The new president will be puppeteered out of office quicker than he was put in 

The election played out as many opposition supporters of Henrique Capriles supporters feared.

Government candidate Nicolas Maduro won by a close margin — closer than expected actually. Capriles denounced the results, pointed out cases of fraud and intimidation and called on his supporters (approximately 50 percent of the population, even according to official results) to demand a vote recount of the National Electoral Commission (CNE).

More specifically, the Capriles campaign called for verification of the receipts that print out after a ballot is cast, also buying time for international votes, the vast majority of which were cast for him in the Oct. 7 election, to be counted.

This call to action galvanized his base, which had been disillusioned after his quick acceptance of defeat in October. Yet no one, not even Maduro’s own party, seems to think much of the new leader.

From start to finish, Maduro’s most ardent supporters aren’t his supporters at all. They are Chavez supporters. One of Chavez’ last recorded statements to the public asked voters to support Maduro in the event that something were to happen to him. This deathbed plea has translated into a certain power beyond the grave. Maduro’s most popular campaign slogan, was in fact, a solemn vow by voters: “Chavez, te juro, voto por Maduro” [Chavez, I swear, I am voting for Maduro].

Maduro has now been left with the ticking timebomb that is Venezuela: a worsening economy, a sharply declining oil production capacity, a horrific security situation (Caracas is widely considered the most violent city in the Western Hemisphere), and, to top it all off, his own party is increasingly fractionalized and fissured.

Within the official party it is widely known that Maduro is not in charge. Most speculate he’ll be asked to step down within the first two years. Venezuelans are exhausted and fed up with the worsening economic and security situations, but they’ve never had a set figure to blame it all on. Until now, the blame has been shifted to the advisors and people “around” Chavez because he was so well-loved.

The people don’t love Maduro. At the first sign of discontent, the people “around” Maduro — most likely Diosdado Cabello — will find a way to blame then remove him, with little trouble or fanfare.

Cabello has broad support in the military and is thought to be more astute than Maduro when it comes to political movements and manipulations. It was Cabello’s decision to reject a vote recount after Maduro had already agreed to one.

Maduro’s sad fate as a temporary placeholder was visible since the beginning of the campaign in early April. Some of Maduro’s campaign posters didn’t even have his face on them – they had Chavez.

The average Maduro supporter couldn’t, and still can’t, really articulate why Maduro had been anointed as the chosen one. Antonio Mendoza, a government architect explained:

“Chávez designo a esta persona, que seguimos. No estamos en posición de cuestionar, somos militantes… simplemente es la línea que nos dejó el presidente. El presidente vio en él … cualidades extraordinarias,” [Chavez, designated this person, whom we follow. We aren’t in a position to follow, we are militants… this is simply the line the president left us. The (former) president saw in him… extraordinary qualities].

With supporters like this, it won’t take long before Maduro becomes the scapegoat for the country’s various ills and he is unceremoniously dumped from office.  The only bets now are if it will be before he hits the two year mark, and if Diosdado Cabello will take the roll himself, or test it out on someone else first.

The optimism over Latin America’s economically mobile population has missed the large segment that remains vulnerable—not in poverty but still at risk of falling back into it. Photo: Monique Naoum.

This week the BBC was promoting a new study that redefined the traditional class structure in Britain into new modern categories. With the assistance of some U.K. universities and research institutes, they made a class calculator that can be taken online and will define in what part of British society you currently belong. You can find the link to the survey here – I suggest you take a turn as it is fun and interesting. On the BBC World Service, they compared the seven new categories of classes redefined in the study with the traditional class and caste system in India. While there were changes and movement due to certain lower classes gaining additional wealth over the generations, the class system and caste systems are still very prominent in India, affecting how people work, live, socialize and define themselves politically.

Latin America is not a stranger to a ridgedly defined class system, and some conclusions from the discussion on Britain and India could be easily applied to many countries in the region. One issue that was raised by the expert on India’s caste system was that while some lower castes enjoyed some economic success, their identity in their caste system defined much of their political support in the greater political system in their region in India. It could be the case that a wealthy entrepreneur could also support a social left leaning party in such a conflict among classes, even if the party they support is not considered business friendly. So much was the divide among classes that political support may be secured not for a positive policy approach, but an approach that reasserts the divide among classes even if some from the lower class had the funds and mobility to become part of the top economic percentile of the population. In this case, class systems could result in possible “entrepreneurial socialists” due to a narrowly defined class structure.

In the upcoming election in Venezuela, the strategy that may define how much the opposition wins or loses in the election may not be solely based on the popular support Hugo Chavez’s base has for the party and Maduro. While many socially oriented voters in Venezuela supported Chavez, the balance of the vote may depend just as much on how they see the opposition as coming from a different class in Venezuelan society and how they see those classes supporting social goals in the next presidential term. If the Venezuelan opposition ends up being defined as a different class that can never be permeated or become accepting of hard working and innovative lower class individuals, then those classes that have no opportunity to grow will inevitably choose and change or revolution over promoting elites into power. This underlying narrative in Venezuelan and Latin American society may keep the leftists in the region around for a long time, even without their natural leaders being present in future debates.

The inherent problem with strong class systems is that it solidifies traditional systems that may not work to benefit the nation as a whole. The result is that the best and brightest that should come out of fair and healthy competition in society are stifled at the whims of a few powerful elites. Without a way to benefit from hard work and innovation, a country can never move forward or grow because the elite structure that benefits from current and past contradictions in society will keep the nation from innovation and growth in order to maintain the awards of a system that keeps them in an elite posture. One of the best examples illustrating the errors of class limitation in Latin American society is the progressive and organised nature of the non-documented worker community in the United States. Most undocumented workers in the United States come from Mexico and Latin America to the U.S. due to a lack of jobs in their own countries and a limitation on their ability to grow and prosper in society in the region. Despite not having the legal rights to work in the United States, many undocumented workers earn and save to such a great degree that they have rebuilt many of their communities back home and now have ownership of one or more homes in their community as well. Funds coming from lower class undocumented workers in the United States compete with the levels of national revenues in Mexico that come from Mexico’s oil industry, placing Mexico’s illegal émigrés in direct competition with Mexico’s upper classes that run much of PEMEX and Mexico’s energy sector.

Despite having a legal limitation to earn and work in the United States, the opportunities for undocumented workers to rebuild their own communities in Mexico and Latin America grew from nothing into Mexico’s largest source of national revenue. This socially orientated industry came from innovation, hard work and growth, separated from class limitations. The rebuilding of Mexico’s hinterlands through the work of socially oriented entrepreneurs comes from a group of individuals limited in both Mexico’s class system and America’s legal system. The only lesson to be learned in their class is that an entrepreneurial spirit will come naturally from innovative individuals when they find an opportunity for a better life for themselves and their communities.

Now that one of Latin America’s most controversial figures has died, it is interesting to look back at his actions, actions that will reverberate in the western hemisphere for some time to come.

This is a short piece (about 52 minutes) that is clearly a love letter from the maker, Cinema Libre Studio. The whole film is just Chávez expounding about his ideas on capitalism and socialism.

It is much like a state of the union address.

The Venezuelan president was part of the new left in Latin America, which includes Rafael Correa of Ecuador, Evo Morales of Bolivia, the Kirchners in Argentina, Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo, and Brazilian President Lula.
Chávez did not hide is disdain for capitalism, considering it a destructive force in the world. But he was not a proponent of socialist theory.

The socialism he envisioned was one where the community looked after itself before profit. Chávez criticized Marxists and Josef Stalin for their mistakes in inculcating a top-down approach to socialism.

He also took issue with some statements made by Simon Bolivar, who is practically Venezuela’s patron saint.

It was not only his embrace of socialism that set the United States’ teeth on edge but also his close relationships with Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

According to Chávez there is a need for a new socialism, one that evolves through trial and error.

According to a recent opinion piece in the Los Angeles Times, “From 1997 to 2011, he [Chávez] reduced the percentage of people living in moderate poverty from 54% to 31%, and those living in extreme poverty from 23% to 9%, according to the World Bank.”

He called his movement the Bolivarian Revolution and it remains to be seen if Vice President Nicolas Maduro can carry the torch now that Chávez is gone.

While Chávez claimed to be a proponent of inclusive politics and transparency, he clamped down on the press and granted himself more time in office.

Chávez claimed the United States was trying to undermine his rule and even assassinate him. One could in some way understand his paranoia given U.S. President George W. Bush supported a 2002 coup d’etat that briefly removed Chávez from power. So what is to be learned from Chávez’s reign in Venezuela?

Some say he was a populist like Argentina’s Juan Perón but Chávez dismissed that assertion, claiming he was a socialist.

Was his time in power a David and Goliath story, where his small country was in a deadly battle with the United States, also known in Latin America as the “Colossus of the North”? Or was he Robin Hood, stealing from the nefarious oil companies and spreading the wealth to his country’s poorest? Or was he a quixotic figure, a dreamer who did not fully grasp the need for capitalism to foster growth in Venezuela? Maybe he was a clown, a charismatic buffoon who riled up the population just to feed his own ego.

It is possible he was all those things.

For more information about Chávez and the leftward turn in South America, see older blogs entries here and here.
Now, as we wait with baited breath, it remains to be seen what will happen in Venezuela now that Chávez is dead.

Speaking Freely Volume 5: Hugo Chávez is available to rent.
Murphy can be reached at: Lojano@comcast.net

One of the issues with many leftists in Latin America is that while there are a lot of supporters that will never disappear as long as inequality is at one of the highest level worldwide, left-wing leaders often are successful in applying their policies because they are charming and popular individuals. Despite many criticisms of corruption in leftist administrations in Latin America, continued support and the election of leftist leaders comes from their ability to speak to the minds of many in the region who live at the spear’s end of existence in their daily lives in the cities and towns in Latin America.

So who will replace the Castros once they retire? It had been thought that Hugo Chavez in Venezuela would be the natural successor in the region, but recent months has revealed his health as an issue that cannot be avoided, and Venezuela’s ruling party is struggling to keep their hold onto power without the main ingredient that put them in power in the first place, that of Chavez himself. Yesterday, Hugo Chavez met his eventual death, and while expected, it is really the official beginning of the next era of the future of the left in Latin America.

The Economist recently published two interesting articles on Chavez and recently re-elected President of Ecuador Rafael Correa that might shed some light on how the future of the left may develop in the region. The author speaks in great detail about Chavez’s return from his treatments in Cuba. The unnamed author goes into a brilliant discussion on how the parties will deal with the ill president and the division of powers laid out in the constitution. He claims that for the most part the constitution is being ignored in order to keep Chavez in control. It is a wonderfully laid out article, but my final assessment of the situation regarding the presidency of Venezuela after studying many years of Latin American politics and studying constitutional law is that the president was simply very sick, he had aggressive cancer and needed to rest in order to be as healthy as he can be considering his awful illness. He passed away yesterday at 58, leaving his revolution to the party in power that faces an election in 30 days. During his illness, he was extremely limited in being able to stay at the head of government and as the de facto leader of this generation’s left in Latin America.

One of the left’s main weaknesses is its link to populism as a method of support. It is hard to say who will gain power in Venezuela or Cuba now that the leaders of the cause will no longer be available to support it in the future. In a separate Economist article, the victory of Rafael Correa in Ecuador’s election with 57 percent of popular support shows that leftists do not lack support in the region and that their policies can have a future in a country like Ecuador. It is uncertain whether or not Correa or someone like Evo Morales can become the new Castro or Chavez, but if populism can go beyond one person and become a political party with a strong mandate and leaders, it can avoid the eventual collapse of leftist popular movements that are always expected in government and by investors. Populism often creates a revolutionary situation in a country, but chaos at the end of one person’s life does not always have to end ideologies on the left in Latin America. Ideas on the left exist in all countries in Latin America to a very large degree, and populism does not always have to bring an end to social ideas for Latin Americans. For the future left, another populist voice may be needed to further expand a leftist revolution, but the left will always be at the core of social ideas in the region.

The ongoing conflict in Syria has been treated very differently from the one in Libya after the Arab Spring movement took hold in the region. The lack of support for Syria’s government might have to do with the lack of trade and ties between Syria and many European countries and the U.S. Syrian oil does not have a large effect on major industrialised countries, so it has received less initial attention than Libya, who supplies much of the oil and gas production for some European countries. Another theory is that Syria’s ties with Iran have made assistance for Syria’s government a quagmire for many foreign policy experts in the West. While rebel forces in Syria are strongly laced with Al Qaeda, Syria’s secular government is seen as closely tied with Iran’s government and is a major source of conflict in the region. For tying itself to Iran, even though Syria’s government has little in common with the Iranian government, it has shut out any support its government might have had if it had taken a neutral position in the region.

The loss of Chavez might have its greatest effect on leftist ideals in the region. The popularity of Hugo Chavez might have been stronger than his reforms, and when populism dominates socialism, the risk of policy change becomes great when the popular figure is no longer available as the tip of the spear to push the movement beyond its initial revolution. For Venezuela’s foreign policy, it was likely Chavez himself that pushed for intervention in Colombia and it was Chavez who sought to create strong ties with Iran. While Venezuela’s new leaders will still maintain ties to Iran, the brotherhood among populists that brought Chavez so close to a conflict so far away may be tamed down, especially if the conflict in the Middle East becomes hot. Without Chavez, oil exports will not be a source of funds for housing for the poor, but simply a source of revenue that will be heavily scrutinized by the opposition. Pressure on Venezuela’s left will have pressure brought on it indeed, but unbearable pressure would come with continued strong ties to countries like Iran and the security threats that peak the gaze of American officials in its wake. With no Fidel in Venezuela to take the reigns of Chavismo, a more passive left and its supporters will remain, albeit for a long time.

Photo Credit: Rodrigo Abd/AP Photo

This week’s election in Venezuela was important for reasons outside of Venezuela itself. The victory of Hugo Chavez with over 80% of the electorate voting and a sizable minority voting against the current President showed that Hugo Chavez does have a great deal of support as well as a strong opposition to his economic model. Outside of Venezuela it also represents the continuation of a model that while having long term weaknesses, still allows for a great deal of popular support in Latin America as a whole. Chavism, or the left-leaning economic model currently being developed in Venezuela has reduced poverty and inequality in Venezuela, but may only be feasible with high oil prices in a country with large oil reserves. The fear many in Venezuela and outside of the country have is that if the money runs out, there will also be an end to the poverty reduction strategy without any other economic engines to cushion the impact. Chavism may run out of fuel in the long run as revenue is directly tied to oil prices, and most, if not all natural resource based economies have suffered from steep market fluctuations when they are dependent on commodity prices alone.

Venezuela will soon have to deal with the limitation of over a decade of President Chavez and his economic model as he contends with his own personal health and regional elections coming up this December. Any severe change may cause a great deal of problems in Venezuela, but with changes to Venezuela’s economy and perhaps to the President himself, social inclusion in Venezuela’s economic future may still be at the core of any shift in Venezuela’s economic model. In Brazil, Lulaism, or what Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue has defined further as The Brasilia Consensus, may become the core economic model for productive left leaning countries in Latin America. In the event that economic growth becomes elusive in Venezuela in the near future, the roots of Chavism based in social inclusion may still be a priority in line with a stable growth model. Standing apart from The Washington Consensus, the Brasilia Consensus promotes stable growth with social programs as a priority as currently operating in Brazil, one of the BRICS nations and a model for stable economic growth worldwide. While many in Venezuela’s opposition supported Lulaism over Chavism, the popular support for Hugo Chavez may only bring about The Brasilia Consensus in Venezuela and to Latin America as a whole if Venezuela undergoes strong economic issues in the near future, and this may occur in several ways unfortunately according to many experts on Venezuela.

Part of the problem with oil prices is that the consumers of oil, the EU, U.S., China and other large economies are slowing down currently, with a focus on a Chinese slowdown now affecting commodity prices globally. When China curbs its needs for commodities, Latin America and its natural resources take a direct hit. Today, the slowdown in China due to Western nations not being able to effectively deal with their own economic knots had made the IMF reduce its forecast for global growth in 2013, and China’s once double digit economic boom has turned into a fizzle. Venezuela’s dependence on oil prices being high is directly related to demands for Chinese manufactured goods. Economic models based on commodity wealth often have troubles maintaining their economic plans, and Venezuela and Chavism if unstable many have many issues in the near future. Even Brazil has reduced their once healthy growth forecast for more modest numbers, and while Brazil may grow less than once thought, it still will likely be able to maintain its socially oriented economic model with a reduction in growth.

For a well balanced and healthy analysis of Brazil’s reduced economic prospects, as well as China slowing, the EU not growing, and oil prices dropping in the medium to long term, I suggest viewing today’s Canadian broadcast in Ontario of TV Ontario’s: The Agenda. It is one of the best policy shows in English speaking North America and often they will publish the broadcast soon after airing the program usually within 24 hours. You can find the link to the show here.

For years there has been criticism of national programs that use large amounts of oil revenue to fund projects issued by the office of the president towards large projects and social development programs for the poor of Venezuela. While many communities in Venezuela have benefitted greatly from the programs, many programs have also fallen into disuse, with projects having millions spent on them with nothing to show for it in the end. Funds from these projects often have no transparent records and are not scrutinised by the Congress. In addition, this fund makes up almost a third of investment funds going into Venezuela, more than the US put into reconstruction for Iraq at $29 billion. Over seven years, opposition leaders claim that over $105 billion has been spent with no records to show for its progress as the program is controlled and signed through by Hugo Chavez directly. While this likely is a great concern for many Venezuelans, many communities now have hospitals and homes where none of this existed before Chavez. It is likely that many poorer Venezuelans would vote for the person who gave them the most opportunities, as would anyone in the same position, and for good reason.

China has taken advantage of many conditions in Venezuela and Latin America in order to secure its own oil reserves for future development and industrialisation in China. With a lack of attention from the US towards South America, China has invested in development and large projects in exchange for guaranteed commodity access throughout the region. When referring to Venezuela, China has made agreements with Venezuela to invest and help build up Venezuela with funds and expertise in exchange for secured oil access to Venezuela’s reserves. These agreements allows China to have access to oil, as opposed to fluctuating currencies, and also places Chinese firms and workers in Venezuela to handle and manage many large industrial projects taking place in Venezuela under Chinese support. China does not wish to appear to be influencing elections in Venezuela as not to awaken the attention of the US. While Chavez uses his control of a portion of Venezuela’s oil wealth to promote his revolution and re-election in the country, China would have no reason to complicate its current beneficial position in the agreements with Chavez and Venezuela. While China may not be influencing the election directly, it likely would prefer a relationship with Chavez, who would ensure strong ties and dependence on China as well as do everything to avoid dealing with the US, even if it is at the detriment of Venezuela and competitors to Chinese investment. Chinese funds certainly are going to Chavez and he is likely investing as much as he can to ensure his re-election.

October 7th will show the true results of the positions of the candidates at the outcome of the election. While Chavez may help the poor, it is not every poorer Venezuelan who will vote for him. There have already been accusations of Venezuelans losing work opportunities to Chinese workers brought in on cooperative projects in Venezuela. There have also been instances where Venezuelan workers have been abused, and even assaulted when complaining about work conditions on Chinese projects in their country. There are certainly a mix of opinions and voters in the upcoming election that is not limited to class or position in Venezuelan society. We await the results for the next great discussion.

Student protests this year in the streets of Montreal over a relatively small tuition hike took the Quebec government by storm. In reality, it is likely more than just tuition that fuelled this year’s protests with the Liberal Party of Quebec facing allegations of corruption after nine long years in power. The Parti Quebecois, the last separatist party in Canada after the national party was practically eliminated from the political map, will likely win the election, not for their own policies, but because they are not the Liberals. Evidence of the not-a-Liberal movement shows clearly in the large number of votes that will likely come to the new Coalition Avenir Quebec party. As recent P.Q. support has come from apathy, the CAQ has been able to gain a sizeable section of the electorate in their favor, or at least gained as the alternative is clearly out of favor. Of a choice of the traditional parties, the Liberals and P.Q., it seems that the CAQ is the only voteable option for many in the election.

Being discontent with leadership does not always come from bad policies or corrupt practices. The trend has been that even when a government has been doing relatively well, apathy has determined the outcome of an election. In Mexico’s presidential election, the party that has unseated the PRI after over 75 years in power, the PAN party of Mexico, were relegated to third place after creating one of the largest periods of economic stability in Mexico’s history despite economic pressures from abroad. The PRI had come back into power with no real discussion of new policies or a push from the candidates to discuss any important issues. The election seemed to flow on who looked more like a President rather than what policies would keep Mexico on the current path or change Mexico for new and innovative ideas. Discussion in the electorate was extremely apathetic with no strong support coming from people on the street coming to any party except for the left PRD. Protests and votes for the PRD pushed the PANistas further down, and in the end the PRI, or new PRI as is claimed, won the election with a lack of policies and a presidential looking candidate in Pena Nieto.

While it is certain that the nomination of Romney and Ryan this past week in Tampa was not influenced by apathy in Canada or Mexico, the American trend of apathy might help the Republicans return the U.S. to the pre-Obama era, the one that created the global economic crisis that Obama has been trying to fight during his four years in office. Romney’s policies to this point have been based around those people who dislike Obama, as most of his major policy announcements have been against Obamacare and other initiatives put in by the current President. The Republicans under the Bush Administration cultivated economic policy that has mired the U.S. in joblessness and debt. Because of Bush’s economic record the apathetic Republicans may not give Romney their vote, but neither will they give it to President Obama. Romney has no real option but to energize the Tea Party base by using a smaller, younger Tea Party version of himself in Ryan. The “I am not Obama” campaign will solidify Republican votes in their base as former supporters of Obama stay home and claim apathy as the only way to protest government as a whole. Romney can only rely on not being Obama as him and Ryan, his younger twin, continue as a pair of presidential looking partners in the next election, trying to look picture perfect for the upcoming job interview in November.

One place where apathy has taken a back seat is in Venezuela. Hugo Chavez is seeking a third six-year term in office, battling his personal illnesses and strong opposition from the MUD party and opposition leader Henrique Capriles. Chavez in the last few weeks has likely realized his re-election may not be as easy as once thought. He often gained from winning small majorities in elections and referendums, but with technical glitches showing a lack of support from unions and workers for the president, and areas formerly seen as supporting Chavez now seeing some open opposition, Mr. Chavez may have a real fight on his hands for the next election, one that did not come from apathy. The latest blow to the government came in an explosion in one of Venezuela’s oil refineries, killing 42 people and injuring over 100, hitting the country as a whole and putting a price on placing political supporters in charge of national industries. The explosion created a big political debate among the parties, with claims ranging from lack of union support to sabotage by the opposition, looking more like a political debate in Syria rather than Venezuela. While it was likely an accident or due to negligence despite government claims against the contrary, it is clear that Venezuela’s chavistas and opposition supporters are anything but apathetic. Venezuelans have likely realized that they must take a serious approach to their future government and the future of their country.

Any leadership that cannot be peacefully turned over by the population is inherently unaccountable. Citizens should always have the ability to vote for their preferred leaders and reject those who they do not favor. Even some elected leaders who remain in office too long can begin to become unaccountable, as inertia and a lack of viable alternatives keep them in office as their energy and skill begin to diminish. One might think not only of Hugo Chavez but, arguably, Michael Bloomberg.

On the other hand, there are things that an unelected (or elected through rigged polls) leader can do to increase accountability. Consultations with civil society and the general public, maintaining transparency in governmental processes, and a fair judicial system won’t replace free and fair elections, but they will improve the ability of the population to effect some change. The problem is that most “benign dictators” believe that they are doing these things to a greater extent than they are. Don’t we all want to believe that on balance we are doing the right thing?

Egypt’s allies, and especially the United States, are walking through a minefield at the moment. Hosni Mubarak is still in power (as of this writing), so they have a difficult time saying outright that he is in the wrong. This clearly is a failure to hold him accountable. But much as human rights activists would like things to be otherwise, the primary concern of the White House and the State Department is not to maintain maximum accountability in the world. Their job is to maintain security and prosperity for the American people, and sometimes that requires a little authoritarianism here and there. It is certainly right to pressure the Obama administration to promote human rights and condemn the excesses of the Mubarak regime, but the reality is that that is only one of many considerations they have to grapple with. Clearly we cannot rely on foreign leaders to hold governments accountable; that is why true democracy, even when it brings unsavory types to power, is better than benign dictatorship.

Lastly, it is tempting to see the current demonstrations as the Egyptian people finally seizing the opportunity to hold their government accountable. They are expressing the grievances that were never before heeded, and they are attempting to effect the change that they could not achieve through the ballot box. But violent protests that bring a country to a halt – closing businesses, leaving people to hide in their homes – are not a means for ensuring that the voices of the population as a whole are clearly expressed to those in power. The demonstrations are the voice of the most aggrieved, the most daring, perhaps the most violent, but not necessarily a representative majority. The Egyptian people may have had no choice but to take to the streets, and we can hope that their efforts are not in vain. But that does not mean that a new leader in Egypt will mark a boost in accountability.

Great, but the deal is that I’m not so sure Everyman is, first, interested in the kind of raw data WikiLeaks is spewing out, or second, sufficiently schooled in international affairs to figure out how these facts, the policy blueprints, the test parts thrown out by the State Department’s  Office of Research and Development, so to speak, drive the actual production of history–decisions to send US soldiers onto foreign battlefields, to force information out of alleged terrorists when terror may be minutes away, to impose hard economic sanctions to head-off conflict, to say no to the rapid and disproportionate buildup of arms or the acquisition of nuclear capability by self-avowed enemies of the US on an American continent, or to prevent the meltdown of our economy and the repetitive patterns of crime and corruption that continue to erode the nation’s economic security.

WikiLeaks, as many analysts have already noted, isn’t throwing grenades.

In fact, most of the information revealed in the cables is common knowledge in Washington, stories that have traveled news circuits in abbreviated or disconnected forms for years or months, their urgency or relevance disguised by half-hearted coverage or editorial choices that bury the items on back pages or inside the daily flood of indiscriminately ordered  information on the web.

Without the ability to put these WikiLeaks into a larger context, to follow the ‘leads’ that punctuate this virtual information dump, what we’ve got (as Robert Dinero, playing Al Capone in “The Untouchables” put it) is “nuttin.”

“NUT-TING.“

WikiLeaks hole? Advice: stop digging

Indeed, the fact that government outrage continues to provide the international media with grist for its insatiable mill is one of the great ironies in this scenario: perturbed at the site’s revelation of embarrassing diplomatic discussions and fumblings–tales only mildly interesting to the average reader–government officials are now in the process of creating a better, and far more spectacular story over First Amendment rights and the ‘treasonable’ activities of a Dutch citizen accused of committing “sex by surprise” (in Sweden?).

Even worse, the official call from some quarters for draconian regulation of the internet has given Russia (which suggests nominating Assange for the Nobel Peace Prize) and China, a human-rights violator of mammoth proportion, opportunities to ‘prove’ to an already hostile world that when Washington suddenly finds itself looking out through wall-to-wall glass, this nation of stone-throwers is no better than anyplace else.

The WikiLeaks story as denoted by Moises Naim (Will Assange be indicted? By whom? For what? Will he go to jail? Will governments ‘cleanse’ the internet via raging bonfires of nationalist insularity?) will no doubt continue to fuel media coverage through the New Year, longer if DOJ manages to build a criminal case against the WikiLeaks mastermind.

But let’s face it: getting Assange for espionage and/or conspiracy and making the internet safe for democracy is a much better, and easier to follow story than Hillary Clinton’s permutated musings about what North Korea could possibly be planning to do with its nuclear arsenal or whether the US will ever be in a position to ‘get tough’ with China, a country Clinton intrepidly calls ‘America’s  banker.’

The information Assange threw out into cyberspace, the ‘secret cables’ and such, will fade sooner than later from front pages around the world, reduced to the feeble stuff of obscure policy discussions editors know will not sell papers.

People want black and white, ‘gotcha’ news reports accompanied by photos of burned out bunkers.

Steak Not the Sizzle

Not me. It’s the steak, not the sizzle I’ve been savoring, especially those juicy WikiLeaks that seem to confirm tips I’ve posted on this site.

One of my favorites is the evidence WikiLeaks provides regarding the Iranian infiltration of Venezuela, its willingness with Russia to supply Hugo Chavez with billions in weapons (1900 surface-to-air missiles as of 2009) as well as financial support (from Putin) for the construction of a factory in Venezuela dedicated to the manufacture of Kalashnikov rifles and a second factory dedicated to the manufacture of ammunition for these weapons.

WikiLeaks also zeroes in on offers from Iran and Russia to aid Chavez in the buildup of Venezuela’s nuclear capabilities, another story that’s been making the rounds for some time.

Then, of course, there’s also acknowledgment, deep within the US Department of State, that Venezuela is trading weapons for drugs supplied by the FARC, which are, in turn trafficked through cartel gangs in Mexico–the same gangs that have already killed roughly 30,000 civilians on the US-Mexico border and that continue to threaten US lives on our own side of the line.

What do we think the FARC wants to do with all those arms, and eventually, maybe, the nuclear materials Chavez will be doling out? Do we really need Assange to connect these dots for us?

Some of the WikiLeaks revelations even manage to generate humor–who says there’s no fun in foreign affairs?

“No Intervention” Calderon Urges US to Get Tough with (the rest of) Latin America

We have, for example, President Calderon’s concern about the growing connections between Venezuela, Iran and Russia and his consequent urgings to the US government (which is itself prohibited by a US-Mexico Treaty from ‘interfering’ in Mexico’s sovereign affairs via unilateral counter-drug investigations) to  intervene (Urgent!) against the Venezuela, FARC, Bolivia, Cuba, Iran, Russia coalition Calderon cites as a looming threat.

While Calderon wants the US to stay out of Mexico’s involvement in the drug trade, the storm he sees gathering to the south has him playing Winston Churchill to a US administration happily non-interventionist and definitely not ready to extend a sympathetic ear–no Harry Hopkins in this picture. One savors the image of Obama advising Calderon to move any resources he thinks may be threatened to a safer port–maybe Canada, the site to which Roosevelt suggested Britain might want to move its naval fleet. Oh well.

The question is: Do we really need Calderon or Assange to paint a portrait of an ever cozier relationship between Venezuela, Cuba, Boliva, Nicaragua, the FARC, Iran and Russia?

The Latin American nations referenced above openly share an anti-US animus and a common enterprise: to launder criminal funds, traffic in drugs and illegal weapons, achieve nuclear capability, and establish a robust Marxist base (like the one the US faced down in Cuba) to support destabilization and revolution in the Americas. Their old-line communist sponsors openly vow to assist and support them.

WikiLeaks also leads us to another story, reported already, about the US government sending ‘special US advisors’ (paid via funds from Merida Intiative, aka “Plan Mexico”) to work with the Mexican military and ‘vetted units’ (theoretically, individuals with no connection to the bad guys, in this case, the Zetas and other rogue cartel figures) to end the siege of violence that has given the Mexican drug trade such a bad name in recent years.

The best thing we can say about this arrangement is that at least a few US government employees are reclaiming, via contractor salaries, some of the billions we’re sending to Mexico in the wild hope those dollars may work against and not in support of the national drug industry.

Unfortunately, the notion that US operatives will  work only with stand-up individuals within the Mexican military or the Federal Judicial Police Force, people who represent absolutely clean links in an untainted chain, is hard to swallow. Everyone reports to someone, and, as they say, it only takes one rotten apple.

US and Russia: Enemy of My Enemy My Friend

The US is also involved in joint counter-drug operations with Russia in Afghanistan: the Russians are giving us supply lines, and at this point, with troop withdrawals scheduled for July 2010, we’re only too happy to take them.

Expect US-Russia cooperation on counter-terrorism as well.

Winning elections means ending unpopular wars, and that means foreign threats to the US which remain unresolved must be addressed covertly (joint operations) or through proxy interventions–think Russia against Afghanistan; India (shhh!) leaning on Pakistan; and, believe it or not, the notion, hatched somewhere in the State Department, that the Saudis, amply supplied with cutting-edge weaponry from the US, might want to take on Iran.

Think again, Pilgrim.

The Saudis, WikiLeaks reveals, don’t want more weapons–they really want the United States to stay and stand tall (Gary Cooper, High Noon) even while they sympathize with other middle eastern states about American imperialism and jawbone with NATO about US exceptionalism.

And then, of course, there’s Pakistan, another real bad boy of narco-nuclear states. Leslie Gelb (Council on Foreign Relations) says Pakistan is the “greatest threat to world peace, highly unstable, haven for countless extremist groups, with 100 nuclear weapons–a country with 180 million people that can’t govern itself…”

“We can’t fix it [Pakistan],” finishes Gelb. “What are we going to do?”

It’s a rhetorical question, of course, and Gelb races to answer it: “Ask THEM what we can do…”

Palistan, John Kerry, and Osama bin Laden

WikiLeaks suggests another scenario, reporting that US Officials believe Pakistan’s ISI has been aiding the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan for years, cooperating in suicide attacks, and maintaining bonds with Taliban leaders Pakistan knows will take back power when the US and NATO pulls out.

The US, however, has assured Pakistan that we won’t be pulling our money out with our troops, so the current plan might well be code named “Keep Showing Them the Money”–tens of billions per year.

What will that buy? No one in the US government really seems to know, and Senator John Kerry suggests it’s time to review our policy toward Pakistan and Afghanistan. Good thinking.

Pakistan has already let us know that our money can’t buy their love, only maybe, if we’re on time and looking good, a place on the dance card. Given that Pakistan is as fickle as it is dangerous, that may not be enough, but it is all the US has.

According to WikiLeaks, Hillary Clinton believes Osama bin Laden in hiding in Pakistan’s tribal regions–again, not new news, but an important clue to understanding what Pakistan is really all about. If bin Laden is still alive and still well in Pakistan, it’s because he knows it’s the safest place in the world for him to be.

You don’t need a WikiLeak to know the way this wind blows.

The revelations flowing from Assange’s organization offer us more than repackaged facts, however. They tell us what we already feared–that foreign policy is as much luck as it is knowledge and skill, and that US negotiators, lacking clear direction, are opting for slow moves, small moves, and sometimes no moves at all.

It’s our job, I guess, to figure out whether this is the good news or the bad news.

Yes, WikiLeaks may have damaged our confidence in our government  leaders, shown them with their pants down and thinking caps off, but the next time they tell us “We’re just like you,” we will at least know that much is true.

Not in this case.

The diplomatic furor over Hillary Clinton’s use of the word ‘insurgency’ to describe the current situation in Mexico, and the speedy rejection of the term by President Felipe Calderon and the Obama Administration, has only added fuel to a fire Mexico appears unable to put out.

In remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations (9/8/10), Clinton said:

“We face an increasing threat from a well-organized network, a drug-trafficking threat that is, in some cases, morphing into or making common cause with what we would consider an insurgency.”

Don’t Rock the Boat

For the past two decades, Washington’s take on the trafficking situation in Mexico has been fairly simple and straightforward: according to the US government, Mexico’s drug cartels are in it for the money, for the buck, for profit alone. We know their kind.

The solution (including the Merida Initiative) has been to offer the government of Mexico millions in support of various counter-drug initiatives that officials in both countries swear are effective in combating drug-trafficking, eliminating  money laundering, and in curbing the power and influence of regional drug cartels.

It’s the US and Mexican governments versus ruthless, greedy narco-traffickers, and in this ‘bad-guys/good guys’ scenario, the two governments work mano-a-mano toward common goals–eliminating drug trafficking and nurturing trade relationships (Mexico is our second-largest trading partner, a priority in tough economic times).

The US supplies financial support for counter-drug programs and technical expertise. Mexico continues to report progress–ongoing arrests of traffickers and significant encounters between police/military and cartel gangs.

The Plot Thickens

Some big names are taken down (“La Barbie” the most recent), and the arrest stats and seizures sound spectacular.

But billions of narco-dollars continue to move into legitimate off-shore or US bank accounts. Tons of cocaine still move into the US from Mexico; growing quantities of heroin travel the same pathways, and there are growing reports that criminal/terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah are also penetrating Latin America via Paraguay (Cuidad del Estes)–a notorious Tri-Border (Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil) region known for the scale and audacity of its money-laundering (millions on behalf of mid-eastern account holders), counterfeiting, drug-trafficking, and arms smuggling operations.

Other reports challenge the simple ‘Mexican government versus the cartels’ equation as well: Hugo Chavez pays billions for small arms and other weapons (attack jets, tanks, armored personnel carriers, S-300 missiles, and surface-to-air missiles) imported from Russia, China, Iran and Cuba; the FARC trades coke for Venezuelan guns; Venezuela and Nicaragua sell arms to Mexico’s cartels.

An expert on global crime once said that nations, governments and even the ordinary man on the street are inclined to overlook white-collar crime,  especially financial crimes, as long as these illegal activities do not become triggers for political upheaval or violent conflicts that threaten to undermine the stability or security of the state–when they do not support insurgencies.

In other words, drug trafficking and money laundering would be far less newsworthy, and certainly less important politically, if  the Calderon Administration and the Mexican military were merely able to ‘maintain order’ among the cartels–if they succeeded, not even in eliminating trafficking, but simply in keeping the players under control–referees, so to speak, capable of settling disputes in ways that preclude palpable US involvement in Mexico’s internal workings, or the attention of the international press.

Obama and Calderon Deny ‘Insurgency’

President Calderon’s repudiation of an “insurgency” at work in Mexico is clearly meant to keep US intervention at bay, and to preserve trade benefits provided by NAFTA. Cynics might also say Calderon wants to keep the government’s family skeletons where they belong–locked tightly in Mexico’s closets.

It has long been the contention of law enforcement officials in the US–officers with Customs and Border Patrol (DHS/CBP)–that the Mexican government and its military have, indeed, played the role of referee for many years, and played it well.

Enforcement insiders will tell you that government and military involvement in the billion-dollar business of narcotics trafficking has provided many of Mexico’s policymakers with compelling incentives to tamp down cartel rivalries and  preempt open and ongoing warfare.

The last US investigation into drug trafficking and money laundering in Mexico, Operation Casablanca, was a bottom-up operation that eventually led federal agents to high-value and highly-placed targets within the Mexican government.

Mexico claimed that the US had failed to provide Mexican authorities with a pre-brief on the aims and methods of the investigation, and demanded that the US shut down the investigation.

Mexico’s outrage was resolved only after then-Attorney General Janet Reno and her Mexican counterpart signed what is known as The Brownsville Agreement, a pledge on the part of the United States to fully inform the Mexican government prior to the initiation of any US investigations that might involve Mexico or threaten its “national sovereignty.”

Mexico Polices Itself

The practical and little-discussed result of the Brownsville Agreement has been to shut down any covert US investigation into drug trafficking and/or money laundering that might implicate or embarrass prominent government or industry executives in Mexico–the US pledge to alert Mexican authorities that an investigation is on the way allows important principals and lesser criminals as well to cover any tracks well in advance.

The Mexican government, consequently, has been operating on ‘the honor system’ since the Brownsville Agreement went into effect, a situation that would certainly change if Clinton’s diagnosis of ‘insurgency’ were to replace the idea currently underpinning US-Mexico relationships: that the violence in the streets of Mexico cities is an internal matter, that the reported 28,000 deaths so far represent collateral damage triggered by cartel rivalries, and that this is a matter for Mexico to resolve, with financial assistance from the US, on its own.

The Merida Initiative, which has pumped millions of US dollars into counter-drug efforts designed by the Mexican government and its military, is viewed, in some quarters, as both a reward and a form of compensation to Mexican officials capable of  ‘containing’  criminal activities in ways that have, until recently, supported Washington’s vision of able governance in Mexico.

The Emperor Has No Clothes

Now, after 28,000 deaths over the last four years–and despite President  Felipe Calderon’s protests to the contrary–the Department of State appears to be questioning not only the ability of Mexico’s leaders to rein in cartel violence, but also the long-held notion that cartel violence (crime-for-profit), issuing from discrete, specific, and easily identifiable sources, can be targeted and surgically removed.

The term ‘insurgency’ speaks to a larger problem, and to responses  neither the US nor the Mexican government is eager to discuss.

To ascribe the root cause of violence in Mexico to the growing influence of ‘insurgents’ suggests that the mayhem on Mexico’s northern border signals the unfortunate arrival of larger, more flexible, adaptive criminal networks, syndicates which allow garden-variety drug traffickers (interested only in profit) to join forces in ad hoc, short or long-term alliances (sharing routes, logistical and operational cooperation, adopting similar strategies for laundering money) with individuals and groups driven by profit and ideology, or by ideology alone.

This is the new face of global organized crime–a criminal smorgasbord in which players energized by shifting motives still cooperate at intersections in their operational journeys, ‘hooking up’ for a day or an extra dollar when there are benefits all around.

This is how criminal gangs and terrorist outfits leverage their resources–opportunistically.

This is how terror piggybacks its way towards a target, hitching piecemeal rides with coke dealers and human ‘mules’ smuggling bulk cash across borders, or buying a plane ticket with funds generated via an unexpected opportunity to get in on a ‘side deal’ providing arms to the FARC or counterfeit copies of Disney’s DVD, “The Lion King,” to a retailer who just happens to be ‘on the way.’

Nexus between Illicit Trafficking and Terrorism

There is strong evidence that leftest groups across Latin America, ‘insurgents’ for whom money is only an end to a larger ideological goal (the destabilization of US allies in Central and South America) are linked at many levels and in many ways to Mexico’s cartels.

Cartels adopt terrorist methods, car bombings, kidnappings, civilian assassinations.

Chavez and Ortega sell guns to Mexican gangs.

Venezuela trades guns for coke which travels through Mexico to the US.

Hezbollah uses trafficking routes established by Mexico’s cartels.

In 2008, the US, in cooperation with Colombian investigators, identified and dismantled an international cocaine smuggling and money laundering ring based out of Colombia. This operation, which was made up of a Colombian drug cartel and Lebanese members of Hezbollah, used portions of its profits–allegedly hundreds of millions of dollars per year–to finance Hezbollah.

The kinship between Chavez, Ortega, the FARC and foreign allies that include Russia, Iran, China, and Cuba, and the reciprocal trade between them–drugs, guns, money–openly reflects an anti-US agenda for which Hugo Chavez continues to be a voluble spokesperson.

In the end, Chavez and his cronies are preaching revolution.

Are Mexico’s traffickers and money launderers inherently immune to Hugo’s socialist pitch? Do their eyes never leave the prize?

Of course, they must. Both history and logic tell us that it is impossible to quarantine criminal activities, or to argue that drug trafficking gangs in Mexico occupy cloistered quarters in the criminal world, never crossing paths or stopping to parlay with colleagues along the way. Bureaucracies stovepipe–criminals know better.

There are accounts of drug traffickers forsaking profit for ideological passion, and jihadists abandoning a better deal in the after-life for a five-bedroom house in this one, a place with a pool on the Florida panhandle.

You just never know.

What we do know is that criminal activities across the world are interconnected, and that insurgents whose goal is to destabilize a state or region invariably use criminals and criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, as intermediate tools to weaken a target, or as Trojan horses, with the darker threat hidden within.

Insurgents also depend on corruption, ‘the taste’ as Tony Soprano might say, which belongs to  even the most distanced collaborator in the criminal process. It isn’t difficult to hijack a nation already in a state of self-induced dissolution.

And Mexico has it all.

Right now, Felipe Calderon is scrambling to admit ‘the ferocity’ of the drug violence in Mexico, coming clean soon enough, he hopes, to head off any impulsive proposals the US State Department might conjure up as a remedy to an ‘insurgent threat’ in Mexico.

President Obama is on the same train, assuring America that Mexico does not, in any way, resemble Colombia twenty years ago.  We don’t need a ‘Plan Colombia,’ requiring big investments and significant US intervention, in Mexico.

With enough time and money, we are told, Mexico’s government and the military can take care of the problem themselves.

These middlemen are almost certainly motivated by greed more than ideology, but US government insiders suggest that the arms flows between Nicaragua, Venezuela, Mexico, and the FARC are, at bottom, part of a larger ideological blueprint to destablize countries already weakened by social and political unrest: for the FARC, that country is Colombia.

The United States has warned that such actions–this increase in the import and sales of weapons–might “spark an arms race in Latin America,” but the fear must certainly be much broader than that.

What US policymakers should dread is another scenario, one in which the steady sale of arms to Venezuela from Russia, Iran, China, and Cuba–and the willingness of both Venezuela (Russian and Chinese arms) and Nicaragua (US-manufactured weapons) to resell firepower to criminal or insurgent elements throughout South and Central America (Mexico being the prize)–someday allows Chavez and Ortega to realize a common ambition: power over a Socialist Empire  encompassing the greater part of  Central and South America.

On April 5, 2010, Congressman Connie Mack (FL-14), the Ranking Republican of the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, blasted Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin for completing another $5 billion arms deal the day before.

Mack said:

“This isn’t the first arms deal between the two countries, and I doubt it will be the last. Since 2005, Venezuela has purchased $4 billion worth of Russian arms, including assault rifles, helicopters and fighter-bombers.”

Mack continued, “This deal is another example of Hugo Chavez’s dangerous alliances with the thugocrats of the world and other enemies of freedom like Iran and Cuba.”

In mid-May the country’s Aban Pearl platform sunk. Apparently the safety mechanisms functioned and there are no ongoing gas leaks. All employees were safely evacuated.

Maybe Venezuela has some kind of comparative advantage when it comes to the sinking of oil or natural gas platforms? Then again, any response is easier in 160 meters of water rather than the 1500-meter depth of BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil drilling platform.

There has been little or no news since the first reports of the loss of the seemingly forgettable Aban Pearl. Meanwhile, daily updates about the ongoing BP disaster in the Gulf of Mexico mean that the name Deepwater Horizon will be etched into our collective memory.

Those opposed to the Venezuelan government will likely interpret this ruling as another sign that the country’s leaders do not accept alternative viewpoints, even the critiques of its former allies.

In the world of Chávez loyalty is extremely important. You are either with him or against him – and there are often consequences for those who choose this second option. Anyone who signed a petition in support of a vote to recall President Chávez in 2004 were blacklisted and are banned from working for the state after their names were leaked in what is known as Tascon’s List. In the case of Baduel, even though he played a crucial role by enabling Chávez to regain power during the 2002 coup attempt, his opposition to the expansion of the president’s control appears to have been too much to overlook. He is not the first former official of the administration to be imprisoned.

Supporters of Chávez, however, probably do not see these as trumped up accusations against Baduel. Instead, they likely see the impending punishment as just desserts for charges that nearly $4 million of funds were unaccounted for when he was in office.

Information for this posting comes from the NYT and BBC.

The move appears to be an effort to dive into the use of digital media that has been a tool of opposition to the government. As Reuters points out, it may require a shift in the President’s approach:

“Known for hours-long speeches, Chavez will now face the challenge of keeping his outpourings within the 140-character limit demanded by Twitter.”

What is the significance of the name used by Chávez? In Venezuela “candanga” has its unique definition, and “is used to mean someone who is strong-willed and rebellious, or a troublemaker”. Given what the world has seen of the President during his decade-long rule of Venezuela and some of his more memorable international appearances (e.g. a speech to the UN in 2006 in which he referred to George W. Bush as the devil, and a public spat with the king of Spain in 2007), this seems appropriate.

Prior to Chávez’s first post there were more than 12,000 followers on Twitter. If these were all Venezuelans it represents a significant portion of the country’s 200,000 accounts, and all without sending even a single message. One wonders who will follow Chávez online. Are his supporters (who are more likely from poorer populations and have less access to the internet) going to be updated, or will it actually be the opposition keeping tabs on the President’s latest commentary?

Note: This story’s source, including the information on the number of Twitter users, is Reuters.