U.S. President Barack Obama checks to see if he still needs the umbrella held by a U.S. Marine to protect him from the rain during a joint news conference with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington, May 16, 2013.
REUTERS/Jason Reed

Preventitive Measures
By Hendrik Hertzberg
The New Yorker

The U.S.’ post-9/11 security establishment has florished — both in the quasi-governmental and governmental realm — in an effort to, as Hertzberg points out, to not necessarily catch killers, but “catch pre-killers.” Its failures are public; it’s successes are buried in a world of secrecy.

Population Boom? So Wrong
By Michael Lewis
The Breakthrough

Contrary to popular belief, the population boom isn’t quite what it’s claimed to be. Even in the so-called “third world,” birthrates have declined tremendously. Lewis analyzes the connection between fetility and development, featuring an interesting twist: What television viewership means to population growth.

The Clinton Legacy
By Michael Hirsch
Foreign Affairs

What will Clinton’s legacy prove to be? The former first lady may have shied away from the hard diplomacy associated with some of the U.S.’ most famous Secretaries of State and may not have any one single “signature” achievement, but she did help restore America’s standing in the world. However, if she gets her way, her tenure may simply be seen as a stepping stone to the presidency.

Escape From Bahrain: Ali Abdulemam Is Free
By Thor Halvorssen
The Atlantic

With his over two years in hiding behind him, world renowned blogger and free speech advocate Ali Abdulemam is now safely in Europe. With the help of the Human Rights Foundation (HRF), Abdulemam was snuck out of the country as part of one intense plan to get him to the Oslo Freedom Forum. Halvorssen details the evolution and execution of Abdulemam’s escape, which at one point may have included a party boat, a fast food restaurant, a performance artist, and, naturally, the monarchy’s authorities themselves.

Requiem for a Realist
By Robert Gallucci, Richard K. Betts, Scott D. Sagan, Ken Booth, Yan Xuetong, Barry R. Posen
Foreign Policy

Kenneth Waltz, one of the world’s most influential thinkers in international affairs, died earlier this week at age 88. His books, Man, the State, and War and Theories of International Relations, are classics, and his thinking has exerted a tremendous amount of influence on policymakers today. To honor his legacy, Foreign Policy compiled six short essays on his contributions to international relations and beyond.

Blogs:

Surprises in the Benghazi Talking Points by Scott Monje
Europe’s Ghosts by Michael Crowley
The Arab Spring: Conspiracy Theory or National Willby Fadi F. Elhusseini
Weighing Afghan Experience, Civil-Military Relations Debate Continues by Jason Anderson
Will Post-Ahmadinejad Iran change its foreign policy? by Alireza Ahmadian

The internet went dark in Syria last week. Although media reports blamed the outage on a fault in optical fiber cables many in the tech community were skeptical. After all, it’s not the first time Syria shut down the internet in an attempt to prevent protestors from using social media to coordinate and share with the outside world. According to the the Electronic Frontier Foundation:

Earlier today, we learned that Internet traffic between Syria and Western online services had plummeted drastically, indicated that the country’s connection to the wider Internet had been shut down. Reports from Renesys and Google confirmed the routes into Syria had been withdrawn, implying either a massive infrastructure cut, or a deliberate silencing of online communication.  [...] This is not the first time Syria has suffered an Internet shut down. In November 2012, Syria suffered a severe Internet black out.  And as the violence in the region has escalated, we’ve documented campaigns of targeted malware attacks against Syrian activists. Syrians have been suffering an unprecedented humanitarian crisis as the uprising against the Assad regime turned into a violent civil war encompassing the entire country.

Prior to the renewed debate about Benghazi dominating the FP news-cycle the top question on the foreign policy agenda was, should the U.S.intervene in Syria? Of course, the U.S. is already providing non-lethal assistance, but has so far balked at directly providing weapons to the Syrian rebels. This appears to be a prudent policy as the rebels are a disparate group with many not aligned with U.S. interests. Still, the question of providing further support for the rebels remains far from settled.

The internet outage last week reminded me that although the U.S. is not directly providing the support the Syrian rebels want, the U.S. is doing what it can to make sure the internet remains an open channel of communication for them. After the Arab Spring demonstrated the ability of local despots to control the internet and use it as a tool for the surveillance and monitoring of protestors, the U.S. took steps to prevent American companies and individuals from providing the technology that would enable such crackdowns. President Obama signed an executive order in April 2012 prohibiting Americans from providing, “information and communications technology that facilitates computer or network disruption, monitoring, or tracking that could assist in or enable serious human rights abuses by or on behalf of the Government of Iran or the Government of Syria.” Sanctions and visa bans are provided as punitive options for those who violate the order.

This executive order is necessary because, although we may not want to admit it, U.S. companies have been among those supplying technology to repressive governments. The Wall Street Journal has reported that McAfee, part of Intel, has provided content-filtering software used in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Do you suppose that companies such as McAfee could be dissuaded from such disreputable practices merely by naming and shaming? I doubt it.

Although the U.S. has not yet decided on further support for the rebels in Syria, it is encouraging to know that American companies and citizens are now prohibited by law from providing the technological support the Assad regime uses to manipulate and control the internet.

Trita Parsi on Sanctions and Iran’s Strategic Imperatives 

Trita Parsi is is the founder and president of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), a non-partisan, non-profit organization through which Iranian-Americans could participate in American civic life. Dr. Parsi is considered a leading analyst and observer of US-Iranian relations, Iranian foreign politics, and the geopolitics of the Middle East. He is the author of Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States (2007), for which he conducted more than 130 interviews with senior Israeli, Iranian and American decision-makers. Treacherous Alliance was the silver medal winner of the 2008 Arthur Ross Book Award from the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Parsi is also the author of many articles and Op-Ed pieces in leading American and European newspapers and journals.  He is the author, most recently, of  A Single Roll of the Dice – Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran (2012), for which he interviewed 70 high-ranking officials from the U.S., Iran, Europe, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Brazil—including the top American and Iranian negotiators. Dr. Parsi sat down with Reza Akhlaghi of Foreign Policy Association to discuss Iran’s strategic imperatives in a new Middle East and the country’s upcoming presidential elections. 

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In the current post-Arab Spring regional dynamics, do you think Iran is in need of
re-defining its key strategic imperatives? If so, what would those key strategic imperatives be and how urgent is it for a new administration to re-define them?

The Middle East is going through some very radical changes right now. On the one hand, the Arab Spring is changing the landscape politically. Contrary to Iran’s expectations, the fall of some of the pro-American regimes have not translated into a strategic advantage for the Iranian government. Tehran had based its analysis on the questionable assumption that the new regimes in the Arab world would distance themselves from the United States and move closer to Iran, precisely because of their Islamic bent. Instead, we have seen that their Islamic orientation has brought them closer to Saudi Arabia, at least thus far.

At the same time, the United States is reducing its footprint in the Middle East. Some would perhaps say that the United States is preparing a wider withdrawal from the region. In the short to medium term, this means that we will have far more instability in the Middle East, including regional rivalries playing out through proxy war such as what is happening in Syria right now.

In essence, the region will transition from the defunct American order to a new order that has not yet been defined. During the transition, there will be greater instability, more violent conflicts and potentially even the disintegration of certain states such as Iraq. Needless to say, all states need to recalibrate their strategies in light of these new developments.

In this year’s election dynamics, do you see any particular faction with a well-defined platform for and chance of mending relations with the United States?

At this stage, it’s too early to detect that. Little has been said that would indicate a new strategy and approach, expect a few candidates criticizing the policies and rhetoric of the Ahmadinejad government. Clearly, reversing the bombastic rhetoric of Ahmadinejad would be helpful to reduce the political toxicity that he carried, but that is in and of itself not sufficient to resolve the nuclear dispute.

NIAC has been in vocal opposition to sanctions on Iran on humanitarian grounds. It’s also supportive of greater engagement between Iran and the United States, arguing that engagement with Iran has greater chance of influencing the Iranian leadership’s behavior. If the United States eases the sanctions against Iran, what specific steps, in your opinion, the Iranian leadership should take to reciprocate the move by the United States?

The contour of a deal on the nuclear issue is clear: Iran must limit its enrichment to no more than 5%, implement the additional protocol, limit its stockpile of Low Enriched Uranium, and address its past activities etc. In return, the nuclear specific sanctions should be lifted and the file closed at the Security Council. A bolder approach would aim higher, and seek to address non-nuclear issues in the talks such as human rights in Iran and regional instability and by that seek to resolve conflicts between the US and Iran that go beyond just the nuclear file.

In a new report, NIAC demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the current sanctions and their ability to impact the Iranian leadership’s nuclear calculus. Can you elaborate on your findings and why we haven’t seen the changes in Iran’s nuclear posture as many in the West had expected. 

The main point of the report is to show why these sanctions have failed to shift Iran’s policy on the nuclear issue, in spite of the tremendous pain they have inflicted on Iran. One factor is because stakeholders in Iran are not convinced that changing the nuclear approach would lead to the West lifting sanctions, and as a result, they don’t see any incentives for themselves to push the government in that direction. As a result, Khamenei has not been under pressure from key constituents to shift the nuclear policy. Another related factor is the dominant narrative within the elite that essentially states that the West’s real goal is to keep Iran dependent, weak and technologically underdeveloped. According to this narrative, the issue is really not about enrichment, but Iran’s independence. Within the elite, there isn’t a potent counter-narrative that states that the sanctions are a reaction to Iran’s own actions and that if Iran wishes to end the pain of the sanctions, it should shift its nuclear policy. Those who wish to challenge Khamenei’s narrative don’t have much to hang their hat on right now because many of Iran’s efforts to reconcile have been rebuffed – such as the Turkey-Brazil mediation of 2010.

How would you assess the capacity of the Iranian leadership to reform itself from within and to move toward a more democratic and inclusive polity with a less corrupt economic management system?

Unfortunately, the political spectrum in Iran has, in the past 8 years, contracted significantly and shifted far to the right. The prospects for internal change are as a result lower today than it has been for a very long time. At the same time, it is difficult to see how peaceful, non-violent change towards a truly democratic system can be achieved unless it is coming from inside the country. I think the key is not that it would or should be the regime changing or reforming itself, but that the change must come from within Iran’s society rather than from the outside. This is not just a point of principle, in my personal opinion, but also one of practicality: The experience in the Middle East in the past ten years shows that the West does not have the competence to bring about democratization in the region through coercive means. For democratization to be sustainable and in line with the desires of the Iranian people, it must be rooted in Iran’s own society. 

Photo Credit: Elizabeth Arrott/VOA

by Abul-Hasanat Siddique and Casper Wuite

Abul-Hasanat Siddique and Casper Wuite, co-authors of The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction, talk about the political unrest in the Middle East, the Syrian Civil War, the globalization of media, and the future prospects for the region.

Is the unrest in the Middle East and North Africa homegrown or a Western-sponsored revolution for change?

Abul-Hasanat Siddique: Home-grown. Seeing the uprisings in the region as Western-sponsored “revolutions” is far from reality. Firstly, that view sees the populations in the region as passive recipients. It also negates the Arab people, particularly its youth populations, in their moment when they called or are still calling for freedom and dignity. That would also not do justice to the way foreign governments and local populations have acted on the ground.

In fact, Arab youth movements and political activists have been mobilizing for many years. The April 6th Movement in Egypt has been on the scene since 2008. Autocratic regimes in the region, most of whom are backed by the West, have long ignored their disgruntled people. Revolts were bound to happen at some point in the Arab world; a region which has seen poor economic growth, atrocious human rights records, and a growing youth population with high unemployment. Such issues have boiled up and created restive societies throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

Casper Wuite: What is true is that in some countries, particularly Libya, home grown revolutions with enough critical mass could simply not to be ignored by the West. The action the West subsequently undertook, however, was never part of a Cold War-type strategy to sponsor certain elements in the region.

Is the Middle East in a phase of transition from “dictatorship to democracy”? If so, will the Arab Uprisings pave the way for transitions in Syria, Jordan, and then Saudi Arabia as well?

Siddique: The plenitude of elections held in the wake of the Arab Uprisings in no way signifies a democracy, but merely a first step. True democratic reform takes a substantial amount of time to achieve; the history of Europe is a key example. Some parts of the region are in this long transitional period. The transitions occurring in countries like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have been rather complicated. However, in time, these countries will make (some) shifts towards democratic reform. This may take several years or even decades to achieve and it will not be easy.

Wuite: The Arab Uprisings are less likely to pave the way for transitions in Jordan and Saudi Arabia although incremental changes have been made particularly in Jordan. Yes, they face the same challenges: a demographic youth bulge and an economic reality that is increasingly at odds with the regime’s existing policies and practices. However, calls for reform are diluted by political and fiscal co-optation in both countries. On the other hand, in Syria the question is not so much whether we will see a transition soon, but rather whether a stable democracy will be its endpoint.

In your view, is Morsi capable of keeping a balance between Islamists and liberal forces within Egypt? Does Egypt dream of becoming a regional power under Morsi, as was the case during the Gamal Abdul Nasser era?

Siddique: At present, the president is clearly failing to keep the balance between the Islamist bloc and the liberal and secular forces. Post-Mubarak Egypt has further highlighted political polarization in the country. The political unrest over Morsi’s rather inexperienced and poor strategic move with his presidential decree and the ensuing referendum over the new constitution, has further deepened this polarization. Indeed, Egypt’s transition is very complicated and the judiciary is full of former Mubarak-era officials. But there are undoubtedly many within Egypt who are disengaged with Morsi, as they simply see him as a stooge for the Muslim Brotherhood’s policies. What he needs to do is truly engage all groups within Egypt, including secularists, liberals, women, and religious minorities. Indeed, he is the president for all Egyptian people and not one portion of society; he needs to realize this if Egypt is to move forward. Unilateral steps like initiating presidential decrees will not help Egypt; it will simply evoke more and more unrest and resentment within the country.

He also needs to reform the police and security forces. The unrest over the Port Said trials was a reaction against Morsi’s presidency, but also at the corrupt police and security forces. Whether or not Morsi made a deal with the military is up for question, but he very much needs to pursue those responsible for the death of protestors in 2011, and those still unaccounted for. The people want justice to be served.

Wuite: Indeed, many have argued that the current riots are a sign that the standoff between Morsi and the opposition is spiralling out of control. However, not every rioter is a member of either two groups. Many rioters are hooligans upset with the Port Said trials, or are youth settling scores with the police. Yet, one cannot deny that the political polarization is increasingly paralysing the country. What is thus instrumental in understanding the crisis, is that it is not simply that the political arena has lost its primacy of settling disputes to the streets. What has been crucial to the current standoff has been the extent to which democratic procedures and the rule of law have lost their primacy and how the remaining institutions, most notably the judiciary, have been politicized and turned into political fiefdoms.

Siddique: As for Nasser. Domestically, Morsi falls far short of living up to Nasser’s legacy within Egypt despite the late leader having been a dictator himself. Nasser is still held high within the country but also within the wider Arab world. With regards to being a regional power once again: Morsi clearly sees that Qatar and Turkey are making advances in becoming the regional hegemon. Saudi Arabia is shifting away from the fore-front of regional affairs, and Egypt has been in a complicated transitional period for over two years. However, it is highly unlikely that Egypt will return to the heights of Nasser’s pan-Arab dream. Simply put, pan-Arabism, as Nasser dreamed of it, is dead — it has been dead for decades.

That said, Morsi wants to develop further foreign ties. If his domestic policy fails, he at least wants his foreign policy to be worth something. If his foreign policy is to be deemed a “success,” however, a drastic development needs to be made with the Israeli-Palestinian peace-process. Pressure will need to put on the Palestinians, namely Hamas, while the U.S. will finally need to act as a genuine peace broker.

Did the Syrian conflict begin as a genuine uprising or a proxy-war? Will Bashar al-Assad fall to the opposition as with Libya?

Siddique: A genuine uprising that has turned into a proxy-war. There is a belief by some that the Syrian Civil War was instigated by a Western-led conspiracy to overthrow the Ba’athist regime in a bid to derail its ally in Iran. Notably, this is the same view held by Bashar al-Assad and his aides. The problem with that belief is it completely negates the start of the unrest in Syria and the history of the country under the Assad family. Let us not forget that the Syrian people rose up peacefully in a bid for genuine reforms as their counterparts had done so in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and so on. But they were met with force from the state. As time went by, some in the opposition took up arms to defend themselves. At the same time, however, some radical and extremist elements (with an affiliation to Al-Qaeda) in the Syrian opposition (some foreign) have capitalised on the conflict and begun calling for an Islamic state.

The Syrian people, those opposing the Ba’athist government, be they secular or Islamist, have genuine grievances against the Assad family which has been in power for over 40 years. Viewing the whole war, from the initial peaceful uprising, as a Western conspiracy ignores those grievances and sees the Syrian people as passive bystanders. The Syrian people should not be seen as a pawn for the U.S., Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Israel, and Iran, but instead as people who want their freedom and dignity.

As for Assad falling like Qaddafi did in Libya: the situation is different. The opposition in Libya had a base of “operations” in Benghazi. From there, they made advances westwards and were then backed by NATO airstrikes. That isn’t the case in Syria, as the armed opposition have only seized fragments across the country. There are also divisions within their ranks. In addition, while the Syrian Uprising did not begin as a sectarian battle, sections of the protagonists on the ground now see the civil war as a conflict between Sunnis and Alawites (and the wider Shi’a region). If Assad does fall, there is a genuine fear that the Alawite community could be targeted by extremists. Unlike Libya, the sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict today has meant that sections within Assad’s ranks are reluctant to defect to the opposition, and will continue to be reluctant unless genuine security promises are made. With the current stalemate, the civil war could last for a substantial amount of time. As with the Algerian and Lebanese civil wars, a negotiated settlement seems to be the only way forward. Whether the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition agree to any settlement is highly questionable.

How do you view the role of media coverage in “bridging the gaps” or “widening the gulf” in the Middle East?

Siddique: News media coverage and social media has been quite key in the Arab Uprisings, and with modern conflicts in general. A cousin of Mohammed Bouazizi — the Tunisian street seller whose self-immolation ignited the uprising in Sidi Bouzid — highlighted this very well. The cousin had sent mobile phone footage of the aftermath of Bouazizi’s self-immolation to Al Jazeera, who broadcasted it. Subsequent videos were sent to the broadcaster of the unrest in Sidi Bouzid. But as the cousin highlighted: protests in the Arab world are not unheard of, at least in the country (in question) itself. However, if the footage of the unrest hadn’t been shown on the news, it would have been as if protests hadn’t happened. It’s the whole “tree falling in the woods” issue: If no one hears about a protest, did it really happen?

And it is due to this, the globalization of media and its technological developments, that coverage of what is happening on the ground can be disseminated on an astonishing scale. Social media, and the wide-availability of satellite television, has allowed for videos, messages, and so, to be distributed to wide-spanning audiences much faster. This didn’t happen in the 1977 Bread Riots, or even in the Gulf War; the Gulf War was CNN’s moment to shine — there was no pan-Arab broadcaster like Al Jazeera. However, today, the biggest factor is that autocratic regimes can’t control these media developments. They have been hit by the reality of globalisation. Media is indeed helping to “bridge the gaps” between what the state allows and what its people want; the people who are getting the message out by whatever means necessary. Protests or conflict, no matter how big or small they are, will now always be “heard.”

How do you see the future scenario of the Middle East? Will stability be reached or will anarchy prevail?

Wuite: I agree with Stephen Waltz who argues that future scenarios of the Middle East can roughly be divided into three situations. Optimists will argue that the road will be bumpy for a while, but that the Arab Uprisings mark the end of an era of regional stagnation and will give way for economic development and liberal democracy. Others exercise more caution and argue that as political dynamism returns to the region, we should be careful of what we wish for. In other words, under the influence of popular sentiment, more capable and competent Arab regimes will not necessarily be more compliant. Lastly, pessimists will argue that although the Arab Uprisings will succeed in overturning a number of regimes, stable governance will not replace them everywhere. Instead, extremism and sectarianism will be rife in some countries.

Personally, I believe that any positive change will only be incremental and that given the state of the economy, social and regional polarization, and continued fiscal and political co-optation in the region, we should be cautious when it comes to the outcomes of the Arab Uprisings in most countries and flatly pessimistic when it comes to some others.

(The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction is available to purchase at Amazon. A paperback version is available at the SlimBooks store.)

Abul-Hasanat Siddique is the Managing Editor/Middle East Editor at Fair Observer. Having co-authored his first book called The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction, Abul-Hasanat’s main research interests lie in the upheaval sweeping the Middle East and North Africa, and the rise of political Islam. His other research interests lie in the history and future of the Israel-Palestine conflict. 

Previously, Abul-Hasanat worked as a News Editor for the Gorkana Group. He is currently completing his thesis for his MSc in Middle East Politics at the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London), exploring the notion of post-Islamism and the Arab Uprisings. He also holds a BSc (Hons) in Sociology and Media Studies from the City University London.

Having worked at Fair Observer since May 2011, Abul-Hasanat has been a pivotal figure with the growth and success of the company.

Casper Wuite is a Contributing Editor (Middle East) at Fair Observer. Currently based in Cairo, he writes on politics and development in the Arab world. Casper co-authored his first book called The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction.

As a contributing editor, Casper draws on a wide range of experiences in the region. He has worked as a policy officer for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lebanon, a development consultant for NGO’s in Egypt, and an international election observer for the National Democratic Institute in both Algeria (2012) and Egypt (2011).

Casper holds an MSc in Politics and Government from the London School of Economics (University of London).

This article has been published in full with the permission of the authors. The original article can be found here at Fair Observer. 

Image: Australian Broadcasting Corporation

The vice grip of prolonged violence suffocating Syria is sending the humanitarian situation there careening towards the fading lights of a blackout. With a death toll looming somewhere between 70-90,000 and a refugee population of over a million in two years time, international intervention to this point has been largely limited to food aid and armored vehicle shipments while foreign leaders grapple with the implications of sending opposition forces lethal armaments.  As the G8’s Foreign Ministers meeting convenes in London next week, Britain’s hosting chief diplomat, William Hague, proposes an agenda he hoped would favor conflict prevention that is now making room for crisis alleviation.

The U.K. holds this year’s G8* presidency and its leadership is keen to make the most of the post.  In announcing the Ministers meeting last year, Hague was primed to comment on the ground he wished to cover.  The official statement released by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in November outlined an ambitious field of diplomatic concerns. Those early bullet points looked to Middle East regional stability and an examination of the group’s role in facilitating and promoting economic development and open governance in the Arab Spring states.  He linked these elements as building blocks of conflict avoidance.  They are not without an existing framework from which Hague wants to work – the Deauville Partnership.

The marina-laced seaside resort town of Deauville, France, lays in stark contrast to the bloodied upheaval witnessed by the flush of states comprising the Arab Spring.  Their connective thread exists by way of a G8 meeting hosted in this oasis of the French northwest in May 2011. The meeting was a wisp shy of six months past Tunisia’s initial flashpoint – the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in an open market in Sidi Bouzid – and the initiative born from it aimed to build trade and investment relationships between these larger economies and the burgeoning governments of the Spring.  The diplomatic designs of such a partnership were probably fixed on creating incentives for democratic transition and renewed alliances with the West early on in a period of transformative political fragility.

Beyond assessing the state of Deauville, preliminary discussions on Somalia ahead of a summit on the state in May and the eradication of rape as a weapon of war in conflict zones are directly identified in the agenda.  Hague used the ensuing months, and the agenda progress reports released during that time, to highlight and evolve these points – taking on a prominent role in a February meeting with Spring state representatives in Rome to advance the tenets of Deauville as well as a high-profile trip to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda at the end of March with U.N. Human Rights Commission Ambassador and actor Angelina Jolie to highlight gender-based violence and define the issue as a personal priority for his counterparts in London come Wednesday.

Image: CNN

Although Syria did not make the initial round of meeting objectives by name, Hague left room for addressing the pressing security issues happening in time with the ministers meeting.  And just as his work over the past four months has drawn attention to the other topical discussions he’ll facilitate next week, Syria has increasingly appeared on Hague’s public radar.

This increased prominence is no accident.  Since November, Prime Minister David Cameron has considerably ramped up Britain’s diplomatic profile around Syria.  Formally identifying Syrian rebel partners, drawing public attention to increases in aid, facilitating conferences on developing a post-Assad transition and offering much clearer language on intervention options than any of the other G8 states all feature as part of the prime minister’s emerging scheme.  His foreign minister, a long-standing ally, has used his podium to plainly deliver Cameron’s message.

A converted country estate in the southeastern English county of Sussex serves as a conference center for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office outside of London. It housed a two-day meeting on the Syrian crisis at the start of the year, drawing a collection of country experts from across the globe and leaders of the moderate Syrian opposition to brainstorm scenarios for a post-Assad transition.  While not present, Hague’s expressed aim for the meeting was to outline possible plans for what he and Cameron see as Assad’s “inevitable” departure from office.  Orchestrating the meeting was a less-than-subtle suggestion that the shape and look of the New Syria was somehow entwined with British influence and assumed the impending demise of its standing, if withered, government.

In March, Hague made his most forceful comments on the crisis by taking aim at an EU ban on the shipment of lethal-force arms to the Syrian opposition, citing the immediacy and magnitude of the humanitarian deterioration there as cause to leave all intervention mechanisms available for use.  Britain currently stands in line with the EU embargo, offering food and reinforced vehicles, but this solidarity could be short-lived.  Hague has not minced words in expressing the possibility that the U.K. may subvert the ban and send lethal armaments to specific groups within the opposition movement anyway.

Hague is no stranger to rustling feathers with Brussels.  He is a long-standing eurosceptic and while his pronouncements on Syria are outlined for him by the prime minister, one wonders if this colorful diplomat relishes the opportunity to be the voice of a move viewed as a disassociation from the continent and, by extension, the U.K.’s often conflicted European identity.

If Hague plans to open a discussion on Syria at the Ministers meeting with suggestions that all options be on the proverbial table, the reply may take the form of a pronounced ringing in his ears — a potent mix of hesitant silence from some and resounding rejection from others.  A notable member of the cricket gallery will likely be new U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry.  The Obama administration has avoided suggestions that any Syrian endgame could go as far as to involve a “boots on the ground” strategy and hasn’t wished to draw heightened attention to CIA efforts in siphoning arms into Syria and facilitating training of opposition groups with Turkey.  Another will be French foreign minister Laurent Fabius who, until recently, was aligned with the U.K.’s overtures.  Late last week Fabius released a position reversal requesting more time in determining its interest in sending weapons to Syrian opposition forces.

The EU’s British foreign minister, Catherine Ashton, will find herself wedged between her official and national identities when she attends — likely with her hands tied by the former. The most vocal opponent of the British position is Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, who calls such a move illegal in the realm of international law and in overt disregard for the European Union embargo. This comes despite a one-on-one meeting with Hague on Syrian goals as part of the first U.K.-Russian Strategic Dialogues last month.

So, an impasse at the outset.  But the Ministers meeting offers time to push the conversation further.  Maybe.  Such conferences suffer an intrinsic flaw in their general structure — time constraints.  When the pleasantries are through and the doors to the public and press are closed, two days is a brutally short amount of time to volley points of cohesion and division among power states on even a single issue let alone spread their energies across a field of many subjects.  Subjects which, in this case, are complex and deserving of more than a few hours of chatter before the day’s diary moves everyone along to the next. Certainly, no minister/secretary stands alone and they will descend on London with advisory teams in-tow and each will have position points on the ready and a backlog of exchanges shared in pre-meeting conversations, but preparatory work is no substitute for a thorough negotiation once everyone’s around the table.

Image: The Guardian (UK)

The ministers meeting is not a playground for breaking new policy ground.  The point isn’t to go charging back to the offices of respective executive leaderships with blueprints for proactive coalitions of the willing.  As an exercise in high-level diplomacy, the language at the end of these gatherings is largely littered with reaffirmations of existing alliances and generalized pledges to work together on reaching common ground in areas of discord.  What else can truly be expected when hosting states want to tackle so much? Last year’s U.S.-lead ministers meeting covered transitions in the Middle East and North Africa, Middle East peace, Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan, Africa, terrorism, maritime security, and transnational organized crime. In two days.

Britain’s managed to back itself into a corner over the question of a future Syria, having taken on such a pronounced role in the exploratory consideration of a solution and open-ended language about where its capacity for aid begins and ends.  The Syrian opposition liaison to London publicly identified the U.K. as the best remaining hope for external intervention.  It’s politically treacherous territory to inhabit.  The British constituency is largely wary of over involvement, fatigued by what is viewed as the U.K.’s habit of assuming huge burdens in the security affairs of other states.  Following its experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, intervention arguments, even when tinged by a visible display of human suffering like that witnessed in Syria, are met with an audible shuffling backward.

It is unlikely that the after action report on next week’s meeting will see a syncing of the collective G8 and EU message on Syria.  But with so much political exposure and personal investment in a home court discussion among an audience of peers, Hague needs to produce a statement fuller in body than “my colleagues and I agree that we want to see a peaceful end to the situation plaguing Syria.” Well, of course.  Perhaps the best-case scenario is a genuinely thorough trade of constructive ideas on how each state’s respective offerings can be webbed together to create workable approaches to helping Syria forward.  He’s got a lot of other ground to cover.  Let’s hope the time clock is forgiving, because a million displaced Syrians hanging in the air are expecting more from the U.K.

*The G8, long-form “Great Eight,” is comprised of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.S. and the U.K.

Barbara Slavin on Iran’s Regional Dynamics

Barbara Slavin is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor.com, a website devoted to news from and about the Middle East. The author of a 2007 book, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the US and the Twisted Path to Confrontation, Ms. Slavin is a regular commentator on U.S. foreign policy and Iran on NPR, PBS and C-SPAN. A career journalist, Ms. Slavin previously served as assistant managing editor for world and national security of The Washington Times, senior diplomatic reporter for USA TODAY, Cairo correspondent for The Economist, and as an editor at The New York Times Week in Review. Ms. Slavin sat down with Reza Akhlaghi of Foreign Policy Association to discuss the upcoming presidential elections in Iran.
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Since the report you authored in 2008 for the U.S. Institute for Peace entitled “Mullahs, Money, and Militias: How Iran Exerts Its Influence in the Middle East ” what changes, if any, have you noticed in Iran’s strategic regional calculus? 

Iran’s goals have not changed dramatically since I wrote that report, but its influence has diminished because of rising sectarianism, the conflict in Syria and economic sanctions. Iran’s reputation was at its peak from 2006-2008 as it basked in the glow of Hezbollah’s quasi-victory over Israel (in 2006) and benefited from Arab hostility toward the George W. Bush administration.  Bush’s departure from office and the U.S. exit from Iraq, however, lessened anti-Americanism while Sunni Muslims increasingly feared that Iran would dominate Iraq’s new government and forge a “Shiite crescent” extending through Damascus to Beirut.

Meanwhile, the Arab uprisings, beginning in 2011, have been a double-edged sword for Iran: They have hurt U.S. and Israeli interests by toppling pro-Western dictators but they have not benefited Iran because they stirred up sectarian hatred against Shiites. This has reached a critical point in Syria where Iran’s staunch support of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has alienated most of the rest of the region – and the wider Muslim world — and undermined Iran’s narrative of “siding with the oppressed.” Iran has also lost influence over Palestinian movements such as Hamas, which is now closer to Sunni Turkey and Egypt. Hezbollah, Iran’s most prized regional partner, has also been put in an uncomfortable position over the conflict in Syria. In addition, draconian economic sanctions imposed on Iran because of its nuclear program are reducing Iran’s ability to lavishly fund and arm Arab militants.

Iran’s goals remain as I described them in 2008: “to achieve strategic depth and safeguard its system against foreign intervention, to have a major say in regional decisions, and to prevent or minimize actions that might run counter to Iranian interests.” Much will depend on the outcome in Syria and whether Iran is able to maintain physical control over enough Syrian territory to continue to send money and weapons to Hezbollah. Iran’s fate also rests on the nuclear crisis. A U.S. or Israeli attack on Iran would likely shift regional opinion toward sympathy with Iran, especially if fighting is prolonged and there are massive civilian casualties.

From a historical perspective the mentality of Iran’s power structure is rooted in an imperial-oriented tradition. Over the last eight years of the current administration in Tehran, one can witness a gradual re-orientation of state ideology toward a glorified imperial past. Are you of the view that Iran is redefining its role based on a re-construction of an imperial-oriented, Iranianized Islam? If that is the case, what would, in your opinion, be the implications of such a policy?

Iranians have always been very conscious of their imperial past.  I see more continuity than change in Iranian foreign policies. It was the Shah, after all, who seized three small islands in the Persian Gulf that are also claimed by the United Arab Emirates – islands that Iran still occupies. Bahrain, which has a Shiite majority, was once part of Iran, as both the Shah and Islamic Iranian leaders have noted. Iran historically has tried to maintain close relations with other former parts of the Persian Empire – including Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan and western Afghanistan.  Recently, Iran has sought to exert influence through the Non-Aligned Movement, which it currently chairs. However, the sectarian factors I mentioned above are blunting Iran’s reach.

Iran’s power structure has had an antagonistic relation with women’s presence in public life including the unclear barrier in Iran’s legal system for women and in particular religious minorities (including Sunni Muslims) to become presidential candidates. Should these issues be addressed in the new administration and to what extent do you anticipate a modification of these policies? 

Iran actually provides more political space to women and minorities than most of its Arab neighbors. However, the theocratic nature of the Iranian system prevents a woman or a Sunni from running for president or achieving other significant office. I do not anticipate any changes in this discriminatory situation in the near term. I am hopeful that Iran’s political system will gradually evolve, restoring influence to the reform movement and reversing the securitization of society that has taken place since the disputed 2009 presidential elections. Given the current atmosphere of tension – both inside Iran and internationally because of the nuclear program – it’s hard to imagine that the system will open up in this fashion in the near future.

Where are U.S.-Iran relations headed in the short to mid-term? Are they nearing a tipping point?

There is a slim chance for a partial agreement in the nuclear talks that would relieve tensions. Recent comments by President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu suggest that both are willing to give diplomacy at least another year before resorting to military force. In a new report, the Atlantic Council Iran Task Force, with which I work, has proposed some steps to shore up relations with the Iranian people – by designating several Iranian banks that can be used for transactions involving food, medicine and other humanitarian matters and by encouraging more academic and cultural exchanges. The Task Force also advocates asking Iran to allow American diplomats to staff an Interests Section in Tehran, putting American diplomats back in Iran for the first time in 30 years. But I do not know if the Obama administration will implement these recommendations – or if Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will allow them to be implemented given his fear of Western influence and a “velvet revolution” against his government. I don’t necessarily see a “tipping point” in U.S.-Iran relations this year. Relations have been poor for so long that a continued stalemate is entirely possible.

With rivalries between Iranian proxies on one hand and those of Saudi and its allies on the other, and the presence of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, what is your outlook on the future direction of Iran-Arab relations? 

As I mentioned earlier, the outlook is poor because of the conflict in Syria and the advancing Iranian nuclear program. While Muslim Brotherhood-connected officials have come to power in North Africa and Egypt, no country has adopted Iran’s unique theocratic system, nor is one likely even in countries with substantial Shiite populations like Lebanon and Iraq. As I wrote back in 2008, “Iran’s ability to project power, even among fellow Shiites, is aided by historic and familial ties between clerics but constrained by sectarian and ethnic divisions and the nature of the religion itself. Shiism is not a monolith, and Iran’s supreme leader faces competition from a number of prominent figures whose allegiances are not neces­sarily to the Iranian state.” With wealthy nations such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar backing Sunni proxies and governments, Iran will exploit chaos and political violence but it is hard to see it developing more reliable friends. In the end, as Shireen Hunter has said, Iran is a “strategically lonely” nation – a Persian, Shiite island in a Sunni Turkic and Arab sea.

AFP

Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab Spring, is an important historic crossroads that finds itself at one. With a draft constitution to be ready by the end of April and elections by the end of the year, there are many challenges for this democratic transition in a region where several conflicts are brewing which could impact U.S. interests.

One of the most important forces that will contribute to a successful post-Revolution Tunisia is the diaspora in the United States and in other countries whose influence can help promote democratic transition, stability and security. In the United States, there is a very strong and active Tunisian-American community which has undertaken several important projects to rebuild and restore confidence in the investment environment in Tunisia.

This week, I sat down with Mohamed Malouche, president and Saoussen Mahjoub, vice-president, of the Tunisian American Young Professionals (TAYP) to get their perspectives on what’s happening in Tunisia the importance of strengthening Tunisia-U.S. relations.

Who are the Tunisian American Young Professionals and what is TAYP’s origin and purpose?

The Tunisian American Young Professionals (TAYP) is a non-profit association of Tunisian and American professionals. We committed, shortly after the revolution, to play the role of a bridge between the U.S. and Tunisia. We wanted to help support Tunisia in its transition towards prosperity and democracy. Our skills and competencies were primarily in business, economics, finance and technology, so we decided to use our resources to focus on strengthening economic relationships between the two countries. We chose to focus on two themes: 1) investment, which consisted in presenting Tunisia’s value proposition to investors; and 2) entrepreneurship, which encompassed supporting young Tunisian entrepreneurs through mentoring, technical and financial assistance.

Our investment-related efforts took us to business communities, chambers of commerce, think thanks as well as investment roadshows throughout the U.S., where we discussed the reasons why investors should consider Tunisia as an investment location. We also discussed the necessary reforms that Tunisia must undertake to become a more attractive investment destination. In addition, we helped foster entrepreneurship in Tunisia through mentorship programs and by connecting entrepreneurs to needed networks in both countries. Finally, TAYP essentially a networking platform for Tunisians—who currently live or have lived at some point in their lives in the United States—to connect and support each other professionally.

What are the challenges facing Tunisia today and how can TAYP and the Diaspora make a difference?

Tunisia is in a delicate situation. Economic indicators are worrisome and the absence of a clear timeline for constitution drafting and elections, combined with violence, is preventing flow of investments and tourists into the country and, in turn, hindering economic recovery. The political and economic processes are closely tied. Unless the political process matures and progresses, both will inevitably deteriorate. With this said, Tunisia has the fundamentals to succeed in its transition, but the window to success is shrinking rapidly.

Under these circumstances, what TAYP can do is to continue supporting the country in its path towards economic recovery. Pitching Tunisia to investors is challenging, but not impossible. There are investors who look at first movers’ opportunities because they believe that Tunisia has what it takes to succeed in the future, with its educated population, homogenous society and good infrastructure. Investment does not stop even in transition countries or countries that are experiencing violence. Mexico still sees an influx of U.S. businesses despite the insecurity generated by cartel wars. Tunisia is nowhere near that, but given its traditional peacefulness for the longest time, acts of violence are disturbing to Tunisians and to those who are used to dealing with the country.

The other component of our action, which we are going to reinforce in the upcoming months, is connecting and sustaining young promising Tunisian entrepreneurs. We are building a program as we speak that will systematically connect mentors to entrepreneurs and enable linkages to markets, networking and partnerships. We already have a few success stories of diaspora entrepreneurship and investment in Tunisia such as CloudMedx and TuniLab but want to take our entrepreneurship program to the next level.

Finally, we are increasingly involved at the policy level, organizing workshops on the political and economic transition, participating to conferences and inviting delegations to visit Tunisia. Last December, we hosted a delegation of seven young American political leaders in partnership with the American Council for Young Political Leaders (ACYPL). The program focused on five themes, each provided the delegation with a better understanding of Tunisia’s rich and diverse past, its present challenges and opportunities. The themes covered the following topics: History and Heritage, Government and politics, Regional and Bilateral Cooperation, Education and Civil Society and finally Investment and Trade.

What has been the U.S. role in post-Revolution Tunisia? Can or should it do more?

From our standpoint, the U.S.
has been supportive of Tunisia’s transition and engaging the diaspora in the process. The State Department helped us, through its convening power, promote Tunisia’s image with investors and the general public. We’ve done it through many events including the Tunisia Partnerships Forum, which was held at the U.S. Department of State in Washington D.C. in November 2011, “doing business in Tunisia” sessions at the U.S. chamber of commerce in April 2012, and the Global Diaspora Forum in May 2012.

In terms of assistance, the U.S. government has provided more than $350 million in support to Tunisia since January 2011, focusing heavily on technical and financial assistance to the private sector and civil society. Programs are underway through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), USAID and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to encourage investment and growth-minded reforms. In fact, one of our favorite programs is the workforce development scholarship fund that will provide scholarships for Tunisians to study in the U.S.

After the unfortunate September 14 attack on the U.S. embassy in Tunis, the U.S. administration was forced to slow down its efforts. Many Tunisians sensed that the birth place of the Arab Spring was no longer the priority it used to be. Yet, it is important for the international community and the United States to help turn the transition in Tunisia into a success story. Just like Secretary Kerry indicated in his March 13, 2013 statement, it is critical for the U.S. to clarify on a regular basis what it stands for, in particular:

• A zero tolerance policy to those who preach violence or who do not condemn it unequivocally;
• A timeline to fair and transparent elections to which the government and the National Constituent Assembly will be held accountable;
• A roadmap that leads to strengthened democratic institutions;
• A continuation of economic assistance programs geared primarily towards the private sector and civil society, which correlates directly with the level of progress in the three items listed above

The window of opportunity for Tunisia to get back on track is still open and now is the time to encourage all of Tunisia’s forces – from civil society, political, and economic actors – to not waste what could potentially be a crucial turning point to the Arab Spring revolutions.

Why is Tunisia an attractive investment partner for the U.S.?

The promotion of a country as a destination for investment is always an exercise that is done relative to “competitors” countries that share the same natural, geographical or demographical advantages. Tunisia is strategically located with a young population at a crossroads of commercial trade roads in the world, but so are many other countries in that region of the world that can claim those advantages.

What really differentiates Tunisia compared to its neighboring countries and other emerging economies in the region is the widespread level of education, the vibrant role of women in society and the capacity of the people and the country to reinvent itself when facing major challenges. These strengths made our small country, an agile and trend setting nation. Historically, Tunisia was to first Arab country to establish a constitution in 1861, give equal rights to women in 1956, initiate the Arab Spring in 2011 and we hope that it will be the first to address its current challenges in the very near future.

Tunisia’s openness to the world, as indicated by an impressive array of trade agreements with partners like the European Union, the African continent and the Middle East positions the country as a natural hub in the region. Tunisia has no choice but to be wide open to the World. Unlike oil rich countries, it is unable to afford the contradictions between economic growth and ideology as Tom Friedman eloquently described in a recent New York Times op-ed.

But beyond the country’s advantages, at the end of the day, it all comes down to people, relations and networking. We recently had a discussion with a US multinational with heavy operations in Tunisia about the main reasons that attracted their business and maintained them in Tunisia. First and foremost, the main reason was due to the Tunisian competencies and Tunisian partners that they were able to connect and build a trusted relationship with. The dedication of their employees and their analysis and technical capabilities was second on their list. The country’s advantages only came as a distant third reason—in other words, it was simply the icing on the cake.

For more about the Tunisian American Young Professionals, visit www.tayp.org

Editor’s Note:

The following is a guest contributing piece by Adam Hedengren. Mr. Hedengren is co-founder and managing editor of YourMiddleEast.com

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Young surfers on the beaches of Gaza, war in Gaza, media censorship in Tunisia, a Libyan boxer and an Algerian painter, youth unemployment, startups in the Emirates, Lebanese pop stars, food crisis in Yemen and solar energy in Saudi. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is one of contradictions, beauty, challenges and opportunities.

Through our biggest side-product to date, we aim to portray that complexity, providing you with a nuanced, approachable and thought-provoking selection of stories from Your Middle East’s 2012.

The app: https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/the-middle-east-yearbook-2012/id596291672?ls=1&mt=8

These 100 pages or so invites you to a world of over 200 journalists, bloggers, photographers and activists who all decided to be part of changing the way news is reported from the MENA region. Our work is based on three pillars: independence, unbiased and balance, which in practice means that we never take sides but always remain open to the free exchange of ideas between people of all backgrounds and faiths.

For this, we continue to garner attention across the globe – in the international press, from high-profile commentators on the region as well as a large and growing number of followers. Your Middle East has become an invaluable source of information for hundreds of thousands people who want to get a different – more complete – story from the MENA region.

By purchasing this app, you support the development of an independent media that challenges mainstream outlets in their one-sided reporting from regions like the Middle East.

The eleventh Iranian presidential election is scheduled to be held this June. Local council elections will also take place at the same time as presidential elections.

To take an analytic look at this year’s Iranian elections from a number of relevant angles, the Foreign Policy Association (FPA) will be discussing the elections with leading observers and analysts of Iranian affairs.

Part of FPA’s “Candid Discussion Series” by Reza Akhlaghi, these discussions will engage internationally recognized and accomplished professionals who come from media organizations, think tanks, and academia armed with extensive research and insight on Iranian socio-political, geopolitical, and cultural affairs.

This year’s presidential elections come amid a crisis hitting the country on a multitude of dimensions, including a corruption-stricken economy worsened by harsh international sanctions; a sharp decline in the value of the Iranian currency that has drastically lowered the purchasing power of average Iranians; absence of a settlement to the country’s nuclear dossier; intensification of Iran’s highly factional politics; and regional transformations induced by the Arab Spring.

Through these discussions, we will try to find answers to questions on whether or not the elections are held in a democratic fashion; the direction of shifting alliances in Iran’s corridors of power; the potential impact of sanctions on the selection of final candidates to run, and on the future and stability of the Islamic Republic. Please join us as we take an in-depth look into Iran’s upcoming elections with help from a team of world-class experts.

U.S. Senator John Kerry signs an autograph for Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member Bertie Bowman during Kerry’s confirmation hearing for Secretary of State. [Reuters/Gary Cameron]

Articles From Around the Web

The Force
By Jill Lepore
The New Yorker

Once a country that regarded a large standing army as a form of tyranny, the United State’s has now become one of the largest spenders on defense — and its military spending exceeds all of the nation’s in the world combined. When does a large military become “too much”?

Could Cyril Ramaphosa Be the Best Leader South Africa Has Not Yet Had?
By Bill Keller
New York Times Magazine

Once a powerful figure in the struggle against apartheid, Ramaphosa has become a promenant figure in the business community. Yet his election to Deputy President of the African National Congress has brought him back into politics, and “we may find out whether he is, as many South Africans have long believed, the best president South Africa has not yet had.”

The Egyptian Revolution Through Mubarak’s Eyes
By Dan Kenner
Foreign Policy

Two years after the January 25th protests in Egypt, some of Mubarak’s closest confidants are going public about the discussions within the upper echelons of the Egyptian government after initial the outbreak of protests. By all accounts, he seems to have been more of a passive figure.

The Danger in the Desert
The Economist

With the escalating war in Mali and the recent battle between the Algerian special forces and Islamic extremists, the specter of a “new jihadism” seems to be hanging over the continent. But is the fear of these jihadists bringing the mayhem to the West as well-founded as the danger to the African countries themselves?

The Mirage of the Arab Spring
By Seth G. Jones
Foreign Affairs

The Arab Spring — once perceived as a sign of hope and freedom — has yet to lead the Middle East to throw aside its authoritarian yolk. Instead leaping into an idealistic quagmire, the United States needs a policy to deal with the region as it is.

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McDonough’s Elevation and the Obamians’ Ascent
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EU High Representative Catherine Ashton speaks during her visit to Kenya © European External Action Service (EEAS)

As the EU is dragged into coping with the ongoing financial crisis, there has been a lively discussion what will be the consequences on the EU’s foreign policy in the long-term forecast. Most of the arguments deal with a question of how the nature of the EU Crisis Management will change in the upcoming years, as EU Member States are less and less willing to contribute to the EU’s activities under an umbrella of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, as it turns out, one of the instruments in the EU’s foreign policy tool-box, which has been so far overlooked in the last years, seems to swiftly evolve into a prominent tool filling the raising gap.

Indeed, in respect to implementation of sanctions as a ‘default’ response to human rights violations, political turmoil, democratic backsliding or security threats beyond EU borders, sanctions have been enormously gaining more prominent place in the EU’s foreign policy and developed as the EU’s widely used instrument. A look at the last 3 previous years give us a picture of a sharp increase in use of sanctions. While in 2010 EU implemented 22 decisions in this respect, a year later it was already 69. That means a use of sanctions more than tripled in one single year.

Yet never before sanctions reached high numbers like this. A year 2012, accordingly, introduced many policy analysis trying to figure out what does the rising number of sanctions tell us about direction of the EU’s foreign policy. Two larger analysis, notably, stand at the forefront of the whole debate. The first one is the recently published Policy Brief ‘Shooting in the Dark? EU Sanctions Policies’ by Konstanty Gebert, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). A credit for the later one goes to Stephan Lehne, Visiting Scholar at the Brussels office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for his analysis ‘The Role of Sanctions in the EU Foreign Policy’.

Both authors agree, that sanctions “becoming one of the European Union’s favorite foreign-policy tools” and that “sanctions seem to have become the EU’s new default response to international challenges”. However, as both authors continue in the same breath, there seems to be a negative side of the rapidly expanding numbers of sanctions. In particular, whether sanctions have really the effect for which they are usually praised for and whether they can push states effectively to the wall, does not seem to be so clear yet.

What are the roots of the recent boom?

Firstly, the EU is obviously more than well positioned to use sanctions as its core foreign-policy tool. Latest statistics show, that only with 7% of the world’s population, the EU counts for 25,8 % of world GDP, and its trade with the rest of the world accounts for around 20% of global exports and imports (excluding intra EU trade). This clearly makes the EU not only the biggest trade player in the world, but also the biggest importer, the biggest exporter and the biggest investor. That said, given these advantages placing the EU at the core of the international trade system, one might wonder why it has taken so long for the EU to pull the sanctions out of its foreign-policy tool-box and place them at the forefront of its foreign policy actions.

Surprisingly, while 1980s saw a limited number of sanctions, the main trigger can be identified in the Balkan Crisis, which lifted up the number and the EU rapidly started to use sanction more systematically. Following decade witnessed steadily growth of a use of sanction. However, even though growth was slow but persistent, it was in the beginning of 2010, when the number of sanctions literally took off. As is already mentioned in the first lines, while in 2010 EU implemented 22 decisions in this respect, a year later it was already 69 (needless to say, that a big portion targeted Iran, Syria and Libya). Why has the EU, then, discovered the use of sanctions so late and has been massively expanding its use only in the recent years?

S. Lehne identifies in his analysis these factors standing behind the increase: Firstly, it is rather easy to adapt sanctions, even though once they are under way, it is more difficult to jump off. Freezing of assets, banning oil imports and adapting travel restrictions on regime officials has the advantage, that used sanctions do not target the population as a whole, at least not primarily. Besides, there are virtually no cost in sanctioning individuals from states with massive human rights violations or presenting security threats to the International order (especially in a form of travel restrictions). Secondly, one can agree that austerity measures and overall financial crisis at the European continent favors using sanctions. With the ongoing austerity measures less and less states are willing to contribute to Crisis Management operations under CFSP/CSDP. A use of sanctions, arguably, presents a way of limiting impact of the adopted policies on the budget itself, but also is not demanding in terms of ‘political energy’. Last but not least, as he continues, sanctions adopted by the UN has also influenced the EU’s view on this particular area. Specifically, it was the Obama’s sanctions against the Iranian regime from 2009, which were based on UN Security Council Resolution and which took on board not only the main EU Member States, but also those European states being so far reluctant to this foreign policy tool.

Making the ‘sanctions machine’ more effective?

While all aforementioned factors mutually contributed to the current state of play, it does not offer an answer on whether the ‘sanctions machine’, as The Economist quipped one of the European ministers, is at the end effective. Although to measure overall effectiveness in terms or reaching desired goals is far from being easy, as both authors agree. K. Gebert points out in his Policy Brief few particular adjustments the EU has to take into account if the sanctions ought to me more effective.

Firstly, as there is no procedure on the EU level to verify the implementation of sanctions, there is a pressing need to develop a better monitoring system. Secondly, in certain cases less can be more. Extensive sanction targeting various actors and level in the targeted regime will hardly achieve, that the regime will be willing to accept them. Consequently, a way forward might be when sanctions are used in a smaller scale (starting with releasing political prisoners, for instance). Thirdly, regimes should be ‘rewarded’ for good behaving. If the regime faces a ‘domino effect’ of escalating sanction from the EU, it is hard to expect some political changes or at least stepping out of the internally set up political directions. If the EU would communicate more precisely what is the desired goals of the EU and International community in general, and under what circumstances sanctions can be lifted, the effectiveness, according to K. Gebert, would be higher.

Sanctions…but what next?

As one proverb goes, ‘There’s more than one way to skin a cat’. And indeed, as it seems, not even a greater effectiveness might put sanctions at the pedestal of the EU’s foreign policy tool-box in the future. S. Lehne hits the point in his analysis by giving assumption of what could happen, if sanctions start overshadowing the EU’s in parallel existing instruments at its disposal: „The EU is still a relatively weak international actor. If current trends continue, it risks turning itself into a ‘sanctions machine’. And while it uses its energy and resources to build complex sanctions regimes, it will leave diplomatic initiatives and political crisis management to others, including at times to some of its own member states. The idea of the EU as a toolbox rather than as an international actor might appeal to some, but it certainly does not do justice to the objectives of the EU treaty and the ambitions of many member states.“ Indeed, there are reasonable doubts that the EU’s Foreign Policy tool-box overflowing with sanctions as a ‘default response’ to ‘not-so-well-behaved regimes’ could potentially undermine effectiveness and credibility of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as such. Also The Economist is aware of the consequences: “Europe needs to do more than respond to every problem with fresh sanctions (…) just thinking up new sanctions every month does not amount to a strategy.”

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S. Lehne, The Role of Sanctions in EU Foreign Policy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 14 December 2012 (http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/12/14/role-of-sanctions-in-eu-foreign-policy/etnv).

Tough Talk, No Strategy? The Economist, 3 March 2012. (http://www.economist.com/node/21548952).

K. Gebert, Shooting in the Dark? EU Sanctions Policies, European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, 11 January 2013 (http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/shooting_in_the_dark_eu_sanctions_policies).

The ongoing conflict in Syria has been treated very differently from the one in Libya after the Arab Spring movement took hold in the region. The lack of support for Syria’s government might have to do with the lack of trade and ties between Syria and many European countries and the U.S. Syrian oil does not have a large effect on major industrialised countries, so it has received less initial attention than Libya, who supplies much of the oil and gas production for some European countries. Another theory is that Syria’s ties with Iran have made assistance for Syria’s government a quagmire for many foreign policy experts in the West. While rebel forces in Syria are strongly laced with Al Qaeda, Syria’s secular government is seen as closely tied with Iran’s government and is a major source of conflict in the region. For tying itself to Iran, even though Syria’s government has little in common with the Iranian government, it has shut out any support its government might have had if it had taken a neutral position in the region.

The loss of Chavez might have its greatest effect on leftist ideals in the region. The popularity of Hugo Chavez might have been stronger than his reforms, and when populism dominates socialism, the risk of policy change becomes great when the popular figure is no longer available as the tip of the spear to push the movement beyond its initial revolution. For Venezuela’s foreign policy, it was likely Chavez himself that pushed for intervention in Colombia and it was Chavez who sought to create strong ties with Iran. While Venezuela’s new leaders will still maintain ties to Iran, the brotherhood among populists that brought Chavez so close to a conflict so far away may be tamed down, especially if the conflict in the Middle East becomes hot. Without Chavez, oil exports will not be a source of funds for housing for the poor, but simply a source of revenue that will be heavily scrutinized by the opposition. Pressure on Venezuela’s left will have pressure brought on it indeed, but unbearable pressure would come with continued strong ties to countries like Iran and the security threats that peak the gaze of American officials in its wake. With no Fidel in Venezuela to take the reigns of Chavismo, a more passive left and its supporters will remain, albeit for a long time.

Catherine Ashton addresses the Water, Peace, and Security conference at the United Nations in New York, Tuesday, Sept. 27, 2012 © European External Action Service (EEAS)

Pro-democracy and human rights movements beyond the EU borders will have a new access to grants from a budget of the newly established European Endowment for Democracy (EED). However, even though The Board of Governors of the EED held its meeting in Brussels on 9 January 2013, which also marks its official launch, the future performance of the EED still remains foggy.

Nevertheless, one question is finally clear and that is who is going to take the lead of the new institution. The EED Board of Governors named Jerzy Pomianowski, a career diplomat and the current Polish Undersecretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the Endowment’s Executive Director. This appointment is far from being a surprise, though. Especially as the whole initiative to establish the “Euro-version” of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), has been primarily Poland’s flagship initiative.

Besides Catherine Ashton, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, the 9 January board meeting was joined also by MEP Elmar Brok, chair of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and by Štefan Füle,Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy.

It is worth to have a look at the opening speech by Catherine Ashton and the following participants. Catherine Ashton opened the floor with the following words: “The central idea that motivated the creation of the Endowment is Europe’s commitment to advancing democracy. Not only does this benefit the people who aspire to freedom and who champion democratic transitions worldwide; it is also in our own European interest. The Endowment comes at a very timely moment, as 2013 will be a crucial year for democratic transitions, in particular in the EU’s neighbourhood. The European Endowment for Democracy can play a very important role. By working directly with those in the field, who are striving for democracy; and by offering flexible, non-bureaucratic and dedicated procedures that are tailored to the needs and demands on the ground.” [1]

Štefan Füle continued by stating: “I am delighted to see the European Endowment for Democracy becoming a reality. I see the Endowment for Democracy as a strengthened effort, supporting democratisation and peaceful forces that work for democratic changes to happen, supporting the actors of change in our neighbourhood, the emerging players that face obstacles in accessing European Union funding. With this new initiative we are sending a clear message of solidarity to the peoples of the Neighbourhood, assuring them that their democratic aspirations and their fight for human rights will be heard and supported by the European Union. The European Union can also bring its experience and know how to help them address the challenges of transition from authoritarianism to democracy.” [2]

In spite of that, the question of financial backing of the whole project is still unclear, even after 6 months from a point, when the whole project has been announced. Besides € 6.2 million allocated by the Commission from the budget of the European Neighbourhood Policy, both Polish and Swedish governments agreed on providing another € 5 million each. The same is expected from The Netherlands. Switzerland has also generously given with a handful of other EU Member States an additional € 8 million. According to Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza another € 10 million will most likely flow from the Commission over the next three years. [3] All in all, the financial side of the whole project still raises question, whether the rather small amount of money for the kick off – compared to the NED in the United States, which operates with more than 4 times higher budget – will be enough to support all activities the EU aims to in the following years.

As was already mentioned in the previous article, there are many doubts how exactly will the EED look like in the future. The biggest challenge, obviously, besides the financial side of the whole project, is on what actors beyond the EU it aims to focus. The same goes to how flexibly and swiftly the EED is going to be able to support non-institutionalized actors in the already highly unstable and unpredictable areas beyond the EU’s borders. Needless to say, that  half-hearted efforts without adequate backing by all 27 Member States – with Croatia to become the 28th Member State on 1 July 2013 – could lead not only to a lack of legitimacy for the EED, but for the EU’s human rights a and democracy promotion efforts beyond its borders as such. Hence, let’s see how Jerzy Pomianowski is going to handle these challenges in his new office.

[1] European Endowment for Democracy – additional support for democratic change, Press Release, Brussels, 9 January 2013, A 5/13, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134628.pdf

[2] ibid.

[3] EU launches new fund to help oppressed, Euobserver, 10 January 2013, available at http://euobserver.com/enlargement/118684

Credit: Hamza Turkia/Xinhua/Corbis

The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, long-term wars pitting factionalist fighters against government forces, renewed international interest in counter-insurgency. Washington D.C. sparked a cottage industry in what became known as COIN: think-tanks climbed aboard, new prophets emerged, blogs bloomed. Press accounts in 2009-2010 trumpeted COIN as the U.S. surged civilians and troops to Afghanistan, echoing General Petraeus’ surge in Iraq in 2007 that many considered key to subsequent stabilization.

COIN tenets became a catechism for field commanders. Lists of ‘commandments’ from its gurus, such as David Kilcullen and John Nagl, became scripture. Separate the Population. Enable Local Government. The gospel is that a population that trusts and supports its officials has no need for rebels.

Allegiances, however, are a funny thing. Those two little words, trust and support, have a firepower all their own. Not two years after the US surge in Afghanistan the international community began to cheer for the rebels, this time in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and a handful of their regional neighbors. If trust and support win popularity contests, the rebels were/are now freedom fighters, insurgents by another name.

In 2006 David Kilcullen circulated “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counter-insurgency” as a guide to field commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. As an influence he acknowledges T.E. Lawrence’s “Twenty-Seven Articles” from a 1917 Arab Bulletin. Lawrence, at the time advising the Arabs how to fight the approaching Turks, wrote from the perspective of insurgency, something the once-outgunned Libyan and Syrian rebels would identify with today.

Whatever side one is on in an insurgency or civil war, the population is the prize. When more are with you, fewer are against. The following COIN guidelines, in forward or reverse, illustrate how Arab Spring rebels, most notably in Libya and Syria, have been able to counter counter-insurgencies and put themselves on the path to securing the population.

The chart is heavy with examples from Libya and Syria, as counter-insurgency theory is geared to drawn-out and kinetic conflicts. Fortunately Egypt and Tunisia were not subject to overt guerrilla warfare. In all cases however the maxim applies of trust and support of the population.

Decisively, trust and support needs to include that of the security forces, who, if not defeated, need to support the opposition. This was true in Egypt. Bahrain, which like Tunisia and Egypt experienced substantial anti-government demonstrations in early 2011, looked to be travelling a similar path. But authorities in the tiny Gulf nation have powerful backers in neighboring Saudi Arabia, which helped quell protests, and in October 2012 the government banned demonstrations outright.

This examination of course only catches part of what is still an Arab Spring half-abloom. A new government has sat down in Tunis, yet Tripoli and Cairo continue to wrestle with the way forward.  And amid recent murmurs from both sides that neither can win militarily, Syria’s civil war continues, on a trajectory that confounds most analysts.

Glancing into the conflict crystal ball, one may linger on Central Asia. This region is adjacent to south Asia, western China, and the north Caucasus, all areas of recent or current Islamic insurgency. Some nations in the region suffer from various definitions of fragile states. Most however share low confidence in officials, extensive corruption, and a deepening rich-poor divide, similar to Arab Spring nations. Sparks in recent years—a murderous crackdown and curious deaths of imams in Uzbekistan, ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan—have yet failed to ignite a larger conflagration.

The U.S. and NATO allies have been accused of cozying up to authoritarian rulers in Central Asia, to stem insurgent traffic and preserve supply lines to Afghanistan. In coming years, however, these donor nations will likely move the magnifying glass to political reform. Will there be open revolt, and will political Islam be a force? Whomever the population trusts and supports will differentiate insurgent from freedom fighter, and oppressor from legitimate official.

Catherine Ashton with a “Free Libya” t-shirt (© European External Action Service)

The socio-political development of the Arab Spring has been a real wake-up call for the EU’s policy-makers. Rapid changes in the South Mediterranean once again pointed the finger at the EU’s inability to act swiftly, decisively and audaciously to the events unfolding beyond the EU’s southern borders. Numerous policy changes have recently occurred in the EU’s policy focus aiming to mirror these sudden changes. The most recent step to enhance the EU’s effectiveness of democracy and human rights support is the establishment of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), launched in November 2012. However, as it turns out, there are reasonable doubts whether the whole initiative has been well thought out.

Firstly, to understand the current state of play of the EU’s human rights and democracy promotion policy is possible only through the preceding steps. Here just to shortly describe the whole picture. Firstly, the initial step goes back to December 2011, when the Commission adopted a new document called ‘The Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – Towards a more Effective Approach’ aiming to boost the human rights policy and foster democratisation efforts throughout the matrix of the EU foreign policies. The next step followed with a set-up of a new office of the Special Representative for Human Rights, for which has been appointed Stavros Lambrinidis. The last step – and so far the most important one – is the ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’ from June 2012. By now, the launch of the EED represents the last stitch to the EU human rights and democracy promotion initiatives.

Before we get to further characteristics, goals and potential strengths and weaknesses of the newly established foundation, the following part offers a background of what has shaped the decision-making on the EED’s contours. Yet, as the EED can be still considered as a newborn baby of the Brussels’ institutions, it is still early to guess what the future performance will look like. This article addresses some preliminary thoughts on what can constitute the primary obstacles for the EED’s performance in the future and – perhaps even more importantly – whether the EU has had a clear vision of what it actually aims to bring into existence.

Polish initiative in line with the new human rights discourse

A course towards the creation of the EED has been set up in context of the Polish presidency of the Council of the EU. It was, notably, the Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski who called for bringing the lengthy discussions on the creation of the Endowment to a successful end and jumped-started the whole process of negotiations, in particular in light of the deteriorating human rights situation in Belarus and the North African countries in the first half of 2011. Although, one has to bear in mind, this has not been an enlightened idea in the Brussels’ institutions. Calls for the EU’s very own democracy fund, generously giving assistance to those in need beyond the EU borders, has been already hotly debated in previous years. However, none of them was yet unanimously supported by Catherine Ashton, the High representative of the Union for the Foreign and Security Policy, hand-in-hand with an approval by Stefan Füle, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, as in this case.

Without doubt, it has been an ambitious project from the beginning; to set up an entity creating the sixth pillar of the EU’s Instrument for Stability (IfS) with the aims and capabilities to flexibly, promptly and effectively support human rights and democratisation activities well beyond the EU member states’ borders. From the institutional perspective, the vision was to have an entity, which is not directly associated with the European External Action Service (EEAS) nor the Commission, with a certain degree of independence, however operating along the line of the EU policies. The operating of the EED was expected to run on voluntary contributions by the EU member states.

What has been decided on and what is not clear yet

12 November marks a day when the Commission allocated 6 million EUR to safeguard the swift launch of the EED. As it took 6 months to decide on all the aforementioned aspects, it is finally obvious on what basis the EED will be functioning. The headquarters is going to be based in the EU’s capital Brussels and it is a private foundation registered under the Belgium law (that is independent from the EU). It does not widen the already existing instruments of the EU, such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) or the Instrument for Stability. As was initially expected, the EED is going to be an independent institution aiming to co-exist with the already functioning instruments Brussels has in their sleeves. However, there are still some unclear points waiting to be clarified.

The first question deals with a financial side of the whole project, in particular whether the EU member states will be sufficiently up to financially contribute on a regular basis. The austerity measures adopted throughout the EU will not make it easier. The overall effectiveness and sustainability of the EED will strongly depend on how this issue is going to be tackled. The current financial backing of the EED is rather limited: Besides 6 million EUR allocated by the Commission from the budget of the European Neighbourhood Policy, both Polish and Swedish governments agreed on providing another 5 million EUR each. The same is expected from The Netherlands. Generous donation ought to arrive also from Switzerland, which – even though non-EU member state – has been enormously supporting similar initiatives focusing on human rights and democracy on a regular basis. At the moment, it is expected that a budget close to 20 million EUR should ensure the swift launch of the EED.

The EED’s financial budget for the initial months cannot be compared, obviously, to the other EU instruments in this particular field or to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in the United States (established in the first half of 1980s), which operates with a more than 5 times higher budget. It is then beyond doubt, that if the EU member states will not be willing to regularly contribute to the EED’s activities, there is hardly to expect that the EED would live up to the expectations and give a new dynamism to the EU’s human rights and democracy promotion policies already in place.

What is the added value?

Many articles, policy papers and policy briefs had an intention over the last months to identify numerous hurdles the EED could run into in the first years. The most insightful ones came mainly from FRIDE, German Development Institute, Centre for European Policy Studies and Open Society Institute. [1] Although all of them laid out guidelines for what is needed for the EED to be successful, it was not obvious at that time what exactly is the EED going to look like once launched.

So far, the answer of what will be the added value of the EED to the already existing plethora of human rights and democracy promotion instruments depends largely on how it will cope with two major challenges. That is, firstly, which actors in authoritarian and potentially democratizing regimes it aims to support and, secondly, how it will fill up the already existing gaps of the in parallel existing instruments the EU has in its hands.

To shortly elaborate on the first point, the EED faces the ever-lasting issue related to international support of democratization ever since a similar foundation has been established. That is the identification of the actors at the receiving end. Is it going to be political parties, independent media, journalists, foundations, educational institutions or selected dissidents? To tackle this issue will not be trouble-free, obviously. Not only that a group of potential receivers of the EED’s financial help can target actors all the way from governments to individual dissidents, but external support of opposition in authoritarian regimes can be at the end also a two-edged sword; in the worst-case scenario the beneficiaries are discredited in the eyes of public or punished directly by the autocratic regime holding power.

The already mentioned National Endowment for Democracy in the United States, for instance, cannot give a direct support to political parties. Support, thus, bypasses political parties and targets public society initiatives aiming to attract people to the polls. The EED, or the Union respectively, has to face this question as well. Even though political parties are usually the weakest point in political transitions, their support does not have to necessarily pay off. Yet, there are no official signs that the EED aims to take this approach, even though some EU officials are personally in favour of this idea. [2]

As was already touched in the previous lines, the key obstacle of the EED is to avoid duplication with the already existing EU instruments for human rights and democracy promotion beyond the EU borders; namely the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the already mentioned Instrument for Stability. The most similar is especially the first one. As various bureaucratical obstacles limit those particular instruments – such as programming cycles and budgeting – to deliver financial support to the recipients’ hands, the main added value of the EED should be to act flexibly and swiftly in the first place. That is, notably, to support smaller projects, non-registered NGOs and dissidents. In other words, namely those, which have difficulties to provide financial contributions by themselves in order to get financial support by the EU, as it is required in the EIDHR, for instance. As those beneficiaries are out of the mainstream of financial support flowing from the aforementioned instrument, this should be the crucial area of interest for the EED.

What is on the menu?

In the current state of play, it is still too early to conclude on what will the EED have on the menu, as the dust of the newly established institution has to settle down; nor how well thought out are its intentions for the future. So far, it is still yet a newborn baby facing countless questions on what skills it aims to acquire.

Surprisingly, also some of the EU officials have doubts how exactly it will look like in the future. One of the EU high officials, who was present in the whole negotiation process, led by the Polish presidency, commented in a private conversation in a similar way: “[the Polish presidency] pushed through the whole idea [on the EED], without even thinking on how to secure the long-term financial backing by the member states (…) it is not clear what exactly is it going to be supporting and how to make sure that it will not duplicate the other instruments.” [3]

In light of these information, as the EED has been already established, some of the issues it has to cope with are obvious. Institutional framework engraved in the still hot off the press founding statute allows various directions in which the EED can take its lead in the upcoming years. However, and most notably, to acquire a regular financial support by the EU member states will be the key for its successful role among the other EU human rights and democracy promotion initiatives. For instance, a wrongly addressed financial support to actors collaborating with authoritarian regimes could obviously hinder the hardly developed and determined picture of the EED and could result in a weakened legitimacy of the whole project. The same goes to only half-hearted efforts without adequate backing by all 27 member states. All in all, the effectiveness and sustainability of the whole project will be derived from how flexibly and swiftly the EED is able to support non-institutionalized actors in the already highly unstable and unpredictable areas beyond the EU’s borders. If the EED will be limited by strict bureaucratic restrictions, as it is the case for in parallel existing instruments for human rights and democracy, the added value of the whole project will be seriously challenged.

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[1] For more information generally R. von Meijenfeldt, ‘A European foundation for democracy: what is needed’, Policy Brief No. 93, FRIDE, September 2011; R. Youngs & K. Brudzinska, ‘The European Endowment for Democracy: will it fly?’, Policy Brief No. 128, FRIDE, May 2012; J. Leininger & S. Richter, ‘The European Endowment for Democracy between Wishful Thinking and Reality. Flexible and Unbureaucratic?’, Briefing Paper 11/12, German Development Institute, 2012; J. Hale & V. Ursu, ‘How Could a European Endowment for Democracy Add Value?, Discussion Paper, Open Society Institute-Brussels, 2012; H. Kostanyan & M. Nasieniak, ‘Moving the EU from Laggard to a Leader in Democracy Assistance: The Potential Role of the European Endowment for Democracy’, Policy Brief. No. 273, Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2012.

[2] A conversation with EU official involved in the whole process of negotiations on EED, 29 November 2012.

[3] Ibid.