There is a good rule taught in newsrooms early in one’s reporting life that goes along the lines of why one should listen to so-called crazy people. It is because, sometimes, they actually say the truth.

By dint of luck or perhaps true insight, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has stumbled into that equation. He warned that the U.S. support for Syrian rebels would result in another bastion of Al Qaeda terrorists – should the rebels somehow manage to win, of course.

“The West paid heavily for funding al Qaeda in its early stages in Afghanistan. Today it is supporting it in Syria, Libya and other places, and will pay a heavy price later in the heart of Europe and the United States,” he told al-Ikhbariya channel.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/17/uk-syria-conflict-assad-idUKBRE93G0ZP20130417

Not satisfied by making one cogent point, win, Assad then went on to suggest that the U.S. should switch sides and join with him since his government is the best hope for the Syrian people.  And then a few days later, he used chemical weapons on some of those Syrian people. How he thought that might aid is argument remains, well, more on the crazy than cogent side.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/middleeast/la-fg-us-syria-chemical-weapons-20130426,0,2526791.story

What is new is that the U.S. has increased its focus on aiding some elements of the Syrian opposition. Secretary of State John Kerry – showing his years of knowing the world and its players – continues to craft a plan to provide increased support to targeted entities.

Kerry, attending a conference in Turkey of the coalition and its 11 main foreign supporters, announced a doubling of non-lethal U.S. assistance to $123 million. Some of that reportedly will be supplies of night-vision equipment, armored vehicles, body armor and radios to the group’s military wing.

The NATO alliance also has deployed missile-defense batteries in neighboring Turkey to dissuade Assad from attacking Syrian rebel bases and refugee camps there. In addition, the U.S. decided to send 200 troops to Jordan in the coming weeks to boost defenses in the face of the worsening conflict in neighboring Syrian, a Jordanian cabinet minister said.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/17/uk-syria-crisis-jordan-usa-idUKBRE93G14920130417

Yet Assad’s point of sleeping with the wrong enemy still is a top concern. The U.S., France, Britain and others face a Hobson’s choice; they cannot support elements of the Syrian opposition that may have Al-Qaeda ties, which sadly have been the most successful fighting force taking on Assad.

That extremist force also makes Assad look prophetic – he once spoke of “ten Afghanistans” in Syria once outside elements and extremists enter the fight. The Assad regime will say it has been proven right, as will Russia, China and Hezbollah

In addition, it divides Syria’s political opposition even more. An Al Qaeda group on the battlefield creates a quandary for other rebel groups: Do they bed down with these well-organized extremists or continue the lonely fight?

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/syria-live/are-we-seeing-bashar-al-assads-second-wind/article11222855/

Under the “no good options” umbrella comes the chemical weapons moment.

U.S. intelligence has concluded “with some degree of varying confidence,” that the Syrian government has used sarin gas as a weapon, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said. President Obama has said the use of chemical weapons would be a “game-changer” in the U.S. position on intervening in the Syrian civil war, and the letter to Congress reiterates that the use or transfer of chemical weapons in Syria is a “red line for the United States.” However, the letter also hints that a broad U.S. response is not imminent.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-26/obama-s-syria-red-line-tested-by-chemical-weapons-report.html

Despite a lack of conclusive evidence, the U.S. intelligence assessments that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale intensified pressure on President Obama to give yet more help to rebels fighting Assad.  And that goes back to the Hobson’s choice.

“This is a case where there is nothing but bad options,” said Anthony Cordesman, an expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Randa Slim of the Middle East Institute said Obama must take some kind of action or risk large-scale regime chemical attacks on opposition enclaves that Assad’s forces appear to be carving out around Damascus, the city of Homs and the border with Lebanon.

If Obama doesn’t “do something now,” she said, “we will see Assad upping the ante and using CW (chemical warfare) on a larger scale.” She agreed that Obama’s choices are “between bad and worse.”

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/25/189715/obamas-options-to-curb-syria-range.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter#storylink=cpy

Cordesman warned that sending U.S. special forces into Syria to destroy the regime’s chemical weapons stocks before they could be stolen or used in major attacks is too risky and would likely end in disaster. “It’s a great movie, but that’s where it ends,” he said.

That’s not the movie anyone thinks will be made.

(Photo credit: MSNBC Media)

Photo Credit: Elizabeth Arrott/VOA

by Abul-Hasanat Siddique and Casper Wuite

Abul-Hasanat Siddique and Casper Wuite, co-authors of The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction, talk about the political unrest in the Middle East, the Syrian Civil War, the globalization of media, and the future prospects for the region.

Is the unrest in the Middle East and North Africa homegrown or a Western-sponsored revolution for change?

Abul-Hasanat Siddique: Home-grown. Seeing the uprisings in the region as Western-sponsored “revolutions” is far from reality. Firstly, that view sees the populations in the region as passive recipients. It also negates the Arab people, particularly its youth populations, in their moment when they called or are still calling for freedom and dignity. That would also not do justice to the way foreign governments and local populations have acted on the ground.

In fact, Arab youth movements and political activists have been mobilizing for many years. The April 6th Movement in Egypt has been on the scene since 2008. Autocratic regimes in the region, most of whom are backed by the West, have long ignored their disgruntled people. Revolts were bound to happen at some point in the Arab world; a region which has seen poor economic growth, atrocious human rights records, and a growing youth population with high unemployment. Such issues have boiled up and created restive societies throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

Casper Wuite: What is true is that in some countries, particularly Libya, home grown revolutions with enough critical mass could simply not to be ignored by the West. The action the West subsequently undertook, however, was never part of a Cold War-type strategy to sponsor certain elements in the region.

Is the Middle East in a phase of transition from “dictatorship to democracy”? If so, will the Arab Uprisings pave the way for transitions in Syria, Jordan, and then Saudi Arabia as well?

Siddique: The plenitude of elections held in the wake of the Arab Uprisings in no way signifies a democracy, but merely a first step. True democratic reform takes a substantial amount of time to achieve; the history of Europe is a key example. Some parts of the region are in this long transitional period. The transitions occurring in countries like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have been rather complicated. However, in time, these countries will make (some) shifts towards democratic reform. This may take several years or even decades to achieve and it will not be easy.

Wuite: The Arab Uprisings are less likely to pave the way for transitions in Jordan and Saudi Arabia although incremental changes have been made particularly in Jordan. Yes, they face the same challenges: a demographic youth bulge and an economic reality that is increasingly at odds with the regime’s existing policies and practices. However, calls for reform are diluted by political and fiscal co-optation in both countries. On the other hand, in Syria the question is not so much whether we will see a transition soon, but rather whether a stable democracy will be its endpoint.

In your view, is Morsi capable of keeping a balance between Islamists and liberal forces within Egypt? Does Egypt dream of becoming a regional power under Morsi, as was the case during the Gamal Abdul Nasser era?

Siddique: At present, the president is clearly failing to keep the balance between the Islamist bloc and the liberal and secular forces. Post-Mubarak Egypt has further highlighted political polarization in the country. The political unrest over Morsi’s rather inexperienced and poor strategic move with his presidential decree and the ensuing referendum over the new constitution, has further deepened this polarization. Indeed, Egypt’s transition is very complicated and the judiciary is full of former Mubarak-era officials. But there are undoubtedly many within Egypt who are disengaged with Morsi, as they simply see him as a stooge for the Muslim Brotherhood’s policies. What he needs to do is truly engage all groups within Egypt, including secularists, liberals, women, and religious minorities. Indeed, he is the president for all Egyptian people and not one portion of society; he needs to realize this if Egypt is to move forward. Unilateral steps like initiating presidential decrees will not help Egypt; it will simply evoke more and more unrest and resentment within the country.

He also needs to reform the police and security forces. The unrest over the Port Said trials was a reaction against Morsi’s presidency, but also at the corrupt police and security forces. Whether or not Morsi made a deal with the military is up for question, but he very much needs to pursue those responsible for the death of protestors in 2011, and those still unaccounted for. The people want justice to be served.

Wuite: Indeed, many have argued that the current riots are a sign that the standoff between Morsi and the opposition is spiralling out of control. However, not every rioter is a member of either two groups. Many rioters are hooligans upset with the Port Said trials, or are youth settling scores with the police. Yet, one cannot deny that the political polarization is increasingly paralysing the country. What is thus instrumental in understanding the crisis, is that it is not simply that the political arena has lost its primacy of settling disputes to the streets. What has been crucial to the current standoff has been the extent to which democratic procedures and the rule of law have lost their primacy and how the remaining institutions, most notably the judiciary, have been politicized and turned into political fiefdoms.

Siddique: As for Nasser. Domestically, Morsi falls far short of living up to Nasser’s legacy within Egypt despite the late leader having been a dictator himself. Nasser is still held high within the country but also within the wider Arab world. With regards to being a regional power once again: Morsi clearly sees that Qatar and Turkey are making advances in becoming the regional hegemon. Saudi Arabia is shifting away from the fore-front of regional affairs, and Egypt has been in a complicated transitional period for over two years. However, it is highly unlikely that Egypt will return to the heights of Nasser’s pan-Arab dream. Simply put, pan-Arabism, as Nasser dreamed of it, is dead — it has been dead for decades.

That said, Morsi wants to develop further foreign ties. If his domestic policy fails, he at least wants his foreign policy to be worth something. If his foreign policy is to be deemed a “success,” however, a drastic development needs to be made with the Israeli-Palestinian peace-process. Pressure will need to put on the Palestinians, namely Hamas, while the U.S. will finally need to act as a genuine peace broker.

Did the Syrian conflict begin as a genuine uprising or a proxy-war? Will Bashar al-Assad fall to the opposition as with Libya?

Siddique: A genuine uprising that has turned into a proxy-war. There is a belief by some that the Syrian Civil War was instigated by a Western-led conspiracy to overthrow the Ba’athist regime in a bid to derail its ally in Iran. Notably, this is the same view held by Bashar al-Assad and his aides. The problem with that belief is it completely negates the start of the unrest in Syria and the history of the country under the Assad family. Let us not forget that the Syrian people rose up peacefully in a bid for genuine reforms as their counterparts had done so in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and so on. But they were met with force from the state. As time went by, some in the opposition took up arms to defend themselves. At the same time, however, some radical and extremist elements (with an affiliation to Al-Qaeda) in the Syrian opposition (some foreign) have capitalised on the conflict and begun calling for an Islamic state.

The Syrian people, those opposing the Ba’athist government, be they secular or Islamist, have genuine grievances against the Assad family which has been in power for over 40 years. Viewing the whole war, from the initial peaceful uprising, as a Western conspiracy ignores those grievances and sees the Syrian people as passive bystanders. The Syrian people should not be seen as a pawn for the U.S., Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Israel, and Iran, but instead as people who want their freedom and dignity.

As for Assad falling like Qaddafi did in Libya: the situation is different. The opposition in Libya had a base of “operations” in Benghazi. From there, they made advances westwards and were then backed by NATO airstrikes. That isn’t the case in Syria, as the armed opposition have only seized fragments across the country. There are also divisions within their ranks. In addition, while the Syrian Uprising did not begin as a sectarian battle, sections of the protagonists on the ground now see the civil war as a conflict between Sunnis and Alawites (and the wider Shi’a region). If Assad does fall, there is a genuine fear that the Alawite community could be targeted by extremists. Unlike Libya, the sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict today has meant that sections within Assad’s ranks are reluctant to defect to the opposition, and will continue to be reluctant unless genuine security promises are made. With the current stalemate, the civil war could last for a substantial amount of time. As with the Algerian and Lebanese civil wars, a negotiated settlement seems to be the only way forward. Whether the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition agree to any settlement is highly questionable.

How do you view the role of media coverage in “bridging the gaps” or “widening the gulf” in the Middle East?

Siddique: News media coverage and social media has been quite key in the Arab Uprisings, and with modern conflicts in general. A cousin of Mohammed Bouazizi — the Tunisian street seller whose self-immolation ignited the uprising in Sidi Bouzid — highlighted this very well. The cousin had sent mobile phone footage of the aftermath of Bouazizi’s self-immolation to Al Jazeera, who broadcasted it. Subsequent videos were sent to the broadcaster of the unrest in Sidi Bouzid. But as the cousin highlighted: protests in the Arab world are not unheard of, at least in the country (in question) itself. However, if the footage of the unrest hadn’t been shown on the news, it would have been as if protests hadn’t happened. It’s the whole “tree falling in the woods” issue: If no one hears about a protest, did it really happen?

And it is due to this, the globalization of media and its technological developments, that coverage of what is happening on the ground can be disseminated on an astonishing scale. Social media, and the wide-availability of satellite television, has allowed for videos, messages, and so, to be distributed to wide-spanning audiences much faster. This didn’t happen in the 1977 Bread Riots, or even in the Gulf War; the Gulf War was CNN’s moment to shine — there was no pan-Arab broadcaster like Al Jazeera. However, today, the biggest factor is that autocratic regimes can’t control these media developments. They have been hit by the reality of globalisation. Media is indeed helping to “bridge the gaps” between what the state allows and what its people want; the people who are getting the message out by whatever means necessary. Protests or conflict, no matter how big or small they are, will now always be “heard.”

How do you see the future scenario of the Middle East? Will stability be reached or will anarchy prevail?

Wuite: I agree with Stephen Waltz who argues that future scenarios of the Middle East can roughly be divided into three situations. Optimists will argue that the road will be bumpy for a while, but that the Arab Uprisings mark the end of an era of regional stagnation and will give way for economic development and liberal democracy. Others exercise more caution and argue that as political dynamism returns to the region, we should be careful of what we wish for. In other words, under the influence of popular sentiment, more capable and competent Arab regimes will not necessarily be more compliant. Lastly, pessimists will argue that although the Arab Uprisings will succeed in overturning a number of regimes, stable governance will not replace them everywhere. Instead, extremism and sectarianism will be rife in some countries.

Personally, I believe that any positive change will only be incremental and that given the state of the economy, social and regional polarization, and continued fiscal and political co-optation in the region, we should be cautious when it comes to the outcomes of the Arab Uprisings in most countries and flatly pessimistic when it comes to some others.

(The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction is available to purchase at Amazon. A paperback version is available at the SlimBooks store.)

Abul-Hasanat Siddique is the Managing Editor/Middle East Editor at Fair Observer. Having co-authored his first book called The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction, Abul-Hasanat’s main research interests lie in the upheaval sweeping the Middle East and North Africa, and the rise of political Islam. His other research interests lie in the history and future of the Israel-Palestine conflict. 

Previously, Abul-Hasanat worked as a News Editor for the Gorkana Group. He is currently completing his thesis for his MSc in Middle East Politics at the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London), exploring the notion of post-Islamism and the Arab Uprisings. He also holds a BSc (Hons) in Sociology and Media Studies from the City University London.

Having worked at Fair Observer since May 2011, Abul-Hasanat has been a pivotal figure with the growth and success of the company.

Casper Wuite is a Contributing Editor (Middle East) at Fair Observer. Currently based in Cairo, he writes on politics and development in the Arab world. Casper co-authored his first book called The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction.

As a contributing editor, Casper draws on a wide range of experiences in the region. He has worked as a policy officer for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lebanon, a development consultant for NGO’s in Egypt, and an international election observer for the National Democratic Institute in both Algeria (2012) and Egypt (2011).

Casper holds an MSc in Politics and Government from the London School of Economics (University of London).

This article has been published in full with the permission of the authors. The original article can be found here at Fair Observer. 

(AP Photo/Kamran Jebreili, File)

by Jennifer Norris

Americans who left the theatre watching “Zero Dark Thirty” thinking that the dark stain of torture is in our past, should be cautioned by our exit strategy in Afghanistan.

As a 2014 deadline for ending our combat mission in Afghanistan approaches, policymakers say that our main objective is to prepare Afghan security forces to fight terrorists so that Al Qaeda will never again establish a safe haven in the country.  To that end, U.S. forces have been working with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to build their capacity to provide for their own security.   The ANA and ANP, however, cost the U.S. billions of dollars a year, and there are still swaths of the country that the national army and national police cannot cover.

Faced with an impending withdrawal deadline and tightening budgets, the U.S. created another security entity, the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which is seen as an affordable short-term fix to filling the security vacuum.  However, the name Afghan Local Police is a misnomer used to provide legitimacy since members do not have police powers and are essentially village militias armed with AK-47s, hired to fight the Taliban and other anti-governmental elements.  Given the ALP’s prominence as a key feature of the U.S. exit strategy, General Petraus described the ALP program as “arguably the most critical element in our effort to help Afghanistan develop the capacity to secure itself.”

Despite some success in achieving security gains, the ALP program has proved to be a high-risk strategy, plagued by problems such as Taliban infiltration and insider attacks.  Most notably, the ALP program has been the source of much controversy due to complaints that members have committed human rights abuses against the local population with impunity. President Karzai recently expelled U.S. Special Forces from Wardak province due to allegations that American forces, and the Afghan Local Police they had trained, had tortured and killed Afghan civilians. Much of the media criticism focused on Karzai and his political motivations for making such an announcement.  While it is true that Karzai has proven to be an untrustworthy figure, even outrageously accusing the U.S. of colluding with the Taliban, allegations of human rights abuses committed by Afghan partners working with U.S. Special Forces should be taken seriously. President Obama’s commitment to end the war responsibly in Afghanistan should also include a commitment to ensure that the ALP program does not harm Afghans.

ALP units are established in volatile districts where the national army and police have little presence.  According to the official directive, ALP members are selected by local shura members and after passing a biometrics test, they receive three weeks of training by U.S. Special Forces.  They are paid about 60 percent of a police member’s salary and provided with AK-47s, radios and uniforms, and perform a range of duties from manning checkpoints to providing information about insurgents to security forces. Some 20,000 members are currently employed nation-wide.

The ALP is the brainchild of General Petraus, modeled after the Sons of Iraq (or Awakening Councils), which was a major centerpiece of the Iraq surge and largely credited with defeating the insurgency in Anbar province.     The Sons of Iraq (SOIs) were Sunni militias, employed by the U.S. military from 2007 to 2009, and were made up of many former insurgents who became disillusioned with the violence wreaked by Al Qaeda forces on Iraqis.  At its height, some 100,000 members were employed by the U.S. The U.S. promised SOI members they would eventually receive jobs within the Iraqi security forces. However, the Shiite-led Iraqi government, suspicious of the Sunni SOIs, remains reluctant to integrate them into the Iraqi military, police, and government or ministries. To date, only a small percentage of SOIs have received government jobs and many are left feeling isolated and disgruntled. The fate of the Sons of Iraq can be instructive to the future of the ALP because a central question is what happens to 30,000 former ALP members who are armed and unemployed once the U.S. can no longer afford to pay their salaries?  It is unlikely that ALP members will be absorbed into the Afghan army or national police simply due to a lack of funding.  In a public report, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) expressed concern that ALP members are only motivated by economic interests and will turn into an anti-government force after the U.S. withdraws.

There is more reason to be concerned about employing a program of U.S.-backed militias in Afghanistan – a country plagued by more than 30 years of war with a long history of abusive militias or gangs with guns.   Many of these militias have left behind a legacy of thuggery. Today, some Afghans have difficulty distinguishing between the ALP program and militias of the past.

Since the ALP program started in 2010, serious accusations have been lodged against ALP members, including rape and murder.  In May 2012, an ALP commander in Kunduz province and four of his men abducted an 18 year old girl, chained her to a wall, and repeatedly raped her for a week.   The girl’s father said she has threatened to set herself on fire if she does not get justice.  Human Rights Watch investigated an incident in Pul-e-Khurmi district in Baghlan province where four armed ALP members abducted a 13-year-old boy and took him to the house of the ALP commander and gang raped him.  In February 2011, an ALP unit in Shindand district in Herat province reportedly raided several homes, stole belongings, and beat residents.  One boy was also reportedly detained and beaten overnight by the same ALP unit in June 2011 and had nails hammered into his feet.  There have also been many complaints of ALP members demanding bribes or “Islamic taxes” from villagers.  Community members say that the national police have failed to investigate such incidents.

The ALP program implicates the U.S. Leahy Law, which prohibits U.S. military assistance to “foreign military units” if there is credible evidence that such units have committed gross violations of human rights.  However, there have been no financial cutbacks to the ALP program under the Leahy Law.  In fact, Congress has approved funding to expand the program to a total of 30,000 ALP members by the end of 2014 and the L.A. Times has reported that the Pentagon plans to ask Congress fund the program for another five years.

Despite safeguards to promote Afghan ownership, the ALP is largely viewed as a creation of the U.S. Under the official directive, ALP units should operate under the command and control of the local chief of police.   In practice however, the chief of police has little to no control over ALP units, especially since ALP units operate in areas where ANP cannot go.  As a result, ALP units operate relatively independently and are perceived to be an apparatus of the U.S. military.

Vetting is a serious concern.   Sometimes local strongmen are selected – former Taliban commanders, or warlords who yield influence on shura members. While engaging local shuras is a laudable objective, the truth is that as outsiders, it is difficult for U.S. officials to navigate a highly complex web of histories and tribal loyalties.  In Badghis province, a Taliban commander and 20 of his men were recruited into the ALP — the same men who were implicated in stoning a woman to death and a series of beheadings in the past.  Both Afghan and U.S. officials have used the ALP program as a way of persuading insurgents to lay down their arms and join the government by promising them jobs with ALP units.   Such quick fixes without regard for justice and reconciliation can create tension within these communities, for the regular Afghans who know exactly who the bad guys are and do not wish to see them in positions of power in their own villages.

In the end, any program where militias are trained and paid for by the U.S. government should be carefully reviewed. Congress must be better informed about the program, which is being implemented in America’s name and should ask for detailed plans from the Pentagon on measures taken to improve vetting and accountability over the ALP program. While some Pentagon officials defend the program by noting that no police program is perfect, it must be recognized that the ALP program is particularly vulnerable to problems due a general atmosphere of lawlessness in Afghanistan.  To presume that security gains outweigh any abuses suffered by the Afghan population would be a mistake for the United States, especially as it seeks to persuade the Afghan government to respect and promote human rights.  ISAF and the Afghan government must work together to ensure that there is greater oversight and control over ALP units by the national police and that mechanisms are in place to hold human rights abusers accountable.  It is especially important that all allegations of abuse are fully investigated and prosecuted.  In a country that has suffered from years of war, it is America’s responsibility to monitor this program and ensure greater protections for the local population.

Jennifer Norris is a lawyer specializing in international human rights law. She holds a J.D. from Benjamin Cardozo School of Law and a B.A. in political science from UC Santa Barbara. She recently worked for the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva in the treaty bodies division, specifically for the women’s rights treaty (CEDAW) and the child’s rights treaty (CRC) monitoring committees. She also worked for the UN political mission in Afghanistan as a Governance Officer and was stationed in Kunar province. Previously, she also worked for the International Rescue Committee in Iraq where she focused on refugee and IDP issues.

Jennifer credits her Peace Corps service in Benin, West Africa for cultivating her passion for human rights and international affairs.

Anniversaries are dangerous days.  There is often a flash of attention, lots of words and supposedly deep thought and meaningful promises. Then the sun goes down, and life goes on as before. The world often notes an anniversary without real thought or determination on how to take the steps needed to make it meaningful.

As the second anniversary of the civil war in Syria passes, there continues a swirl of uncertainty with that nation and similarities to the sad disillusionment of past anniversaries elsewhere.

Among the items on Syria’s anniversary table: Military leaders of the Syrian rebel force denounce the new head of the civilian political opposition, Iraq continues to let Iranian flights to Syria pass overhead uninterrupted, reports of the one million refugee has crossed the border and of increased military aid to the rebels, new worries about chemical weapons, and Israel and Turkey making up with each other, which has longer term implications for Syria and the broader Middle East power dynamic.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/25/syria-qatari-influence-rebels-arab-league

Now, what will tomorrow bestow?

To frame that response, perhaps other March anniversaries may lend perspective. This same time period has brought the 10^th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, the 25^th anniversary of the chemical gassing of Kurds in Halabja, the 35^th anniversary of the United Nation’s ongoing mission in Lebanon and the 40^th anniversary of the U.S. troop exit from South Vietnam. What lessons have been learned from those anniversaries and, crucially, what knowledge has been applied other than March being an ominous month for anniversaries?

Sadly, very little.

The uprising started with anti-government protests on March 15, 2011, escalated as residents of Deraa took to the streets after troops arrested teenagers who scrawled anti-regime graffiti on a wall, then metastasized into a civil war with an estimated 70,000 people killed, according to the U.N. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said it is “deplorable” that people are getting used to the fact so many civilians are being killed each day in Syria. “These ongoing violations of international humanitarian law and of basic humanitarian principles by all sides must stop,” said Robert Mardini, who heads the Red Cross’ regional operations.

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/03/2013315112715330950.html

Good luck with that demand.

With the exception of Aleppo, which is divided between loyalists and insurgents, the government still maintains its hold on Syria’s largest cities. It has resorted increasingly to airstrikes, artillery barrages and surface-to-surface missile attacks to reach rebel-held areas where loyalist ground troops no longer operate.

Now, as the third year of the war begins, we see more of the stories that were written about the Bosnia conflict emerging from Syria – including such “down the road” stories as the U.N. warning about a lost generation of young people and how those crucial middle class skilled workers and thinkers are fleeing to seek lives elsewhere.

http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97736/Syria-s-brain-drain-another-twist-to-the-country-s-crisis

The son of a former colleague is doing a paper on genocide and recently asked me some questions about the genocide in Bosnia.  Among those posed: what did the world learn from Bosnia? The question pinpoints a key issue; the answer is realizing the crevice between learning and then applying that knowledge.

The world cannot always stop genocide, yet it can often take steps to mitigate in and sometime stop it. It chooses not to.

The Bosnia intervention lesson is clear: The bullies would continue until stopped and, like many bullies, they were not going to mess with someone stronger. While it was fun for them to humiliate and shoot at U.N. troops from some nations, when Canadians and British were involved, there was less of that. And when their fear – that a U.S. backed NATO mission would occur – came true, they backed down.

That lesson is specific to Bosnia in the 1990s and not easy transferable to Syria. Assad is fighting for his life, unlike the Bosnia Serbs who were fighting for power and greed. Careful specific steps are needed.

The Washington Post does not want caution. It predicts Syria will crack into pieces controlled by rival authorities, with fighting along sectarian lines and between extremist and moderate Sunnis, fighting will spread into Lebanon and Iraq, with the possible use of chemical or biological weapons. “The means to prevent this implosion are the same that could have stopped the ignition of the civil war: aggressive intervention by the United States and its allies to protect the opposition and civilians. This would not require ground troops, only more training and the supply of heavy weapons to the rebels, and airstrikes to eliminate the regime’s warplanes, missiles and, if necessary, chemical weapons. The recognition of an alternative government led by the civilian Syrian National Coalition would send the message to wavering regime supporters that it was time to defect and would help to isolate al-Qaeda before it is too late,” the Post opined.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-bloody-second-anniversary-of-syrias-civil-war/2013/03/14/e5c96dc4-8bf9-11e2-b63f-f53fb9f2fcb4_story.html

Yet those steps are already feeble as the Syrians themselves resort to bickering. Today in Syria, a common thread is optimism running low and anger increasing at the west.

Anniversaries in March. Beware those ides.

(Photo credit: Global Post)

With the French military intervention in Mali shifting to a more sustained action, the reality of the long, hard slog in the Mali region has triggered inevitable questions by diplomats, policy planners and many others as to what defines success – and what comes next? 

Most mouthed answer: “Somalia.” 

That’s correct.  The place where humanitarian intervention went bad in a major way, where Black Hawk Down became a symbol of how fraught Africa intervention can be that it scored America so badly that the U.S. sat back and watched Rwanda bleed and did all it could to avoid intervention, is now seen as the template solution for Mali. 

This really does stop one in the tracks.

Yet on occasion reality demands action. And the successes, as they are, are few and far between.  

A classic failed state, Somalia was a hub and major enclave for al-Qaeda. The West, with African help, tried repeatedly to turn things around, and suddenly the right mix appeared. A combined military and diplomatic effort got democracy back in Somalia and al-Qaeda on the defensive. Earlier this year, the U.S. formally recognized the government of Somalia for the first time in more than two decades. 

Success! At least for the moment.

For years, Somalia looked similar to how Mali was in January. The al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab controlled a vast territory, was able to implement its harsh version of sharia law, and easily struck outside the country’s borders. But then al-Shabaab mishandled the 2011 drought that wracked the region, exacerbating the crisis by accusing humanitarian organizations of trying to spread Christianity then ejecting them from areas it controlled. Meanwhile, the U.S. developed a strategy for reversing al-Shabaab’s gains that included supporting African Union counterinsurgency efforts and recruiting Somali groups to to function as proxies against the extremists, building an indigenous Somali intelligence network, and employing “decapitation” strikes (often employing drones) against al-Shabaab leaders. 

http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/01/16/us-official-mali-success-should-be-shaped-by-somalia

Defeated in Somalia, al-Qaeda found Mali, which became the biggest territory held by al-Qaeda and its allies. “Al-Qaeda never owned Afghanistan,” said former United Nations diplomat Robert Fowler, a Canadian kidnapped and held for 130 days by al-Qaeda’s local chapter. “They do own northern Mali.”

That was before the French action. Yet al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, known as AQIM, still operates not just in Mali, but also in a 7,000-kilometer long ribbon of land that runs across the widest part of Africa and includes sections of Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Libya, Burkina Faso and Chad.

Experts caution in assuming that what seemed to work in one part of Africa will work in another. It is difficult to suppress a group roaming around in the Sahara; also, unlike the focused militaries of Uganda and Kenya that played such an important role in Somalia, Mali’s neighbors are, in the best of times, fragile states with extremely limited political and military capacities.  The strong nations have yet to contribute troops.

http://allafrica.com/stories/201302250069.html

That was highlighted over the weekend when more than a dozen Chadian soldiers were killed in clashes with al-Qaeda, the heaviest single incident losses by African troops since the campaign began six weeks ago.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/24/us-mali-rebels-chad-idUSBRE91N09A20130224

The Somalia success of the moment needs to be leavened with the yeast of recent history. For example, the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 appeared successful for a short time — that is, before the insurgency sparked.  Afghanistan burst as a shimmering success after the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance quickly displaced the Taliban following the 9/11 attacks, but preventing the Taliban’s resurgence has been elusive. Iraq, of course, is fraught with issues, despite the somewhat rapid fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

In some years, we may see that the current talk of Somalia as a template will appear every bit as wishin’ and hopin’ and thinkin’ and prayin’ as the talk in 2003 that the Iraq war was the ideal way for the U.S. to remove Middle Eastern dictators.

Yet we like how one size must fit all, even if forced to fit. Other than the Philippines success right after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. antiterrorism schemes have fallen short.

The U.S. African Command, independent since 2008, still does not have a physical home on the continent – no country will take it – but the U.S. is opening its third drone base on the continent, this time in Niger’s capital, Niamey. Military officials would like to eventually move it north to the city of Agadez, which is closer to the parts of Mali where al-Qaeda cells have taken root, but “not [it's] feasible at this point.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/world/africa/in-niger-us-troops-set-up-drone-base.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

The jihadists already distribute tip sheets on how to avoid drones.

http://www.indianapolisrecorder.com/news/international/article_3c7b6bae-7f66-11e2-a545-0019bb2963f4.html

New page in an undefined war, new style — the question remains, new outcome? Conventional wisdom is often the drug of failure.

(Photo credit: PASCAL GUYOT / AFP / Getty Images)

Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Francisco V. Govea II/Released

By Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, Middle East Institute Scholar-In-Residence

Assertions and opinions in this publication are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.

Washington and Kabul have welcomed increased Pakistani cooperation in finding a political solution to the Afghan conflict. Pakistan’s willingness to release 18 Taliban-held prisoners with the promise of more is seen as demonstrating a significant change in Pakistan’s approach to a settlement. But in reality Pakistan has for some time been trying to coax the Taliban to join a coalition government in Kabul. A power-sharing arrangement would go far in confronting what Pakistan perceives as acute security threats arising from an unsettled Afghanistan: a military encirclement by India and an outcome in the Afghan conflict that promotes the forces of extremism in Pakistan.

So why has Pakistan until now appeared reluctant to facilitate negotiations with the Taliban? Simply put, it has needed to be confident that its prime security interests would be satisfied in a negotiated peace. Standing in the way of such assurance has been Afghanistan’s depiction of its neighbor as almost solely responsible for sustaining the insurgency, as well as an absence of trust between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban leaderships. The first impediment has eased as the Kabul government, acting through its High Peace Council, has come to the realization that a peace agreement cannot be achieved without the inclusion of Pakistan in the negotiating process. Moreover, if the two countries can agree on the contours of a political settlement, it could open a second negotiating track alongside bilateral talks between the U.S. and the Taliban, thus possibly precluding the Americans striking a deal that prioritized U.S. interests.

Before Pakistan can throw its full weight behind negotiations it needs to be certain of having Taliban interlocutors of its own choosing. It is often assumed that because Pakistan offers sanctuary to Mullah Omar’s mainline Taliban, the Haqqani network, and Gulbudeen’s Hekmatyar’s Hizb–e-Islami that its intelligence agencies exercise strong leverage with these groups. In reality, the Taliban have always resisted and resented being dictated to by Pakistan. Their aims as well as strategies are often at odds. Heavy pressure on the Taliban stands the risk of having the Taliban align with Pakistan’s Islamic militants in opposing the state. There is also reluctance to alienate the Taliban while they still figure in Pakistan’s contingency plans in the event of a disintegrating Afghanistan.

While Pakistan may still value the Taliban as its ethnic Pashtun proxy in Afghanistan, it has shed any illusion that a strategy based on promoting Pashtun dominance can bring about a deferential, stable Afghanistan. This is not the political landscape of the 1990s when a largely indifferent world watched the Taliban progressively roll over hated warlords and put their Islamic stamp on an anarchic country. Today’s Afghanistan has many more powerful domestic stakeholders who will resist a takeover and a far more concerned international community. If there is to be a political settlement in Afghanistan and civil war averted then it must be inclusive of the major Afghan power centers. But getting the Taliban’s traditional adversaries to accept that it is safe to cohabit a political system with the Taliban will take a major selling job for Pakistan and far-reaching compromises by the Taliban. The Pakistanis’ failure to date to get the Taliban leadership to yield on key constitutional issues or break ties to Al Qaeda suggests that a more flexible approach to negotiations will not come from Pakistan’s pressure but when the Taliban’s core leadership is ready to change.

Without a negotiated peace, Pakistan has reason to fear its being drawn into a costly and dangerous proxy conflict should Iran, Russia and India again back those forces resisting the Taliban. Pakistan faces the prospect that millions of Afghans will again seek refuge in Pakistan, thus putting enormous strain on a country now even less able to receive them. This time around Pakistan is not anxious to see the Taliban score an outright victory in Afghanistan, whether militarily or politically. The Pakistani military has concluded that it would be only a matter of time before the Taliban join with Pakistan’s Islamic militants in trying to impose a Sharia state. The optimal outcome for Pakistan, its strategists have reasoned, would be having the Taliban included in a coalition government where they could check Indian influence and immersed in the politics of Afghanistan, diverting them from pursuing any broader Islamic ambitions.

Recent diplomatic activity notwithstanding, the prospects for a compromise agreement any time soon remain dim. There is no hurting stalemate. The Taliban fight a relative low cost insurgency where a few high profile attacks are all that is needed to give the impression that the Taliban are relentless adversaries, probably impossible to defeat. Simple logic says to hold on until the presidential election when disputed results could cause the prevailing political system to lose legitimacy.  Still more compelling is the case for waiting until it becomes clear as to whether the Afghan security forces can fight with any effectiveness or can even keep from breaking up once most foreign forces have departed.

If there is anything that might entice the Taliban’s leadership into peace negotiations, it is the kind of proposals that the High Peace Council has recently carried to Islamabad for Pakistan’s endorsement. Its terms would seem to offer the Taliban an opportunity to take effective control of Afghanistan’s south and east in exchange for joining the country’s political process. Pakistan may be initially attracted to the idea of a Pashtun buffer zone at its border or see a settlement as undermining its own insurgency. But Pakistan seems short sighted; were the Taliban to assume power in the Pashtun heartland, Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan would effectively disappear and the foundations would be laid for the creation of a Pashtunistan. So while Pakistan continues to search for a political outcome to the Afghan conflict, it may get far more than it bargained for.

Dr. Marvin Weinbaum was an Afghanistan and Pakistan Analyst at the Bureau of Intelligence Research at the U.S. Department of State from 1999 to 2003. He is a Professor Emeritus at the University of Illinois and served as Director of the South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies program. He was a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (1996–1997), and held Fulbright Research Fellowships for Afghanistan (1989–1990) and Egypt (1981–1982). 

He has authored numerous books, chapters and articles, including “Human Rights, Culture, and Politics in Northern Tier Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan” (2003) and Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (1994).

Extremist groups in northern Mali hope to carve out a safe haven and rule under Sharia law.

With the election of President Barack Obama to a second term as President of the United States, the operational realities of an exit strategy for U.S. forces to leave Afghanistan by 2014 began to be put into place. Obama campaigned strongly on the notion of turning the security of Afghanistan over to the national forces in two years, and this plan appears to be coming to fruition as transition talks are already being held to prepare for the departure of over 60,000 U.S. troops.

The elimination of Osama Bin Laden and over 13 years of war waged inside the country have destabilized the al-Qaeda stronghold provided by the Taliban. And while the notorious terrorist group may never be completely extinguished inside Afghanistan or its duplicitous neighbor, Pakistan, the work done by U.S. forces in both countries have dealt major blows to the organization’s regional position.

Now the current leadership for al-Qaeda and other terrorist cells have been scrambling for a new safe haven to regroup and plot terror attacks to unleash their global jihad. Unfortunately they may have found it in the lawless lands of West Africa.

When a coup shook the poor West African nation of Mali back in March, extremist groups with ties to al-Qaeda saw their opportunity and seized it. Originally, a separatist group of Tuaregs — a minority people that populate the northern territories of the country — took control in order to advance their plans for the creation of a separate Tuareg state. However, just three short months later, the Tuaregs were forced to flee into neighboring Burkina Faso as extremist al-Qaeda linked groups chased them out, enlisting a new rule that was based on Sharia Law. Three such groups now maintain a stranglehold over the north, governing with Islamic extremist authority and providing a potential safe haven for al-Qaeda to regroup.

In addition, continued violence in the northeast region of nearby Nigeria by the extremist Muslim group Boko Haram have produced another hotbed for international terrorist cells and Islamic extremists. Recently, the organization announced its affiliation with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Boko Haram has used brutal terrorist tactics to kill 770 people so far in 2012, making it the worst year for deaths attributed to the group. They also have aspirations of overthrowing the Nigerian government and also enlisting a rule based on Sharia law.

These two situations are just the latest in the growing trend of Islamic extremists in Africa. Until recently much of southern Somalia was controlled by the al-Qaeda affiliated group al-Shabaab. Although an African Union force recently derailed the organization and seized control of much of the country — which has been controlled by militants for over two decades — al-Shabaab remains a threat to the Horn of Africa, especially neighboring Kenya.

At a speech last week at George Washington University, General Carter Ham — leader of the U.S. African Command — told a forum that he was concerned about cooperation among the extremist Islamic groups that continue to populate the continent. He noted that intelligence has already shown a level of unification between organizations in Mali, such as Ansar Dine, and Boko Haram of Nigeria. He urged the promotion of an African solution, as was the case in Somalia, to quell the emergence of these threats throughout the continent.

Whether the U.S. will take a backseat to any African coalition over the long-term is unclear. What is clear is that an alarming number of Islamic extremist groups are arising all across Africa. This poses a major security threat to both Africa and the West. These groups must not be allowed to carve out a base of operations anywhere on the continent. Any functioning safe haven for a terrorist cell can provide the means to carry out attacks on an international scale, threatening the peace of the global environment. It has become common practice for al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups to migrate to regions that provide the most instability. With the problems occurring in Mali, Nigeria, Libya and Somalia, as well as a number of fragile, adolescent or nonexistent democracies present in Africa, the threat of the continent turning into a hotbed for Islamic extremism is very real. While the West focuses their interests on the Middle East, they must also keep a close eye on this alarming rise of extremists in Africa and recognize this as the potential new threat to the global community.

Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda, Uganda’s Minister for Communications and Information, said that his country felt “stabbed in the back” over a leaked U.N. report implicated Uganda in providing support to M23 rebels in the DRC. Uganda has threatened to withdraw troops from all U.N. and A.U. missions.

A U.N. report leaked last month to Reuters indicated that both Uganda and Rwanda were supporting M23 rebels in the North Kivu Province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The confidential report stated that while Rwanda’s Defense Minister, James Kabarebe, was actually commanding the rebel group, Uganda was also guilty of supplying arms and soldiers, while providing a safe haven for the political branch of the rebellion to operate inside of Kampala.

Both countries have fervently denied any involvement and Uganda’s Minister of Communications  and Information Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda, stated that Uganda felt “stabbed in the back” by such accusations in a meeting with the Security Council. Uganda has now threatened to withdraw all troops from regional missions that are backed by both the U.N. and the African Union (A.U.).

While the U.N. should foster some concern over the fact that these supposed “confidential reports” on the rebellion in the eastern DRC continued to be leaked to the media, the more overwhelming challenge is how to diplomatically deal with Uganda by jointly condemning such actions and maintaining crucial support in peacekeeping missions in Somalia, The Central African Republic (CAR) and the DRC. (Ugandan troops have been operating in the the northeastern section of the DRC in conjunction with approximately 100 U.S. soldiers to hunt down Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army or LRA.)

The problem with these allegations is that Uganda supplies essential forces to many peacekeeping missions in the region, most notably to AMISOM — the joint A.U. and U.N. mandated mission to Somalia — which has enjoyed huge success as of late, as an AMISOM coalition, together with Kenyan troops, took the port of Kismayo from the terrorist group al-Shabaab last month, obtaining control over what is believed to be the last al-Shabaab stronghold. Uganda currently supplies over one-third of the approximately 17,000 soldiers operating in Somalia. Withdrawing these units from the fray could have dire consequences in maintaining control of the areas recently seized from al-Shabaab insurgents. The Somali Prime Minister stated that it would be a challenge to hold this domain and that any reduction in troops could hand the advantage to the insurgents. Al-Shabaab has long been known to provide refuge and support to al-Qaeda.

The U.S.  issued a statement on Monday that they expect Uganda soldiers to remain in Somalia, while the UN Security Council extended AMISOM’s mandate for another four months.

Both missions in which Uganda has played a prominent role as a stabilizing force are vital to maintaining fragile peace on the continent. Somalia — which has long been a lawless haven for terrorists and militants — was able to hold its first presidential elections in decades because of the gains made by AMISOM. The fight against the LRA — which has been ongoing since 1986 — remains important for communities in the DRC, CAR and South Sudan, as Kony’s troops have perpetuated a long and dark history of murder, mutilation, pillaging and kidnapping to any surrounding civilian communities that cross their path. It is believed that the small number of remaining LRA loyalists are now operating on the border of CAR, DRC and South Sudan, ravaging local villages for supplies and forcefully enlisting child soldiers and female slaves to swell their numbers.

If these mandates, in which Uganda has provided important support, are carried out, it would provide closure to two of the longest standing feuds on the continent.

At this point, the United Nations Security Council must walk a fine line. Although the accusations against Uganda, if founded, should be condemned and warrant punishment of some sort, the consequences of cornering Uganda into pulling troops out of crucial conflicts could leave both missions reeling. If the report had not been leaked in the first place, then the U.N. would have ample time to take a diplomatic course in dealing with this challenge. However, since this is not the case, the Security Council may be forced to make a difficult decision regarding Somalia, the LRA and the DRC, one or more of which will certainly falter as a consequence. If this scenario unfolds, then the gains to achieving sustainable peace and stability in the region may come unhinged. Let’s hope, for the sake of the region, that the Ugandan threats are empty and peaceful resolve can be achieved in all of three areas.

“Abu Bakr Baghdadi Emir of the Islamic State of Iraq”

“You will soon witness how attacks will resound in the heart of your land, because our war with you has now started…“

- Abu Bakr Baghdadi

Presaging the latest wave of violence in Iraq, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) released a recorded message, heralding the start of Ramadan. The speaker, believed to be Abu Bakr Baghdadi (the name, itself, has become something of an heirloom nom de guerre), foretold a new campaign of violence against the Iraqi government, heralded the Syrian uprising, and directly threatened Americans. Not those Americans still stationed in Iraq – forgotten on the home-front as they while away in bureaucratic limbo. No, Baghdadi has promised to bring the war in Iraq to us here in the States. And yesterday, at a House Committee on Homeland Security briefing, the issue was addressed by Congress.

Representative Michael McCaul (R-Texas) spoke to the threat and offered a realistic assessment: Attacking the United States proves easier said than done, but now’s the time to stiffen our guard.

“…When you have the leader signaling that it is time to go on the offensive, there is a heightened sense of concern for law enforcement and intelligence agencies here in the U.S.”

Fair enough. Of course, this isn’t the first time America has faced a “threat” from AQI.

The L.A. Times reminds us:

Two Iraqi refugees were arrested in Kentucky in May of last year and charged with attempting to ship weapons from the U.S. to assist Al Qaeda in Iraq. The fingerprint of one of the men had allegedly been found on a bomb that attacked a U.S. convoy in Iraq in 2005. Federal officials believe the two men had been trained to build roadside bombs from cordless telephones.

In January 2011, a Canadian man named Faruq Isa was arrested for allegedly recruiting fighters to launch attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq. Isa is fighting extradition to the U.S. from Canada to face charges of conspiracy to kill Americans.

The former incident consisted of two ham-fisted, would-be jihadists ensnared in an FBI plot that lured them into action. The latter incident involved a more serious threat that cost five American soldiers and seven Iraqi police officers their lives – in Iraq. Tragic, nonetheless, but impossible to construe as an attack – or even a threat – against the North American mainland.

I’m inclined to presume Baghdadi’s threats ring hollow when directed against Americans living in America. However, on the ground in Iraq, his organization’s ability to mobilize the mechanics of terror is clearly on the uptick. With fighters waging war against the Assad regime, some Iraqis have expressed fears that a slow-burning civil war in Syria would provide a new toe-hold for extremists, bent on engulfing the region in the flames of sectarian conflict.

In an odd way, this might distort Baghdadi’s human capital. Consider this passage regarding the shape and stature of the 2012-iteration of al Qaeda, prepared this year by Rand Corp.’s Michael Jenkins:

A weakened but still lethal al Qaeda in Iraq continues its campaign of terror aimed at Iraqi government officials, Sunni tribal leaders who have turned against it, and members of the Shia community, in an effort to provoke a sectarian civil war between the country’s Sunni and Shia communities as the remaining American forces are withdrawn. One of the West’s greatest concerns is that these experienced, technically savvy veterans of al Qaeda’s terrorist campaign in Iraq will slip into the West, elevating the domestic terrorist threat.

With all hands on deck in the battle for Syria, one wonders whether AQI can effectively wage a two front war. Only time will tell.

Al Qaeda in Iraq since 2003!

Way back in February I expanded on a report in the Christian Science Monitor that suggested al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had set up shop against the Assad regime, in Syria. Writing both here and for The American Spectator, I joined the chorus of analysts, academics and pundits who urged caution against arming Syrian rebels – precisely because it’s unthinkable to equip battle-hardened veterans of an Iraqi insurgency who cut their teeth fighting American servicemen in the street of Fallujah, Tikrit, et al. 

These initial warnings surfaced around the time al Qaeda’s de facto leader, Ayman al Zawahiri, urged Levatine Islamists of all shapes and sizes to take the fight to Damascus. In essence, he was appealing to members of the most-radicalized membership of the Ikhwan movement and violent Salafists, many of whom live on the eastern side of the shared, 600 mile border between Syria and Iraq.

Needless to say, rank-and-file types serving in such organizations as AQI, the United Jihad Factions, Jaish al-Rashidun, and the Islamic Army in Iraq weren’t necessarily produced by a monolithic, indigenous militant Islamist movement in Iraq. They came from other countries. Many of them came from Syria. And now they’ve returned home.

This latter statement was confirmed by Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, on Thursday. AP reports suggested leadership in Baghdad feared an extremist toehold in Syria – Zebari elaborated cautiously, but did state his main concern is “extremist, terrorist groups taking root in neighboring countries.”

An understandable concern, given the current state of Iraq – a country so fragile, it exists in a perpetual state of simmering self-implosion. A famous German proverb states that a long war leaves a country with three armies – an army of cripples, an army of mourners, and an army of thieves. While the latter force occupies the parliament in Baghdad, one might argue a fourth army manifested itself in the Iraq war, and it’s now pitched camp in Syria.

Lest we make the same mistakes again; let us recognize the latest confirmation of collateral damage wrought by war in Iraq – when first we beheaded (if not quite literally) our unlikely Iranian counterbalance and ally in the war on radical Islam, Mssr. Saddam Hussein. The Butcher of Baghdad was a vile despot. His tyranny represented the petty archaism of socialist Pan-Arabism, and his iron fist throttled the lifeblood of his countrymen. But coalition war on Iraqi Arabs cultivated popular protest – the sort of social upheaval  that resulted in the ouster of two of America’s most-unpopular proxies, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Of course this was before the NATO bombing campaign over Libya created a migration crisis that ultimately destabilized Mali.

Before the next Turkish plane gets shot down, I’d expect Ankara to demand a contingency plan from fellow NATO members. Well, it’s time to “just say no” to any military intervention (“kinetic,” supportive, or otherwise) and tone down the insatiable instinct to intervene.

Why is it that the media in the West seem to fixate on some stories while completely ignoring others? The strategic analysis firm Stratfor recently sent their subscribers a report by Robert Kaplan that contained the following quote that provides an insightful answer:

The media love people stories; they love to humanize everything about a foreign country. Therefore, you have the obsession with individual Chinese dissidents to the exclusion of other critical developments in China… The media deal with drama — sudden developments, not with gradual transitions such as China’s acquisition of a formidable navy and civilian maritime force. We become preoccupied with the minutiae of every twist and turn in Egypt, Syria and Libya, even as we become blind to a larger and equally profound development elsewhere.

This nicely explains why those stories easily marketable with dramatic (or dare I say sensational) human interest angles dominate Western mainstream media. Don’t get me wrong–I like a good human interest story as much as the next person, but I think the explanation only goes so far. Take, for example, the case of Nigeria. There is a militant Islamist group there responsible for a series of atrocious attacks on schools, police stations and churches. Their goal is to impose Sharia law on the country and they attack any group–government, military or civilian–that they see as representing Western values. Their name, Boko Haram, actually means “Western education is sinful,” and this explains why they target schools and are particularly against educating girls.

So, think about this for a minute in terms of the human interest angle: schools and churches are being attacked over a long period of time with hundreds of people killed in a rising tide of sectarian bloodshed. Where are the dramatic interviews with local teachers about the attacks on schools, with police chiefs about the attacks on police stations, or with pastors about the attacks on churches? The stories practically write themselves. And, of course, I’m cynically assuming here that the human interest stories are required to provide the “hook” needed to tell the compelling story about why the U.S. and the West have an interest in the stability of a strategically important oil-rich country as well as an interest in making sure that Boko Haram doesn’t begin to coordinate attacks with al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Still, our media is silent. Ask most Americans about the violence in Nigeria and you will draw a blank.

If it seems like the carnage in Nigeria has been overlooked by our media, it has not fully escaped notice. The U.N. has condemned the attacks and warned that continued attacks on churches and civilians could be considered crimes against humanity. The U.S. State Department imposed sanctions last week on three leaders of the Boko Haram, and Senator Scott Brown (R-MA) introduced legislation last month that would officially designate Boko Haram a foreign terrorist organization. These are important steps, to be sure; it’s just a shame that our media seems to be missing in action.

Image Credit: AFP/Getty Images; Source: Guardian.co.uk

There were many dangers faced by reporters during the four-year Bosnia war. Gunfire. Freezing. Food poisoning. Checkpoints manned by drugged out crazies. Yet one fear stood out, and it was usually away from the fighting.

That was going to Zenica, a city in the central part of the area controlled by the Bosnian government. The danger was something new – and a harbinger of things to come. Zenica was the bastion of the radical Muslim extremists who came to Bosnia to help their beleaguered Muslim brothers – or at least, on paper that was the reason. The real reason, as we all learned, was to get a new beachhead in their effort to purify Islam and the world.  They quickly took over Zenica and made it clear that any outsiders, especially western media, were extremely unwelcome.

This less than pleasant memory rears back into the mind as reports continue to filter in about more and more “foreign fighters” entering the fray in Syria. That will certainly mean one thing: any resolution of the conflict in Syria will immediately become even more complicated – and any tentative peace that may stumble from a settlement will be constantly pockmarked by these elements.

That harbinger of things to come is real.

Four weeks into the cease-fire that never really ceased, those in the outside world hoping to seek change in Syria are once again frustrated and befuddled. To many it seems clear that Syrian President Assad has no desire to yield anything, anywhere. The cease-fire seemed more like a pause to reload, regroup and relocate his churning offensive strategy.

The longer it takes for the west or the Arab League or the U.N. or anyone to find the determination to stop the carnage and try and have change happen, the more time the “foreign fighters” flowing into Syria will have to take root and become a festering, ongoing problem.

They fight for their causes. That is the only thing they believe in. Neither side should cheer their arrival.

Between 1996 and 2001, many of the former fighters occupied Bocinja, a town near Zenica, which had been a Serbian village in central Bosnia. The fighters lived there under Sharia law until they were evicted by the government, and they dispersed throughout central Bosnia.

Why were they permitted to come in the first place? Because no one else would help the Bosnians. An arms embargo only hurt them and the diplomatic niceties and timidity kept the Bosnians at a severe military disadvantage.

Sound familiar?

Many of these 3,000 to 4,000 foreign fighters who went to Bosnia were veterans of the war in Afghanistan and were wanted in their own countries. They were linked to violent Islamic groups struggling to overthrow the governments in Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In their zeal to enforce a militant form of Islam that most Bosnian Muslims themselves did not espouse, the fighters, distinctive in their flowing black beards, forced United Nations vehicles off the road, smashed bottles of alcohol in shop windows and warned Christian families at gunpoint to leave Bosnia.

It was so dangerous that British aid workers had their homes attacked and spray-painted with Arabic slogans, forcing most to leave left Zenica — – which was populated by some who later went on to greater roles in Al Qaeda.

Ancient history? Hardly. Last month prosecutors in Bosnia charged three men with terrorism over an attack on the U.S. embassy in the capital Sarajevo last year that raised questions over the threat from radical Islam in the Balkans. They still have their own agenda.

What does that mean for Syria and the region?

As the anti-Assad forces seek help, the same story is replaying. Syria has become a magnet for foreign fighters coming from Iraq, the rebel forces of the Libyan city of Misrata, from Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Lebanon. International media and numerous experts have attributed this massive affluence of foreign fighters to Al Qaeda’s call on Muslims to join the Syrian revolution and fight against Assad’s regime. http://unitedexplanations.org/english/2012/04/13/syria-a-new-destination-for-only-al-qaidas-foreign-fighters/

Syria is ripe for their picking. One year after the fighting started Syrians continue to die and Assad remains in power. The international community seems helpless. This is all very fertile ground for lawless foreign fighters. They do not need any ceasefire to enter.

Be clear, this is not the Spanish Civil War, where the Abraham Lincoln Brigade will leave when the war is over. In the end, both sides in Syria will pay the price.

From Bosnia to Chechnya to Afghanistan to the Middle East, the “foreign fighters” well trod road. Here is one chunk of food for thought for those in the Middle East: where do these fighters go next? Right down the street no doubt. That may finally motivate the Arab League to act.

The past week has been a particularly bloody one for Nigeria. Simultaneous attacks against This Day newspaper offices in Abuja and Kaduna killed nearly a dozen last week. Last weekend, gunmen attacked church services at Bayero University in Kano. Yesterday, the U.S. State Department released a statement emphasizing its concerns regarding continuous attacks against Christians. And on Monday, 11 people died in an IED attack against the police commissioner in Taraba State.

Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan who has frequently spoken out against Boko Haram, has ordered an increase in security throughout Abuja and the north, and has repeatedly attempted to negotiate

Security forces view the scene of a bomb explosion at St. Theresa Catholic Church at Madalla, Suleja, just outside Nigeria's capital Abuja, December 25, 2011. REUTERS/Afolabi Sotunde

with the group. However, Jonathan has yet to generate a strategy for addressing the security threat.

Nigerian civil societies, such as the Christian Association of Nigeria, are running low on patience. According to the group’s spokesman, Elder Sunday Oibe:

It seems that the government of [Nigeria] led by Goodluck Jonathan is helplessly looking on, always telling us that security men are on top of the situation.… We are telling President Goodluck Jonathan if he has not done anything to put an end to this madness, then, he should now that there is trouble in his hand.

Nigerians are not the only ones fearing for their security. Speaking at the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Chad’s autocratic Muslim leader Idriss Deby Itno demanded the creation of a joint deterrence force to stop Boko Haram before the group spreads it influence throughout the region: “Now is the time for action. We cannot save Lake Chad without eradicating this Boko Haram sect.” President of the Central African Republic Francois Bozize echoed Itno’s assertion: “A joint effort is needed to tackle insecurity in the region.”

Regional concerns are not unfounded. Boko Haram militants are known to have received training and resources from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Shabab in Somalia. Furthermore, documents recovered from Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad residence in Pakistan reportedly reveal that Boko Haram has been in contact with core members of al-Qaeda. Considering the latest instability throughout the Sahel, the opportunity for extremist groups to take advantage of the power vacuum is apparent.

It’s past time that Jonathan and his administration start taking Boko Haram seriously. Ignoring the problem will result only in escalating attacks and regional instability.

Aftermath of U.S. airstrikes in Yemen (AFP/BBC News)

Al-Qaeda, the terrorist group that seeks to establish the return of the Islamic Caliphate over the Muslim world is believed to have grown way beyond “containment security parameters,” posing a very real threat to Yemen’s national hegemony within in its own territories.

As Yemenis rose against President Ali Abdullah Saleh in the wake of Egyptian President Hosni Mubaraks’ resignation, hoping that they would also be able to facilitate a change in regime by the sheer will of the people, the Islamic terrorist group saw in the unrest that followed a perfect opportunity. Aware that the regime was concentrating its efforts on quelling the brewing rebellion, as it recalled most of its military forces back to the capital, Sana’a, where massive protests were being staged, the armed militants moved into position, ready to pounce on Yemen.

A few months into the Revolution, al-Qaeda militants traveled along the country southern provinces, knowing that the terrain and somewhat lawlessness would favor their advances. Yemen’s southern territories are largely controlled on tribal grounds, which prevents to some extent the central government from fully establish its authority in the region. The provinces therefore also serve as a breeding ground for groups like al-Qaeda.

The most infamous defector from the regime, General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who was once an ally of President Saleh, accused the incumbent of allowing the Islamic militants to roam the land in order to prove a point: to establish once and for all that only he could keep al-Qaeda at bay. President Saleh actually warned last year that with his departure al-Qaeda would soon move to the offensive, seizing several provinces and jeopardize the nation’s unity. Regardless of one’s belief, his foretelling of Yemen’s fall into darkness is materializing, striking fear at the heart of Yemenis.

The Caliphates

Seemingly, the elections that appointed Abdu Rabbo Mansour as Yemen’s new President signaled the beginning of al-Qaeda’s widespread military campaign across the country’s southern regions, with a surge in attacks of military bases and bombings against government buildings and officials. In a matter of weeks the group had declared two Caliphates in Yemen, claiming the southern provinces of Abyan and Shabwa.

Sources within the military and Yemen’s CTU have told the press that the militants are now moving dangerously close to controlling the southeastern province of Hadramaut, one of Yemen’s largest and natural resources rich regions. According to tribal leaders and local officials on Mukalla, al-Qaeda would have already spread out an impressive support network, warning that if the regional capital was to fall, nothing and no one would stop the militants from taking over and claiming control over the province.

Last week, pamphlets were posted all over Mukalla warning that whoever would side with the regime would be considered a traitor to Islam and therefore killed, a campaign that underscores the far reach of the group and its new daring approach. The Central Security Forces say an estimated 300 Jihadists are present on the ground and are currently training in the Azzan and Maifa’a directorates of the Shabwa governorate in preparation for an assault against Mukalla. If one bares in mind that 100 al-Qaeda fighters managed to slaughter their way through a reported 185 soldiers in Abyan last week, one can only imagine what tragedy could unfold if 300 were allowed to rain death on Mukalla.

Popular Outcry

Tens of thousands of Yemenis across the nation came out this Friday to denounce al-Qaeda’s attacks and massacres in Dofes and al-Qud, urging President Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi to execute the people’s revenge. Yemen is mourning its braves, waking up to the harsh reality of terrorism, which so far seemed to be a mere political tool, a myth without substance.

Wounded in its flesh, Yemen is now calling for a national strike against the group, with Yemenis across the political spectrum expressing their outrage and disgust. “We are very sad about what happened in the Dofes massacre,” said Mohamed Mohsen, a government employee. “Al-Qaeda has gone way beyond the red line, taking advantage of [Yemen's current] military and political divide. The time has come for the state to take revenge for its men and restore stability to these areas, especially since there are thousands of displaced people from Abyan who are enduring hardship because of al-Qaeda’s presence there.”

Hamoud al-Hattar, former minister of endowments and guidance, told the press that terrorist acts are contrary to Islamic law. “We condemn all terrorist acts that occurred after February 21st, including al-Qaeda’s attack on the presidential palace in Mukalla and Sunday’s incident in Dofes,” he said. “We called for the formation of a neutral commission of inquiry to investigate what happened, especially if there was dereliction on the part of members of the army.”

Political Manipulation

The Joint Meeting Parties, an umbrella group comprised of all political factions opposed to the incumbent  General People’s Congress, interestingly expressed their condemnation of al-Qaeda’s attack on Yemeni soil after Saleh’s loyalists advanced the possibility of a proxy war with al-Islah, Yemen’s Islamic party, who they say would attempt “to raise hell and finish off the Republic” in order to attain power. The theory is that al-Islah’s most radical militants would disguising themselves as al-Qaeda agents or possibly would have infiltrated al-Qaeda ranks to draw the regime into an armed conflict, weaken the central government and pounce on the presidential seat asserting al-Ahmar rise to ultimate domination.

Although some might categorize the conspiracy as borderline delusional, it cannot be ignored that certain figures amongst al-Islah have undeniable ties with the terrorist group. Names such as Sheikh Abdel-Mageed al-Zindani and Sheikh al-Dhahab are all high ranking leaders of al-Islah and alleged terrorists according to the U.S.

Saleh’s loyalists also supported their allegations by pointing out that only the Republican Guards and the Central Security Forces, both under the control of Saleh’s family members, had been targeted so far, proof that al-Islah was trying to get rid of the competition.

Who Can Save Yemen?

But beyond political manipulation is the fate of a nation, with people looking towards Sana’a for a strong military leader. With its armed forces in tatters and little to no unity, Yemen faces its toughest challenge yet. And while politicians from the opposition are clamoring for an immediate military restructuring, urging President Hadi to fulfill the terms of the power-transfer, the people are starting to wonder whether it would be wise to remove the very figures who could save the country from utter disaster.

“Not that I necessarily agree with them or even know what they stand for politically, I would rather keep Ahmed Saleh [the Head of the Republican Guards and Saleh’s eldest son] and Yehia Mohamed Saleh [the Head of the Central Security Forces and Saleh’s nephew] than put Yemen’s fate into the hands of others. At least they have been trained and are fully in control of their men. Who’s to say that the soldiers would follow another leader? We don’t need more problems. Hadi should postpone the restructuring until after al-Qaeda is destroyed,” said a University professor, Mohamed al-Ansi.

So far the Americans and the Saudis have been in favor of keeping those two main figures of the regime as they represent strategic allies, directly going against the JMP’s wishes as the latter seeks to appoint their own loyalists. With alarming reports warning against al-Qaeda’s plans to strike at the very heart of the Yemeni capital by targeting the U.S embassy and other state institutions, the government has raised the alarm to a maximum.

Sources said that al-Qaeda cells in the areas of Zindan and Arhab have trained for operations involving the storming of fortified sites, attacking fixed and mobile targets while aboard vehicles and motorbikes, and that al-Qaeda militants have entered Sana’a in preparation for carrying out their attacks in the coming few days.

The New America Foundation's drones database analyzes the reported number of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan since 2004.

I recently had the privilege to attend an event sponsored by The Aspen Institute’s Justice and Society Program entitled, “Targeted Killings and the Law of War.”  The roundtable discussion brought together leading experts in law and foreign policy, each of whom addressed if/how U.S. and international law apply to the practice of targeted killings. It was obvious from the nature of the questions and a quick glance through recent headlines that drone strikes dominate the debate – rightfully so given the onset of the new, advanced technology and the ease with which it can be utilized on (and off) the battlefield.

So far, drone strikes have reportedly been carried out in six countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Libya. According to the New America Foundation’s drones database, which analyzes U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, “283 reported drone strikes in northwest Pakistan, including 70 in 2011, from 2004 to the present have killed approximately between 1,717 and 2,680 individuals, of whom around 1,424 to 2,209 were described as militants in reliable press accounts.”

Two main themes are immediately clear. First, if you accept the premise that the U.S. is engaged in an armed conflict with non-state actors domiciled in foreign countries which are unable or unwilling to respond to an imminent threat of violence (however one defines ‘imminent’), do drone strikes adhere to international law according to the Geneva Conventions? Second, according to U.S. law, what rights, if any, are guaranteed to those individuals being targeted, especially if they are U.S. citizens as was the case with Anwar al-Awlaki? Should they be afforded an opportunity to surrender? What about due process and the role of the courts?

The event at The Aspen Institute made it clear that the answers to these questions remain unclear at best and non-existent at worst. Targeted killings will no doubt be a policy – covert or not – that faces increasing legal scrutiny at home and abroad. For that reason, and because after-the-fact adjudication is unlikely to happen in the near future, many experts are urging the executive and legislative branches to clarify the substantive and procedural law surrounding the use of targeted killings – before others attempt to do so for us.

 This piece was originally published in The School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution Newsletter, February 2012 edition.

(Photo Source: New America Foundation)