AP Photo/Virginia Mayo

Is it in the interest of the European Union to arm Syrian rebels? Here is the real question. After almost two years of vicious civil war, over 80,000 deaths and 1,5 million refugees, the EU once again led by Paris and London has received flexibility for actions if needed through eventual shipment of weapons to Syrian rebels.

After over 13 hours of negotiation on May 27, the 27 foreign ministers have agreed on supplying weapons to Syrian rebels and to extend all other sanctions, including visa bans, asset freezes and prohibition on buying oil from regime-linked firms, for one year. Despite the political agreement nobody, mainly Paris and London, will be shipping weapons at this stage to Syria.

The following segment is the official agreement made the Council on May 28^th, as published in the latest press release, the Council agreed on the following declaration:

“The Council agreed the following elements on the renewal of the restrictive measures against Syria:

1) At the expiry of the current sanctions regime, the Council will adopt for a period of 12 months restrictive measures in the following fields, as specified in Council Decision2012/739/CFSP:

– Export and import restrictions with the exception of arms and related material and equipment which might be used for internal repression;

– Restrictions on financing of certain enterprises;

– Restrictions on infrastructure projects;

– Restrictions of financial support for trade;

– Financial sector;

– Transport sector;

– Restrictions on admission;

– Freezing of funds and economic resources.

2) With regard to the possible export of arms to Syria, the Council took note of the commitment by Member States to proceed in their national policies as follows:

– the sale, supply, transfer or export of military equipment or of equipment which might be used for internal repression will be for the Syrian National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces and intended for the protection of civilians;

– Member States shall require adequate safeguards against misuse of authorisations granted, in particular relevant information concerning the end-user and final destination of the delivery;

– Member States shall assess the export licence applications on a case-by-case basis, taking full account of the criteria set out in Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

Member States will not proceed at this stage with the delivery of the equipment mentioned above. The Council will review its position before 1 August 2013 on the basis of a report by the High Representative, after having consulted the UN Secretary General, on the developments related to the US-Russia initiative and on the engagement of the Syrian parties.”

Syria has become a real headache for the West. In the case of the EU, this decision is far from symbolizing unity on the matter. As demonstrated by Gideon Rachman in his latest article there is no such thing than a Western view on the Syrian crisis. Even within the EU several Member States, such as Austria, Czech Republic and Sweden, have raised their concerns. Germany has as well expressed its skepticism. It appears that the most vocal EU member state opposed to this outcome was Austria leading to a clash during the meeting between British foreign secretary, William Hague, and its Austrian counterpart, Michael Spindelegger. Spindelegger went to declare afterwards that the meeting was a failure and criticized the British tactics. His main declaration was that “we [the EU] are a peace community and we would like to stay as a peace community.” Such statement is fascinating as it underlines a fundamental and ideational clash on the role of the EU as a global security actor. On one side, Paris and London want to militarize the EU in order to become a stronger global security actor, while on the other, states like Germany, Austria and so on, are advocating in favor of a more civilian type of power, if one recalls the literature developed by Duchêne and Manners. Despite strong foreign policy division, France and Britain have finally been able to advance their positions at the EU level, arming the rebels. Within the US the divisions are very clear as well: the republican hawks, John McCain and Lindsey Graham, are pushing for a no fly-zone and arming the rebels; Secretary of State, John Kerry, is in favor of arming rebels; and US President, Barack Obama, is opposed to arming them and any intervention. In the case of John McCain, he did spend Memorial Day in Syria meeting with rebel leaders. As reported by Politico, his secret trip was organized by Syrian Emergency Task Force, a U.S.-based group that works with the Free Syrian Army.

Der Spiegel

However, the EU position to arm the Syrian rebels raises several issues: first, Russia. Since the beginning of the uprising, Moscow has been a fervent ally of the Al-Assad regime. Russia has been sending weapons and military supports to the Syrian government. Not surprisingly Russia has already condemned the EU agreement. Russian deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov argued that “this does direct damage to the prospects for convening the international conference.” He refers to the international conference on peace talks planned for next month in Geneva. It will be interesting to follow how Moscow reacts to the new EU position and see if the peace talks will take place and how successful will they be.

Second, which lucky rebel groups will be receiving weapons and what types of weapons. Even though the U.S. and Turkey support the Franco-British strategy, the control of weapons once they cross the borders will be impossible. Assuring that the weapons, such as modern surface-to-air or anti-tank missile, go directly in the hands of the selected rebels, like the Free Syrian Army, will not be feasible. Paris, London, Washington and Ankara know that. So on the question of the risks of shipping weapons to extremist fighters, William Hague, British foreign secretary, replied

One of the arguments for sending arms is that at the moment the extremists can get weapons, the regime can get weapons, but if you are of moderate opinion, and you are a citizen of Syria, and every weapon that has ever been invented, except nuclear weapons, is being dropped on your town or village, the world has been denying you the means to defend yourself. And that is radicalising people and driving them to extremism.

Berlin has been very concerned about shipping weapons to rebels.  German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle raised the following questions which have been dividing the Union: How can it be guaranteed that the weapons don’t fall into the wrong hands? And would more weapons really help end the war sooner? Paris and London have yet to answer them.

Third, what is the endgame? The endgame ought to be informed by national and/or European interests. No need to underline that Paris and London envision a Syria free of Al-Assad regime. But what would be the direct and indirect costs of a post-Al Assad Syria? Can the West continue to use force – directly or indirectly – when war crimes are committed? Last, what are the interests of the EU and the U.S. in Syria? In case of an eventual fall of the Al-Assad regime, how will Israel and Iran react? The cost of action-in-the-dark – blindfolded actions – may be greater than inaction. The Libyan experiment illustrates such statement. The 2011 mission in Libya opened a pandora’s box, the power vacuum following the fall of the Qaddafi regime has led to a massive shift of power in the region of the Sahel. As a consequence since January 2013, the French troops have been fighting a war in Mali against rebels, tuaregs and radical Islamists. Ultimately the real question is: Can the French and the Brits assume the consequences of a regional power vacuum in a post-Al Assad period? If the answer is no, then the option is quite straightforward.

Ambassador Susan Rice on Face the Nation (photo: cbsnews.com)

On Friday, ABC News published all 11 versions of the Benghazi talking points that were written by the CIA at the request of Congress and used by Ambassador Susan Rice on several TV talk shows on Sunday, Sept. 16, 2012. It was widely reported for months that the original talking points had been edited and that the changes included the deletion of references to the terrorist group al-Qa’ida and to Ansar al-Shari’ah, a local Islamist group with suspected ties to an al-Qa’ida affiliate called al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Republicans have used this to assert that the administration changed the talking points in order to cover up the terrorist nature of the incident that occurred in Benghazi on Sept. 11, 2012. They have also suggested that the administration introduced the notion that a demonstration preceded the attack and that this notion was intended somehow to distract the public’s attention from the fact that a terrorist attack had occurred, apparently unimpressed by the fact that President Obama had already referred to it as “an act of terror” on Sept. 12 and that the public often rallies around an administration after an attack. We now know that there was no such demonstration, although several published reports at the time suggested that there had been.

We still know relatively little about the actual editing of the talking points, other than that the final version was written by an interagency deputies’ group (that is, a meeting of the deputy heads of several agencies, such meetings are a common coordinating mechanism within the bureaucracy). Now that we have the texts of all the versions, we know that the original talking points grew but then shrank again and in the end, at the deputies’ meeting, were severely cut. These cuts, however, are not what we were led to believe.

It is notable that the “spontaneous demonstration” is included in every version of the document, including the original. This was wrong, but it was believed by many at the time and there was no particular reason to assume that it would be important or controversial. (People on the scene would have known that there was no demonstration, but they presumably would have had no reason to mention that fact at least until they had heard the claim made on television.) It is also notable that, although al-Qa’ida and Ansar al-Shari’ah were mentioned in the original talking points, the document did not claim that they were responsible for the event. Rather, it said that the attack was carried out by “a mix of individuals from across many sectors of Libyan society,” including “Islamic extremists with ties to al-Qa’ida.” It goes on to say that “initial press reporting” linked Ansar al-Shari’ah to the attack but that the group denied organizing it. It is worth mentioning that Ambassador Rice, speaking on CBS on Sept. 16, also allowed that local extremists, al-Qa’ida-affiliated groups, or al-Qa’ida itself could have been involved but that further investigation was necessary to determine that. This was true, and in my modest opinion, a more responsible way of handling the issue than making unsubstantiated public claims of responsibility. Another item cut was actually supportive of the notion that the attack might have been spontaneous, pointing out that weapons and experienced fighters were widely available in Libya.

As mentioned above, we still do not know who, or which agency, made specific cuts or why. Glenn Kessler of the Washington Post has suggested, however, that the various agencies (the State Department and the CIA, in particular, based on the leaks so far) appeared wary of their attempts to blame each other for the incident. The State Department, for example, reportedly claimed that the mention of previous attacks (1) exceeded what State had been permitted to say in its effort to avoid undermining the FBI investigation and (2) was an attempt by the CIA to shift blame and cause trouble for State in Congress. (This probably referred to an intermediate version that stated more explicitly that the CIA had warned of the extremist threat in the area.) In any event, in the end they managed to eliminate just about everything from the talking points that any agency objected to, leaving a document that was short, bland, safe, and—well—bureaucratic. It is not really necessary to assume White House manipulation to explain this outcome, nor is it clear that the White House benefited from it.

Here, in full, are the original talking points (grammatical peculiarities and all) as provided by the CIA on the morning of Sept. 14, 2012:

• We believe based on currently available information that the attacks in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the U.S. Consulate and subsequently its annex.
• The crowd almost certainly was a mix of individuals from across many sectors of Libyan society. That being said, we do know that Islamic extremists with ties to al-Qa’ida participated in the attack.
• Initial press reporting linked the attack to Ansar al-Sharia. The group has since released a statement that its leadership did not order the attacks, but did not deny that some of its members were involved. Ansar al-Sharia’s Facebook page aims to spread Sharia in Libya and emphasizes the need for jihad to counter what it views as false interpretations of Islam, according to an open source study.
• The wide availability of weapons and experienced fighters in Libya almost certainly contribute to the lethality of the attacks.
• Since April, there have been at least five other attacks against foreign interests in Benghazi by unidentified assailants, including the June attack against the British Ambassador’s convoy. We cannot rule out the individuals has previously surveilled the U.S. facilities, also contributing to the efficacy of the attacks.
• We are working w/ Libyan authorities and intelligence partners in an effort to help bring to justice those responsible for the deaths of U.S. citizens.

Update: David Brooks at the New York Times reports that the deputies’ committee barely discussed the talking points. His sources tell him that the CIA rewrote the document taking the other agencies’ objections into account.

Last Wednesday was a day of extremes for the former Secretary of State, who was in Beverly Hills to pick up a public service award from a private foreign policy organization.  There her tenure at the State Department was lauded as activists from a group called “Ready for Hillary 2016” gathered nearby to round out the chorus.

Yet hours earlier and on the opposite side of the country, her legacy came under heavy fire in a hearing convened by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.  There a trio of State Department witnesses offered gripping testimony calling into sharp question Clinton’s conduct and that of her senior staff in the run-up and response to the September 2012 jihadi assaults on the U.S. diplomatic mission and a CIA annex in Benghazi that killed J. Christopher Stevens, the U.S. ambassador to Libya, and three other Americans.

The hearing did not live up to the hype (here and here) about exposing Watergate-style malfeasance, but it gave renewed vigor to criticisms about Mrs. Clinton’s actions in her final months at Foggy Bottom.  These criticisms include:

Why did Clinton propagate a discredited administration narrative about the assault being the consequence of a spontaneous violent reaction to an anti-Muslim YouTube video that key State Department officials knew almost immediately to be false?  Yet she presented this line in her public remarks and private comments to the grieving families at the September 14 memorial service for the four dead Americans.  And she apparently took no action to correct this narrative even as Susan E. Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, was giving it wide broadcast and President Obama dispensed it before the U.N. General Assembly a full two weeks after the attack.

Clinton, Rice and other top administration officials claim that the narrative was based on the intelligence community’s consensus view at the time.  But Gregory Hicks, a well-respected career diplomat who served as the No. 2 U.S. official in Libya at the time of the attack, testified at last week’s hearing that he immediately reported to the State Department that the Benghazi assault was a terrorist strike.  According to him, “the only report that our mission made through every channel was that there had been a [terrorist] attack.”

The hearing also presented into evidence a September 12 email from Elizabeth Jones, the acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, showing that these reports had quickly traveled up the State Department’s chain of command.  In the email, Jones tells Ambassador Rice, Cheryl Mills (Mrs. Clinton’s chief of staff and long-time consigliere) and Patrick Kennedy, who as the Under Secretary for Management had ultimate responsibility for diplomatic security in Libya, that the attack was the premeditated work of Ansar al-Sharia, an Islamist militia group affiliated with Al Qaeda.

We know from previous disclosures (here, here and here) that the CIA station chief in Libya was reporting a similar message, which was supported by National Security Agency communications intercepts.  And this message made its way into the initial version of the talking points that the agency prepared for the administration but which were then misleadingly revised (here, here and here) at the State Department’s insistence.  Indeed, it now appears that Jake Sullivan, then Clinton’s deputy chief of staff and currently Vice President Joe Biden’s national security adviser, played an instrumental role in shaping the final version of the talking points.

Questions about the version of events that the administration initially put out are important for two reasons.  First, it bears centrally on the mounting criticism that the Obama team habitually subjects foreign policy to political machinations.  True, this charge is voiced all the time by partisan antagonists.  But in recent months former administration insiders and even Obama supporters have come forward to give it credence.  It is, for example, a prime accusation in Vali Nasr’s new book, The Dispensable Nation.  Nasr previously served as a State Department advisor on AfPak policy and he writes that…

[T]he president had a truly disturbing habit of funneling major foreign-policy decisions through a small cabal of relatively inexperienced White House advisors whose turf was strictly politics. Their primary concern was how any action in Afghanistan or the Middle East would play on the nightly news, or which talking point it would give the Republicans. [Emphasis added]

And even administration well-wishers like David Rothkopf lament about how “political calculations often trump good policy choices” in the Obama White House.

Given that the Benghazi strikes occurred just as the presidential election season kicked into high gear, last week’s testimony only deepens suspicions that the administration’s first inclination was to see the attacks through the lens of domestic politics.  This is all the more so since: 1.) Hicks testified that he was told to cease and desist his internal probing about the false narrative’s genesis and that his persistence has placed his career in jeopardy, and 2.)  Allegations have surfaced from inside the State Department that some of its counter-terrorism staffers were cut out of the decision-making process in the attack’s aftermath.

The second reason why the origins of the discredited narrative are important is that Hicks, who has spent most of his career in the Middle East, attests that it unnecessarily complicated the FBI investigation of the attacks.  Libyan leader Mohamed Yusuf al-Magariaf had quickly announced that the strikes were the work of terrorists and repeated this assertion on a Sunday morning television talk show on September 16, only to be contradicted by Ambassador Rice, who appeared on the same show right after him.  As Hicks put it, Magariaf, who was struggling to assert the authority of the new central government in the aftermath of the Libyan revolution, was “insulted in front of his own people. His credibility was reduced. His ability to lead his country was damaged.” And in Hicks’ mind, this sense of affront helps explain why Tripoli’s cooperation with the FBI team became difficult.  As it turned out, the diplomatic post in Benghazi remained unguarded from looters and others for more than two weeks after the attacks, with the result that it offered little of evidentiary value once the FBI finally arrived on the scene.

Why was the diplomatic post in Benghazi so lightly protected?  The security situation there was rapidly deteriorating – indeed the United Kingdom closed down its consulate following a failed assassination attempt on the British ambassador who was visiting Benghazi in June 2012 and the U.S. post was subject to a bomb attack the same month.   So it is extremely puzzling that the State Department not only failed to beef up security there in violation of its own guidelines, but had actually withdrawn security personnel and resources even as Ambassador Stevens and his staff protested.

According to press accounts, the Benghazi post was primarily a cover for a CIA operation aimed at neutralizing terrorist groups and weapons networks that sprang up in the chaos following the Libyan revolution.  And because of this special status, confusion reigned between the State Department and the CIA over which agency had responsibility for the post’s security arrangements.*  But even if this is the case, the department’s actions are striking given that Secretary Clinton, who was planning on visiting Libya later in the year, wanted to upgrade the post into a full-fledged consulate.  Indeed, as Mr. Hicks testified last week, Ambassador Stevens went to Benghazi to advance this plan.

Just how thorough was the State Department’s formal inquiry into the Benghazi attacks that Clinton convened?  The Accountability Review Board’s report released last December was a scathing indictment of the negligent security practices in Benghazi but assigned responsibility for them several bureaucratic levels down from Secretary Clinton and her senior staff.  Critics question the ARB’s failure to include Clinton and her two chief deputies among the hundred or so department officials it interviewed, and some have even accused the inquiry of deliberately shielding the department’s higher-ups from justifiable blame.  And even before last week’s hearing the department’s own inspector general had launched an unprecedented “special review” of the ARB’s “effectiveness and accountability.”

The hearing testimony gave new impetus to these concerns.  Eric Nordstrom, who served as the security chief at the embassy in Tripoli until last July, attested that “[The ARB] stopped short of interviewing people who I personally know were involved in key decisions.”  And Mark Thompson, the acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counter-Terrorism, complained that the ARB did not interview him despite his request to appear before it.

Hicks and Nordstrom expressed dismay that the ARB let the department’s senior staff off the hook for the security inadequacies in Benghazi and they singled out Under Secretary Kennedy as deserving special censure. Nordstrom also believes that responsibility extends all the way up to Mrs. Clinton’s door.  He is incredulous at her denials that she ever saw the requests coming from Tripoli and Benghazi for added security.  And it should be noted that General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed a similar disbelief in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 7.  Dempsey stated that he had known of a cable sent a month before the attacks conveying concerns about the security protection in Benghazi and that “I would call myself surprised that she didn’t.”

Exclaiming “What difference, at this point, does it make?” before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 23 was really dumb.  The now-memorable phrase by Secretary Clinton, made just as she was departing government service, might have been prompted by exasperation with what she considered partisan sniping.  But coming in the same breath with a promise to “figure out what happened,” it instead conveyed callous indifference.

Last week’s hearing offered evidence of just how angry the State Department bureaucracy is with Clinton’s words, with Mr. Nordstrom in particular delivering a poignant rebuttal.  She must surely regret the line and would have had to account for it had she remained in Foggy Bottom much longer.  In any case, it will no doubt come to haunt her if she plans on resuming a political career.  As one analyst observes, “Credibility is Clinton’s vulnerability…. Doubts persisted about her veracity and authenticity throughout the 2008 presidential campaign.”

The Benghazi controversy derailed President Obama’s first choice for Clinton’s successor.  And with last week’s developments accelerating calls for a special Congressional investigation, two other potential casualties now appear in sight.  The more vulnerable at present is Clinton’s own legacy as Secretary of State.  But also at risk, especially if further evidence emerges of White House skullduggery, is the political advantage on national security issues that Democrats have only recently wrested from the Republicans.

*This interagency disarray is evident in the process that led to the CIA’s discredited talking points.

This commentary is cross-posted on Monsters Abroad.   I invite you to connect with me via Facebook and Twitter.

Photo Credit: Elizabeth Arrott/VOA

by Abul-Hasanat Siddique and Casper Wuite

Abul-Hasanat Siddique and Casper Wuite, co-authors of The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction, talk about the political unrest in the Middle East, the Syrian Civil War, the globalization of media, and the future prospects for the region.

Is the unrest in the Middle East and North Africa homegrown or a Western-sponsored revolution for change?

Abul-Hasanat Siddique: Home-grown. Seeing the uprisings in the region as Western-sponsored “revolutions” is far from reality. Firstly, that view sees the populations in the region as passive recipients. It also negates the Arab people, particularly its youth populations, in their moment when they called or are still calling for freedom and dignity. That would also not do justice to the way foreign governments and local populations have acted on the ground.

In fact, Arab youth movements and political activists have been mobilizing for many years. The April 6th Movement in Egypt has been on the scene since 2008. Autocratic regimes in the region, most of whom are backed by the West, have long ignored their disgruntled people. Revolts were bound to happen at some point in the Arab world; a region which has seen poor economic growth, atrocious human rights records, and a growing youth population with high unemployment. Such issues have boiled up and created restive societies throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

Casper Wuite: What is true is that in some countries, particularly Libya, home grown revolutions with enough critical mass could simply not to be ignored by the West. The action the West subsequently undertook, however, was never part of a Cold War-type strategy to sponsor certain elements in the region.

Is the Middle East in a phase of transition from “dictatorship to democracy”? If so, will the Arab Uprisings pave the way for transitions in Syria, Jordan, and then Saudi Arabia as well?

Siddique: The plenitude of elections held in the wake of the Arab Uprisings in no way signifies a democracy, but merely a first step. True democratic reform takes a substantial amount of time to achieve; the history of Europe is a key example. Some parts of the region are in this long transitional period. The transitions occurring in countries like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have been rather complicated. However, in time, these countries will make (some) shifts towards democratic reform. This may take several years or even decades to achieve and it will not be easy.

Wuite: The Arab Uprisings are less likely to pave the way for transitions in Jordan and Saudi Arabia although incremental changes have been made particularly in Jordan. Yes, they face the same challenges: a demographic youth bulge and an economic reality that is increasingly at odds with the regime’s existing policies and practices. However, calls for reform are diluted by political and fiscal co-optation in both countries. On the other hand, in Syria the question is not so much whether we will see a transition soon, but rather whether a stable democracy will be its endpoint.

In your view, is Morsi capable of keeping a balance between Islamists and liberal forces within Egypt? Does Egypt dream of becoming a regional power under Morsi, as was the case during the Gamal Abdul Nasser era?

Siddique: At present, the president is clearly failing to keep the balance between the Islamist bloc and the liberal and secular forces. Post-Mubarak Egypt has further highlighted political polarization in the country. The political unrest over Morsi’s rather inexperienced and poor strategic move with his presidential decree and the ensuing referendum over the new constitution, has further deepened this polarization. Indeed, Egypt’s transition is very complicated and the judiciary is full of former Mubarak-era officials. But there are undoubtedly many within Egypt who are disengaged with Morsi, as they simply see him as a stooge for the Muslim Brotherhood’s policies. What he needs to do is truly engage all groups within Egypt, including secularists, liberals, women, and religious minorities. Indeed, he is the president for all Egyptian people and not one portion of society; he needs to realize this if Egypt is to move forward. Unilateral steps like initiating presidential decrees will not help Egypt; it will simply evoke more and more unrest and resentment within the country.

He also needs to reform the police and security forces. The unrest over the Port Said trials was a reaction against Morsi’s presidency, but also at the corrupt police and security forces. Whether or not Morsi made a deal with the military is up for question, but he very much needs to pursue those responsible for the death of protestors in 2011, and those still unaccounted for. The people want justice to be served.

Wuite: Indeed, many have argued that the current riots are a sign that the standoff between Morsi and the opposition is spiralling out of control. However, not every rioter is a member of either two groups. Many rioters are hooligans upset with the Port Said trials, or are youth settling scores with the police. Yet, one cannot deny that the political polarization is increasingly paralysing the country. What is thus instrumental in understanding the crisis, is that it is not simply that the political arena has lost its primacy of settling disputes to the streets. What has been crucial to the current standoff has been the extent to which democratic procedures and the rule of law have lost their primacy and how the remaining institutions, most notably the judiciary, have been politicized and turned into political fiefdoms.

Siddique: As for Nasser. Domestically, Morsi falls far short of living up to Nasser’s legacy within Egypt despite the late leader having been a dictator himself. Nasser is still held high within the country but also within the wider Arab world. With regards to being a regional power once again: Morsi clearly sees that Qatar and Turkey are making advances in becoming the regional hegemon. Saudi Arabia is shifting away from the fore-front of regional affairs, and Egypt has been in a complicated transitional period for over two years. However, it is highly unlikely that Egypt will return to the heights of Nasser’s pan-Arab dream. Simply put, pan-Arabism, as Nasser dreamed of it, is dead — it has been dead for decades.

That said, Morsi wants to develop further foreign ties. If his domestic policy fails, he at least wants his foreign policy to be worth something. If his foreign policy is to be deemed a “success,” however, a drastic development needs to be made with the Israeli-Palestinian peace-process. Pressure will need to put on the Palestinians, namely Hamas, while the U.S. will finally need to act as a genuine peace broker.

Did the Syrian conflict begin as a genuine uprising or a proxy-war? Will Bashar al-Assad fall to the opposition as with Libya?

Siddique: A genuine uprising that has turned into a proxy-war. There is a belief by some that the Syrian Civil War was instigated by a Western-led conspiracy to overthrow the Ba’athist regime in a bid to derail its ally in Iran. Notably, this is the same view held by Bashar al-Assad and his aides. The problem with that belief is it completely negates the start of the unrest in Syria and the history of the country under the Assad family. Let us not forget that the Syrian people rose up peacefully in a bid for genuine reforms as their counterparts had done so in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and so on. But they were met with force from the state. As time went by, some in the opposition took up arms to defend themselves. At the same time, however, some radical and extremist elements (with an affiliation to Al-Qaeda) in the Syrian opposition (some foreign) have capitalised on the conflict and begun calling for an Islamic state.

The Syrian people, those opposing the Ba’athist government, be they secular or Islamist, have genuine grievances against the Assad family which has been in power for over 40 years. Viewing the whole war, from the initial peaceful uprising, as a Western conspiracy ignores those grievances and sees the Syrian people as passive bystanders. The Syrian people should not be seen as a pawn for the U.S., Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Israel, and Iran, but instead as people who want their freedom and dignity.

As for Assad falling like Qaddafi did in Libya: the situation is different. The opposition in Libya had a base of “operations” in Benghazi. From there, they made advances westwards and were then backed by NATO airstrikes. That isn’t the case in Syria, as the armed opposition have only seized fragments across the country. There are also divisions within their ranks. In addition, while the Syrian Uprising did not begin as a sectarian battle, sections of the protagonists on the ground now see the civil war as a conflict between Sunnis and Alawites (and the wider Shi’a region). If Assad does fall, there is a genuine fear that the Alawite community could be targeted by extremists. Unlike Libya, the sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict today has meant that sections within Assad’s ranks are reluctant to defect to the opposition, and will continue to be reluctant unless genuine security promises are made. With the current stalemate, the civil war could last for a substantial amount of time. As with the Algerian and Lebanese civil wars, a negotiated settlement seems to be the only way forward. Whether the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition agree to any settlement is highly questionable.

How do you view the role of media coverage in “bridging the gaps” or “widening the gulf” in the Middle East?

Siddique: News media coverage and social media has been quite key in the Arab Uprisings, and with modern conflicts in general. A cousin of Mohammed Bouazizi — the Tunisian street seller whose self-immolation ignited the uprising in Sidi Bouzid — highlighted this very well. The cousin had sent mobile phone footage of the aftermath of Bouazizi’s self-immolation to Al Jazeera, who broadcasted it. Subsequent videos were sent to the broadcaster of the unrest in Sidi Bouzid. But as the cousin highlighted: protests in the Arab world are not unheard of, at least in the country (in question) itself. However, if the footage of the unrest hadn’t been shown on the news, it would have been as if protests hadn’t happened. It’s the whole “tree falling in the woods” issue: If no one hears about a protest, did it really happen?

And it is due to this, the globalization of media and its technological developments, that coverage of what is happening on the ground can be disseminated on an astonishing scale. Social media, and the wide-availability of satellite television, has allowed for videos, messages, and so, to be distributed to wide-spanning audiences much faster. This didn’t happen in the 1977 Bread Riots, or even in the Gulf War; the Gulf War was CNN’s moment to shine — there was no pan-Arab broadcaster like Al Jazeera. However, today, the biggest factor is that autocratic regimes can’t control these media developments. They have been hit by the reality of globalisation. Media is indeed helping to “bridge the gaps” between what the state allows and what its people want; the people who are getting the message out by whatever means necessary. Protests or conflict, no matter how big or small they are, will now always be “heard.”

How do you see the future scenario of the Middle East? Will stability be reached or will anarchy prevail?

Wuite: I agree with Stephen Waltz who argues that future scenarios of the Middle East can roughly be divided into three situations. Optimists will argue that the road will be bumpy for a while, but that the Arab Uprisings mark the end of an era of regional stagnation and will give way for economic development and liberal democracy. Others exercise more caution and argue that as political dynamism returns to the region, we should be careful of what we wish for. In other words, under the influence of popular sentiment, more capable and competent Arab regimes will not necessarily be more compliant. Lastly, pessimists will argue that although the Arab Uprisings will succeed in overturning a number of regimes, stable governance will not replace them everywhere. Instead, extremism and sectarianism will be rife in some countries.

Personally, I believe that any positive change will only be incremental and that given the state of the economy, social and regional polarization, and continued fiscal and political co-optation in the region, we should be cautious when it comes to the outcomes of the Arab Uprisings in most countries and flatly pessimistic when it comes to some others.

(The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction is available to purchase at Amazon. A paperback version is available at the SlimBooks store.)

Abul-Hasanat Siddique is the Managing Editor at Fair Observer. Having co-authored his first book, The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction, Abul-Hasanat’s main research interests lie in the upheaval sweeping the Middle East and North Africa, and the rise of political Islam. His other research interests include socio-economic development in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, the history and future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Al Jazeera’s rise as a pan-Arab news broadcaster. 

Abul-Hasanat is the former Middle East Editor at Fair Observer. Having worked at the publication since May 2011, he has been a pivotal figure with the growth and success of the company.

Previously, Abul-Hasanat worked as a News Editor for the Gorkana Group. He is currently completing his thesis for his MSc in Middle East Politics at the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London), exploring the notion of post-Islamism and the Arab Uprisings. He also holds a BSc (Hons) in Sociology and Media Studies from the City University London. He intends to pursue a PhD.

Casper Wuite is a Contributing Editor (Middle East) at Fair Observer. Currently based in Cairo, he writes on politics and development in the Arab world. Casper co-authored his first book called The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction.

As a contributing editor, Casper draws on a wide range of experiences in the region. He has worked as a policy officer for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lebanon, a development consultant for NGO’s in Egypt, and an international election observer for the National Democratic Institute in both Algeria (2012) and Egypt (2011).

Casper holds an MSc in Politics and Government from the London School of Economics (University of London).

This article has been published in full with the permission of the authors. The original article can be found here at Fair Observer. 

Photograph: Georges Gobet/AFP/Getty Images

Several weeks ago, HR Ashton, EU foreign policy chief, announced that she will be done at the end of her mandate in 2014. In an interview – posted below – orchestrated by Steven Erlanger, Paris Bureau Chief of the New York Times, and organized by the German Marshall Fund, Cathy Ashton finally opened up and talked about her job and its challenges. She even reflected on her legacy. This interview touches on very important issues such as the creation of the position of HR after the Treaty of Lisbon; intervention in Libya; lifting the arm embargo to Syria; Iran talks; the EU relative failures in Libya and Mali; and the context of the creation of EEAS. This discussion is a must-see as it is in some degree an intimate discussion with a misunderstood, unknown, and too some extent controversial European leader.

Her predecessor, Javier Solana, was a master at shaping a narrative through its heavy presence in the press, conferences

Council of the EU

and so on. Prior to his appointment at the head of NATO, Javier Solana served in the Spanish government of Felipe González from 1982 to 1995. His last mandate as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain from 1992 to 1995 exposed him on the international arena, which contributed to his appointment at the head of NATO from 1995 to 1999. Many argue that Solana was a diplomatic and strategic politician allowing to become the only remaining politician from the original cabinet of González after 13 years. His presence at the forefront of international affairs was central in shaping a European narrative. His main theme developed and promoted throughout his two mandates was to create a multi-dimensional global Europe with a diplomatic, military, political and institutional dimension.

Under HR Ashton, her approach and strategy have been very discret and even reserved. She has been avoiding talking to the press directly after closed- and open- doors meetings. However, this type of interview with the GMF is very positive and plays in favor of Ashton as she can finally formulate her vision of ‘her’ global Europe. She has been criticized for not playing the media game. Solana was excellent at promoting his global Europe; Ashton has failed short of it. Too some extent, HR Ashton has never taken full possession of her position, which was not the case of Solana.

Back to the interview – below – the moderator asked a key question reflecting on the last two engagements in Libya and Mali: “In Mali, even the French has given up on using EU ressources for their military goals. What is left, how can the EU have  a serious pretention to play a role in international security, when even its key members are not using it?” The question is legitimate; her answer was too technocratic. She argues, not surprisingly, that the EU is already very involved in the region of the Sahel with missions in Niger, EUTM, and has even drafted a strategy for the region. Unfortunately, she never tried to tackle the problem of a weaker EU in terms of defense.

Another interesting question raised by Erlanger was: “Some people would have said that your job is impossible, and it takes a lot of patience obviously. What would you say are the biggest constraints you being able to do the job you really would like to do.” Ashton’s reply was right on again, as she underlined the financial crisis – austerity measures across Europe – as a major limitation to the development of the EEAS to its full potential. Not only the EU budget is tighter and Europe’s neighborhoods are so volatile. She describes her job as “trying to fly a plane while building the wings at the same time.” This may be the major difference between Solana and Ashton. Solana took the lead of the EU foreign policy in times of growth and stability and supports by the EU Member States. Ashton, instead, is facing a vicious crisis and strong domestic oppositions to fostering the integration of the Union.

During the Q&A, a member of the audience asked HR Ashton to reflect on her legacy. She replied without any doubt that her “legacy would be the foundation of the External Action Service and the beginning of what its role can be.” Many experts have certainly argued that HR Ashton has proven to be more of an administration than a diplomat.

This video is very positive as it finally shows the face of European foreign policy to wider audience. Part of the job of a politician ought to be half policy-making and half marketing. Ashton has not done enough of marketing. Even though she did a convincing job of public relations, there is a sense that she is rather uncomfortable seating down and discussing about her job. In concluding the interview, Steven Erlanger, asked her “you seem shy of the press. You don’t give briefings, you don’t give off the record briefings. Why? What constrains you from being more of an advocate?” To be honest, HR Ashton dodged the bullet once again. As it was the case for Solana or even Cooper, the press always played an important role in order to construct a narrative around their policies and even their diplomacy. This has certainly been missing from Ashton’s arsenal.

The idea of arming the Syrian rebels is being chatted up once again.  The debate will wander and focus in many theoretical directions. Yet essentially the decision will focus on one key pivot: is the goal a short-term or long-term victory?

The safe bet: short-term considerations will win out.

The U.N. proclamation that the one millionth Syrian refugee has crossed an international border adds to the swell of pressure for action. The drumbeat of “desperation” coming from various rebel leaders is increasing, playing on the guilt of some in the west.

So now there is some fudging in public and, no doubt, much nudging out of view.

The U.S. history of giving guns to the guys – a history that must include those times when weapons were NOT given – offers plenty of solid examples and guide points for Secretary of State John Kerry, pro-rebel members of Congress and the Obama administration.

A few cases in point to give a superficial framing to the debate:

In Bosnia, the West stuck to an arms embargo put in place for all of former Yugoslavia. They left the Bosnian Muslims at the mercy of the Serbs, who had the weapons from the Yugoslavia army; the Bosnians’ desperation for assistance then drove them straight into the arms of Muslim extremists who were happy to aid them in all ways possible.  Twenty years hence, some of those extremists are still in Bosnia.

In Afghanistan, thanks to Charlie Wilson, the U.S. did supply weapons to the rebels. Then after they beat the Russians, the U.S. disengaged but, of course, did not disarm those guys. Years later, those weapons were used against the U.S. and its allies.

Then there was Libya. No direct weapons supplied but the U.S. winked at smuggling. After that revolution was completed, those weapons bled out of the country — literally – to other parts of north Africa, including Mali, where today they are being used against the French troops and African allies.

So perhaps it is not unfair to ask, does it matter if we give weapons or not in the long term?

Those seeing the positive may embrace the “when” of any weapons delivery as an axiom of the old Fram oil filter commercial. That commercial urged motorists to take action in preventative maintenance sooner as opposed to waiting for the problem to fester. “You can pay me now or pay me later,” that commercial reminded. Point taken from Bosnia.

Yet such a philosophy must be leavened with a reality that in much of the world, the U.S is not liked even if it helps, that supplying weapons may not end a war but help combatants just pause to reload and shift alliances.  As Mephistopheles is fond of saying, “You are dammed if you do and dammed if you don’t.”

The table for needing weapons has been poignantly set again and again, including in early February when the Washington Post wrote about Syrian rebels armed with cash descending on military supply shops in Turkey. “These guys, armed with Syrian pounds worth a few hundred bucks, scouted out the best deals on winter clothing, binoculars and walkie-talkies,” the Post wrote. It noted how “It has also been a business boom for the Antakyans who own military supply shops….They’ve never seen business like this.”

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syrian-rebel-fighters-armed-with-cash-storm-turkish-military-supply-shops/2013/01/31/02e3984e-67d8-11e2-9e1b-07db1d2ccd5b_story.html

Nice image of desperation.

In response to the dynamics of the moment, the Obama administration in early March said it was giving an additional $60 million in assistance to the country’s political opposition including non-lethal aid directly to rebels. Syrian opposition figures and fighters were not happy: Gen. Salim Idris, chief of staff of the Syrian opposition’s Supreme Military Council, apparently channeling The Treasure of the Sierra Madre,  told the Associated Press: “We don’t want food and drink and we don’t want bandages. When we’re wounded, we want to die. The only thing we want is weapons.”

http://www.idahostatesman.com/2013/02/28/2470813/syrians-clash-around-12th-century.html#storylink=cpy

That does not suggest harmony or thank yous after the fighting in over.

The rebels are getting weapons from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, according to reports, thanks in part in purchases from Croatia.  Those weapons began reaching rebels in December via shipments shuttled through Jordan, officials said, and have been a factor in the rebels’ small tactical gains this winter against the army and militias loyal to Assad.

Croatia is a member of NATO and was the chief U.S. surrogate during the Bosnia conflict. Eventually, Croatia received weapons from the U.S. and the West. Some of those are now in Syria. The cycle continues.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/planeloads-of-croatian-combat-weapons-for-syria-al-qaeda-rebels/5324818

For months, regional and Western capitals have held back on arming the rebels, in part out of fear that the weapons would fall into the hands of terrorists. But officials said the decision to send in more weapons is aimed at another fear in the West about the role of jihadist groups in the opposition. Such groups have been seen as better equipped than many nationalist fighters and potentially more influential.

http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_22667526/saudis-bought-weapons-syrian-rebels-sources-tell-new#ixzz2Ms23dH1E

So the questions remain: Short-term, long-term or does it really matter?

In an interview with ABC News, Kerry left open the possibility of lethal aid in the future.

“That’s the president of the United States’ decision, and I don’t think this is a president who ever takes any option off the table,” Kerry said. “But for the moment, he feels like what we’re doing is the right policy.”

We shall see.

(Photo credit: AP)

With the French military intervention in Mali shifting to a more sustained action, the reality of the long, hard slog in the Mali region has triggered inevitable questions by diplomats, policy planners and many others as to what defines success – and what comes next? 

Most mouthed answer: “Somalia.” 

That’s correct.  The place where humanitarian intervention went bad in a major way, where Black Hawk Down became a symbol of how fraught Africa intervention can be that it scored America so badly that the U.S. sat back and watched Rwanda bleed and did all it could to avoid intervention, is now seen as the template solution for Mali. 

This really does stop one in the tracks.

Yet on occasion reality demands action. And the successes, as they are, are few and far between.  

A classic failed state, Somalia was a hub and major enclave for al-Qaeda. The West, with African help, tried repeatedly to turn things around, and suddenly the right mix appeared. A combined military and diplomatic effort got democracy back in Somalia and al-Qaeda on the defensive. Earlier this year, the U.S. formally recognized the government of Somalia for the first time in more than two decades. 

Success! At least for the moment.

For years, Somalia looked similar to how Mali was in January. The al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab controlled a vast territory, was able to implement its harsh version of sharia law, and easily struck outside the country’s borders. But then al-Shabaab mishandled the 2011 drought that wracked the region, exacerbating the crisis by accusing humanitarian organizations of trying to spread Christianity then ejecting them from areas it controlled. Meanwhile, the U.S. developed a strategy for reversing al-Shabaab’s gains that included supporting African Union counterinsurgency efforts and recruiting Somali groups to to function as proxies against the extremists, building an indigenous Somali intelligence network, and employing “decapitation” strikes (often employing drones) against al-Shabaab leaders. 

http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/01/16/us-official-mali-success-should-be-shaped-by-somalia

Defeated in Somalia, al-Qaeda found Mali, which became the biggest territory held by al-Qaeda and its allies. “Al-Qaeda never owned Afghanistan,” said former United Nations diplomat Robert Fowler, a Canadian kidnapped and held for 130 days by al-Qaeda’s local chapter. “They do own northern Mali.”

That was before the French action. Yet al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, known as AQIM, still operates not just in Mali, but also in a 7,000-kilometer long ribbon of land that runs across the widest part of Africa and includes sections of Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Libya, Burkina Faso and Chad.

Experts caution in assuming that what seemed to work in one part of Africa will work in another. It is difficult to suppress a group roaming around in the Sahara; also, unlike the focused militaries of Uganda and Kenya that played such an important role in Somalia, Mali’s neighbors are, in the best of times, fragile states with extremely limited political and military capacities.  The strong nations have yet to contribute troops.

http://allafrica.com/stories/201302250069.html

That was highlighted over the weekend when more than a dozen Chadian soldiers were killed in clashes with al-Qaeda, the heaviest single incident losses by African troops since the campaign began six weeks ago.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/24/us-mali-rebels-chad-idUSBRE91N09A20130224

The Somalia success of the moment needs to be leavened with the yeast of recent history. For example, the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 appeared successful for a short time — that is, before the insurgency sparked.  Afghanistan burst as a shimmering success after the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance quickly displaced the Taliban following the 9/11 attacks, but preventing the Taliban’s resurgence has been elusive. Iraq, of course, is fraught with issues, despite the somewhat rapid fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

In some years, we may see that the current talk of Somalia as a template will appear every bit as wishin’ and hopin’ and thinkin’ and prayin’ as the talk in 2003 that the Iraq war was the ideal way for the U.S. to remove Middle Eastern dictators.

Yet we like how one size must fit all, even if forced to fit. Other than the Philippines success right after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. antiterrorism schemes have fallen short.

The U.S. African Command, independent since 2008, still does not have a physical home on the continent – no country will take it – but the U.S. is opening its third drone base on the continent, this time in Niger’s capital, Niamey. Military officials would like to eventually move it north to the city of Agadez, which is closer to the parts of Mali where al-Qaeda cells have taken root, but “not [it's] feasible at this point.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/world/africa/in-niger-us-troops-set-up-drone-base.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

The jihadists already distribute tip sheets on how to avoid drones.

http://www.indianapolisrecorder.com/news/international/article_3c7b6bae-7f66-11e2-a545-0019bb2963f4.html

New page in an undefined war, new style — the question remains, new outcome? Conventional wisdom is often the drug of failure.

(Photo credit: PASCAL GUYOT / AFP / Getty Images)

The U.S. conducted airstrikes against Serbian forces in 1994 and 1999, and against Libyan troops in 2011, to reduce threats of genocide and humanitarian disaster. But the sole superpower sat idle in 1994 while hundreds of thousands were slaughtered across Rwanda and bodies floated down river past horrified neighbors. Just what criteria the U.S. has used – and what it should or could use – to intervene militarily is discussed in “The Intervention Calculation.”

As a cast of former generals, diplomats, and think-tank luminaries discuss the role of U.S. intervention after World War II, generally two reasons come to the fore, humanitarian and strategic. Strategic interests remain loosely defined, several experts note, and can usually be traced to economic or political motives. Whatever the reason, interventions come at a cost, and just off-camera lurks the question, as narrator David Strathairn starkly intones, “Can we still afford to flex our military might in conflicts that aren’t ours?”

Historically among these U.S. interests, none were greater than curbing communist influence. For armed interventions such as Korea and Vietnam (and later proxy conflicts worldwide) there was always a defense budget and popular will. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and a new world stage, the criteria for U.S. intervention became less clear.

One chapter, “Economic Interests,” shows how stated interests may have ulterior motives. Desert Storm in 1991 pushed Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait – the purported right thing to do – but also restored a neutralized oil source, removed the threat to Saudi Arabia and Israel, and straitjacketed a dictator. Airstrikes in Libya, though conducted more by NATO partners, did offer the chance (although now, it seems, equally distant) for Western multinational companies to access an oil giant. As Jonathan Tepperman, Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs, observes, “If you look closely, strategic and economic interests have been closely intertwined.”

Similar charges come from several contributors in another chapter, “Humanitarian Concerns.”  Perhaps intervention is never more justified than when under a threat of mass casualties or genocide. Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya in this case figure prominently, yet detractors remained. Russia (and China, in the case of Libya) charged that NATO had used a humanitarian excuse to intervene when the real motive (they say) was regime change.

Whatever the finger-pointing, racial and ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War power vacuum continued to fester. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, intent on establishing white-hat recourse to pre-empt carnage, helped bring a majority of countries together under the banner of “Responsibility to Protect.” This initiative, agreed by members at the 2005 U.N. World Summit, states that all nations have the responsibility to protect their own from genocide and humanitarian crimes. Danielle Pletka, of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), comments that “R2P, as it’s known in the foreign policy community” has been a powerful message to autocrats that they can no longer rule through marginalizing or eliminating opposing groups. And NATO stands by, the narrator reminds us, ready to use U.N. security resolutions as a license to intervene.

The last chapter, “Policy Decisions,” starts by noting that historically there has been no unifying policy thread across U.S. presidential administrations defining conditions for intervention. Going forward, is this any different? Do any criteria apply?  In a twenty-first century world, in which brawn is drawn economically and majority Islamist nations experiment with democracy, the role of U.S. interests and goals of possible intervention have become obscured.

President Obama is shown proclaiming, “When our values and interests are at stake, we have a responsibility to act.” Yet this is juxtaposed with the civil war in Syria, whose regional neighborhood, Russian military base, and substantial arsenal complicate a case for U.S. intervention. Former Congressman Barney Frank is shown shrugging, “The likelihood of success is also a factor.” Such is the calculus for planning intervention, as the documentary title suggests.

Without predetermined criteria of when to step in, Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, simply recommends preparation. “History keeps dealing us cards we don’t expect,” he says, and “we simply have to have a military that can be ready for a wide spectrum of scenarios and can effectively intervene.”

Yet great decisions, like sound arguments and noble acts, should be made by informed leaders. As detectives look for the whole story, so should policymakers, and especially a global policeman. Beltway pundits who are former U.S. government managers and work for U.S.-based organizations, and often U.S.-funded initiatives, suffer from a limited viewpoint, which could also be said of “The Intervention Calculation.”

The video does mention how interventions can evolve into uncertainty, such as in Afghanistan; it should explore further, however, whether calculations consider political climate and stakeholders. A recurring frustration among allies and enemies alike is that American policymakers, with all their resources, usually fail to understand cultural and regional dynamics that, if addressed, can lead to quicker solutions and reduce the impetus for intervention (and, worse, extended stays).

Cases in point have occurred in every region, be it military intervention or simply funding projects that exacerbate tensions.  The U.S. bolstered border guards and security transit regulations along an African border, which actually increased instability, since regional traders depended on the porous border for access to local markets. U.S. rule of law programs push court systems in rural Afghanistan, where most prefer traditional judgments by council. The Arab world is traditionally distrustful of American programs since the U.S. has supported dictators (in direct contravention of its own representative system) and assisted in Israeli theft of Arab land. And in former communist bloc nations, a gradual NATO drift eastward, installation of missile systems, and training/equipping militaries cannot help but raise the eyebrows of a transitional Russia. Humanitarian motivations for intervention are all well and good, but the calculation needs to factor in perception of regional states, and local realities, to be most effective.

Another factor not explored in the video is an alternative enforcer, namely, forces from Europe. In the wake of World War II, a debilitated Europe relied on the U.S. to counter any Soviet military threat. Europe has since suffered smaller militaries, partly a result of domestic defense decisions, but with instability in the Middle East and North Africa arguably affecting Europe more than the U.S., Germany and France and/or an EU force are more appropriate policemen. Airstrikes on Libya, as Damon Wilson of the Atlantic Council tells us in the video, were carried out predominantly by non-U.S. NATO forces.

In the wake of heavy U.S. involvement abroad, the bar for military intervention in 2013 is set much higher than 10 years ago. A stagnant U.S. economy overdue for jobs, and expected defense cutbacks, has whet few appetites for further intervention. When humanitarian disaster looms, however, the most able should not shy from duty. With U.N. backing as moral justification and the ability to project power across the globe, it seems that if the U.S. has the ability to act, with a likelihood of success, not only should it act – if recent history is any guide, it probably will.

“The United States is struggling to confront an uptick in threats from the world’s newest jihadist hot spot with limited intelligence and few partners to help as the Obama administration weighs how to keep Islamic extremists in North Africa from jeopardizing national security without launching war. We want to put up a map here and explain to people where this is–Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Mali, Niger.” – Chuck Todd to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta on “Meet the Press” on Sunday, February 3, 2013.

On Sunday’s “Meet the Press,” contributing editor Chuck Todd cited a February 1, 2013 Associated Press account which highlighted the challenges facing the US as it fights terrorism in North Africa for President Obama’s second term.  Among the most recent developments was the killing of nearly 40 hostages, including 3 Americans, during a raid near a gas facility in In Amenas, Algeria after a hostage siege by operatives linked to al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) based in Algeria.  Last September 11, 4 Americans including Ambassador Chris Stevens were killed during an attack on a U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi, Libya.

As I sipped my morning coffee, I was puzzled by Todd’s map graphic as it appeared on the screen, so I pressed pause. (How did we exist before DVR’s live-tv pausing capability?) Among all the reds and oranges, threatening arrows and markers, Morocco was so greyed out that it almost went unnoticed.

Grey seems such an inappropriate color for a critical U.S. ally.

In one sense, the color choice is testimony to Morocco as a model which has maintained stability while being surrounded by an ocean on one side and chaos on all others.  It is no accident of history or fluke of policy that this chaos didn’t bleed across its borders.

However, in another sense, it’s indicative of the fact that U.S. policy in North Africa needs work.  As conflicts brew in several theaters around the world, the US must balance its domestic appetite for involvement with protecting vital security and strategic interests.  When we look to partner with other nations with their own interests wrapped up in these conflicts we find that our relationship status with them is often “complicated.”  We are forced to make strategic decisions on how we engage and partner – sometimes navigating around serious policy differences in other areas.

In North Africa, the U.S. doesn’t have that problem. What we do have is Morocco (for more than 225 years actually).

What’s more – than a history of good bilateral relations – is that we now have an official framework, the Morocco-U.S. Strategic Dialogue, which was put in place for the very purpose of making sure that our two countries can efficiently communicate, coordinate and act on several fronts, including security.  Add to this, Morocco’s role as a Non-Permanent Member of the U.N. Security Council and the 2013 Chair of the U.N. Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee.

“Within this framework, the problem of security, notable in the Sahel-Sahara zone, is a shared priority [with the U.S.]” – Youssef Amrani, Morocco’s Minister-Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

While the growing instability in North Africa may be new to the radar screens of some in the U.S., it has, necessarily, been Morocco’s focus for some time.  As Minister-Delegate Amrani noted, “We’ve been following the worrying developments in the Sahel-Sahara zone for years and we have not stopped alerting the international community to it.” Morocco has been largely successful in combating the threat internally, but it has still suffered losses such as the bombing in Marrakech’s Argana cafe in Jemaa el-Fnaa square, which Morocco attributed to terrorists linked to AQIM.  Unlike many of its neighbors, Morocco must maintain a delicate and difficult balance of being the open, progressive and tolerant society it has been known for with tough policies, measures and enforcement against outside influences and threats.

Then there’s the Western Sahara conflict, whose significance many Americans, admittedly and understandably, don’t appreciate.  The territorial dispute between Morocco and the Polisario Front (a Cold-War era guerrilla movement) is nearing its fortieth year, but here’s why you should care now: The Polisario has holed itself away in camps in Algeria where no outsiders can see in and where thousands of refugees are in forced confinement with rejects and castaways from every conflict in the region, including “al-Qaida, its affiliates, and its wannabes.” (I stole that one from former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.) It is already a challenge for Morocco to address the economic needs of the large number of unemployed, often disaffected, young people who are recruiting targets for terrorist networks. Imagine the vulnerable situation of the thousands of young refugees for whom the Polisario offers no alternatives for livelihoods except for smuggling, kidnapping and aiding terrorist networks who benefit from the lawless, closed nature of the Polisario camps.

Inaction is perpetuating a conflict that doesn’t have to exist. As Morocco’s King Mohammed VI has said, the conflict is from “a long-gone era,” and it’s time to move on and address very real contemporary regional crises that are threatening interests and costing lives, including American ones.  Morocco understands this threat and has presented a compromise solution which is gathering dust on the negotiating table because the Polisario’s priorities and focus are still wrapped around a fallen Wall, dead (and dying) dictators and a worldview that is older than many of the conflict’s refugees (as well as the author of this post).

The U.S. should also remember that having an ally means being an ally.  Morocco faces serious threats to its own stability and security, and vocal U.S. support for progresses made and actions to back up this support is key. Over the last two years, countries in the Middle East and North Africa have had to grapple with change and reform, and Morocco is no exception.  But it did so in a way that was productive and peaceful – so much so that it is often “greyed out” in commentaries and analyses of the “Arab Spring” fallout and follow up.  Let’s not punish the student that did his homework by ignoring him; let’s support him so he can rise to greater challenges. (I’m sure there are some easily bored former honor roll students that feel me on this one.)

In President Obama’s second term, a successful U.S. foreign policy in North Africa cannot grey out our strategic partners.  I hope that someone has taken the time to add a little color to Morocco on the maps in Secretary Kerry’s briefing books so he doesn’t overlook a ready and potentially useful ally in a region that will dominate U.S. foreign policy and attention for the near future. -CDark

Going home. The resonance of that phrase is universal. The happy homecoming. The poignant or sad one. The unsure one. The second chance one.

For His Royal Highness Prince Mahdi Al-Senussi that ultimate appellation of his “going home” remains to be determined. Forty-two years to the month that Prince Mahdi was forced to leave Libya, he has returned. Armed with a template from the past and an eye to the realities of the 21^st century, the Prince is ready to make his homecoming to Libya one of a storybook ending for his people and his nation.

It was the same airport from which he departed Benghazi. Little had changed, it seemed.

There was, of course, the expected feelings of overwhelmingly joy, trumpeting a cavalcade of emotions being forged on the anvil of what can he do – he of royal blood – to help restore prosperity, dignity, happiness and hope to his nation.

He touts the great Libya of the past and its promise of return and already some are listening.

Malta will be investing heavily to boost its diplomatic and consular presence in Libya in the coming months and has already acquired more than €1 million in EU funding for this purpose.

Brussels has acknowledged Malta’s role to act as a bridge between the EU and Libya and has already given the green light for this plan to materialize – a major boost for Libya.

http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20121203/local/Malta-gets-EU-funds-to-strengthen-Libya-presence.447928

Since toppling Gaddafi regime, Libya has begun rebuilding the country on the cornerstone laid decades ago by King Idris.  In July, the country accomplished its first democratic election seating the 200-member General National Congress that quickly and peacefully assumed power from the National Transition Council.  The GNC without haste elected Mohammed Magarief as its new President.

The Prince was able to return. There were lines of relatives to greet him. the Prince saw the flag of his Libya, the flag that flew when his uncle was king and his father was a vibrant part of helping to guide Libya.

He knows that flag well – in particular one that his aunt had brought with her as she left the country, akin to Dolly Madison saving the portrait of George Washington that hung in the White House away from the oncoming British troops. “This particular flag belonged to the king,” the Prince said. “It is a powerful thing.

“During the reign of the King, Libyans had economic development, rule of law, a strong media, education and health care,” the Prince said during an interview. He recalled the U.S. air base at Tripoli, an anchor of a strong, vibrant and two-way relationship with the United States.

The Prince wants all that back.

There is a pot of $580 billion in the Libyan budget, a central geographic location and a bounty of resources as a lure for prime investments, he says. There are three big players in the world, according to the Prince – Russia, China and the U.S. – and he wants to U.S. to move quickly to once again be the champion of Libya.

Some say it is worth a look: the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development projected 20.1 percent in growth in Libya for 2012 and almost 10 percent in 2013.

http://video.foxbusiness.com/v/1995246238001/investing-in-libyas-economic-recovery/

The Prince repeats the word of his father reminding him that it is business and philanthropy, not politics, in which he serves Libya best. “Here is a people that not only love you but believe in you,” he said in the interview. You have to come back they say. It’s a beautiful feeling when you hear than say we hope you are coming to stay.”

He recalls how Libyans were treated with scorn around the world because of Gaddafi and how he did whatever he could when meeting them, recalling a time in an Amsterdam airport where he saw authorities verbally hectoring a Libyan woman with children as a terrorist. When he intervened to help, they asked who she was and he said clearly he was helping her because “she is my wife, my daughter, my mother and my sister.”

Others have noted the actual pro-western history of pre-Gaddafi Libya .  For example, The Weekly Standard detailed why Libya did not vote for the Muslim Brotherhood, unlike Egypt and Tunisia, and how Libyans actually seek bonds with the West. Stephen Swartz wrote:

“Many Libyans remember the tradition of their ‘Sufi king’ with affection. King Idris created a pro-Western state, erected modern universities in Tripoli and Benghazi, and established a Senussi religious university, which Qaddafi shut down in 1984 in an effort to extirpate the memory of the Senussis. Ahmad Ibn Idris was notable both in his reforming concepts—he called for abandonment of the traditional sharia schools of Islamic law—and for his active opposition to Wahhabism. The flag of King Idris, which was adopted by the anti-Qaddafi Libyan rebels and has been restored as Libya’s national banner, includes a central black stripe with a white crescent and star, representing the Senussi Sufis, and the Idrisi legacy.”

http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/why-did-libya-vote-against-muslim-brotherhood_648318.html

“When I was there, a lot of things got done,” the Prince said of his recent trip. “I was reminded that the people needed me.” He is already returning.

The attack on the U.S compound in Benghazi left the wrong image of the city and its feeling for the U.S., the prince said.  He insists the city and the country are eager for U.S. friendship.

“Make no mistake the potential of greatness is real,” the Prince said. “There is no turning back.”

(Photo: Daily Telegraph)

David H. Petraeus, former director of the CIA. To paraphrase Howard Baker: “What could the director be expected to know, and when could he be expected to know it?”

With the election behind us and David Petraeus having testified in closed House and Senate hearings, we may hope for a more measured and less emotional examination of the events in Benghazi, Libya, on Sept. 11, 2012. In a previous post, I looked at some of the background behind the issue of post security. In this post, rather than rehearsing the controversies that have raged in recent weeks, I would like to highlight some of the common pitfalls that we encounter when we try to judge large, unexpected events during and shortly after the fact. The controversies that so often arise may reflect a combination of the nature of such events, the ambiguities of the intelligence assessment process, and the pressures of politics.

In the case of Benghazi, the full story is still not known—and it may never be—yet many people have made up their minds that they already “know” what happened. More fundamentally, people assume that “someone,” especially the CIA, must have known what was happening at the time and is not telling. The fact is, however, analysts are still piecing together the evidence. They certainly did not know the full story as it was happening, and it takes a considerable amount of time after the fact to reconstruct the most likely version of what probably happened.

The most important thing to remember is that confusion is common in sudden, large, unexpected events, whether they be surprise attacks or natural disasters. The first reports from the scene are often incorrect because the early evidence is fragmentary, contradictory, and sometimes erroneous. Afterward, when we already have a good idea of what happened, we can look at the same reports and say, “Obviously, these clues, and not those, were the ones they should have been focusing on.” At the time, however, that judgment is not so easily made. Moreover, early analysis will be influenced by the existing theories or preconceived notions of the analysts; sometimes those theories will be correct, or close enough not to matter, but in other cases they will be out of date or even completely wrong. Either way, that initial analysis will then set the framework for the next wave of analysis and evaluation. If the initial assessment is off, the accumulation of information will eventually bring analysts around to the right direction, but that correction may be delayed to the extent that the incoming flow of information continues to be slow, partial, and contradictory. Information of that sort can be subconsciously dismissed or interpreted to fit into existing frameworks for a considerable period of time.

Analysis is also subject to political cross-pressures. Analysts fear they will be held accountable for mistakes, so their preference is to wait, to take the time necessary to be sure. Because they want to avoid outright errors, and because the situation is by its very nature vague, confusing, and imprecise, their reports will also tend to be hedged, vague, and imprecise—much to the vexation of political leaders. Political leaders and intelligence analysts often have different understandings of the nature of intelligence. Political leaders want to receive precisely the opposite of what analysts want to give. They want details, and they want them to be clear, definitive, unambiguous, and correct. They want the entire story immediately, and they do not want to hear that the story has evolved since they first heard it. Leaders have invested enormous quantities of tax dollars into intelligence budgets, and they are responsible for making consequential decisions based on intelligence; when the crunch time comes, they do not want to hear that the benefits they expected when they made those investments are not really possible. Adding further to the tension between the two groups is the natural preference of intelligence professionals to keep as much information secret as possible versus the temptation of politicians to use that information to bolster public positions and arguments.

The election season only adds to the political pressures already at work. Politicians tend to believe members of their own party and suspect those of the other party. If the administration is not forthcoming with details, the opposition will accuse it of a cover-up. On the other hand, if it is forthcoming, the opposition may accuse it of playing politics with national security by divulging classified information. Factions within an administration (or bureaucrats who fear they will be blamed for something) may release selective bits of information either to reinforce or to undermine a particular version of events. Each side will jump to the conclusion that the clues that support its interpretation are obviously the correct and important ones and then proceed from that assumption.

At the same time, people engaged in political arguments over controversial events often simplify and distort those facts that are known (or are believed to be known), making each position simpler, but also more internally consistent and more different from the contending argument than the facts may warrant. Thus, in the Benghazi case, the two interpretations become caricatured as either a totally spontaneous event inspired by outrage over an Internet video or a terrorist attack planned long in advance by a known al-Qa’ida-affiliated organization that was untouched by emotion and uninfluenced by the video. The variants are treated as mutually exclusive, although there is no reason that parts of each cannot be true and it is unlikely that either is fully correct as is. Much of this political positioning occurs at the psychological level, before the conscious angling for advantage even begins.

In the case of the Benghazi attack, the selective release of three e-mail messages reinforced the confidence of those arguing that intelligence officials knew the complete truth all along. Yet those messages are vulnerable to the same errors as any early reports of such events. Just what did they say (keeping in mind that they constitute only a small piece of the communications that were flying around that day)?

The first, sent at 4:05 p.m.,Washington time (10:05 p.m., Benghazi time), reported on the subject line: “U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi Under Attack (SBU)” “SBU” indicates that the message is sensitive but unclassified. The text reads: “The Regional Security Officer reports the diplomatic mission is under attack. Embassy Tripoli reports that approximately 20 armed people fired shots; explosions have been heard as well. Ambassador Stevens, who is currently in Benghazi, and four COM personnel are in the compound safe haven. The 17th of February militia is providing security support.” Now, this tells us quite a bit about the situation, except that the “20 armed people” appears to refer to the diversion at the front gate, not the much larger group later reported to have come in through the rear. “COM” usually means “chief of mission” and presumably refers here to members of the ambassador’s staff, but the State Department later listed only two people with Ambassador Stevens in the safe haven: Sean Smith, who died along with the ambassador, and one Diplomatic Security agent, who survived. Moreover, the two 17th of February militiamen who showed up for duty that day were, by their own admission, hiding on the roof through most of the event.

A second message, sent at 4:54 p.m. (10:54, Benghazi time), reported that “the firing at the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi has stopped and the compound has been cleared.” So the incident appears to be over. Yet minutes later U.S. personnel were abandoning the compound under fire. In fact, at this time, only two Americans had been killed. The other two deaths occurred hours later.

The third message, sent at 6:07 p.m. (12:07, Benghazi time), has attracted the most attention. It came under the subject heading “Ansar al-Sharia Claims Responsibility for Benghazi Attack.” The text reads, “Embassy Tripoli reports the group claimed responsibility on Facebook and Twitter and has called for an attack on Embassy Tripoli.” Now some people have read this in accordance with the rule: “If a terrorist says it on Facebook, it must be true.” Unfortunately, many terrorist attacks are accompanied by multiple contradictory claims of responsibility. In this case, the CIA ultimately concluded that it probably was true, but this was based on further evidence, including communications intercepts. It is not accurate to say that this was “known” at 6:07 p.m. on September 11; it had to be confirmed. By the way, no one has been able to verify that Ansar al-Sharia’s Facebook page actually said that at the time; it said something quite different the next day.

In connection with this, the classified version of Ambassador Susan Rice’s talking points reportedly laid responsibility to both Ansar al-Sharia and Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The Office of the Director of National Intelligence deleted the specific names and replaced them with the term “extremists” in the unclassified version. This was reportedly done because the link was considered “tenuous” even at that time. A further reason could have been to conceal from the two groups how much we knew (or did not know, as the case may be). Other leaked reports, however, suggest that the classified talking points were wrong in part; AQIM was not directly involved and learned of the event only after the fact, when Ansar al-Sharia called them up to brag about it. The relationship between the two groups is still not fully understood. In any case, the intelligence community still does not consider the talking points to have been distorted; unnamed sources within the community have expressed surprise at the political reaction.

Regarding other aspects of the current “common knowledge,” it is worth mentioning that both Reuters and the New York Times have stood by their interviews with people originally described as unarmed demonstrators. It now appears, however, that they arrived at the scene after the attack was initiated rather than before, as observers, cheerleaders, or perhaps looters. Also, the CIA continues to stand by its assessment that the attack was inspired by the Internet video and the attack on the U.S. embassy in Egypt earlier that day. The agency apparently has evidence that the attackers watched the Egypt assault on TV; moreover, that is what Ansar al-Sharia told AQIM when they called to brag. It is also what the attackers told the unarmed bystanders at the time. So, if the attack was “preplanned,” the planning occurred that same day. In this connection, the CIA has dropped the description “spontaneous attack” in favor of “opportunistic attack.”

The main point, again, is that confusion reigns during such events. Intelligence professionals understand this, and they take it into account. They avoid making claims that may be proved false as the evidence evolves. Beyond that, as a general rule, they prefer to say as little as possible in public. Intelligence agencies will do their best to sort the facts out, but assessments take time. The next time something like this occurs and you are sure that the intelligence community knows the truth the moment it happens, keep in mind the assessments of two historical events that were considerably larger and more significant than this one. First, on June 6, 1944, the Allies landed in Normandy, opening the Second Front in Europe. The Germans had expected the attack, but they expected it to come at Calais. It was at least seven weeks, about the end of July, before the German high command was convinced that Normandy was not a diversion for the real landing coming at Calais. By that time there were 1–2 million Allied troops in France.

Second, on October 12, 1950, the CIA—with the concurrence of the State Department, the army, the navy, and the air force—sent a memo to President Truman. It assessed that, despite Chinese threats and despite the fact that the possibility could not be ruled out entirely, the agency deemed it unlikely that China would intervene in the Korean War. At the time the memo was sent, China was already sending troops in moderate-sized units into Korea. It would be about three more weeks, early November, before General MacArthur’s Far Eastern Command realized that it had been fighting the Chinese army.

The Benghazi compound prior to the attack. (Photo: House Oversight and Government Reform Committee)

There seem to be two enduring issues surrounding the attack on the U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi, Libya, on Sept. 11, 2012. The one that has received the most attention is the election-year hysteria over a supposed administration effort to cover up the fact of an attack. I shall return to that one at a later time. The issue that has garnered less attention, but one that might warrant an investigation, has to do with the nature of the security arrangements at the post. This essay will review what is known at this time about the security provisions.

As an aside, let me first say that I am using the term “diplomatic post” because I am not entirely certain what the official status was. Some of the popular press uses the term embassy, which is clearly wrong. The embassy is in Tripoli. More often the term consulate is used. This makes more sense, but it is not the term that the State Department officials have been using; they tend to say “temporary U.S. consulate,” “post,” “special mission,” or the “U.S. embassy’s office in Benghazi.” Nor has there been any reference to a consul. Nothing in this is necessarily nefarious. It may well be there is not yet any need for consular activities in Benghazi (the consular office in Tripoli had just opened in August). Most likely, the embassy simply had use for an office in eastern Libya to maintain contact with the country’s innumerable regional factions. It is not clear, however, that the department intended to keep it open beyond 2012. The post’s ill-defined status may have hindered the assignment of permanent personnel. The situation is further confused a bit by the presence of an apparent CIA operation at an “annex” located two kilometers from the post. This presence was inadvertently revealed by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee in its apparent zeal to politicize the events in Benghazi. In any case, we can call the main Benghazi facility a post.

Security at overseas diplomatic posts, in general, is a divided responsibility. The periphery of a diplomatic compound is protected by the host state. The interior is the responsibility of the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), led by an assistant secretary. DS, which was elevated to the status of a bureau in 1987, has the authority of a federal law enforcement agency. Its leaders on the scene are called regional security officers (RSOs). In the era of terrorism, it has grown to become one of the largest bureaus in the department. Still, its roughly 1,700 officers amount to fewer than six apiece for all the department’s domestic and foreign offices and facilities, and it has numerous responsibilities (ranging from investigating passport fraud to conducting background checks) in addition to physical and personnel security.

Despite the expanding size of DS, therefore, the State Department has found itself hiring private security contractors to supplement the bureau’s efforts. This began with the hiring of private guards for diplomatic posts after the Beirut embassy bombing of 1983. In 1994 the State Department hired a private firm to protect President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti. Private security firms were then hired to protect U.S. civilian operations in Bosnia. The process escalated, however, after 9/11. A firm was contracted in 2002 to provide bodyguards for Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan. In 2004 the State Department took over an existing Defense Department contract with Blackwater to protect U.S. civilian personnel in Iraq. The following year State put out a uniform $1.2 billion five-year “Indefinite Delivery–Indefinite Quantity” contract bid for private security services in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations. The award went to a consortium of Blackwater, DynCorp, and Triple Canopy.

While State’s reliance on private security rose, Congress began cutting the department’s security budget (which comes under two accounts, either Worldwide Security Protection or Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance). Relative to the department’s requests, Congress cut $129 million for fiscal year 2011 and $341 million for fiscal year 2012. House Republicans were the driving force behind the cuts and had proposed deeper cuts ($131 million for FY 2011 and $520 million for FY 2012) than those that eventually came out of the conference committees. (For fiscal year 2013, the House has proposed cutting the request by $316 million and the Senate by $70 million.) For a suggestion of the base-line funding behind these appropriations, recall that Robert Gates, when he was secretary of defense, repeatedly lamented the inadequate funding of the State Department. Remember as well that a 1985 recommendation by the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security to replace or renovate 126 high-risk posts within seven years has yet to be fully implemented.

At the same time, many countries were becoming warier of the role of private security firms and reluctant to permit them to operate on their territory. A turning point in this regard was the incident on Sept. 16, 2007, when Blackwater personnel guarding a convoy of State Department vehicles in Baghdad killed 17 Iraqi bystanders and injured 20 others in the mistaken belief that they had come under fire.

When the State Department began setting up facilities in Libya at the end of the country’s civil war, the scene was chaotic. Libya did not have the wherewithal to provide perimeter security for the Benghazi facility. Therefore, a local militia, the February 17 Brigade, was designated as the official stand-in for of the Libyan state for that purpose. (Ansar al-Shari’ah, the group accused of attacking the Benghazi post, performed a similar security function at the local hospital.) With regard to interior security, none of the private security firms with which State had existing contracts were permitted to operate in the country. Therefore, for its Benghazi office, the department signed an ad hoc contract with Blue Mountain Group, a little-known firm based in Wales, that had acquired permission to operate in Libya by collaborating (temporarily as it turned out) with a local Libyan security firm. Blue Mountain hired Libyans to work as security guards at the Benghazi post, but most of them had little or no experience and the firm provided little training. The person put in charge of the detachment was a Libyan English teacher who was selected, he was told, because “you have great English and get along with everyone and are punctual.” None of that is to be sneered at, to be sure, but he had no background in security. None of the guards carried firearms. Armed private security companies are not allowed to operate in Libya; Eric Nordstrom, the RSO in Tripoli, saw this, at least in part, as a reaction to Qadhafi’s use of foreign mercenaries. Their job, therefore, was to observe, report, and alert others in case of an incident.

The department acquired the Benghazi site in the summer of 2011, when the Transitional National Council was located in that city. The compound is 100 yards by 300 yards and contains four buildings: the main building with a public area, a residential area, and a safe haven; a building that housed DS agents; the Tactical Operations Center (TOC); and a barracks for the February 17 Brigade detachment. Security improvements made to the site included raising the height of the outer wall with concrete to nine feet and then topping that with three feet of barbed wire and concertina razor wire. External lighting and security cameras were added, as were Jersey barriers to obstruct car bombs. Steel drop bars were installed behind the steel gates in the perimeter wall. Security grills were installed on windows accessible from the ground. Explosive-detection equipment and an Imminent Danger Notification System were installed. Doors and locks were reinforced.

The Libya posts experienced a high degree of staff turnover, including a number of DS agents who passed through on temporary duty (TDY), often for only eight weeks, which, according to Nordstrom, made it difficult to establish procedures, policies, and relationships. For much of this period, Tripoli had only one permanent DS officer—Nordstrom—and Benghazi had none. A Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was located at the Benghazi Annex, two kilometers away.

Eight DS agents had been assigned to Benghazi in September 2011, but they were focused on crisis and stabilization work and were not expected to remain for the long term. The number was reduced within a few months as the security situation improved.

Incidents directed against targets with foreign affiliations, in both Tripoli and Benghazi, rose again in the spring of 2012. For this reason State delayed the arrival of a principal officer in Benghazi, curtailed staff movements, engaged local officials on the investigation of such incidents, maintained contact with security officials at other countries’ diplomatic posts, and continued to train members of the February 17 Brigade. Nordstrom hoped to maintain U.S. security personnel until “direct-hire” Libyan bodyguards could be trained and issued Libyan firearms permits. Evidently, the Libyans deemed direct hires by the U.S. government to be less sensitive than armed private security. The Libyan authorities, however, insisted on vetting applicants for ties to the Qadhafi regime. Libya began issuing permits to U.S. personnel in June 2012 and to Libyan bodyguards about a month later.

As of late July 2012, the embassy in Tripoli had three permanent RSOs (including two assistant RSOs), four TDY DS agents, four Mobile Security Deployment (MSD) DS agents training local bodyguards, and 16 local bodyguards. Two other MSD teams had already been withdrawn in the spring, and the third was scheduled to leave in August. In addition, a 16-member Site Security Team (SST) led by a member of the Utah National Guard was stationed in Tripoli and scheduled to be removed by mid-August. Benghazi had three TDY DS agents. At the time of the September 11 attack, the number of TDY DS agents in Benghazi was five because two from Tripoli had accompanied the ambassador. Four members of the February 17 Brigade were supposed to be at the site; one of those positions had been vacant for several days, and on September 11 only two were on duty.

Complaints that the department did not fulfill the embassy’s requests for security are a valid cause for investigation, although in my view that investigation should focus on improving capabilities and procedures rather than scoring points or finding scapegoats. For Benghazi, Nordstrom had requested three to five DS agents, and by coincidence five were there at the time of the attack. The complaints refer primarily to the removal of the MSD teams and the 16-member SST; the embassy hoped to have them replaced or have their terms extended. These men were stationed in Tripoli, not Benghazi, although a few might have accompanied the ambassador during his stay there. A previous extension request for the SST had been granted, but the last one was not. In turning the request down, Deputy Assistant Secretary Charlene Lamb cited the ongoing training of local bodyguards.

The wisdom of denying the requests can certainly be disputed, especially given the sensitive and unsettled condition of Libya, but as a general rule we cannot expect such requests to simply be granted whenever they are made. All missions see the urgency of their own needs most clearly, but people at the center have the unenviable task of making decisions about resources and priorities. Under Secretary Patrick F. Kennedy has argued that these decisions involve dialog, negotiation, between the overseas post and headquarters. The errors are always obvious when the decision goes badly, but they are only obvious after the fact. In this case, it is not at all clear that a different decision would have changed the outcome. According to Nordstrom’s written testimony, no force level under consideration would have been adequate to the attack, which was unprecedented in its nature. By definition it is no longer unprecedented, but given funding limits, it is still unlikely that this attack will set the security standard for other posts in the future. Future needs will be addressed by future negotiations between overseas posts and headquarters against a background of competing needs and available resources, and sometimes the solution won’t work out.

During Monday night’s town hall style debate between President Obama and Governor Mitt Romney, the domestic issues once again seem poised to take the spotlight until one Mr. Kerry Ladka took to the microphone.  Asking President Obama about the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Ladka said:

This question actually comes from a brain trust of my friends at Global Telecom Supply in Minneola yesterday. We were sitting around, talking about Libya, and we were reading and became aware of reports that the State Department refused extra security for our embassy in Benghazi, Libya, prior to the attacks that killed four Americans.  Who was it that denied enhanced security and why?

Ladka’s question raised many questions (i.e. exactly is in this “brain trust” of friends at Global Telecom Supply?) the most frequently asked one was, “Who really sits around just casually talking about Libya?”

*For the less eloquent phrasing, see the thoughts of comedian Aziz Ansari here and here.

While it is fair enough to say that foreign policy is not what many consider the sexiest topic of conversation, there are plenty of interesting people (namely, contributors to and readers of foreignpolicyblogs.com) who often find themselves “sitting around talking about Libya” and other topics of conversation that are not exactly shoe ins for the “Hot Topics” segment on The View.   In defense of those folks, here is a list of ten  conversationalists who talk foreign policy and make for great follows.

 @Max_Fisher Foreign affairs blogger at The Washington Post

@AzmatZahra Digital producer for Frontline on PBS

@blakehounshell Managing editor of Foreign Policy

@ianbremmer President of Eurasia Group

@columlynch UN reporter for The Washington Post, Turtle Bay blogger at Foreign Policy

@mbesheer Voice of America UN Correspondent.

@dandrezner International Politics professor – Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Senior editor – The National Interest, Contributing editor - Foreign Policy

@robert_nolan Editor, Producer at Foreign Policy Association

@jeremyscahill National Security Correspondent for The Nation

@dpletka Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute

Know someone that you think should be added to the list?  Let us know your top picks in the comment section below.

In their sole debate before the election, Vice President Joe Biden and GOP challenger Congressman Paul Ryan sparred for 90 minutes on the direction of U.S. policy, both for foreign and domestic.  Last night’s debate was a stark contrast to last week’s meeting between the two men at the top of the tickets, with Biden and Ryan engaging in an impassioned and, at times, heated discussion moderated by ABC’s Senior Foreign Affairs correspondent Martha Raddatz at Centre College in Danville, Kentucky.

News coverage the day after has focused primarily on Vice President’s Biden’s impassioned defense of the Obama administration’s policies, his penchant for unbridled laughter and Irish inspired vocabulary.  But it was the Vice President’s statements on the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi on September 11, 2012 that has many analysts wondering if the vice president delivered a bit of “ malarkey” of his own.

The moment in question was the vice president’s response to Raddatz’s question on the attack in Libya that resulted in the death of four American, including U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens.  When asked if the attack was due to an intelligence failure, Biden responded by saying:

 “We weren’t told they wanted more security. We did not know they wanted more security there.”

The vice president’s response seems to directly contradict the account of State Department officials, who in a congressional hearing yesterday, admitted denying requests for additional security at the consulate in Benghazi.  The requests were made from the former State Department official Eric Nordstrom, who had previously served as the top security officer in the region.

Nordstrom testified that his requests for additional security personnel for the U.S. diplomatic mission in Libya had fallen on deaf ears.  At a congressional hearing this Wednesday, Nordstrom testified that he had expressed his concerns to senior State Department officials saying, “For me, the Taliban is on the inside of the building.”

During today’s briefing, White House spokesman Jay Carney sought to clarify the vice president’s debate response, telling reporters that Biden was not referring to the entire Obama administration in his comments but rather “speaking directly for himself and the president…the White House.”  The Obama campaign also responded to Ryan’s accusations’ that their candidate has slashed funding for security at the consulate in Benghazi, noting that Congressman Ryan had been among the House Republicans who voted to reduce funding to security for diplomatic missions.

All of this, bring us to what many pundits will be debating today and on the Sunday morning talk-circuit: What did the vice president mean when he said “we”?  Did his answer to the question put the intelligence community and the State department under the bus? If the White House did not know about the requests for additional security for the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, does that necessarily abstain the Obama Administration of responsibility?

All these questions are valid and will most likely unfold in the coming weeks as the congressional investigation as to what happened in Benghazi continues.  And there is no doubt that the inquiry will continue.  During the the House Oversight Committee’s meeting on Wednesday, Chairman Darrell Issa indicated that he would be reaching out to Ambassador Susan Rice regarding her comments on ABC This Week in the aftermath of the attacks where she claimed what happened in Benghazi was directly related to the inflammatory anti-Islam YouTube video that had spurned protests in countries across the Middle East.  Today, video from the night of the attacks raised further questions as to whether the attack was due to a protest or premeditated.

The story shows no signs of dying down as the Obama and Romney campaigns head into the final days until November 6^th.  And there will no doubt be more clarifications from other top officials in the weeks to come — if not sooner — given the second debate between President Obama and GOP nominee Mitt Romney is set for next Tuesday, October 16. But if last night’s debate has made one things clear, it is this: The American public remains unclear on who knew what and when they knew it.

Charlie Hebdo’s editor, Stephane Charbonnier, with a copy of the magazine’s controversial issue.
Source: The Huffington Post

Less than a week after a controversial, anti-Islamic film incited violence throughout the Middle East, riots and protests gained momentum from a French satirical magazine’s publication of crude representations of the Prophet Muhammad. Meant to mock violence sparked by the American-made film Innocence of Muslims, the French weekly, Charlie Hebdo, included pornographic and demeaning illustrations of the Prophet. With an arguable numbness to self-mocking animations and illustrations, some in the Western World are confused by the intense response, which has resulted in at least 49 deaths, to a filmmaker’s ignorance and a publication’s poor humor. While cartoons like South Park and Family Guy continuously poke fun at people of all religious affiliations, the recently published lewd cartoons and film raise issues about protecting freedom of speech and expression at the price of provoking anti-religious sentiments and triggering international unrest.

Initial shockwaves reverberated throughout the Middle East after the Internet circulation of Innocence of Muslims. Riots in Libya led to the murder of the American ambassador to Libya and three embassy staff members. Crowds stormed the American Embassy in Cairo, and other American and Western embassies were attacked. In response to the viral video and the violence it catalyzed, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, addressed the world, saying, “I hope it is obvious, that the United States government had absolutely nothing to do with this video. We absolutely reject its content and message.” Despite the American stance against anti-Islamic productions, and its continued commitment to religious tolerance, the American government continued to receive backlash from the film.

Less than a week later, Charlie Hebdo’s cartoons mocking the Prophet Muhammad stoked anger created by Innocence of Muslims, catalyzing protests outside the French embassy in Tehran. Demonstrators burned American and French flags while chanting, “Death to France,” and “Down with the U.S.” In a September 21^st news conference, French Interior Minister Manuel Valls banned all protests of Charlie Hebdo’s cartoons. As a precaution, that same day, many French embassies and schools were closed throughout the Middle East.

Charlie Hebdo’s cartoonists and writers defended the paper’s caricatures, stating that in a democracy no groups should be off limits from discussion. Although the publication is notorious for producing proactive material, targeting many religions and groups, its Islam-centered copy is not only highly criticized and controversial, but it had the added effect of exacerbating already heightened tensions between Muslims and Western societies.

While outrage over the obscene portrayals of the Prophet Muhammad is understandable, it is confusing why anger is directed toward countries’ governments and citizens. While boycotting a magazine and film may seem like potential solutions, recent protests and violence target more than the latest anti-Islamic productions. Instead, outbursts throughout the Middle East and Europe challenge the negative aspects of “freedom of speech and the press,” a government defended right throughout the Western World that enables, and does not punish, anti-Islamic media.

The First Amendment is, arguably, the cornerstone of America’s “free society.” Similarly, other Western countries uphold similar ideas about the importance of freedom of speech and the press. The ultimate question is whether there should be a religious sensitivity boundary, and if so, has the Western World crossed it?