back.</p>
<p>Ujiri aspired to follow in fellow countryman and NBA star Hakeem Olajuwon&#8217;s footsteps as a professional player in the NBA. First he attended a prep school in Seattle, staying with a Nigerian family there. Upon graduation he attended a junior college in Bismarck, North Dakota where he played until transferring to Montana State. He left Montana State early to pursue a professional opportunity in Europe. After spending six years bouncing around European teams, Ujiri realized that his path to the NBA may not be as a player.</p>
<p>“At some point I started chasing this thing that is not there anymore,” he said.</p>
<p>Ujiri decided it was time to expand his basketball knowledge, develop contacts internationally and work with players from his native continent. Then, in 2000, <a href="http://espn.go.com/blog/TrueHoop/post/_/id/19475/masai-ujiri-through-david-thorpes-eyes" target="_blank">he first met player development expert David Thorpe</a>, who has worked with a wealth of NBA talent over the years. Thorpe first met Ujiri at a workout for a Nigerian NBA player, Olumide Oyedeji, who was a rookie for the Seattle Supersonics in 2000. Ujiri contacted Thorpe again just weeks prior to the 2002 Final Four and journeyed to Atlanta to meet with Thorpe. Ujiri used the weekend to meet as many people in the business as he could, utilizing this opportunity to create a catalyst to launch his professional executive career. Later that year he met former Orlando Magic and current Boston Celtics coach Doc Rivers and the two hit it off. Ujiri showed his contacts in the basketball world that stretched across Europe and Africa. By the fall of that year, he was a scout for the Orlando Magic. The <a href="http://www.cp-africa.com/2012/11/04/how-nigerias-masai-ujiri-rose-to-become-the-general-manager-for-an-american-major-league-sports-team/" target="_blank">first year was rough</a> as Ujiri was an unpaid scout that paid his own from tournament to tournament, often staying with friends.</p>
<p>From there his diligence and track record paid off <a href="http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=5503979" target="_blank">as he was offered a full-time gig</a> with the Denver Nuggets in 2003.  He stayed with the team until 2007 when he was offered a position as the director of international scouting in 2008 with the Toronto Raptors. He stayed with the team for a few years as assistant general manager in charge of player personnel, before returning to the Nuggets as their general manager in August of 2010.  With his hiring, he became the first and only African to run a major sports team in the United States.</p>
<p>Ujiri certainly rose through the ranks quickly and unconventionally. He has also run the Nuggets unconventionally. When he was hired he was held hostage by player Carmelo Anthony&#8217;s trade demands. He parlayed that potential disaster into a major haul for the Nuggets. Contrary to conventional NBA patterns, Ujiri has built a team designed around sharing and depth as opposed to a traditional playoff team built around a couple of players. His methods are paying dividends quickly.</p>
<p>The Nuggets for many years have been a fringe playoff team, but this year, after struggling through a brutal opening schedule, the Nuggets charged back and snatched the third seed in the ultra-competitive Western Conference. Now, locked in a heated battle with the Golden State Warriors, the Nuggets have a chance to advance in the NBA playoffs for only the second time in nearly 20 years.</p>
<p>Ujiri has not forgotten his homeland of Nigeria either. Every year he hosts two camps there, one for the top 50 players in Nigeria, sponsored by Nestle Milo and another for African big men, which he co-sponsors with Nike. He also leads an annual Basketball Without Borders Camp in Africa along with players, coaches and league officials to help promote the game on the continent.</p>
<p>Ujiri has become a pioneer and role model for anyone, not only in Africa, internationally that has a passion for sports and wants to enter the realm of professional scouting or team management. His story proves that determination and passion can lead to success no matter how long the odds are. Furthermore, through all of his success, Ujiri has not failed to give back to his homeland and his people with the sport he loves.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Obama&#8217;s 2013 Africa Visit</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/04/11/obamas-2013-africa-visit/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=obamas-2013-africa-visit</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/04/11/obamas-2013-africa-visit/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2013 15:37:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Scott Firsing</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[american foreign policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mali]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Obama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Africa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=76141</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[It was a story that many people missed. United States president Barack Obama met with four African leaders in Washington in late March 2013: President Sall from Senegal, President Banda from Malawi, President Koroma from Sierra Leone, and Prime Minister Neves from Cape Verde.
A positive step in the right direction ...]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="attachment_76142" class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 610px"><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/2013_0328_potus_africa_m.jpg"><img class="wp-image-76142 " alt="President Obama Meets With Leaders of Sierra Leone, Senegal, Malawi, and Cape Verde (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/2013_0328_potus_africa_m.jpg" width="600" height="314" /></a>
<p class="wp-caption-text">President Obama Meets With Leaders of Sierra Leone, Senegal, Malawi, and Cape Verde (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)</p>
</div>
<p>It was a story that many people missed. United States president Barack Obama met with four African leaders in Washington in late March 2013: President Sall from Senegal, President Banda from Malawi, President Koroma from Sierra Leone, and Prime Minister Neves from Cape Verde.</p>
<p>A positive step in the right direction for America in Africa, but it is time for Obama to return the favor and once again set foot on the continent.  It was announced late last year that Obama was planning a long overdue African tour sometime in 2013. As a specialist in U.S.-Africa relations and an American living in Africa, I remember thinking simply “Amen!”</p>
<p>There are dozens of reasons why Obama needs to be “here” but to only mention a few. Firstly, there has been a large amount of key personnel changes when it comes to American foreign policy and its African “leadership.” It would prove beneficial for these individuals to accompany Obama on Air Force One for the ride across of the Atlantic, which in turn would help smoothen the transition.</p>
<p>The individuals I speak of are John Kerry, who replaced Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State. The trip should also include the head of the State Department’s Africa Bureau, which until recently was held by Ambassador Johnnie Carson, who formally retired on 29 March.</p>
<p>Although no formal nomination has been announced, it is likely the new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs will have the surname “Smith.” Top guesses for Carson’s replacement include either Gayle Smith, a special assistant to Obama and senior director at the National Security Council, or Shannon Smith, the top staff member for Africa at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who worked closely with Secretary Kerry.</p>
<p>General David M. Rodriguez who assumed control of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) from General Carter F. Ham in Stuttgart last week, should also form part of the delegation. The General is Africom’s third commander, and he previously served as the Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces Command, and deputy commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan from November 2009 to July 2011.</p>
<p>Closer to “home,” America has a new ambassador to South Africa, Patrick Gaspard. Born in the DRC and known as a policy man, Gaspard is the former executive director of the Democratic National Committee and formerly the director of the Office of Political Affairs in the White House. He is viewed as being close to Obama, as is former U.S. ambassador to South Africa Donald Gips, who recently vacated his post in Pretoria. Mr Gips served as Assistant to Obama and ran the office of Presidential Personnel, overseeing the selection of 1000s of political appointments for the Obama Administration prior to serving as the ambassador to SA from October 2009 to January 2013.</p>
<p>The second reason why Obama needs to visit Africa is the economic ground America is losing, and not just to China, with its President Xi Jinping recently visiting Tanzania, South Africa and Congo Brazzaville. The fifth BRICS Summit held in Durban highlighted the influence that Brazil, Russia, India and others like Turkey have in Africa. This influence is strengthened through institutions like Beijing’s Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Moscow has a similar situation through its Russia-African business forum. Adding to this dangerous mix for America is African countries’ continuously wondering [and worrying] if Washington will extend its African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) when it expires in 2015.</p>
<p>Then there are the vast security concerns from Mali to Somalia to CAR to the DRC that needs to be discussed with key stakeholders. Obama has strengthened Washington’s efforts to stem the spread of violence on the continent. He recently sent 100 troops to construct a new drone base in Niger to target Al Qaeda. Obama also determined that Somalia may now receive U.S. military assistance meaning the Somali government is eligible for “defense articles and defense services” under American arms export and foreign aid laws.</p>
<p>Both the economics and security concerns boils down to good old-fashioned politics, and Obama needs to smoothen relations with individuals like new Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden represented Obama at Kenyatta’s swearing in ceremony in Nairobi this week.</p>
<p>Obama told the four African leaders back in Washington that he intended to continue to engage with them through a range of programs such as America’s agency for development (USAID) and their HIV/AIDS initiatives. “But we’re also looking for new models that can potentially improve our bilateral relations even more,” Obama stipulated.</p>
<p>Washington launched the doing business with Africa campaign late last year through its Department of Commerce. This led to a Doing Business in Africa Forum at the White House in February. The U.S. also has its upcoming AGOA forum that will take place shortly in Ethiopia, It will bring together over 600 government leaders and private sector stakeholders from the U.S. and Africa, as well as promote discussion on the future of AGOA. And then there is the ninth Biennial U.S.-Africa Business Summit run by the Corporate Council of Africa being held in Chicago on 8-11 October 2013.</p>
<p>Although this may sound like enough, it is not. Washington must launch &#8220;new models&#8221; for U.S.-Africa cooperation like Obama described. One might start with America establishing a strong FOCAC type setup that can help strengthen the current initiatives and therefore the political and economic dimensions of US-Africa relations.</p>
<p>U.S. Senator Chris Coons, the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs has also put forth realistic recommendations in his 7 March 2013 report “Embracing Africa’s Economic Potential” that should be carefully examined.</p>
<p>Overall, much has changed in recent months and one can see how the U.S. is losing ground on a continent that has an enormous amount of potential. I am not just talking about mineral and oil resources, but opportunities in financial services, tourism, telecommunications and retail. All of these sectors are further strengthened due to the continent being full of hard working and ambitious youth. If these opportunities are seized, it will undoubtedly have positive implications for the African people such as job creation and a growing middle class. This serves not only America’s political and economic interests, but ultimately its security interests as well.</p>
<p>President Obama, I look forward to hopefully seeing you in Pretoria soon.</p>
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		<title>Vulture Funds Curbing African Development</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/03/15/vulture-funds-curbing-african-development/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=vulture-funds-curbing-african-development</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/03/15/vulture-funds-curbing-african-development/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2013 16:30:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Daniel Donovan</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Corruption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Argentina]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IMF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peru]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UNDP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vulture funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[World Bank]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[zambia]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=74912</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In late 2012, vulture funds came to light with the bold <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/10/argentinian-naval-ship-ghanaian-port" target="_blank">seizure of an Argentine naval vessel, the ARA Libertad</a>, in the Ghana port city of Tema. After two-and-a-half months under the control of the U.S.-based vulture fund NML capital &#8211; run by billionaire Paul Singer &#8212; the International Tribunal ...]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="attachment_75029" class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 610px"><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/03/15/vulture-funds-curbing-african-development/vultures-jpg/" rel="attachment wp-att-75029"><img class="size-full wp-image-75029" alt="Vulture funds are preying on impoverished countries, hindering development" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/vultures.jpg.jpg" width="600" height="300" /></a>
<p class="wp-caption-text">Vulture funds are preying on impoverished countries, hindering development</p>
</div>
<p>In late 2012, vulture funds came to light with the bold <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/10/argentinian-naval-ship-ghanaian-port" target="_blank">seizure of an Argentine naval vessel, the ARA Libertad</a>, in the Ghana port city of Tema. After two-and-a-half months under the control of the U.S.-based vulture fund NML capital &#8211; run by billionaire Paul Singer &#8212; the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg ruled that the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/argentina-welcomes-home-ship-held-in-ghana-by-us-vulture-fund-8445151.html" target="_blank">seizure was illegal </a>and ordered the immediate release of the ship. While NML&#8217;s $1 USD billion suit against Argentina that prompted the confiscation of the vessel sheds some light on vulture funds, the <a href="http://www.jubileeusa.org/vulturefunds/vulture-fund-country-studies.html" target="_blank">devastating effect</a> they have on African nations undermines debt relief from the world financial institutes to the poorest countries on earth.</p>
<p>In 1996, a <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm" target="_blank">joint initiative</a> was launched by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to provide debt relief to Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). The goal of this project was to help the poorest nations manage their debt burden. In 1999 the initiative was improved to provide faster, deeper and broader debt relief. It was expanded again in 2005 to coordinate with the Millenium Development Goals (MDG), supplying 100 percent debt relief on eligible loans from the IMF, World Bank and African Development Fund (AfDF).</p>
<p>This program was designed to help HIPCs with debt relief in order to redirect funds that were previously appropriated to make payments to creditors <a href="http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/0,,contentMDK:21254881~menuPK:64166739~pagePK:64166689~piPK:64166646~theSitePK:469043,00.html" target="_blank">to now be utilized </a>in funding the state&#8217;s poverty reduction strategy, as well as fund development projects. Both which are important to evolving their destitute economies.</p>
<p>However, true to their name, vulture funds swooped in on the opportunity and feasted on the leftovers.</p>
<p>As a result of defaulted debts, a <a href="http://http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/african-legal-support-facility/vulture-funds-in-the-sovereign-debt-context/" target="_blank">secondary sovereign debt market</a> came into existence to help alleviate the growing risk associated with lending to sovereign states. Vulture funds prey on sovereign debt on the secondary market, paying pennies on the dollar to own the debt of a sovereign nation. Then, undermining the progress achieved under the HIPC Initiative, they refuse to enter into any negotiations for debt reduction, or any bilateral agreement negotiation with the debtor nation. Instead, the fund turns around and sues the state for the full value of the loan, plus interest, arrears and legal fees, attempting to recover 3-20 times the purchase price of the debt. These litigations are usually held in U.S. or European courts.</p>
<p>So what&#8217;s wrong with collecting the full amount owed by a debtor country?</p>
<p>Vulture funds undermine the exact principles that the world financial organizations and the international forum itself determined would be beneficial to the countries on the brink of potential economic collapse. By establishing the ground rules for debt relief, they created an infrastructure in which developing nations can play catchup with the rest of the world. But what good are debt reductions for development projects if a creditor will turn around and call the full value due for the sake of profit?</p>
<p>The greater concern is how often this devious tactic has paid dividends in the last 20 years. Twenty-five successful suits have been won by vultures, yielding nearly $1 USD billion. In addition, there are still numerous outstanding lawsuits between vulture funds and HIPCs.</p>
<p>Although two of the pioneer cases were against Argentina and Peru, most of them have targeted African nations, especially in more recent years. This trend is not likely to change as over <a href="http://fiftrustee.worldbank.org/webroot/data/DRTF_GOV_2.pdf" target="_blank">80 percent of all HIPCs are located in Africa.</a></p>
<p>Some people have argued in the past that <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jul/19/congo-victory-vulture-fund-hollow" target="_blank">vulture funds divert attention away</a> from corrupt governments and the campaign against them will not help the common people in impoverished nations. While corruption in impoverished nations remains a harsh reality, not all of the nations targeted by vulture funds are considered corrupt. In fact Zambia &#8211; a country that fell victim to a $USD 15.4 million dollar vulture lawsuit in 2007 &#8212; has been gaining significant progress in both <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html">economic advances</a> and <a href="http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results" target="_blank">transparency</a>. Furthermore, the <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/nov/15/vulture-funds-key-players" target="_blank">big players in vultures are billionaire investors</a> attempting to capitalize from the circumstances and add to their enormous wealth. It is hard to justify that the funds would be better suited in the pockets of rich westerners, despite the potential for corruption.</p>
<p>Finally, the funds themselves are not free from shady dealings or corruption. Most of the funds are very secretive regarding their ownership. Generally they are established in offshore tax safe havens such as the British Virgin Islands or Cayman Islands. Additionally, many of them are formed simply for the extent of one particular lawsuit and then dismantled. In one particular case a big player in the vulture fund game &#8212; Michael Sheehan &#8211; obtained the debt illegally from the Bosnian government and the former Bosnian Prime Minister is facing corruption charges based on the details of the transaction. With all the advantages in such a case, the financial organizations are still forced to resort to shady and underhanded tactics to obtain high returns.</p>
<p>Ultimately vulture funds undermine internationally developed programs for the sake of pure profit at the expense of the weakest economies on earth. While certain countries which have played host to vulture lawsuits in the past have <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jul/18/privy-council-vulture-fund-drc" target="_blank">begun to enact legislation</a> weakening the suits, there is no inernational unification on curbing vulture funds. However, if they continue to thrive, then money intended for trade or other creditors can be snatched from the hands of the country that owes the immediate debt. This only hurts HIPCs, which in turn, hurts Africa as a whole. Crippling development among the weakest countries only creates a larger rift between rich and poor, which will utlimately damage progress on the planet.</p>
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		<title>Online Collaborative Think Tank Tackles Transatlantic Issues</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/03/13/online-collaborative-think-tank-tackles-transatlantic-issues/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=online-collaborative-think-tank-tackles-transatlantic-issues</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/03/13/online-collaborative-think-tank-tackles-transatlantic-issues/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Mar 2013 03:10:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Reza Akhlaghi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[International Organizations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Atlantic Council]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Atlantic relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reza Akhlaghi]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=74894</guid>
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The debt crisis in Europe, anemic economic growth in the U.S., an uncertain future for NATO&#8217;s mission in Afghanistan with the year 2014 drawing closer, and growing cyber security challenges facing Western governments and multi-national corporations are some of the key challenges that deserve serious debate and ...]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/03/13/online-collaborative-think-tank-tackles-transatlantic-issues/ac-logo/" rel="attachment wp-att-74895"><img class="aligncenter  wp-image-74895" alt="" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/AC-logo-1024x324.jpg" width="590" height="186" /></a></p>
<p style="text-align: left;">The debt crisis in Europe, anemic economic growth in the U.S., an uncertain future for NATO&#8217;s mission in Afghanistan with the year 2014 drawing closer, and growing cyber security challenges facing Western governments and multi-national corporations are some of the key challenges that deserve serious debate and attention by the public and policy makers.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">Both from geopolitical and economic perspectives, nearly all of the above challenges impact the transatlantic alliance between the U.S. and Europe, an alliance that has endured many challenges for nearly seven decades. So it is perfectly understandable to see efforts aimed at strengthening this alliance and examining in a transparent manner the various challenges it&#8217;s facing.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><a href="http://www.atlantic-community.org" target="_blank">Atlantic-community.org</a> is one such organization. Based in Berlin, Germany and launched in 2007 as a project of <a href="http://atlantische-initiative.org/" target="_blank">Atlantische Initiative e.V.</a>, the Atlantic Community is an online foreign policy think tank focused on issues affecting transatlantic relations with &#8220;a mission to encourage open and democratic dialogue on the challenges facing Europe and North America.&#8221;</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">With an open platform to public policy discussions site members, who register free on the site, contribute op-ed pieces on a daily basis. The content, according to Atlantic Community&#8217;s management, is collected, edited, and put into executive summaries known as &#8220;Atlantic Memos,&#8221; which are then distributed to over 27 countries in Europe and North America. Every week the site offers weekly &#8220;theme topics&#8221; that discuss a particular issue during that particular week. This week&#8217;s theme is focused on security challenges in the north African region of Sahel under the title &#8221;Security in the Sahel: How should the United States and Europe respond to threats to peace and security in the Sahel region of Africa?&#8221; This week&#8217;s discussions on security challenges in the Sahel region can be found <a href="http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/security-in-the-sah-3" target="_blank">here</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">From policy recommendations to critical analyses of issues, contributors offer alternative views that are probably not easily found in mainstream media outlets.  The Atlantic Community has certainly the potential to become an online destination for lively discussions on a whole range of issues affecting transatlantic relations.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">
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		<title>A &#8220;So-Mali&#8221; Solution?</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/26/a-so-mali-solution/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=a-so-mali-solution</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/26/a-so-mali-solution/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 Feb 2013 20:57:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Tom Squitieri</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[9-11 attacks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[African Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Al Qaeda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[al-Shabaab]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Algeria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[aqim]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Black Hawk Down]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Burkina Faso]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Burundi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ECOWAS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[France]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[French troops]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kenya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Libya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mali]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mauritania]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Niger]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Robert Fowler]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rwanda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sahara]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somalia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tom Squitieri]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. African Command]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uganda]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=74246</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[ 
&#160;
With the French military intervention in Mali shifting to a more sustained action, the reality of the long, hard slog in the Mali region has triggered inevitable questions by diplomats, policy planners and many others as to what defines success – and what comes next? 
Most mouthed answer: “Somalia.” 
That’s correct.  The ...]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: center;"> <img class="size-full wp-image-74265 aligncenter" alt="3090240135" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/3090240135.jpg" width="600" height="337" /></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">With the French military intervention in Mali shifting to a more sustained action, the reality of the long, hard slog in the Mali region has triggered inevitable questions by diplomats, policy planners and many others as to what defines success – and what comes next?</span><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">Most mouthed answer: “Somalia.”</span><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">That’s correct.  The place where humanitarian intervention went bad in a major way, where Black Hawk Down became a symbol of how fraught Africa intervention can be that it scored America so badly that the U.S. sat back and watched Rwanda bleed and did all it could to avoid intervention, is now seen as the template solution for Mali.</span><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">This really does stop one in the tracks.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">Yet on occasion reality demands action. And the successes, as they are, are few and far between. </span><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">A classic failed state, Somalia was a hub and major enclave for al-Qaeda. The West, with African help, tried repeatedly to turn things around, and suddenly the right mix appeared. A combined military and diplomatic effort got democracy back in Somalia and al-Qaeda on the defensive. Earlier this year, the U.S. formally recognized the government of Somalia for the first time in more than two decades.</span><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">Success! At least for the moment.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">For years, Somalia looked similar to how Mali was in January. The al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab controlled a vast territory, was able to implement its harsh version of sharia law, and easily struck outside the country’s borders. But then al-Shabaab mishandled the 2011 drought that wracked the region, exacerbating the crisis by accusing humanitarian organizations of trying to spread Christianity then ejecting them from areas it controlled. Meanwhile, the U.S. developed a strategy for reversing al-Shabaab’s gains that included supporting African Union counterinsurgency efforts and recruiting Somali groups to </span><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">to function as proxies against the extremists, building an indigenous Somali intelligence network, and employing “decapitation” strikes (often employing drones) against al-Shabaab leaders.  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Calibri; font-size: small;"><a href="http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/01/16/us-official-mali-success-should-be-shaped-by-somalia"><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype;">http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/01/16/us-official-mali-success-should-be-shaped-by-somalia</span></a></span><b></b></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">Defeated in Somalia, al-Qaeda found Mali, which became the biggest territory held by al-Qaeda and its allies. “Al-Qaeda never owned Afghanistan,” said former United Nations diplomat Robert Fowler, a Canadian kidnapped and held for 130 days by al-Qaeda’s local chapter. “They do own northern Mali.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">That was before the French action. Yet al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, known as AQIM, still operates not just in Mali, but also in a 7,000-kilometer long ribbon of land that runs across the widest part of Africa and includes sections of Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Libya, Burkina Faso and Chad.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">Experts caution in assuming that what seemed to work in one part of Africa will work in another. It is difficult to suppress a group roaming around in the Sahara; also, unlike the focused militaries of Uganda and Kenya that played such an important role in Somalia, Mali’s neighbors are, in the best of times, fragile states with extremely limited political and military capacities.  The strong nations have yet to contribute troops. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: medium;"><a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201302250069.html"><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">http://allafrica.com/stories/201302250069.html</span></a></span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">That was highlighted over the weekend when more than a dozen Cha</span><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">dian soldiers were killed in clashes with al-Qaeda, the heaviest single incident losses by African troops since the campaign began six weeks ago. </span></p>
<p><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/24/us-mali-rebels-chad-idUSBRE91N09A20130224"><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; color: #000000; font-size: small;">http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/24/us-mali-rebels-chad-idUSBRE91N09A20130224</span></a></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">The Somalia success of the moment needs to be leavened with the yeast of recent history. For example, the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 appeared successful for a short time &#8212; that is, before the insurgency sparked.  Afghanistan burst as a shimmering success after the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance quickly displaced the Taliban following the 9/11 attacks, but preventing the Taliban’s resurgence has been elusive. Iraq, of course, is fraught with issues, despite the somewhat rapid fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">In some years, we may see that the current talk of Somalia as a template will appear every bit as wishin’ and hopin’ and thinkin’ and prayin’ as the talk in 2003 that the Iraq war was the ideal way for the U.S. to remove Middle Eastern dictators.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">Yet we like how one size must fit all, even if forced to fit. Other than the Philippines success right after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. antiterrorism schemes have fallen short.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">The U.S. African Command, independent since 2008, still does not have a physical home on the continent – no country will take it – but the U.S. is opening its third drone base on the continent, this time in Niger’s capital, Niamey. Military officials would like to eventually move it north to the city of Agadez, which is closer to the parts of Mali where al-Qaeda cells have taken root, but “not [it's] feasible at this point.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: medium;"><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/world/africa/in-niger-us-troops-set-up-drone-base.html?pagewanted=all&amp;_r=0"><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/world/africa/in-niger-us-troops-set-up-drone-base.html?pagewanted=all&amp;_r=0</span></a></span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">The jihadists already distribute tip sheets on how to avoid drones. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: medium;"><a href="http://www.indianapolisrecorder.com/news/international/article_3c7b6bae-7f66-11e2-a545-0019bb2963f4.html"><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">http://www.indianapolisrecorder.com/news/international/article_3c7b6bae-7f66-11e2-a545-0019bb2963f4.html</span></a></span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Palatino Linotype; font-size: small;">New page in an undefined war, new style &#8212; the question remains, new outcome? Conventional wisdom is often the drug of failure.</span></p>
<p>(Photo credit: PASCAL GUYOT / AFP / Getty Images)</p>
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		<title>The FPA&#8217;s Must Reads (Feb. 1-8)</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/08/the-fpas-must-reads-feb-1-8/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-fpas-must-reads-feb-1-8</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/08/the-fpas-must-reads-feb-1-8/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Feb 2013 20:17:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>FPA Administrator</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Azerbaijan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[COIN]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[counterinsurgency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[counterterrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hillz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Media revolutions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Texts from Hillary]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=73433</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/magazine/azerbaijan-is-rich-now-it-wants-to-be-famous.html?pagewanted=all">If They Build It, Will the Kardashians Come?</a>
By Peter Savodnik
 The New York Times Magazine
Azerbaijan is rich &#8212; oil rich &#8212; pushing one million barrels of crude oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipepline per day. Perched on the Caspian and with a massive energy sector, it&#8217;s no wonder it was ...]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="attachment_73439" class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 610px"><img class="size-full wp-image-73439" alt="John Brennan, President Obama's nominee to head the CIA, prepares to testify at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee on Thursday. [J. Scott Applewhite/AP]" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/brennan1_wide-73f1d0bd271f874205e4a4556dfd5c6c73f7fe28-s6-c10.jpg" width="600" height="337" />
<p class="wp-caption-text">John Brennan, President Obama&#8217;s nominee to head the CIA, prepares to testify at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee on Thursday. [J. Scott Applewhite/AP]</p>
</div>
<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/magazine/azerbaijan-is-rich-now-it-wants-to-be-famous.html?pagewanted=all">If They Build It, Will the Kardashians Come?</a><br />
By Peter Savodnik<br />
<em> The New York Times Magazine</em></p>
<p>Azerbaijan is rich &#8212; oil rich &#8212; pushing one million barrels of crude oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipepline per day. Perched on the Caspian and with a massive energy sector, it&#8217;s no wonder it was the fastest growing economy between 2006 to 2008. These days, however, it wants to be famous.</p>
<p><a href=" http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/07/twitter_devolutions_arab_spring_social_media">Twitter Devolutions</a><br />
By Marc Lynch<br />
<em> Foreign Policy</em></p>
<p>Former <a href="https://itunes.apple.com/us/tv-season/great-decisions-in-foreign/id593073186">Great Decisions in Foreign Policy</a> panelist and George Washington University political science professor Marc Lynch weighs in on the role of social media in the Arab Spring. With all the hype surrounding &#8220;Facebook revolutions&#8221; and &#8220;Twitter revolutions&#8221; &#8212; perhaps soon we&#8217;ll have &#8220;Vine revolutions&#8221; &#8212; Lynch demonstrates it really hasn&#8217;t been as beneficial as we want to believe to the Arab Spring.</p>
<p><a href=" http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/02/escape-from-iran/272976/">Escape from Iran</a><br />
By Vahid Pour Ostad<br />
<em> The Atlantic</em></p>
<p>Hooman Mousavi, an Iranian dissident born in a political prison to a family killed for their opposition activities, was arrested for participating in the protests against the 2009 vote that handed the incumbent Ahmadinejad a 62 percent win. Ostad tells his story a few months after his release in August 2012.</p>
<p><a href=" http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138824/max-boot/the-evolution-of-irregular-war?page=show">The Evolution of Irregular War</a><br />
By Max Boot<br />
<em> Foreign Affairs</em></p>
<p>With all the recent &#8220;droning&#8221; about drones in Washington, Max Boot &#8212; a CFR fellow and <a href="https://itunes.apple.com/us/tv-season/great-decisions-in-foreign/id593073186">Great Decisions 2013 guest</a> &#8212; reminds us that terrorism and guerrilla tactics are not really anything new; it&#8217;s conventional warfare that&#8217;s new. And even though it&#8217;s been belittled since Greco-Roman times, it remains as deadly as ever, only this time with a political scheme that may have been lacking among the tribal warriors of the past.</p>
<p><a href=" http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2013/02/04/hillary-clinton-exits-politics-her-enduring-legacy.html">Hillary Clinton: The Most Powerful Woman in American Politics</a><br />
by Michael Tomasky<br />
<em> Newsweek</em></p>
<p>If there&#8217;s one thing the buzz surrounding Hillary&#8217;s (temporarily?) nonexistent 2016 presidential bid, it&#8217;s that Hillary Clinton as a &#8220;private citizen&#8221; has become hard to imagine. Tomasky discusses her legacy, her diplomacy and her impact on politics in general.</p>
<p>Blogs:</p>
<p><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/04/shades-of-grey-in-us-policy-towards-north-africa/">Shades of Grey in U.S. Policy Towards North Africa</a> by Calvin Dark<br />
<a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/06/hillz-highlights-reflections-on-hillary-clintons-four-years-as-secstate/">“Hillz” Highlights: Reflections on Hillary Clinton’s Four Years as SecState</a> by Hannah Gais<br />
<a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/05/how-secretary-clinton-got-it-all-wrong/">How Secretary Clinton Got It All Wrong</a> by Oliver Barrett<br />
<a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/04/first-african-female-billionaire-a-testament-in-corruption-not-success/">First African Billionaire a Testament in Corruption Not Success </a>by Daniel Donovan<br />
<a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/04/the-long-road-back/">The Long Road Back</a> by Melissa Lockhart Fortner</p>
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		<title>Ending &#8220;Doormat Politics&#8221; In Somalia</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/01/31/ending-doormat-politics-in-somalia/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=ending-doormat-politics-in-somalia</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/01/31/ending-doormat-politics-in-somalia/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 Jan 2013 04:55:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Abukar Arman</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Global Engagement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[debt relief]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dual-Track Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IMF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[John Kerry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Obama's second term]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somalia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vulture funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[World Bank]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=73001</guid>
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“More than ever, foreign policy is economic policy. The world is competing for resources and global markets.”   John Kerry
Considering the positive trend of the past eighteen months, Somalia is en route to recovery, and, in due course, to re-engineer a better state from the ground up. The ...]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/01/31/ending-doormat-politics-in-somalia/somalia-us/" rel="attachment wp-att-73002"><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-73002" alt="Somalia-US" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/Somalia-US.jpg" width="480" height="320" /></a></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>“More than ever, foreign policy is economic policy. The world is competing for resources and global markets.”   John Kerry</i></p>
<p>Considering the positive trend of the past eighteen months, Somalia is en route to recovery, and, in due course, to re-engineer a better state from the ground up. The caveat being: in the long term, this could be another squandered opportunity as long as &#8220;doormat politics&#8221; shapes Somalia’s political landscape.</p>
<p>By doormat politics, I mean the combination of systematic self/foreign-inflicted aggressions and exploitations suffered by the nation and the subsequent desperation, hopelessness, chronic dependency and indignation.</p>
<p>From the cold war proxy geopolitical mortal games, to the iron fist of the military government, to the ruthless militias/warlordism of the civil war, to the moral menace of religious extremism, to the hostile intervention of neighboring countries and the paranoia-driven global war on terror, Somalia has been under the exploitative schemes and the brutal authority of various external and internal actors. By and large, throughout these periods, the nation was used either as a camouflage to advance clan-based exclusive rights or a gambit for zero-sum expedience.</p>
<p><b> </b></p>
<p><b>Mutual Interest and Mutual Respect  </b></p>
<p>Today, Somalia is at the threshold of a new era; an era of bilateral relationships of mutual interest and respect. However counterintuitive it may seem, a new image of Somalia is gradually coming into formation.</p>
<p>Aside from its coveted long and strategic coast, Somalia is a country with untapped energy and other natural resources and massive rebuilding needs. Many recognize its potential lucrative emerging market.</p>
<p>And, as U.S., China, Europe and India continue their scramble in Africa for resources and food security, cultivating bilateral relationship with Somalia as a strategic gateway to sub-Saharan Africa becomes a geopolitical necessity. This, needless to say, provides Somalia an opportunity to expand its horizon and cultivate diverse friendships.</p>
<p>Recently, a number of old friends were compelled to emerge out of their diplomatic ambivalence since the <a href="http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/winter2012/turkey-shocks-africa">Republic of Turkey has raised the bar</a> and re-assumed its full diplomatic relationship with Somalia and opened its embassy in Mogadishu at a time when it was still being considered the most dangerous city in the world. Like China, Turkey has successfully been establishing good footing in Africa based on its method of engagement- soft power.</p>
<p>“What Africa needs is not pity, but <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-303579-turkey-and-africa.html">fairness and opportunity</a>.  Developing partnerships based on respect, equality and mutual interest will go a long way in overcoming the vicious circle of exploitation, poverty and underdevelopment in Africa” writes Turkish Columnist Ibrahim Kalin in Today’s Zaman.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Somali/U.S. Relations</b></p>
<p>On January 17<sup>,</sup> <a href="http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/01/202997.htm">President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton</a> to reactivate the bilateral relationship between Somalia and United States. Though the State Department welcomed “the great strides toward stability Somalia has made over the past year”—an effort in which the U.S. played a key role—it made no commitment to change its <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/abukar-arman/somalia-us-and-the-dualtr_b_779322.html">Dual-Track Policy</a> and globally dreaded <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pierre-guerlain/us-drone-strikes_b_2576829.html">“Drone Diplomacy.”</a>  These are the two sides of a single counter-terrorism based policy toward Somalia that has been undermining the legitimacy of the very central government that US has officially recognized and established bilateral relationship with.</p>
<p>Sustainable bilateral relations between Somalia and the U.S. would remain a political mirage as long as the U.S. policy toward Somalia continues to be driven by counter-terrorism expediency and its diplomatic gestures are delivered by drone strikes! Pressure would soon be mounting against both nations as this policy is getting under intense scrutiny and is the subject of a new documentary called <a href="http://dirtywars.org/">Dirty Wars</a> that recently premiered at the Sundance Film Festival and is expected to hit the theaters in March.</p>
<p>“We cannot allow the extraordinary good we do to save and change lives to be eclipsed entirely by the role we have had to play since September 11th, a role that was thrust upon us,” said John Kerry,  the new Secretary of State. Whether or not these words would prove prophetic per the foreign policy of President Obama’s second term would remain to be seen.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Challenges and Opportunities of Economic Growth </b></p>
<p>Statehood is not sustainable without steady revenue and economic growth and this should not be a shock to a nation emerging out of the ruins of its bloody history and hampered by chronic poverty with roughly seventy percent of its youth being unemployed and nearly two million of its population being internally and externally displaced.</p>
<p>Somalia needs a fresh start. However, as this just resuscitated state is struggling to find its political, social, religious, and economic balance, bill collectors are lining up. Granted, there is nothing illegal about that. However, a few issues must be illuminated:</p>
<p>Even though it is still considered a “Pre-Decision-Point country”, Somalia is qualified for debt cancellation under the <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm">IMF/World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative</a>.</p>
<p>It might even qualify to legitimately invoke <a href="http://pgj.stanford.edu/publications/21472/">“The Odious Debt Doctrine&#8221;</a> (a precedent set by the U.S.) if and where it is necessary. The rationale driving this legal doctrine is that loans not made in good faith to non-democratic governments with questionable legitimacy that then use these monies against their public interests, or to oppress their citizens, or for embezzlement and other corrupt overtly corrupt motives, cannot be transferred to democratically elected governments that may succeed them. Regardless, there is a good chance that these international financial institutions would do what’s right.</p>
<p>That said, a more profoundly complex issue than dealing with these institutions is dealing with Hedge Funds profiteers who purchased some of Somalia’s old debts while the state was on its death bed, hence the name <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vulture_fund">Vulture Funds</a>. This would have to be won legally in the courts. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18894874">Think Congo. </a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Processes and Sacrifices of Transformation</b></p>
<p>It behooves the current government to appoint a Debt Audit and Asset Recovery Commission that includes economists, international lawyers, members of the Parliament and civil societies.</p>
<p>Moreover, it should deliberately avoid any decision that would put this recovering state in a position to be held as ransom for generations to come. This includes aid monies that the state is chronically dependent on. After all, as the old adage goes: “He who pays the piper calls the tune.” Somalia now has too many pipers playing too many tunes, all at once; a classic political cacophony of a sort.</p>
<p>The good news is that the current government already has alternative ways of generating state revenues such taxation, postal services, licensing the telephone gateway, licensing banking, licensing commercial fishing, leasing agricultural lands, etc. in its priority.</p>
<p>The Somali people have resiliently rejected the permanency of failure. They have been responding with an overwhelming stream of repatriation and investments. By and large there is a popular march toward the light at the end of the tunnel. However, the process is not yet complete and hazardous pitfalls along the way still present detrimental challenges. So, the current momentum must be guided with vision, maintained with prudence, and guarded with vigilance. There are valuable lessons to be learned from the magically disappearing $ billions in <a href="http://www.africareview.com/News/Millions-disappear-from-South-Sudan-coffers/-/979180/1456464/-/94kpco/-/index.html">South Sudan</a> and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/24/world/americas/in-aiding-quake-battered-haiti-lofty-hopes-and-hard-truths.html?pagewanted=all&amp;_r=0">Haiti</a>. This indeed underscores, among other things, the importance of having in place effective policies of checks and balances, also the apparatus and the capacity to invest these funds into viable projects of critical nature.</p>
<div>
<p>So, the prospect of ending doormat politics in Somalia is reasonably high as the world continues to change and the political awareness of the average citizens continues to rise. However, as it is a two-engine phenomenon, it is utterly naïve to count on it before the Somali people come to the realization that in the dark pages of history this lamentation is scripted in blood – if only we were united!</p>
</div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>The Question of Budget Support</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/01/10/the-question-of-budget-support/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-question-of-budget-support</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/01/10/the-question-of-budget-support/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Jan 2013 16:18:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Krista Zimmerman</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[aid]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[aid effectiveness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[budget support]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[budgets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[development policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[donors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uganda]]></category>

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<a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/01/10/the-question-of-budget-support/question-mark/" rel="attachment wp-att-72207"></a>
Budget support is in the news once more. <a href="http://www.africareview.com/News/Donors-cut-all-direct-aid-to-Uganda/-/979180/1636076/-/11k5ymv/-/index.html">Corruption in Uganda recently spurred several Western governments to suspend their budget support to the government there</a>. Unfortunately, for Uganda, this type of foreign aid makes up almost a quarter of its annual operating budget.
So I&#8217;m thinking about ...]]></description>
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<p style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/01/10/the-question-of-budget-support/question-mark/" rel="attachment wp-att-72207"><img class="aligncenter  wp-image-72207" alt="Question mark" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/Question-mark-e1357833297542.png" width="600" height="350" /></a></p>
<p>Budget support is in the news once more. <a href="http://www.africareview.com/News/Donors-cut-all-direct-aid-to-Uganda/-/979180/1636076/-/11k5ymv/-/index.html">Corruption in Uganda recently spurred several Western governments to suspend their budget support to the government there</a>. Unfortunately, for Uganda, this type of foreign aid makes up almost a quarter of its annual operating budget.</p>
<p>So I&#8217;m thinking about budget support again and its role in international affairs and the lives of the citizens of those countries that receive it.</p>
<p>One of the “perks” of my job working on policy for an organization that is primarily an international development project implementer is that I often get to go out and visit project sites and meet with community members to solicit their points of view on any number of issues. During these interactions, I usually have a long list of questions I want to ask, but I also try to make time for the people I’m meeting with to ask questions of me. And often, the questions they ask are as illuminating, or more, than whatever I have on my agenda.</p>
<p>One of my favorite instances of this happened in a remote farming village in dusty central Tanzania.  I was visiting a small cooperative of sunflower farmers that was starting to process sunflower oil. After a long day of touring the fields we all sat down for some final Q&amp;A in a miniature cinderblock office building. When it came time for their questions to me, the secretary of the cooperative was visibly ready and excited. “How do you feel about budget support?” he asked. “Is it really the best way of funding development and helping people with what they need?”</p>
<p>My jaw dropped. That was not one of the questions I had anticipated. And as I looked around the room, everyone else was nodding. They were also interested.</p>
<p>Budget support has been a much debated subject among the governments who give aid, the governments who receive aid, the aid effectiveness community and, apparently, at least one entrepreneurial group of sunflower farmers in the heart of East Africa.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7234">OECD definition of budget support</a> is aid given by development agencies to provide financial support to government budgets to assist the recipient through a program of policy reform and implementation to promote growth and achieve sustainable reductions in poverty. This is distinguished from aid provided for specific projects, where donors retain control of financial and results reporting linked to specific project activities and outcomes.</p>
<p>In general, European donor governments favor budget support whereas the U.S. government, or parts of the U.S. government, dislike it and are still strongly committed to the project paradigm (although <a href="http://www.mcc.gov/">MCC</a> and <a href="http://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/progress-data/usaid-forward">USAID Forward</a> are both examples of efforts to try and shift that paradigm a bit without fully embracing budget support either).</p>
<p><a href="http://www.aideffectiveness.org/Tools-Aid-modalities-Budget-support.html">One can well imagine the pros and cons associated with this topic</a>. Budget support helps ensure development that produces public goods and public infrastructure and can improve the public budgeting process. At the same time, it can make core government budgets susceptible to aid flow fluctuation and there are concerns about both donor and domestic accountability.</p>
<p>So what did I tell the farmers in Tanzania when they asked about budget support? I turned the question around and asked them how they felt about budget support.</p>
<p>The domestic accountability question was foremost in their minds. The problem with budget support, they told me, is that we don’t really know where the money goes or how it is spent. We don’t see the results. We have something right here that we need help with and that will improve our lives and prospects for our children. We’re committing resources and time to it and, at the same time, we know there are millions of dollars of budget support flowing into our country but we don’t understand what it does.</p>
<p>That’s how they see budget support, at least for now. How do you see it? Is it an effective policy or not?</p>
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		<title>AU—Yes 2012 for Africa goes to the AU</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/12/27/au-yes-2012-for-africa-goes-to-the-au/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=au-yes-2012-for-africa-goes-to-the-au</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Dec 2012 18:10:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ndumba J. Kamwanyah</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[African Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kismayo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[peace pact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SADC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Satellite Sentinel Project]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somalia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thabo Mbeki]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zimbabwe]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/506562f5e5d7a.image_.jpg"></a>
Given all that we know and hear about Africa, success is not the first thing that comes to mind when penning about the African Union’s intervention in the continent’s conflicts.
But this year, under the continental body’s watchful eye, Kismayo in Somalia has fallen in the hands of the Somalie ...]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/506562f5e5d7a.image_.jpg"><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-71965" title="506562f5e5d7a.image" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/506562f5e5d7a.image_.jpg" alt="" width="500" height="333" /></a></p>
<p>Given all that we know and hear about Africa, success is not the first thing that comes to mind when penning about the African Union’s intervention in the continent’s conflicts.</p>
<p>But this year, under the continental body’s watchful eye, Kismayo in Somalia has fallen in the hands of the Somalie government, and the two Sudan’s-South Sudan and Sudan have reached a landmark agreement which will allow the two nations to co-exist peacefully.</p>
<p>Absent: The Western media and pundits to give credit where it is due. Apparently it is not newsworthy when Africans come up with their own solutions to the continent’s many conflict.</p>
<p>To recap: Captured in August 2008, Kismayo is Al-Shabaab’s (an insurgent group linked to Al-Qaida) last stronghold in Somalia after they were repelled away from Mogadishu by the allied African Union forces under the auspices of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2010-2011. It is in this context that the capture (under the military code name of “Operation Sledge Hammer”) of Kismayo in October 2012 by the AMISOM (led by the Kenyan military contingent) is vital for Somalia’s future. It is in Kismayo where the militia’s central planning command was stationed, including serving as their main route for supply of weapon and other necessities.</p>
<p>On another African front (while AMISOM was militarily battling for the final control of Kismayo) diplomacy was the name of the game in the two Sudan’s of South Sudan and Sudan. South Sudan is that part of Sudan which became an independent nation after they split from the north last year. The result: Tension and dispute over sharing the oil revenues loomed between the two nations.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, under the chairmanship of the former South African President Thabo Mbeki (the chief mediator of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan), the two nations happily embraced (well, maybe not happily ever yet.) and signed a peace pact in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa on September 27, 2012. Although, it seems, the implementation pace is somewhat shaping up to be a very slow process, the Sudan-South Sudan Co-operation Agreement contains important series of accords related to the two nations’ security, economic and political cooperation.</p>
<p>Will the peace pact last? Time will tell. But let’s also note (in humility) here that it is not George Clooney’s Satellite Sentinel Project (also called SSP) from the sky that forced the two nations to sit together on the negotiation table. The power of personal persuasion, dialogue, and neutrality did. And the African themselves did. The lesson: Support, strengthen, empower, and let the Africans themselves take a center stage in solving their own problems.</p>
<p>Also (to the credit of the Southern Africa Development Committee-SADC, and the African Union), in Zimbabwe it seems that a roadmap, patchy but on track, to a new democracy for that Southern African nation has finally emerged. If things go as they appear to be, we may have the new constitution adopted as well as a presidential election in 2013 for Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>However, is this seemingly success scored by the AU and its regional bodies in 2012 a trend of what come? It is in this context that the challenges for 2013 remain huge. There is Mali conflict. There is the Democratic of the Congo’s (DRC) unresolved conflict. And there is Egypt and Libya too.</p>
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		<title>A More Inclusive Global Energy Paradigm</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/12/24/a-more-inclusive-global-energy-paradigm/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=a-more-inclusive-global-energy-paradigm</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Dec 2012 08:03:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Joe Gurowsky</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[climate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Electricity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[solar]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=71592</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[As part of the European Union’s support for the U.N.’s Sustainable Energy for All initiative, E.U. Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs announced with visiting Djibouti Prime Minister Dileita Mohamed Dileita that the E.U. would provide funding for a combined renewable energy and water desalinization plant. The plant, to be built near Djibouti ...]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="attachment_71597" class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 510px"><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/12/24/a-more-inclusive-global-energy-paradigm/energy-poverty-2/" rel="attachment wp-att-71597"><img class="size-full wp-image-71597" title="Energy Poverty" alt="" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/Energy-Poverty1.jpg" width="500" height="283" /></a>
<p class="wp-caption-text">Photo: World Bank</p>
</div>
<p>As part of the European Union’s support for the U.N.’s <em>Sustainable Energy for All</em> initiative, E.U. Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs announced with visiting Djibouti Prime Minister Dileita Mohamed Dileita that the E.U. would provide funding for a combined renewable energy and water desalinization plant. The plant, to be built near Djibouti City, is to provide water for more 200,000 people—about one quarter of the of the country’s population. It will cost $69 million with the E.U. providing $53.6 million and the Djiboutian government to cover the balance. Water demand in the capital is estimated at 80,000 cubic meters daily (cmd), but only 36,000 cmd are supplied; to further complicate the situation, the country recently suffered through a lengthy drought.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In Mr. Piebalg’s statement, he stated that the plant will be powered by renewable energy in the future. This commitment is in line with Djibouti&#8217;s goal of moving towards 100 percent renewable energy by 2020, detailed at World Energy Forum 2012 in Dubai, and to demonstrate steps for sustainable development.</p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p>However, throughout much of Djibouti, citizens suffer from insufficient energy services—which is not unique to the nation.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Energy poverty is generally defined as when people do not have access to modern energy sources. Being reliant on rudimentary sources of energy keeps large swaths of people locked out of the global economy and inextricably linked to poverty. Today, at least 1.3 billion people lack access to electricity globally, according to UNDP. Of those, 85 percent live in rural areas with the bulk concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). More starkly, 2.7 billion people do not have access to cooking and heating fuel and instead rely on traditional, inefficient biomass such as wood, crop waste, animal waste and charcoal for necessary fuel, heat, and light. Kerosene is also used for light, but it is relatively costly and inefficient. Gathering the fuel daily, mostly by women and children, consumes time that could be otherwise utilized productively, stifling their education and career opportunities.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The biomass is usually burned in inefficient stoves inside primitive and poorly ventilated dwellings. The smoke produces high levels of household air pollution (HAP) with a range of health-damaging pollutants, including small soot particles that penetrate the lungs and causes chronic illness and other health impacts. According to the &#8220;Global Burden of Disease Study&#8221; published this past December in the <em>Lancet</em>, HAP from cooking with solid fuels kills 4 million people annually. In addition, millions more are sickened from lung cancer and disease, child lower respiratory infections, cardiovascular disease, and cataracts associated with HAP. Furthermore, these emissions are important drivers of climate change and local environmental degradation.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Shifting from solid fuels to cleaner energy technologies can potentially yield the largest reduction in indoor air pollution levels, while minimizing environmental impacts of energy production and consumption in general.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The <em>Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves</em> is a new initiative, led by the U.N. Foundation, supporting large-scale adoption of clean, efficient and safe household cooking solutions as a way to save lives, improve livelihoods, empower women, and reduce climate change emissions. The Alliance&#8217;s founding partners have set a goal of enabling an additional 100 million homes to adopt technologies such as solar cookers by 2020.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>To meet this goal, increased energy services are necessary.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>There can be no human development without energy. Energy is a key ingredient which allows society to function. It provides the ability to access economic opportunities to create jobs and increase income, it empowers women, children and local communities, it improves the ability to deliver quality education and health services, provides power to refrigerate medicine, power hospitals, and light to study at night, among a myriad of other vital uses.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>It becomes evident for those in energy poverty, they are in a poverty trap. Access to energy is a prerequisite for poverty alleviation.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Highlighting the issue, the United Nations General Assembly declared 2012 the International <em>Year of Sustainable Energy for All</em>, recognizing that “<em>…</em>access to modern affordable energy services in developing countries is essential for the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals, and sustainable development, which would help to reduce poverty and to improve the conditions and standard of living for the majority of the world’s population.” It has drawn greater public awareness and influential commitments for providing access to energy.</p>
<p><strong>            </strong></p>
<p><em>Sustainable Energy For All</em> is a U.N. led initiative that brings together governments, businesses and civil society groups to achieve three goals by 2030: (1) ensuring universal access to modern energy services (2) doubling the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency (3) doubling the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix. The goals encompass boosting economic growth, improving social equity and preserving the environment.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>As Aneri Patel senior associate for energy access at the U.N. Foundation describes, “The United Nations Foundation operates the <em>Energy Access Practitioner Network</em>, a global network officially part of the UN Secretary-General&#8217;s Sustainable Energy for All Initiative to catalyze practitioners across the globe on solving energy poverty. Currently represented in 150 countries, hundreds of practitioners share best practices and recommendations on meeting the 2030 goal of universal access.” She also mentioned successes to include elevating the status of entrepreneurs on an international stage, such as the EPA&#8217;s C3E Awards, IFC&#8217;s Lighting Africa Competition, the Ashden Awards, and Forbes 30 under 30 list.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Providing access to energy remains difficult on a macro level. Constructing a traditional central power plant and the accompanying infrastructure is costly and difficult due to poor conditions and challenging topography. On a micro level, in a twist of irony, many nations with rampant energy poverty are well situated to leverage their local advantages of solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, and/or biomass to provide a reliable source of energy. Constructing decentralized renewable energy infrastructure is a key component to provide access to energy to these areas. The roadmap can be similar to that for mobile phones, which eliminated the need for land lines and other infrastructure.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>This is not cheap and can not be implemented overnight. IEA Chief Economist Dr. Fatih Birol said, “We need $36 billion a year to bring modern energy services to the poor. There is a big gap between this figure, and what is currently being invested.” When placed in context, the $36 billion is 3 percent of funding to be spent on energy services. In 2009, $9.1 billion was invested in extending energy access.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In most countries, the public sector cannot meet the challenge alone, but it can employ national energy plans and targets, and provide basic financial support to replicate similar succeses. Programs are being implemented through financing from international banks, development banks, project developers, local banks, and microfinance institutions. Projects are spreading in certain locations, but it is often hard to make a business case for projects in nations with weak political systems and institutions, and profitability is unlikely, thus many businesses are now citing action more for corporate social responsibility. All nations afflicted with energy poverty need a national policy to lay the foundation to establish a financial environment attractive for investment—many think that it  is easier to attain financing for a large scale power plant than for a small energy project in rural Africa.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In sum, providing access to reliable, sustainable energy is an enormous challenge on many levels. But if the momentum that has continued to build during 2012 endures developing policy, planning, and financing from governments, the private sector, and civil society working together, the bridge to a fruitful life will be presented for hundreds of millions of people that are currently without energy options.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Lumumba (2000)</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/12/21/lumumba-2000/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=lumumba-2000</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/12/21/lumumba-2000/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 Dec 2012 14:57:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Sean Patrick Murphy</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Central Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Belgium]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Congo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lumumba]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=71540</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[While the subject matter is fascinating, this film falls short in at least a couple of ways.
First, the music doesn’t seem to sync up with the action, being loud and dramatic during quiet scenes and being almost silent during the high drama that takes place.
It also presupposes that the viewer ...]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>While the subject matter is fascinating, this film falls short in at least a couple of ways.<br />
First, the music doesn’t seem to sync up with the action, being loud and dramatic during quiet scenes and being almost silent during the high drama that takes place.<br />
It also presupposes that the viewer is familiar with the time and place. In this case it is Congo in the late 1950s and 1960.</p>
<p><iframe src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/xRPYtkQon10" frameborder="0" width="425" height="350"></iframe></p>
<p>The new nation is coming out from under Belgian rule and Patrice Lumumba (wonderfully portrayed by Eriq Ebouaney) stands out as the new prime minister of the country.<br />
From the very beginning Lumumba is faced with obstacles and political intrigue. He is cast as a communist sympathizer and Soviet stooge because many in the west do not want to give up their hold on one of Congo’s most affluent provinces.<br />
Lumumba is portrayed not only as a man of vision for his country but also a great orator, a man of conviction and magnetism.<br />
<em>Lumumba</em> tells the tale of so many countries coming to terms with their past after the colonial powers withdraw. It shows how difficult it is to manage a country, especially when the leaders are unaccustomed to ruling.</p>
<p><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/51YN8C1FH0L.jpg"><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-71541" title="51YN8C1FH0L" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/51YN8C1FH0L.jpg" alt="" width="336" height="475" /></a>Also, while many empires fell in the post World War II era, those powers continued to hover in the background, controlling much of the political lives of the burgeoning nations.<br />
Finally, <em>Lumumba</em> shows how one man tried to hold on to a unified Congo despite the odds not being in his favor.<br />
<em>Lumumba</em> is available to rent.<br />
Murphy can be reached at: Lojano@comcast.net</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Opinion: Cutting Aid Will Help End African Corruption</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/12/07/opinion-cutting-aid-will-help-end-african-corruption/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=opinion-cutting-aid-will-help-end-african-corruption</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/12/07/opinion-cutting-aid-will-help-end-african-corruption/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Dec 2012 01:45:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Kimberly J. Curtis</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Development Aid]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DfID]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[foreign aid]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uganda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Kingdom]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=70992</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/12/07/opinion-cutting-aid-will-help-end-african-corruption/corruption2/" rel="attachment wp-att-70993"></a>
Guest Post by Andy Kristian Agaba
Four European governments <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2225443/Britain-Ireland-suspend-aid-Uganda-10m-funding-ends-Prime-Ministers-account.html">froze some aid meant for Uganda </a>following the discovery of massive corruption in the Prime Minister&#8217;s (PM) office. A forensic audit by the Auditor General&#8217;s office unearthed endemic theft of funds totaling to more than $25 million. Most of ...]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/12/07/opinion-cutting-aid-will-help-end-african-corruption/corruption2/" rel="attachment wp-att-70993"><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-70993" title="corruption2" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/corruption2.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="305" /></a></p>
<p><strong>Guest Post by Andy Kristian Agaba</strong></p>
<p>Four European governments <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2225443/Britain-Ireland-suspend-aid-Uganda-10m-funding-ends-Prime-Ministers-account.html">froze some aid meant for Uganda </a>following the discovery of massive corruption in the Prime Minister&#8217;s (PM) office. A forensic audit by the Auditor General&#8217;s office unearthed endemic theft of funds totaling to more than $25 million. Most of this money was meant for reconstruction of Northern Uganda, an area recovering from a two decades civil war between the Lord&#8217;s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda. In fact, reports of misappropriation of funds in the same office relating to reconstruction first came to light in 2007 when one of the prominent leaders of Northern Uganda, Norbert Mao, exposed through the local media a $2.5 million procurement of <a href="http://www.newvision.co.ug/PA/8/13/577387">&#8220;fake pangas and fake seeds.&#8221; </a></p>
<p>At that time, rather than deal with the malaise, the PM&#8217;s office chose to accuse local officials in Northern Uganda of sabotaging the government, a claim that implied that some individuals from the opposition had deliberately purchased and replaced good materials with bad ones to discredit the government. But that is far from the truth. In fact, as recent as two months ago the same office was accused of providing <a href="http://www.acholitimes.com/index.php/news/acholi-news/923-parents-condemn-food-given-to-nodding-victims-at-treatment-centres">rotten food infested with weavils and magots to nodding disease patients</a>. Never mind that the government was not willing to quickly provide resources and immediate response to the victims of this rare disease.</p>
<p>For years, the citizens of Uganda have found foreign aid partners complicit with the ongoing corruption in Africa and have spoken of their unwillingness to demand accountability from these governments. This carte blanche with which money is given and then eyes shut has not only benefited the ruling class, but has enabled it to cement the stranglehold on power through which public funds are used to bribe the elite: to buy toys, real estate and luxuries, and to fly government officials and their children for medical treatment abroad while the dilapidated local healthcare systems continues to crumble in free-fall. <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/uganda/1443488/President-spends-20000-so-his-grandchild-can-be-born-in-Europe.html">According to the Daily Telegraph,</a> in 2003 President Yoweri Museveni flew his daughter in the presidential jet so she could give birth in Europe. The trip reportedly cost around £70,000. All of this has happened under the watchful eyes of foreign diplomats who regularly dine and wine with these criminals at high end parties and dinners. They have known of this unacceptable behavior, but why has it taken so long to take some action of this measure?</p>
<p>Therefore, when last month the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20368182">United Kingdom suspended all aid to Uganda</a> following the forensic audit in the PM&#8217;s office, this was celebrated quietly and widely in Uganda. You may think that the citizens of Uganda would be worried about the UK&#8217;s action, but that is far from the truth. That is because when the aid was flowing in, it never reached the people it was intended for. When government&#8217;s suspended Rwandan aid, the Rwandans created the <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201208090337.html">Agaciro sovereign fund </a>in which citizens contributed their paychecks to make up for the lost aid. The circumstances under which Rwandan aid was suspended are very different from those of Uganda. People of Rwanda believe in their government to be a good steward of the resources, and I guarantee you, that not a single Ugandan would contribute to such a fund created by the Ugandan government &#8211; not the ministers, not the president, no one!</p>
<p>At the head of the ministry is an individual, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amama_Mbabazi">PM Amama Mbabazi</a>, who in the last two years, has been named in more than four major corruption scandals. Albeit the rote at the ministry began before he became PM, it is hard to imagine that none of this mess happened under his watch – he has served as PM for a little over one year. He is also under fire for cruising around a <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201211120192.html">newly acquired expensive Mercedes Benz</a> that the ministry bought him instead of investing that money in development programs.</p>
<p>Year after year, the government of Uganda under Yoweri Museveni has abused public funds with no real consequences. In the 27 years that Museveni has been president, no single minister or senior official has spent any meaningful time in jail. In fact, the president continues to employ and defend those accused of corruption, insisting that there is no evidence to implicate his loyal officials. It is therefore not farfetched to say that Museveni aids and abets the grand scheme of corruption. Uganda is a mainstay on the lists of East Africa&#8217;s most corrupt countries, reported by <a href="http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/uganda_tops_east_africa_in_corruption">Transparency International</a> as being number one. Ironically, it is also Africa&#8217;s 8<sup>th</sup> fastest growing economy, which reinforces of the belief that with a more transparent government, Uganda&#8217;s economy and service delivery could be much more efficient.</p>
<p>The UK and all development aid partners must demand responsibility and accountability from all aid recipients. There is no reason why a government that does not spend responsibly should continue to receive development assistance. All aid should have conditions; for example, money should not be used to buy expensive vehicles. If a “poor” government should spend <a href="http://www.africareview.com/News/Outrage-over-Museveni-two-new-Benzes/-/979180/1618106/-/1ql5ttz/-/index.html">$2.3 million to buy just two vehicles like Museveni&#8217;s just did,</a> why should taxpayers of the UK or the US or Canada or Japan or Ireland foot that bill? Development partners should consider freezing assets of suspects and imposing travel bans for suspects and their families. But most importantly, they should consider a paradigm shift in development aid in which they work directly with nonprofits and social enterprises.</p>
<p><em>Andy Kristian Agaba is a Native of Uganda, East Africa. He is the Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Hiinga, a Nonprofit Social Enterprise Working to End Hunger and Alleviate Poverty in East Africa.</em></p>
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		<title>Oxfam Criticizes World Bank on Land Issues</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/11/26/oxfam-criticizes-world-bank-on-land-issues/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=oxfam-criticizes-world-bank-on-land-issues</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Nov 2012 12:28:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Krista Zimmerman</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Food Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[land grabs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[oxfam international]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[World Bank]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=70344</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/11/26/oxfam-criticizes-world-bank-on-land-issues/tanzania1-083/" rel="attachment wp-att-70350"></a>
Last month, <a href="http://www.oxfam.org/">Oxfam International</a> released a new policy paper (<a href="http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bn-land-lives-freeze-041012-en_1.pdf">Our Land, Our Lives</a>) that looked at large-scale farm land acquisitions in the developing world, along with the role of the World Bank in facilitating some of the transactions as an investor and/or advisor to national ...]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/11/26/oxfam-criticizes-world-bank-on-land-issues/tanzania1-083/" rel="attachment wp-att-70350"><img class="aligncenter size-large wp-image-70350" title="Tanzania1 083" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/Tanzania1-083-e1353932628710.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="397" /></a></p>
<p>Last month, <a href="http://www.oxfam.org/">Oxfam International</a> released a new policy paper (<a href="http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bn-land-lives-freeze-041012-en_1.pdf">Our Land, Our Lives</a>) that looked at large-scale farm land acquisitions in the developing world, along with the role of the World Bank in facilitating some of the transactions as an investor and/or advisor to national governments. According to Oxfam, Africa has borne the brunt of these “investments,” with “an area the size of Kenya acquired for agriculture by foreign investors in just ten years.”</p>
<p>The paper defines a large-scale land acquisition as one in which a tract of land larger than 200 hectares is involved, and identifies a list of problematic factors that indicate a transaction may be fairly characterized as a “land grab.” Among these factors, are:</p>
<ul>
<li>Human rights violations;</li>
<li>Lack of free, prior and informed consent; and</li>
<li>Failure to assess social, economic and environmental impacts.</li>
</ul>
<p>What I appreciate about this latest publication from Oxfam, is that is goes beyond analyzing these deals solely on the basis of transactional fairness, transparency and so forth (all legitimate concerns by the way) but expands the inquiry to examine their impact on local food security. Increased food security for local people, as a result of wages earned through day labor, additional resource, etc., is one of the primary justifications for these transactions among the institutional donors and policymakers who support or tolerate them.</p>
<p>But because the majority of land investments in developing countries are made by foreign investors who intend to export their production, Oxfam concludes that many of these investments will not solve local food security problems and are more likely to exacerbate them. Oxfam research in Cambodia, for example, showed negative impact from large land concessions on the food security of local populations, especially women. There, in a survey of 60 people, 45 percent said they were less secure in terms of being able to obtain sufficient rice compared to 38 percent previously. Reasons for the increase included labor shortages and reductions in communal land used for growing food for consumption.</p>
<p>Our Land, Our Lives ultimately calls on the World Bank to freeze its own land investments and to review its policies and practices to prevent land grabbing. Whether that happens or not (<a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2012/10/04/world-bank-group-statement-oxfam-report-our-land-our-lives">and so far it has not</a>), kudos to Oxfam for a report that I hope helps generate more political will for close monitoring and evaluation of the impacts of these investments not only in Africa, but around the world.</p>
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		<title>The EU’s Human Rights and Democracy Promotion Strategy Introduced: first signs of strengths and weaknesses</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/11/19/eu-human-rights-and-democracy-promotion-strategy/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=eu-human-rights-and-democracy-promotion-strategy</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2012 17:30:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Petr Pribyla</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Spring]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Catherine Ashton]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EEAS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Endowment for Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European External Action Service]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[human rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[peacebuilding]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sahel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stavros Lambrinidis]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=69898</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Two and a half years after the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU showed up with a new human rights face for its external relations. The often repeated words of Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stating that human rights have to be ...]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="attachment_69978" class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 610px"><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/11/14/69898/t/" rel="attachment wp-att-69978"><img class="size-full wp-image-69978 " title="EU High Representative Catherine Ashton addressed the European Parliament AFET &amp; SEDE committee meeting on Wednesday 7th November 2012" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/t-e1352985988845.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="399" /></a>
<p class="wp-caption-text">EU High Representative Catherine Ashton addressed the European Parliament AFET &amp; SEDE committee meeting on Wednesday 7th November 2012 (© European External Action Service)</p>
</div>
<p>Two and a half years after the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU showed up with a new human rights face for its external relations. The often repeated words of Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stating that human rights have to be a “silver thread” that runs through everything the EU does in foreign policy, gained more realistic shapes. In order to achieve those goals, the EU came up with 3 steps over the last 11 months aiming to stitch the patchwork of the EU’s foreign policies and beef up the human rights and democracy promotion. The task is clear: strengthen, guarantee and promote human rights within the matrix of the EU external policies and push human rights further up the Brussels agenda despite the on-going economic crisis.</p>
<p>Firstly, let’s see what the whole “package” of the human rights-related initiatives is about. The first step goes back to December 2011, when the European Commission adopted a new document called “The Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – Towards a more Effective Approach” aiming to boost the human rights policy and foster democratisation efforts throughout the matrix of the EU foreign policies. The next step followed with a set-up of a new office of the Special Representative for Human Rights, for which has been appointed Stavros Lambrinidis, a former MEP at the European Parliament and most recently a Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece. The last, and the most recent step, is the “EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy” from June 2012.</p>
<p>Yet, as it took more than 2 years for the EU to draft and agree on the aforementioned steps, it is obviously the right time to ask what the EU first-ever strategic framework for human rights in external policies aims to achieve and, primarily, how to make sure that these goals are met.</p>
<p><strong>What is the Strategic Framework about?</strong></p>
<p>Firstly, there are various reasons to conclude on the Strategic Framework’s importance without going into further detail, yet. As already mentioned, it is the first-ever human rights “package” for external policies with a back up not only by Catherine Ashton in parallel with the EU institutions, the European External Action Service (EEAS), but also throughout the EU Member States as such (it is worth to mention, that informal meetings took place also with various NGOs through a lengthy process of consultations). Usually, that has not been the case over the last decade. As the document clearly says, both the EU <em>per se</em> and the Member States individually, are jointly responsible for its implementation.</p>
<p>To find out what it means, it is worth to have a look back to the past when the Arab Spring wake-up call hit the EU in 2011. At that time, Brussels could hardly manage to jointly agree on a unified pro-democratisation strategy for the North African region unexpectedly turning into turmoil and to prove a common stand in this manner. Especially along many stories in European newspapers revealing what a friendly relationship had European leaders with North African autocrats.</p>
<p>Even though the first informal meetings took place already within the EU foreign ministers back at Cordoba in March 2010, the Strategic Framework should be thus seen largely as a respond to the Arab countries awakening, where the EU has not proved to be flexible enough in showing a common stand towards this region. So far, there have been many other areas of the EU policy, where it is still an unfortunate reality that many of the EU Member States prefer in terms of foreign policy to undertake individual actions, instead of stepping into the unified EU-led approach.</p>
<p>This is, notably, often a case of initiatives under an umbrella of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and more precisely issues within the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Over the scope of the last decade, a deployment of more than 28 crisis management missions since 2003 has been an inevitable part of a development of the policy. After a four years break, since the Operation Atalanta operating off the coast of Somalia was launched (except the small-scale EU training mission in Somalia), the EU came up with not only one, but three civilian mission deployed within preceding months. However, many EU Member States are still reluctant to contribute to a common presence on the ground in third countries and prefer to run their own development-oriented initiatives and security sector training programmes, for instance. In light of those cases, which undermine the EU legitimacy and unified presence when dealing with third countries, the adopted Strategic Framework could bring a positive impact. In particular, the more unified policy in regards to post-conflict reconstructions in the third states, is desperately needed.</p>
<p>In a more detail, the Strategic Framework offers 96 steps within 36 areas of the EU foreign policy, which ought to be implemented due 31 December 2014. Some of the steps mentioned can however sound as a more rhetoric practice. An action with a number 11 calls to “Make trade work in a way that helps human rights”. Although it is more outlined and operationalized in subsequent steps, it is hardly to expect a reconstruction of the current discourse of the EU in trade relations, putting a new set of conditions on countries such as China or Russia, pushing for guaranteeing and safeguarding human rights; especially in the light of the on-going financial crisis. As the current development in this manner shows, countries like China see itself as an equal partner and does not see the EU as a more mature nation to have legitimacy to dictate various Human Rights clauses. A reality of double standards, such as criticizing Myanmar but ignoring Saudi Arabia, has been also already widely criticized. The same criticism goes to the aforementioned Human Rights clauses, which are not applied consistently to every country and thus lack of consistency leads to a lack of credibility. In every case, the Strategic Framework committed the EU to detail which of the objectives have been actually met in an annual report on human rights and democracy. This will, obviously, help to keep track of how certain steps have been met and lived-up to the expectations, in every case.</p>
<p><strong>The first-ever EU Special Representative for Human Rights</strong></p>
<p>The EU has recently introduced itself also with a new human rights face, literally. Stavros Lambrinidis, a former member of the European Parliament and recently also a Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, has been appointed the first Special Representative for Human Rights on 25 July and took his office on 1 September 2012.  What should not be overlooked is a fact, that no other Special Representative from the EU has yet had a thematically framed focus. So far, it has been for Brussels a golden rule to have only geographically framed special representatives dealing solely with specific troubled regions, as in a case of Afghanistan, Sudan, Central Asia or Kosovo.</p>
<p>To assess the role, what Stavros Lambrinidis will take on himself in the next 2 years, has not yet to come. So far, a dust of the newly created post needs to settle down. Nevertheless, what is going to be of a particular interest is not only how a cooperation with European External Action Service will look like, but most importantly what role Lambrinidis will take in regards to the newly adopted Strategic Framework; as the official mandate clearly says, he “shall” contribute to its implementation in the EU foreign policy. He clearly has a potential to envisage week points of the current policy settings and in this context he has to prove that his office is not merely a human rights symbol. What is needed, obviously, is to live-up to expectations given to his post within his mandate and bring sufficient visibility to the human rights issues on the international stage. Lambrinidis has a big power hand-in-hand with a huge opportunity to set up a standard for whoever is going to take his office when his mandate ends in 2 years.</p>
<p>The thematic nature of the mandate also raises another question waiting for an answer. While the UN has been using in parallel both thematically and geographically oriented special rapporteurs over the last decades, it has never been the case of the EU. Therefore, it will be interesting to follow up whether his mandate will not be overlapping with the already existing special rapporteurs dealing with particular regions. Let’s think of, for instance, a situation where Lambrinidis deals with a human rights situation in the Horn of Africa (that is a region where the EU recently deployed three CSDP missions), which is geographically under a mandate of another EU Special Representative, Alexander Rondos. Their mandates would be overlapping on the theoretical level. However, 30 years of experience with those mandates in the UN shows, that both mandates can very effectively contribute to each other and enhance their mutual effectiveness.</p>
<p><strong>What exactly does it aim to support?</strong></p>
<p>From a wider perspective, what needs to be also addressed is a cleaner definition of what it is that the EU aims to promote through its democracy and human rights support in third countries. Within a plethora of the EU instruments and initiatives developed over the last years, the substance of democracy promotion remains blurred and unclear. Unfortunately, if one would expect that the adopted Strategic framework would shed some light on the <em>status quo</em> and bring some clarity to the EU’s general conceptualization of a democracy support, it is not the case. In this respect, Anne Wetzel and Jan Orbie stated in a Policy Brief for the Centre for European Policy Studies, that in fact “[the] EU’s haziness with respect to the goal of democracy promotion and the steps needed to reach this goal allows it to stretch the definition of democracy promotion too far; potentially too far. This may be beneficial to the EU’s own interests since it allows for a flexible interpretation of what will (not) be supported under the banner of democracy, but (…) it may actually be detrimental from a democracy promotion perspective.”<a title="" href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> In other words, the EU should seriously reflect on a role of elections, economic development, civil society and rule of law within its democracy promotion activities and bring more clarity of what it aim support in the first place.</p>
<p>But let’s narrow our focus back to the Strategic Framework, the first-ever joint strategic document for support of human rights and pro-democratisation activities within the EU’s matrix of foreign policies, as the EU officials proudly label it. In respect to the on-going ill-conceptualization of the democracy promotion activities, the document undressed another critical concern, namely a relationship between human rights and democracy. Throughout the document, no attention is given to clarify what is their relationship. Counting how many times the words “human rights” and “democracy” shows up, one gets to the following numbers: “human rights” appears 149 times, “democracy” 31 times and “human rights and democracy” hand-in-hand only 16 times. It is obviously a question, why there would be referred to human rights almost five times more than to democracy. Not to mention, that subheadings consistently refer to human rights solely.<a title="" href="#_ftn1">[2]</a> In sum, as it gives the impression that to human rights and democracy is referred in the same breath, no clarification what is the mutual relationship between the two respective concepts is given.</p>
<p>However, even though the aforementioned challenges have to be addressed, yet there are certain positive features. It has been in overall encouraging witnessing, that also EU Member States committed themselves to fulfil their tasks laid down by the Strategic Framework. Further, it offers to certain extent detailed steps in separate areas of the EU external policies on which has to be worked on, but also, and most importantly, which institutions and/or sections are responsible – and accountable – for the subsequent implementation. However, whether to use the official language of the Brussels’ documents and call the Strategic Framework as a “watershed in EU policy making” – especially in respect to what has been mentioned above – is not so clear yet.</p>
<p>That is definitely not to say, that the human rights package is a step in the wrong direction. The Strategic Framework is a step forward for the EU’ foreign policy hand-in-hand with its commitment to promote and guarantee human rights within the EU’s external policy, but the implementation over the next 2 years will solely show whether it has been successful and if it has been a blow of a fresh air for the EU external policy. The poorly conceptualized notion of what constitutes the democracy promotion policies and initiatives will not make it easier. In this respect, it is of importance to follow up on how the EU Member States will tackle the Strategic Framework; that is whether they take seriously into consideration what they preach or they leave it untouched. This is not clear yet and the document itself does not elaborate in more details on it either. At the end of the day, the implementation will be the true measure of the Strategic Framework’s added value.</p>
<p><strong>Reconstructing the current policy discourse: What not to forget</strong></p>
<p>In sum, if the EU aims to have a strong voice in the human rights-related initiatives, reconstruct the current policy discourse in particularly when dealing with third countries and start stitching the patchwork of the EU external policies with the “silver thread”, it still needs to tackle many of the issues outlined above. To name the most fundamental, those are: (1) to bring more clarity of what it aims to support through democracy promotion initiatives; (2) to clarify the relationship of human rights and democracy in external policies; and last but not least (3) to demonstrate stronger commitment to human rights protection within the European borders. Especially the last point should not be overlooked, as the EU’s “value-driven” picture has hitherto many scars on the self-promoted portrait. For instance, the EU migration policy when dealing with asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants at the EU’s external borders; the detention of undocumented migrants and failed asylum seekers in Greece; the treatment of Roma throughout the EU or counter-terrorism measures in the United Kingdom and Germany. Those issues – besides many others – deserve urgently more attention, if the EU aims to have a stronger voice in promoting human rights and democracy beyond its borders and to be taken more seriously.</p>
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<div><em>For slightly edited extract from this paper and related comment </em><em>see an article <a href="http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2012/11/eu-inconsistent-confused-and-hazy-about-promoting-democracy/">&#8220;EU inconsistent, confused and &#8216;hazy&#8217; about promoting democracy?&#8221;</a> at the Democracy Digest.</em></div>
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<p><a title="" href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Wetzel, A. &amp; Orbie, J., “The EU’s Promotion of External Democracy: In search of the plot”, Policy Brief No. 281, <em>Centre for European Policy Studies</em>, 2012, pp. 3. See this Policy Brief for more information. It offers an extensive analysis of the (ill-)conceptualization of the human rights and democracy promotion strategies of the EU, including a list of recommendations.</p>
<p><a title="" href="#_ftn1">[2]</a> cf. ibid.</p>
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