This documentary is all over the place.

It is in part a history of modern Afghanistan and also a film about independent journalists – some of whom were killed – trying to report on the situation on the ground.

Afghanistan is called “The Graveyard of Empires” for good reason: Every country or empire that has tried to possess it gets mired down and loses its way.

What Shadow of Afghanistan does a good job of showing is how so many people have been uprooted and living in refugee camps, most on the border with Pakistan.

Another issue addressed is the landmines left behind by the retreating Soviets. The fact that they either never kept records of where they planted those mines or intentionally withheld such knowledge is barbaric.
Many Afghans – a good many children – have died or been maimed by the mines that lay scattered across the country.

Also, the makers of the film claim the CIA inadvertently supported the Taliban before 9/11 because it was funding the Pakistani ISI (the nation’s largest intelligence service) who supported the radical religious group.
What Shadow of Afghanistan does show in some detail is the number of people and parties vying for power, mostly in the 1990s. Also, the situation average Afghans face every day is explored.

This film could have been much longer or could have been divided into shorter pieces. It should be watched, however, as a primer of modern Afghanistan.

Shadow of Afghanistan is available to rent.

Murphy can be reached at: Lojano@comcast.net

(AP Photo/Kamran Jebreili, File)

by Jennifer Norris

Americans who left the theatre watching “Zero Dark Thirty” thinking that the dark stain of torture is in our past, should be cautioned by our exit strategy in Afghanistan.

As a 2014 deadline for ending our combat mission in Afghanistan approaches, policymakers say that our main objective is to prepare Afghan security forces to fight terrorists so that Al Qaeda will never again establish a safe haven in the country.  To that end, U.S. forces have been working with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to build their capacity to provide for their own security.   The ANA and ANP, however, cost the U.S. billions of dollars a year, and there are still swaths of the country that the national army and national police cannot cover.

Faced with an impending withdrawal deadline and tightening budgets, the U.S. created another security entity, the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which is seen as an affordable short-term fix to filling the security vacuum.  However, the name Afghan Local Police is a misnomer used to provide legitimacy since members do not have police powers and are essentially village militias armed with AK-47s, hired to fight the Taliban and other anti-governmental elements.  Given the ALP’s prominence as a key feature of the U.S. exit strategy, General Petraus described the ALP program as “arguably the most critical element in our effort to help Afghanistan develop the capacity to secure itself.”

Despite some success in achieving security gains, the ALP program has proved to be a high-risk strategy, plagued by problems such as Taliban infiltration and insider attacks.  Most notably, the ALP program has been the source of much controversy due to complaints that members have committed human rights abuses against the local population with impunity. President Karzai recently expelled U.S. Special Forces from Wardak province due to allegations that American forces, and the Afghan Local Police they had trained, had tortured and killed Afghan civilians. Much of the media criticism focused on Karzai and his political motivations for making such an announcement.  While it is true that Karzai has proven to be an untrustworthy figure, even outrageously accusing the U.S. of colluding with the Taliban, allegations of human rights abuses committed by Afghan partners working with U.S. Special Forces should be taken seriously. President Obama’s commitment to end the war responsibly in Afghanistan should also include a commitment to ensure that the ALP program does not harm Afghans.

ALP units are established in volatile districts where the national army and police have little presence.  According to the official directive, ALP members are selected by local shura members and after passing a biometrics test, they receive three weeks of training by U.S. Special Forces.  They are paid about 60 percent of a police member’s salary and provided with AK-47s, radios and uniforms, and perform a range of duties from manning checkpoints to providing information about insurgents to security forces. Some 20,000 members are currently employed nation-wide.

The ALP is the brainchild of General Petraus, modeled after the Sons of Iraq (or Awakening Councils), which was a major centerpiece of the Iraq surge and largely credited with defeating the insurgency in Anbar province.     The Sons of Iraq (SOIs) were Sunni militias, employed by the U.S. military from 2007 to 2009, and were made up of many former insurgents who became disillusioned with the violence wreaked by Al Qaeda forces on Iraqis.  At its height, some 100,000 members were employed by the U.S. The U.S. promised SOI members they would eventually receive jobs within the Iraqi security forces. However, the Shiite-led Iraqi government, suspicious of the Sunni SOIs, remains reluctant to integrate them into the Iraqi military, police, and government or ministries. To date, only a small percentage of SOIs have received government jobs and many are left feeling isolated and disgruntled. The fate of the Sons of Iraq can be instructive to the future of the ALP because a central question is what happens to 30,000 former ALP members who are armed and unemployed once the U.S. can no longer afford to pay their salaries?  It is unlikely that ALP members will be absorbed into the Afghan army or national police simply due to a lack of funding.  In a public report, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) expressed concern that ALP members are only motivated by economic interests and will turn into an anti-government force after the U.S. withdraws.

There is more reason to be concerned about employing a program of U.S.-backed militias in Afghanistan – a country plagued by more than 30 years of war with a long history of abusive militias or gangs with guns.   Many of these militias have left behind a legacy of thuggery. Today, some Afghans have difficulty distinguishing between the ALP program and militias of the past.

Since the ALP program started in 2010, serious accusations have been lodged against ALP members, including rape and murder.  In May 2012, an ALP commander in Kunduz province and four of his men abducted an 18 year old girl, chained her to a wall, and repeatedly raped her for a week.   The girl’s father said she has threatened to set herself on fire if she does not get justice.  Human Rights Watch investigated an incident in Pul-e-Khurmi district in Baghlan province where four armed ALP members abducted a 13-year-old boy and took him to the house of the ALP commander and gang raped him.  In February 2011, an ALP unit in Shindand district in Herat province reportedly raided several homes, stole belongings, and beat residents.  One boy was also reportedly detained and beaten overnight by the same ALP unit in June 2011 and had nails hammered into his feet.  There have also been many complaints of ALP members demanding bribes or “Islamic taxes” from villagers.  Community members say that the national police have failed to investigate such incidents.

The ALP program implicates the U.S. Leahy Law, which prohibits U.S. military assistance to “foreign military units” if there is credible evidence that such units have committed gross violations of human rights.  However, there have been no financial cutbacks to the ALP program under the Leahy Law.  In fact, Congress has approved funding to expand the program to a total of 30,000 ALP members by the end of 2014 and the L.A. Times has reported that the Pentagon plans to ask Congress fund the program for another five years.

Despite safeguards to promote Afghan ownership, the ALP is largely viewed as a creation of the U.S. Under the official directive, ALP units should operate under the command and control of the local chief of police.   In practice however, the chief of police has little to no control over ALP units, especially since ALP units operate in areas where ANP cannot go.  As a result, ALP units operate relatively independently and are perceived to be an apparatus of the U.S. military.

Vetting is a serious concern.   Sometimes local strongmen are selected – former Taliban commanders, or warlords who yield influence on shura members. While engaging local shuras is a laudable objective, the truth is that as outsiders, it is difficult for U.S. officials to navigate a highly complex web of histories and tribal loyalties.  In Badghis province, a Taliban commander and 20 of his men were recruited into the ALP — the same men who were implicated in stoning a woman to death and a series of beheadings in the past.  Both Afghan and U.S. officials have used the ALP program as a way of persuading insurgents to lay down their arms and join the government by promising them jobs with ALP units.   Such quick fixes without regard for justice and reconciliation can create tension within these communities, for the regular Afghans who know exactly who the bad guys are and do not wish to see them in positions of power in their own villages.

In the end, any program where militias are trained and paid for by the U.S. government should be carefully reviewed. Congress must be better informed about the program, which is being implemented in America’s name and should ask for detailed plans from the Pentagon on measures taken to improve vetting and accountability over the ALP program. While some Pentagon officials defend the program by noting that no police program is perfect, it must be recognized that the ALP program is particularly vulnerable to problems due a general atmosphere of lawlessness in Afghanistan.  To presume that security gains outweigh any abuses suffered by the Afghan population would be a mistake for the United States, especially as it seeks to persuade the Afghan government to respect and promote human rights.  ISAF and the Afghan government must work together to ensure that there is greater oversight and control over ALP units by the national police and that mechanisms are in place to hold human rights abusers accountable.  It is especially important that all allegations of abuse are fully investigated and prosecuted.  In a country that has suffered from years of war, it is America’s responsibility to monitor this program and ensure greater protections for the local population.

Jennifer Norris is a lawyer specializing in international human rights law. She holds a J.D. from Benjamin Cardozo School of Law and a B.A. in political science from UC Santa Barbara. She recently worked for the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva in the treaty bodies division, specifically for the women’s rights treaty (CEDAW) and the child’s rights treaty (CRC) monitoring committees. She also worked for the UN political mission in Afghanistan as a Governance Officer and was stationed in Kunar province. Previously, she also worked for the International Rescue Committee in Iraq where she focused on refugee and IDP issues.

Jennifer credits her Peace Corps service in Benin, West Africa for cultivating her passion for human rights and international affairs.

This would seem to be good news for those worried that the Pakistani military establishment’s fixation on the Indian threat has left it blind to the precarious conditions inside the country.  These domestic challenges include spiraling levels of violence in two of its major cities – Karachi and Peshawar, growing Sunni-Shia conflict, and a chronic electrical power crisis that some experts suggest is more of a threat to stability than is terrorism.

Still, a healthy skepticism about Pakistani pronouncements is always in order.  After all, even U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta last summer seemed to be taken in by Kayani’s promises that a long-awaited offensive into North Waziristan was just around the corner.  This occurred despite the incredulity of other U.S. officials – the New York Times even quoted one as quipping that “This is the most delayed campaign in the history of modern warfare.”

So here are two litmus tests for assaying the value of the announced doctrinal change, both of which entail fundamental departures in entrenched security calculations vis-à-vis India.

The first test is whether the revision leads to Pakistan ending its strategy of supporting Taliban insurgents as a means of exerting influence in Afghanistan and instead playing a constructive role as NATO forces prepare to exit the country after 2014.  For two decades, Islamabad has backed the Taliban out of fears of Indian strategic encirclement.  Recent reports, however, suggest that the Pakistani military establishment has had an epiphany and now believes that prolonging the Afghan conflict would only blow back over the porous border, giving further energy to the domestic militants now waging war against the Pakistani state and perhaps even inflaming Pashtun separatism.   Evidence for this change of heart includes stepped up efforts to bring about reconciliation between the Taliban and the government in Kabul, including releasing a number of jailed Taliban leaders as a goodwill gesture, as well as a campaign to reach out to non-Pashtun leaders in Afghanistan who are suspicious of Pakistan’s intentions.

Ahmed Rashid, a keen observer of the AfPak scene, attributes this major shift to the army’s realization that Pakistan is in increasingly desperate straits.  He notes that General Kayani “is now banking on the hope that reconciliation among the Afghans will have a knock-on positive effect on the Pakistani Taliban also – depriving them of legitimacy and recruits.” A Reuters report carries the same message, quoting a senior Pakistani military officer as saying:

There was a time when we used to think we were the masters of Afghanistan. Now we just want them to be masters of themselves so we can concentrate on our own problems.

It obviously bears close watching whether Islamabad follows through with these promises to be a better neighbor.  (For a doubtful view, see here.)  The outcome will have significant implications not only for Afghanistan but the larger region as well.

The second test is whether the doctrinal revisions bring about a more relaxed nuclear posture toward India.  Pakistan is rapidly expanded its nuclear stockpile, especially in tactical nuclear weapons.  Indeed, many worry (see here and here) that South Asia is on the verge of a destabilizing nuclear arms competition.  General Kayani justifies the need for battlefield nuclear options by pointing to the threat posed by the Indian army’s “Cold Start” doctrine – which emphasizes the threat of large-scale but calibrated punitive actions in order to deter Pakistani adventurism.

In an earlier post, I criticized the nuclear buildup as strategically unnecessary as well as a wasteful diversion of precious economic resources away from more pressing national priorities.  So far, there are no signs that the military establishment is reversing course, though civilian leaders are at least beginning to ask tougher questions about the direction of the nuclear program.  The coming year may also see a somewhat changed equilibrium in the country’s fraught civil-military dynamics, with the upcoming parliamentary elections establishing a new milestone in civilian governance coupled with Kayani’s scheduled retirement towards the end of 2013.  It’s also worth noting that the army’s new doctrine acknowledges the legitimacy of civilian input into national security decision-making.

And there might be an opportunity here for New Delhi to provide some strategic reassurance than can help nudge Pakistan’s security calculus onto a new path.  It could further encourage the informal but promising dialogue by retired senior military leaders from both countries that has produced good ideas about confidence-building measures.  It also can signal openness to convening an official dialogue about the posture and readiness levels of military units, including nuclear-capable missile forces, deployed along the common border.  Given their lack of strategic utility as well as the perils they pose for crisis stability, one idea might be for the two countries to agree on eliminating their shortest-range ballistic missiles.

2013 is shaping up to be a pivotal year for Pakistan and I’ll have more to say in a future post about things to watch for.  But one of the key items to monitor is whether the army’s doctrinal shift leads to substantive policy changes on Afghanistan and nuclear weapons.

This commentary was originally posted on Chanakya’s Notebook.  I invite you to connect with me via Facebook and Twitter.

Photo Credit: Zofeen Ebrahim/IRIN

With the opening of “Zero Dark Thirty” this week, many have condemned the depiction of torture in the film — and debates have resurfaced about the “enhanced interrogation” of suspected terrorists by the United States to find Osama bin Laden. What gets left out of these discussions is the role that a deplorable espionage tactic played in the manhunt and the wide-reaching effects that this tactic has had in global health.

I’m talking about the use of a fake vaccination program in Pakistan, run by the C.I.A., that drew blood samples from children in Abbottabad to check their DNA against relatives of bin Laden’s, a story I covered more than a year ago and again this July when the Taliban banned polio vaccinators from operating in Northern Pakistan. Now, nine health workers who were administering polio vaccines have been killed across Pakistan. These coordinated attacks have forced the WHO to suspend a major vaccination drive in the country.

Pakistan is one of three countries in which polio is still endemic (the other two are Afghanistan and Nigeria), although there were resurgences found in Angola, Chad, and the DRC this year. In one of the greatest public health near-victories of the past century, we’ve almost eradicated this devastating disease, reducing cases by 99 percent in 25 years. You rarely see numbers like that in global health efforts — smallpox is the only disease affecting humans that we’ve managed to eradicate. We’ve made these incredible gains through preventative measures:  by vaccinating 2 billion children in the past quarter-century.

When news about the fake vaccine program (which was for hepatitis B, not polio) surfaced, I wrote that it was an unacceptable ruse that undermined global health efforts and took away the ability to trust doctors. As I wrote in July, polio vaccinations are a particularly fraught issue in some parts of the Muslim world, where the drives are seen as a Western conspiracy to infect Muslim children with HIV or conduct espionage, which is why objections to polio programs grew instead of objections to hepatitis prevention. The New Yorker pointed out that in 2004, we nearly wiped out polio, but condemnations from mullahs in northern Nigeria about the programs meant that people refused vaccinations, contracted the disease, and traveled to Mecca for the hajj, where they spread polio to other pilgrims.

According to the AP, the Pakistani Taliban — the prime suspect in the attacks — have distanced themselves from the killings, and there is no confirmation of who organized the two-man motorcycle teams who shot and killed five female health workers on December 17 within the span of an hour, adding four more victims in the following days, some of whom were teenagers. It’s probable that the C.I.A. program is not directly responsible for these deaths, since there are a number of other cultural factors, such as suspicion of polio programs in general, as well as the liberation of women, that could have added motivation for the violence. At the same time, it added fuel to a very volatile fire. As Michael Specter wrote in the New Yorker last week, “There is a history here, and somebody in the American intelligence community should have known it.” Unfortunately, that ignorance, or willful disregard, has potentially contributed to the deaths of nine people and put the great progress we have made against polio in serious jeopardy.

Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Francisco V. Govea II/Released

By Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, Middle East Institute Scholar-In-Residence

Assertions and opinions in this publication are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.

Washington and Kabul have welcomed increased Pakistani cooperation in finding a political solution to the Afghan conflict. Pakistan’s willingness to release 18 Taliban-held prisoners with the promise of more is seen as demonstrating a significant change in Pakistan’s approach to a settlement. But in reality Pakistan has for some time been trying to coax the Taliban to join a coalition government in Kabul. A power-sharing arrangement would go far in confronting what Pakistan perceives as acute security threats arising from an unsettled Afghanistan: a military encirclement by India and an outcome in the Afghan conflict that promotes the forces of extremism in Pakistan.

So why has Pakistan until now appeared reluctant to facilitate negotiations with the Taliban? Simply put, it has needed to be confident that its prime security interests would be satisfied in a negotiated peace. Standing in the way of such assurance has been Afghanistan’s depiction of its neighbor as almost solely responsible for sustaining the insurgency, as well as an absence of trust between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban leaderships. The first impediment has eased as the Kabul government, acting through its High Peace Council, has come to the realization that a peace agreement cannot be achieved without the inclusion of Pakistan in the negotiating process. Moreover, if the two countries can agree on the contours of a political settlement, it could open a second negotiating track alongside bilateral talks between the U.S. and the Taliban, thus possibly precluding the Americans striking a deal that prioritized U.S. interests.

Before Pakistan can throw its full weight behind negotiations it needs to be certain of having Taliban interlocutors of its own choosing. It is often assumed that because Pakistan offers sanctuary to Mullah Omar’s mainline Taliban, the Haqqani network, and Gulbudeen’s Hekmatyar’s Hizb–e-Islami that its intelligence agencies exercise strong leverage with these groups. In reality, the Taliban have always resisted and resented being dictated to by Pakistan. Their aims as well as strategies are often at odds. Heavy pressure on the Taliban stands the risk of having the Taliban align with Pakistan’s Islamic militants in opposing the state. There is also reluctance to alienate the Taliban while they still figure in Pakistan’s contingency plans in the event of a disintegrating Afghanistan.

While Pakistan may still value the Taliban as its ethnic Pashtun proxy in Afghanistan, it has shed any illusion that a strategy based on promoting Pashtun dominance can bring about a deferential, stable Afghanistan. This is not the political landscape of the 1990s when a largely indifferent world watched the Taliban progressively roll over hated warlords and put their Islamic stamp on an anarchic country. Today’s Afghanistan has many more powerful domestic stakeholders who will resist a takeover and a far more concerned international community. If there is to be a political settlement in Afghanistan and civil war averted then it must be inclusive of the major Afghan power centers. But getting the Taliban’s traditional adversaries to accept that it is safe to cohabit a political system with the Taliban will take a major selling job for Pakistan and far-reaching compromises by the Taliban. The Pakistanis’ failure to date to get the Taliban leadership to yield on key constitutional issues or break ties to Al Qaeda suggests that a more flexible approach to negotiations will not come from Pakistan’s pressure but when the Taliban’s core leadership is ready to change.

Without a negotiated peace, Pakistan has reason to fear its being drawn into a costly and dangerous proxy conflict should Iran, Russia and India again back those forces resisting the Taliban. Pakistan faces the prospect that millions of Afghans will again seek refuge in Pakistan, thus putting enormous strain on a country now even less able to receive them. This time around Pakistan is not anxious to see the Taliban score an outright victory in Afghanistan, whether militarily or politically. The Pakistani military has concluded that it would be only a matter of time before the Taliban join with Pakistan’s Islamic militants in trying to impose a Sharia state. The optimal outcome for Pakistan, its strategists have reasoned, would be having the Taliban included in a coalition government where they could check Indian influence and immersed in the politics of Afghanistan, diverting them from pursuing any broader Islamic ambitions.

Recent diplomatic activity notwithstanding, the prospects for a compromise agreement any time soon remain dim. There is no hurting stalemate. The Taliban fight a relative low cost insurgency where a few high profile attacks are all that is needed to give the impression that the Taliban are relentless adversaries, probably impossible to defeat. Simple logic says to hold on until the presidential election when disputed results could cause the prevailing political system to lose legitimacy.  Still more compelling is the case for waiting until it becomes clear as to whether the Afghan security forces can fight with any effectiveness or can even keep from breaking up once most foreign forces have departed.

If there is anything that might entice the Taliban’s leadership into peace negotiations, it is the kind of proposals that the High Peace Council has recently carried to Islamabad for Pakistan’s endorsement. Its terms would seem to offer the Taliban an opportunity to take effective control of Afghanistan’s south and east in exchange for joining the country’s political process. Pakistan may be initially attracted to the idea of a Pashtun buffer zone at its border or see a settlement as undermining its own insurgency. But Pakistan seems short sighted; were the Taliban to assume power in the Pashtun heartland, Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan would effectively disappear and the foundations would be laid for the creation of a Pashtunistan. So while Pakistan continues to search for a political outcome to the Afghan conflict, it may get far more than it bargained for.

Dr. Marvin Weinbaum was an Afghanistan and Pakistan Analyst at the Bureau of Intelligence Research at the U.S. Department of State from 1999 to 2003. He is a Professor Emeritus at the University of Illinois and served as Director of the South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies program. He was a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (1996–1997), and held Fulbright Research Fellowships for Afghanistan (1989–1990) and Egypt (1981–1982). 

He has authored numerous books, chapters and articles, including “Human Rights, Culture, and Politics in Northern Tier Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan” (2003) and Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (1994).

Spokesman for new Syrian National Coalition accuses US of “empty promises’ about the delivery of weapons to rebels

The Syrian rebels, or opposition, or the Syrian National Coalition (the name this motley assembly of Sunnis, Salafists, jihadists, and foreign insurgents) agreed to take on in Doha as a prerequisite for U.S. support (money PLUS guns), successfully launched a surface to air missile (SAM) about ten days ago, bringing down a Syrian government aircraft. Reported by the BBC, the news caused hardly a stir. Word was that the shoulder-hoisted weapon came from Iran, but who really knows?

The fact is that the camel’s nose is definitely under the tent, and the rowdy bunch of Sunnis et al challenging Assad’s Shiite/Alawite regime are loaded for bear. Yes, they’re gunning for the Russians, Assad’s backers, that’s a fact. But will there come a time when they’re also gunning for us? With those same surface to air missiles?

On December 12, the U.S. joined the Gulf States, France, and the U.K. in endorsing the Syrian National Coalition as the “sole representative of the Syrian people,” an announcement that President Obama made live and on TV with the admission that a “tiny part” of that legitimate, Syrian “government in waiting” is constituted of al Qaeda “terrorists.”

Do tell.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but aren’t these the guys who killed roughly 3000 Americans when they flew hijacked planes into the Twin Towers and set the Pentagon on fire?

Of course, if they’re only a “tiny part” of the Syrian group to whom the U.S. is giving millions in support and maybe lethal weapons, what the heck?

The important thing is to support the House of Saud (for oil) and eliminate Iran’s only buddy in the Mideast (for Israel). Oh, oh, wait…there’s also that multilateral, “good neighbor” thing that says we have to support our NATO partners in Europe (Libya?) who REALLY need the oil, and the goodwill of the Gulf States, (I’m told it costs 80-100 euros to fill up on the continent) to struggle on through fiscal catastrophe.

And then there’s politics.

Let’s chase those Russians out of Syria the same way we did in Afghanistan. That worked. And it will work even better, won’t it, when ISAF forces leave Dodge in 2014 and a western-supported government operating out of Kabul…disappears?

It’s ok.

Afghanistan also has a “government in waiting.”

The Taliban.

No matter. Given the fact that I always seem to be living near an international airport, the question of what interests the U.S. might have in the mideast that would justify support for “the Wild Bunch in Syria” has been bothering me more than usual. But before I could blog my way through the problem, someone else did it for me: Aaron David Miller, who writes a column for foreignpolicy.com.

It’s a great read, simple, true, and unbelievably, well, believable. I don’t know who this man is, (his bio says he’s a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and that his new book — “Can America Have Another Great President?” – will be published this year), but his four-point explanation of continuing U.S. involvement in the mideast should be required reading for anyone who doesn’t want to send more taxpayer monies or US troops to shore up the cockeyed Mullah-managed agenda of sectarian wingnuts across the Middle east.

The article below (focus on “oil” and “preventing another 911″ and “human rights?–fuhgeddaboudit”) belongs to Miller, who appears to have hit a big, bad, and hugely misunderstood nail right on the head:

The Politically Incorrect Guide to U.S. Interests in the Middle East

BY AARON DAVID MILLER

AUGUST 15, 2012

Sorry, folks: America just doesn’t care about freedom or Arab-Israeli peace all that much.

Foreign policy, including the use of military power, isn’t an end in itself. It consists of tools and instruments designed to achieve specific and hopefully well-thought-out ends. Those ends — let’s call them interests — are theoretically supposed to drive a country’s foreign-policy strategy. Sounds pretty simple, right?

So what are America’s interests in the Middle East? Are there core goals and priorities that are more important than others? Does the country pretend certain things are more important than they really are? And how do you think it is doing in protecting those interests?

These are really good questions, and they’re not asked nearly enough. One reason is that since 1945, when the United States began to get its feet wet in the region, largely as a consequence of oil, Israel, and the Russians — that complex triumvirate of things it was trying to either protect or guard against — its core interests have remained pretty much the same.

Today, if you take the Russian bogeyman out of the picture (sorry Mitt), add Islamists and counterterrorism, and subtract a few Arab dictators and authoritarians, U.S. interests remain pretty much the same.

And despite all the charges of bias, dysfunction, and incompetence leveled at the United States, the country has actually done a pretty good job at protecting those interests. The Soviets never really made inroads in the Middle East, and eventually collapsed. The oil kept flowing from the Persian Gulf. And there was even progress — under American auspices — on the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Granted, the United States had a couple of oil shocks (1973 and 1979) and a half dozen Arab-Israeli wars, and America’s Arab street cred is way down because the country has cut a devil’s bargain with more than a few authoritarian rulers and because it staunchly supports Israel.

But hey, you know what? It’s not so easy being a great power. And it’s really hard to keep everybody happy. If you want unconditional love and affection, get a puppy.

Indeed, had it not been for President George W. Bush’s trillion-dollar social science project in Iraq and President Barack Obama’s initial tendency to create inflated expectations on both the Israeli-Palestinian issue and what the United States could do to bring democracy to the region, America would even be in better shape.

So what are America’s vital national interests in the region today — the matters it considers the core of its relationship with the Middle East?

Listen to how Obama answers the question. In a major speech in May 2011 dealing with what was then a more hopeful unfolding of the Arab Spring, he said the following:

“For decades, the United States has pursued a set of core interests in the region: countering terrorism and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, securing the free flow of commerce and safeguarding the security of the region, standing up for Israel’s security, and pursuing Arab-Israeli peace.”

But Obama then went on to add that those interests were insufficient to constitute America’s entire foreign-policy strategy. “We must acknowledge that a strategy based solely upon the narrow pursuit of these interests will not fill an empty stomach or allow someone to speak their mind,” the president said.

I’d give the president a B-minus for historical accuracy here and a C for honesty about American priorities. Only relatively recently has the United States been really serious about counterterrorism — it has cherry-picked those countries that it doesn’t mind having nukes (Israel, India) and those of much greater concern (North Korea, Pakistan, Iran). And though the peace process has been a priority at times, it has mostly been pursued haphazardly.

The president’s views on democracy promotion also represent a real contradiction. By trying to wrap the pursuit of more traditional interests in a prettier box, Obama doesn’t do himself or us any favors. Indeed, he raises the expectation — his specialty — that the United States, true to its democratic values and principles, will now rise up to decry tyranny, oppose the heavy hand of the authoritarian, and champion the popular will against oppression.

The only problem is: The country doesn’t. The perpetuation of this fiction sets the United States up for charges of hypocrisy and carries the potential to undercut the very interests the president identifies as core.

To keep commerce free (I think Obama means oil), the United States supports the authoritarian Saudi kings. To keep the region secure, it backs the repressive Khalifa monarchy in Bahrain, which gives the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet the port access that allows it to project power across the Gulf. And to stand up for Israel, the United States gives the Egyptian military $1.3 billion per year to protect the peace treaty and turn a blind eye while the generals protect their praetorian privileges. As far as championing the rights of the Arab peoples, see America’s largely hands-off policy on Syria — correct though I believe it to be.

I’m not complaining, mind you, just reporting. But the United States needs to be clear and stop pretending. There are certain things in this region it really cares about and that resonate powerfully at home, and others that don’t — and in any event are less susceptible to American influence, power, and persuasions.

Here’s the politically incorrect and inconvenient version of American interests in the region. The United States has at least four vital national interests that it really cares deeply about. It is prepared to use force to protect all of them.

1. Stopping an attack on the continental United States with conventional and unconventional weapons. This is the big one. The organizing principle of a country’s foreign policy is protection of the homeland. If you can’t do that, you don’t need a foreign policy. Americans are safer since the 9/11 attacks — but not safe. There are still transnational groups that want to inflict catastrophic harm on the United States. The country will continue to spend the time and resources in an effort to stop them. The U.S. military will whack bad guys with drones whenever it can, regardless of the protestations of local governments.

2. Energy security. The good news for America is that it’s weaning itself off Arab oil. The bad news is that oil is a single market. Supply disruptions and the challenge of making sure Persian Gulf oil doesn’t fall into unfriendly hands — or stop flowing entirely — will be a core interest for as long as America and the world are dependent on hydrocarbons.

Want to worry about something? Worry about the House of Saud coming down. Oil is useless unless sold, but a regime change in Riyadh that triggered lengthy convulsions would be devastating for America and the world economy. So, staying true to the principles it really doesn’t have, America will push what I call the “wink and nod” brand of reform from the Saudis (and also the Bahrainis, and the Kuwaitis, and the Qataris, and the Emiratis). And it’ll use force to keep the Strait of Hormuz open and to protect that tried-and-true democracy in Saudi Arabia.

3. Supporting Israel. I can already hear the “what do you mean supporting Israel is a core interest?” crowd rumbling in the back. Let the Israelis fend for themselves, it says. They don’t deserve any special status, particularly when they ignore U.S. interests.

The fact is, America has allowed the “special relationship” to become far too exclusive and one-sided, and that’s not good for Israel or America. Obama isn’t all that enamored about the special bond either and would like to reset it — but he can’t do much about it at this particular political moment.

But none of that makes the case for supporting one of the few democracies that emerged in the wake of World War II any less compelling. Strict realists question the whole values argument, particularly given the Israeli occupation. But support for the security and well-being of Israel, with all its imperfections, is in accord with the broadest conception of the American national interest — supporting like-minded societies.

Israel also resonates powerfully at home in political terms, and that’s nothing to be ashamed of or defensive about. Even factoring in the power of the pro-Israeli community, the U.S.-Israel bond could not have survived for this long without the support of millions of Americans — not just Jews and evangelicals — who believe in it too. In a democracy, you need a sustainable domestic base for any long-running policy. There’s just no way U.S. support for Israel would have lasted 60-plus years if enough Americans didn’t sign off on it.

There’s a fourth point that I reluctantly put in this category of vital national security interests — though I’m not at all sure about it, particularly on whether the United States should be prepared to use military force.

4. Stopping Iran from getting the bomb. I have to be honest: I thought a good deal about not putting this one in the core category. Don’t get me wrong; you’d have to be interminably obtuse to conclude that Iran with nukes would be anything other than a disaster. It would raise regional tensions, buck up Iran’s regional ambitions, escalate the Israeli-Iranian covert (and maybe overt) war, and probably set off a regional arms race.

And there’s no doubt the Obama administration is exerting great effort to stop or delay Iran’s program. It has implemented powerful sanctions and embarked on negotiations with a weakened but not chastened Islamic Republic, as dubious as their prospects are.

Still, I’m not at all persuaded the president’s heart is in this one. On Iran, he’s clearly the “not now” president — and I suspect he would just like the whole issue to go away. He and the mullahs probably share a common goal: stop or delay an Israeli strike for as long as possible. The president doesn’t want to see Iran with nukes, but he worries even more about an Israeli or American military strike

The Israelis may well force the president’s hand at some point — striking Iran and triggering a U.S. intervention too. But this president will go to great lengths to prevent that. He knows that hitting Iran’s nuclear sites will only set the program back a couple of years. Perhaps he’s prepared — and his successors would be too — for a strategy of striking Iran’s nuclear facilities every so often, like some grand game of whack-a-mole (the Israelis call it “mowing the lawn”). But I’m not sure that’s a sustainable policy.

The fact is, there’s probably only one country that can stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capacity, and that’s Iran. But I’m not at all sure Tehran will determine that the costs of its nuclear program are prohibitive. Indeed, the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime will only sharpen Iran’s sense of vulnerability and accelerate its quest for a weapon.

If Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini hadn’t overthrown the shah in 1979, Iran would be a nuclear weapons state today. Why? Because the four countries that have developed nuclear weapons in the past several decades — Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea — are all fundamentally insecure. They were determined to acquire nukes and had the means and motivation to pull it off. Iran is the poster child for insecurity, but it’s even more than that. Throw in its conception of itself as a great power, its regional ambitions, and its grandiosity, and poof — you’re on the road to Nukeville.

The odds that the United States can stop the mullahs from acquiring the capacity to produce a nuclear weapon, should they truly want one, are long indeed. With regard to military action, the risks are probably overstated. It’s the efficacy that bothers me. Will a military campaign work? Does America try some eleventh-hour, high-level secret talks with Iran first? Great questions; no answers. But the moment is approaching later this year, or early in 2013, when Israel and the United States will probably face a choice. Bomb, or accept the bomb.

The Rest Is Discretionary

But wait, you say, what about America’s other interests, particularly the peace process and democratization?

Great questions. Let me give you some harsh answers. Watch the U.S. government’s hands on these two; don’t listen to its words. And what that disconnect tells me is that however much the United States says it cares, it really doesn’t all that much.

On the issue of a conflict-ending agreement between Israelis and Palestinians, wake me up when the current Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority get serious about doing something real. Every previous breakthrough was preceded by some act — positive or negative — that the locals initiated and that gave Washington the means and motivation to intervene successfully. Unless that ownership is present, the United States should stop worrying about this plan or that and stop pretending that it can somehow fix this.

On the issue of the Arab Spring — or Islamist Winter, depending on your viewpoint — it’s going to be a very long movie. The United States should do what it can to help but stop inflating its rhetoric and realize that it’s in no position to act decisively. The country is still involved in a devil’s bargain with authoritarian monarchies in the Gulf, military elites in Egypt, and a strongman in Iraq (not to mention a corrupt regime in nearby Afghanistan). Nor did it ever have the capacity or the will to remake these lands. The fact is, Arabs own more of their own politics now than ever before. And that’s a good thing.

If America wants to pretend to the rest of the world that it’s serious about Arab-Israeli peace or that it’ll stand up to defend nascent Arab democracies, that’s one thing. All governments dissemble and use idealized arguments to package their policies.

But there are certain things the United States cares about and others it doesn’t — certain issues it’s prepared to do something about and others it chooses not to. At the very least, we should stop fooling ourselves about what those really are.

When U.S. Major Lee and Captain Gil entered Ganat Kahiyl High School in eastern Afghanistan recently, a local teacher slipped them a small note: “The Taliban have visited our school and forced their curriculum upon us. Can the government help?”

This was not an empty threat. Insurgents burned down Sahakh High School in the same district a couple months earlier for teaching girls and the government’s curriculum. Taliban attacks on schools that defy insurgents are reported often, though difficult to confirm because of Taliban influence, say analysts. In fact, the U.S. officers were visiting the school to promote the Village Outreach Program, devised by the local U.S. Army and the district governor of Zormat to battle that type of Taliban influence on schools and children.

The new project, loosely modeled after McGruff the Crime Dog, a cartoon bloodhound used by the American police to build crime awareness in children, is meant to teach schoolchildren civic responsibilities and instill trust in the government and the police.

“If your parents don’t let you go to school, you should cry. Cry until they let you go to school because you are the future of Afghanistan!” District Chief of Police Abdul Wahab, who was visiting the school with Lee and Gil,  told high school students that day. Given the relatively poor reputation of the Afghan National Uniformed Police in most parts of the country, this friendly, fatherly policeman and his message seem revolutionary here. Local forces say there is a lot of hope riding on the program as it builds confidence among schools in places like Zormat. Lee says he hopes it can instill an appreciation for civic responsibility and trust in police and government, so that they can help teachers and schools like Ganat Kahiyl High School, but it still has a long way to go.

Education could be the only lasting legacy that the United States will leave behind after a decade of war.  Yet, the challenges are still daunting. While school enrollment, according to statistics of the Ministry of Education, has increased almost eight times since 2001, demand is by far outstripping supply.

If the trend continues, by 2020 Afghanistan will require some 21,100 teachers, for an additional 7.8 million students at an added cost of almost $300 million. Then there’s the question of who will pay for the increasing demand of education (the total tax revenue of the Afghan government for 2011 was $1.8 billion).

The local Provincial Regional Construction Team (PRT) used to be the shadow government of each province. Now, however, they have almost no budget for new projects, and their influence is waning.

“PRTs were originally set up as temporary solutions to kick-start development in the various regions of Afghanistan. Over the past decade, however, they became the default address for most development projects,” says Lee who is a member of the PRT.  Some 85 percent of Afghanistan’s education budget is still funded by foreign aid and donations.

“The operating and maintenance costs for education in Afghanistan in 2012 are estimated at $170 million, and expected to rise to $235 million in 2014. However, the current budget for operations and maintenance, which doesn’t include teachers’ salaries, is $38 million. As such, without operating and maintenance funding as a priority, much of the investment from the last decade may fall into disrepair or disuse very soon after the transition. Closing this funding gap is critical to the long-term sustainability of Afghanistan,” says Aschkan Abdul-Malek, of Altai Consulting, based in Paris.

Nonetheless, the Village Outreach Program is a Zormat district initiative, planned, led, and executed by the Afghan National Security Forces without any direct outside funding from the U.S. government. This initiative had been planned for several months with US civil affairs officers acting in an advisory capacity; however, the initiative only took hold this past August when all military operations in the district became Afghan planned and led.

Taliban influence

The influence of the Taliban on school curricula is as strong as ever, especially in remote districts such as Zormat, say teachers and U.S. Army officials.

In deed, U.S. forces picked up a typical Taliban curriculum during a visit to a local school recently. The syllabus emphasized the study of the Quran, history of the mujahedeen, Pashto, math and science.

Staff and teachers are still concerned with the physical safety of students, and will often deny intimidation by insurgents.  In fact, in the heavily Taliban influenced areas such as Sahak and Khoti Kheyl, the staff at many schools will dismiss class and send students home when the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) show up in the area, fearing a confrontation with Taliban forces might result in the children being caught in the middle.

Zormat, the southernmost district of Paktia Province, has served as a haven for the Taliban, which continue to exercise considerable influence in the district villages and schools. The infamous Taliban commander, Saifullah Rehman Mansoor, is reported to be hiding here and still widely admired by the local population. Zormat District is home to 25 secondary schools, 30 primary schools, and five madrassas, with a total of 18,000 male and 12,000 female students enrolled, according to the province director of education, Muhamed Ali.

In a short interview, Mr. Ali denies that the Taliban have any influence at all here: “We would never allow the Taliban to enter our school. We have security guards to keep them out, and we stick to the government curriculum.”

Complicating the efforts of International Security Assistance Force troops and Afghans  in charge of the program, villagers, however, tell a different story. They say that the Taliban tightly control the school curriculum and teachers through intimidation tactics.

Glimmer of hope?

Though the Village Outreach Program is still in its early stages, there is some evidence that the program may be working:

During an Afghan Army-led clearing mission in the village of Khotwi Khyl, the local pharmacist, Mohamed Anwir, said the Taliban came to his village and announced that the local school should no longer teach the girls, or they would shut the school down. The village elders, however, decided against it. Mr. Anwir said they decided that: “Afghanistan will need female doctors in the future. We will keep our girls in school.”  The Taliban then threatened to come back and burn the school down, though they haven’t made good on that threat, yet.

Kazyat Mohamed is a 30-year-old math teacher in Kharachi Village. He says he is happy with the school supplies provided by the Kabul government, but he complains that he has not been paid in three months. The Taliban also regularly visit his school, and this scares him. Still, he insisted that he believes in the potential of the Kabul government and the outreach program and says things are better.

“Many more visits are planned under the leadership of the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] and in collaboration with the district director of education, and we are confident that the program will continue to exist when the Americans depart,” says Police Chief Abdul Wahab.

Franz-Stefan Gady was embedded with Dog Company/3rd Battalion/509th Regiment (Airborne) in Paktia Province in the summer of 2012.

PATRICK BAZ/AFP/Getty Images

The Arab Spring awoke people to the power of social media in a political context.  Of course, you would have to be living under a rock to think it was the first time Twitter was ever used to coordinate mass protests — it was hugely prominent in Iran during the 2009 protests, Moldova, and the Greek riots in 2008 (AKA “griots”).  It provides an expansive forum for activists, politicians, and layfolk alike, which, while useful, can spur controversy as well.

So what are some of the best political Twitter feuds in the world of international relations?  We’ll list three big ones for now.  Feel free to add your own in the comments section below.

Krugman vs. Estonia

On June 6, 2012, Paul Krugman cranked out a 70-word blog post that changed the history of a very, very influential country whose economy is…

 No bow ties were harmed in the production of this graph.  Source: the World Bank

 …1% of the size of the U.S. economy.

Estonia, the poster child of austerity and the home of a leader who needs Brooks Brothers’ bow ties more than I need coffee, does not like to be told that austerity isn’t the solution.  In fact, Toomas Hendrik Ilves loathes Krugman’s 70-word blog post so much (crickey mate, it wasn’t even a column) that he cranked out several bitter Tweets slamming the Nobel-lauret and cat lover with fury of a thousand swallows, Estonia’s national bird.

Chill out, bro.  Just chill.

We suspect that Krugman’s thought process probably went as follows: 1) can I make a pun out of this? 2) Princeton! 3) how I can incorporate this into my next post?  He managed to do the latter successfully, proudly speaking positively of Iceland’s recovery while, to Ilves’ chagrin, taking a pot shot at Estonia yet again.  To be fair, who could resist with those Tweets?

Ambassador McFaul vs. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Russia

Yet again, here’s a story of an Ivy-League professor — or former professor — causing a ruckus in the Twittersphere.  Michael McFaul, the second ambassador to Russia in 30 years who has not been a career diplomat, assumed office in January 12, 2012 and has been butting heads with the Russians both in person and on social media for some time now.  He’s new to Twitter as well, so it’s perhaps not entirely surprising that he’s had a few fumbles.

To be fair, McFaul’s ambassadorship in Russia has not been easy.  As he pointed out, anti-Americanism is on the rise in Russia and is affecting his ability to do his job.  Sure, he’s whipped out the “I’m not a professional diplomat” card — particularly after he  misspoke while being harassed by an NTV journalist in the winter — but life was clearly far from easy when McFaul “discovered” some terrible facts about himself:

He was imposing odious American holidays, like Valentine’s Day and Halloween, on the Russian people. He personally whisked Russian opposition politician Alexey Navalny out of the country to Yale on a fellowship. He was inviting opposition figures to the U.S. Embassy “to get instructions.” And he was a pedophile. Or so his online tormentors claimed.

 On top of that, there’s the all-seeing eye of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Twitter, which seems to be manned by either a really bitter intern or a very whiny Putin.  Not to mention that it updates constantly, more so than seems particularly healthy.  Following his remarks at the Higher School of Economics, McFaul was bombarded by Tweets from the MFA.  The following “dialogue” ensues:

Immediately Russia Today reports that the U.S. is now banning its broadcasts.  That was a joke, by the way.

Whoever was dealing with the Twitter that day — drunk hobo, a minister who couldn’t get a visa to the U.S., a bitter intern, or, better yet, Putin himself — seemed to get a little too into it; after all, they fired off four tweets before McFaul even gets the chance to respond.  It doesn’t matter if his Blackberry was slow, if he just wanted to cool off before typing because in either case or if he was — gasp — busy with something more important, the impassioned typist breaks some of the core rules of internet dialogue: Don’t argue with a wall.

The MFA actually continues:

Clearly forgetting that you can actually watch Russia Today on various mediums, the MFA finishes off and retreats back into its cavernous abode.  McFaul continues with life, probably after sighing heavily.

The Taliban (?) vs. ISAF

Twitter: An unexpected den of  counterinsurgency activity.

An alleged Taliban Twitter — we’ll touch on this part later — representative by the name of Abdulqahar Balk (@ABalkhi) moved its 20-hour assault on a diplomatic enclave in Kabul to…Twitter?

They’re called vowels. Use them, please.

Now, usually the arguments were over statistics and how certain events were reported.  @ABalkhi was often inflammatory, but what did we expect from what was allegedly the Taliban interacting with ISAF?  If they were exquisitely polite, something would seem a bit off.

But then @ABalkhi cranks out the big guns.  No, we’re not talking about anti-tank weapons.  @ABalkhi has something even better, even more insidious, and probably outlawed by the Geneva Convention: the words “dumb dumb.”

You, sir, are the dumb dumb for thinking that disguise would actually be effective. (AP Photo/Rahmat Gul)

Debate ensues over the claim that NATO has Afghani mercenaries in its payroll.  @ABalkhi, who obviously is going to push the claim that NATO does, in fact, have these mercenaries, responds to @ISAFmedia by eloquently stating that “your officials admitted to it dumb dumb.”  Some wise man at ISAF responds appropriately with: “Dumb dumb? How the dialogue elevates. Look: Nobody takes you seriously. Everything you type is wrong. Just. Stop.”  @ABalkhi responds: “That’s why they picked you for this job. If I wasnt here, you wouldnt have a job.”

The question is, what does NATO have to gain from these snippy messages?  If they don’t take him seriously, then ignore him; @ABalkhi is the geopolitical equivalent of that stupid kid who sat behind you in the classroom and poked you in the middle of class — all for no good reason.  Obviously some aspect of it ties into information warfare, but the disinformation aspect of it seems overshadowed by snark.  As for the Taliban, the fact that their taking shots at NATO through a social media site isn’t terribly surprising provided their affinity for web-based propaganda, including their site “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” a website that posts messages, battlefield reports and propaganda for the Taliban.

John R. Allen is not pleased.

Most importantly, there’s nothing to suggest that this account is even legitimate.  A quick Google search of the name “Abdulqahar Balkhi” comes up with news about the Twitter wars, @ABalkhi’s Twitter site and that’s about it.  Unlike al Shabaab’s Twitter, Abdulqahar Balkhi’s page doesn’t post anything that isn’t already on the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan website.  Maybe @ABalkhi is a sympathizer, a troll, someone with a lot of free time and a twisted sense of humor, or a legitimate Taliban representative, but there’s no way of knowing.  Short of finding the poster himself, it’s nearly impossible to build a rock-solid case that what the ISAF is doing is actually a good use of time and, thus, money.

But, hey, on the bright side, whoever is tweeting for ISAF totally used the phrase “pro tip” in a sarcastic post to the Taliban.

Photo Credit: Andres Rueda, Flickr

In global health news this week, I have updates to previously covered topics. World leaders have committed money and support to family planning, spearheaded by the Gates Foundation. The CIA’s fake vaccination program, part of efforts to ferret out Osama Bin Laden, has contributed to a ban on polio vaccinations by the Taliban controlling the Waziristan region of northern Pakistan. Finally, the FDA officially approves an antiretroviral drug for prevention of HIV among people at high risk for infection.

Global Leaders Commit to Family Planning: Last week at the London Family Planning Summit, a group of governments, NGOs, foundations, multilaterals, the private sector, and the other usual suspects committed to funding and supporting a family planning initiative to reach 120 million women and girls by 2020. They’ve pledged about $2.6 billion so far for a program that is projected to cost $4.3 billion. Not a bad start, especially with the weight of the Gates Foundation and its $1 billion commitment for family planning. Earlier this year, Gates declared her intention to spend the next 30 years focusing on family planning. A re-focusing of resources and expertise towards encouraging contraception, preventing unwanted pregnancies, and giving women the right to determine how many children they have will be key to improved global health, sustainability and development.

CIA Fake Vaccination Program’s Lasting Effects: Last year, I wrote about the potentially damaging effects of a C.I.A. espionage program that used fake vaccination drives to look for Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan. As AFP reports, the Taliban in northern Pakistan have banned polio vaccination programs in Waziristan, citing anger at U.S. drone attacks and the revelation about the C.I.A. ploy following the U.S. killing of Bin Laden. As the New York Times points out, it is “paradoxically” polio vaccinators that are banned–even though the fake program was administering Hepatitis B shots–because of long-standing regional conspiracy theories that polio vaccines were not halal or were used to infect children with HIV. However, the Times depicts a somewhat sanguine view: Waziristan is rural and more sparsely populated, without the urban concentration that exacerbates polio transmission. All the same, on the edge of the global eradication of polio, this is a frustrating turn of events.

FDA Formally Approves Truvada: It seems that the U.S. government is getting serious about HIV/AIDS prevention. After giving the nod to an at-home HIV test this month, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has now officially approved Truvada, an antiretroviral drug, for the prevention of HIV. In May, a panel endorsed this use of Truvada (which some doctors were already prescribing off-label for prevention) for people at high risk of HIV infection as pre-exposure prophylaxis, as I wrote. With hope, these steps could make a real dent in the tenacious U.S. epidemic. Stay tuned for more HIV news after the International AIDS Society Conference in D.C. next week.

Header photo by Andres Rueda, via Flickr, CC BY 2.0.

Afghan National Army soldiers disembarking a Mi-17 helicopter (credit: sinodefenseforum.com)

Russia looks to do its part for Afghanistan, and itself

While trigger-happy drones do their part to smooth a coming US drawdown in Afghanistan, pundits and diplomats alike nervously pace the green rooms of news and late-night talk shows. What will a counter-insurgency look like without a stabilizing super power? Whether one bets on red or black, the Afghan roulette wheel has started its spin, with international onlookers anxiously awaiting its jerk-stop at the end of 2014.

Unless the Taliban start to re-take cities, conservative wagers expect the area to once again be contested among regional powers. Pakistan, always at the Pashtun doorstep, will always be a contender for influence in Afghanistan, with or without its mountain militants. China has already dug in deep with natural resource investment and, if its approach in Africa is any indication of future behavior, will be a source of unconditional cash and pocket-linings for bureaucrats for the foreseeable future. Ties with Iran will likely be restricted to trade. And while Indian firms have been eager to carve out niches in their underdeveloped neighbor, an unspoken China-Pakistan axis occasionally acts to balance what they consider undue Indian influence. And there will of course remain development advisors of all stripes, funded by the US and EU, coaxing the Afghan state off its training wheels and into adulthood.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional security group consisting of Russia, China, and several Central Asian nations, welcomed Afghanistan as an observer member this week, another sign that the neighbors are extending a hand.

Russia, for its part, seems eager to pitch in. Two scourges of its southern flank – Islamic fundamentalism and heroin smuggling – are currently its biggest motivators.

Heroin makes its way to Russian cities from Afghanistan through the porous borders of its Central Asian neighbors. A raid on Nangrahar opium labs in October 2010, which involved Russian security agents alongside US and Afghan Forces, raised some eyebrows in Kabul and elicited sovereignty questions, yet nonetheless marked Russia’s overt participation in regional security. Russian knowledge of labs and routes from the Soviet occupation can also help contain trafficking.

On a grander scale, Russia wants to curb the Islamic fundamentalist influence it knows too well from its own nightmares in the North Caucasus, from which fighters have transited back and forth to Waziristan. Fighters from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), responsible for bombings in the Uzbek capital, additionally come and go at will.

The agreement to participate in the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), albeit at a price, also indicates a commitment. The NDN shepherds coalition military materiel and supplies, bound for Afghanistan, through Russian ports and across Russian railroads, providing an alternate (and alternative) route to the customary path through Pakistan.

General discussions among officials about other areas of Russian contribution include security training and infrastructure development, including dams and power stations. Soviet Army engineers in the 1980s greatly improved the Salang Highway, which winds through mountainous terrain subject to winter avalanches, and connects Kabul to its northern provinces and Uzbekistan.

There is also a pending sale of 20 Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters, to be purchased by the US and handed to the Afghans. Russian equipment is reliable and more affordable than other arms exporters, making it very attractive.

Russia is urging NATO to stay in Afghanistan after 2014. Foreign Minster Sergei Lavrov,  speaking in April, argued that “as long as Afghanistan is not able to ensure by itself the security in the country, the artificial timelines of withdrawal are not correct and they should not be set,” during a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels in April.

Yet Moscow also very clearly, at least in actions, sees itself as the rightful chaperone for the Central Asian nations as they develop their own institutions and trade infrastructure. Moscow has been subtly campaigning for its own military bases in Kyrgyzstan (which hosts one already) and Uzbekistan while prodding those leaders to disengage with the US. It has long stationed troops in Tajikistan.

The Russians also appear to be taking a path to cooperation independent of NATO. Zamir Kabulov, Russia’s presidential envoy to Afghanistan, commented at the recent NATO summit that they would not be contributing a requested $10 million toward support of security forces. Suggesting NATO duplicity, Kabulov recounted that “[f]or several years we had been knocking on the door of the ISAF suppliers club. But this door was reluctant to open. Now they invited us and started hinting…in response we noted that we’ve long been rendering aid to Afghanistan.”

Russian private transport companies, with their giant Ilyushin-76 cargo aircraft, have long been servicing Kabul airport.

The horrors of the 10-year Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that ended in 1989 have been forgotten by no one–least of all Afghans alive at the time. Yet the some 200-year history between these nations has been predominantly cooperative. In the 19th century, while their empire grew southward, Russians courted emirs and khans in Kabul as a buffer to an expected British advance from nearby India. Starting in the 1930s, Soviet engineering schools welcomed Afghan students and preached the glory of the socialist state through technology and industry. During the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet construction crews built up large residential sections of Kabul and other cities, much as they had done in Tashkent and other present-day Central Asian capitals.

Update (May 9, 2012):  Confirming earlier speculation, the parents of Bowe Bergdahl today announced that he is a focus of now-stalled negotiations between the United States and the Taliban over a proposed exchange of Guantanamo Bay prisoners.  The New York Times reports that they are frustrated over what they see as the Obama administration’s lack of political will to go forward with the exchange.  The newspaper also quotes Pentagon officials as saying that they are working to gain the soldier’s release.  But all of this underscores the question of why Bergdahl was not a focus of the clandestine “strategic release” program in Afghanistan.

The news follows reports earlier this year that among the concessions that the White House is prepared to make as the political endgame approaches in Afghanistan is the transfer of high-level Taliban commanders from Guantanamo Bay to Qatari house arrest. Although the move is currently in abeyance following the breakdown in negotiations with the Taliban two months ago, the Obama administration justified it as an important “confidence building” measure that would establish its bona fides with Afghan insurgents.  At the time, there was some speculation that the gesture would be tied to the release of Bowe Bergdahl, the U.S. soldier who is about to begin his fourth year of captivity at the hands of the Taliban-affiliated Haqqani network.

U.S. officials acknowledge that the releases in Afghanistan are risky and critics are raising questions about their merits.  But it is troubling that they have gone forward at all without any apparent effort to demand Bergdahl’s freedom as reciprocation.  As the U.S. military furnishes more details in the days ahead, it should also provide assurances that it is not leaving one of its own behind.

(As a sidenote, it is dismaying that the media — here, here and here — is more focused these days on Bo, the White House dog, than on Bowe the soldier.)

This commentary was originally posted on Chanakya’s Notebook.  I invite you to follow me on Twitter.

My friend was referring to the haberdashery of the newly installed Afghan leader, Hamid Karzai, whose fashion attire – robes, hat and more – was the first impression many Americans and others fixed upon the new Afghan leader. The hat and wardrobe conveyed a style that seized the imagination of many and added to the vibes that seemed to suggest the United States was in a good fight and was going to make a positive difference.

Even the merchants of Kabul bought into it. When I first asked around for such a hat, there was none for purchase. Two days later, the same merchants were waving me into their stores and quickly the phase “Karzai hat” went like a tsunami through the streets. “Karzai hats” – like that unexpected love affair between Afghans and their new American friends — were sprouting everywhere. The merchants knew a good thing as well. Everything was beautiful.

Americans were happy to go after the bad guys hiding in Afghanistan and be a friend of the good people. Afghans were truly happy Americans were helping them throw off some evil oppression and, in the process, settle a few scores. America showed the world it had learned from the mistakes made by the Soviets – who after all invaded Afghanistan, not liberated it. This was going to be different. The people there liked us.

Indeed they did. Afghans were genuinely grateful for how U.S. action gave them another chance to breathe.

Then things just slipped away, much like Osama bin Laden did at Tora Bora. The U.S. idea of democracy and what should happen in Afghanistan, as noble as it was, was not quite the Afghan’s cup of tea (and this is in a nation where a lot of tea is served). The U.S. military effort seemed mismanaged and without direction. The nation-building plan was as poor, thin and brittle as the attempt to build a ring road around the country.

Only Karzai’s hat still looks good 11 years later, although the colors seem less crisp. He remains president over a government that is weak and lacking popular support, except from those who use it for their own personal enrichment.

Today’s blowback in the wake of the burning of the Korans was just a matter of time. In fact, the violence associated with the burning merely made public what has been brewing for years, as the Afghan people shifted from being wildly pro-American to becoming confused and upset to putting U.S. and NATO troops close to the same category where they hold the Russians.

It does not matter that the Koran and other Islamic texts that were removed had extremist inscriptions written in them. Burning them was foolish and gave an opening – and a vivid reason — to those who oppose the Western efforts to justify violence and improve their own personal political motives.

They were waiting for the chance. The media has reported the singing of “Taliban songs” during demonstrations. The New York Times wrote that Afghanistan is “a religious country fed up with foreigners.” Well, Afghans never did like foreigners but this is far beyond that: as the Los Angeles Times reported, there is now “a visceral distaste for Western behavior and values” among significant numbers of Afghans.

Nation building is tough. Especially when your side has kill teams allegedly hunting Afghan civilians for sport and posing with dead bodies, or when there are videotapes of your side urinating on dead Afghans or abusing children or wearing Nazi SS markings, all well documented in the media. Makes it easier to stir up Afghans to turn their weapons on good, well-meaning soldiers who train, work and patrol with them. Since 2007 there have been at least 47 such attacks, which is historically unprecedented. Not in Iraq, not in Vietnam, not in Korea or even in the Philippines did anything similar occur.

It was always going to be a hard sell. Even in those “Paris liberation” days, it was clear that only so much Western thinking would be politely permitted – and no thanks on actually doing most of what the West wanted. It was clear early on, at the dinner tables in the houses rented by Westerners. Male Afghans would graciously accept the invitation to sit and dine together, but would then refuse to sit at the same dinner table with newly appointed female members of the Afghan government who happen to be guests.

So how do you pull out on terms and timetables not of your making? Does it matter? The reality: it is only delaying what will happen in two or three years. Not wanting to “lose” Afghanistan is a red herring; it was lost centuries ago.

Many Americans rightly feel that the U.S.’ time in Afghanistan should have ended, or downsized, long ago. The killing of Osama bin Laden gave the perfect moment to exit. No one wants a Karzai hat any more. And no one seems interested in selling them, especially to Americans. The transactions ended long ago.

The New America Foundation's drones database analyzes the reported number of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan since 2004.

I recently had the privilege to attend an event sponsored by The Aspen Institute’s Justice and Society Program entitled, “Targeted Killings and the Law of War.”  The roundtable discussion brought together leading experts in law and foreign policy, each of whom addressed if/how U.S. and international law apply to the practice of targeted killings. It was obvious from the nature of the questions and a quick glance through recent headlines that drone strikes dominate the debate – rightfully so given the onset of the new, advanced technology and the ease with which it can be utilized on (and off) the battlefield.

So far, drone strikes have reportedly been carried out in six countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Libya. According to the New America Foundation’s drones database, which analyzes U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, “283 reported drone strikes in northwest Pakistan, including 70 in 2011, from 2004 to the present have killed approximately between 1,717 and 2,680 individuals, of whom around 1,424 to 2,209 were described as militants in reliable press accounts.”

Two main themes are immediately clear. First, if you accept the premise that the U.S. is engaged in an armed conflict with non-state actors domiciled in foreign countries which are unable or unwilling to respond to an imminent threat of violence (however one defines ‘imminent’), do drone strikes adhere to international law according to the Geneva Conventions? Second, according to U.S. law, what rights, if any, are guaranteed to those individuals being targeted, especially if they are U.S. citizens as was the case with Anwar al-Awlaki? Should they be afforded an opportunity to surrender? What about due process and the role of the courts?

The event at The Aspen Institute made it clear that the answers to these questions remain unclear at best and non-existent at worst. Targeted killings will no doubt be a policy – covert or not – that faces increasing legal scrutiny at home and abroad. For that reason, and because after-the-fact adjudication is unlikely to happen in the near future, many experts are urging the executive and legislative branches to clarify the substantive and procedural law surrounding the use of targeted killings – before others attempt to do so for us.

 This piece was originally published in The School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution Newsletter, February 2012 edition.

(Photo Source: New America Foundation)

As the debate over the post-2014 Afghanistan gains more attention, observers fear a ‘political earthquake’ in the country where the US troops’ withdrawal coincides with the next Afghan presidential elections. With the exit of the United States, Afghanistan’s economy and sources of financing the government in Kabul are likely to come under supreme challenges, they maintain.

In an interview with Dawn.com, Vanda Felbab-Brown, a Foreign Policy Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC shares her thought on how prepared Afghanistan is for the transition. With a Ph.D. in political Science from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and a B.A from Harvard University, Ms. Brown is an assistant professor at Georgetown University. She has extensively researched on Afghanistan, Pakistan, civil wars, terrorism, drugs and illicit economies. Her book Shoot Up analyses the relationship between insurgent groups and the drug trade in Colombia and Afghanistan.

Q. Why has the American leverage over Afghanistan decreased in the past decade?

A. The security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. Many parts of the country still remain hard to manage. The level of public optimism is much weaker today. The US announcement to pull out most of the troops by 2014 has left the people wondering as to what extent the Taliban would be undermined before the withdrawal. Washington has also lost leverage over President Hamid Karzai. The relationship with Karzai has not been totally unproblematic but now he is hedging on all sides.

Q. Can the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police manage the post-2014 situation?

A. The story on the Afghan National Army (ANA) is more positive than the Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANA has received extensive training; increased the number of personnel and partnered with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The question now is how capable it will be to stand against Taliban , the Haqqani Network in the East and other rogue militias. This year, in some areas, the ANA will be required to fight mainly on its own with little ISAF support. The ANA is confronted with ethnic imbalance because the commanders from the north dominate it while a very small number of Pashtuns joined the force. We do not know if the army will come under pressure to breakup ethnically after 2014 if violence escalates and signs of civil war arise.

The Afghan National Police (ANP) is sort of the bigger problem because it is confronted with ethnic issues and a lack of accountability. The people view ANP as abusive, corrupt and often complicit in crimes. Besides these two forces, the Afghan Local Police (ALP) was raised from the local population in areas where the ANA and ANP presence is very weak. They are extremely susceptible to far greater abuse of power.

Q. Islamabad complains about the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) having strongholds in eastern Afghanistan while Washington and Kabul grumble about the Haqqani Network using Pakistani territory as a safe haven. Why does such ‘unfaithfulness’ exists between the key allies in the war on terror?

A. Historically, the porous Af-Pak border, which is extraordinarily difficult to seal, has been a part of the problem. There is a big difference between the Pakistani complaints and the US grievances. Pakistan complains that the TTP uses Eastern Afghanistan for safe havens. If the US receives intelligence reports, they are far more motivated to go to take action against these groups.

On the other hand, the US believes Pakistan has not shown any motivation to tackle the Haqqani Network but instead systematically allowed it to flourish. This is despite of the fact that it is the deadliest of all the networks which is also responsible for the attack on the US embassy.  From the US perspective, there is not a bigger irritant than Islamabad’s continued tolerance of the Haqqani Network.

Q. Isn’t it ironic that the Afghans complain about Pakistan’s influence over their country but they also refuse to recognise the Durand Line as an international border so that both the countries fence parts of the border to avoid infiltration from both the sides.

A. Although Pakistan had suggested fencing some parts of the border, the offer has extremely annoyed President Karzai because he does not recognise the Durand Line. Plus, Pakistan is not popular in Afghanistan for historical reasons and because the Afghans view Pakistan as a country that is currently supporting Taliban and the Haqqanis. Karzai is vulnerable to domestic pressure which makes it hard for him to concede to the Pakistani proposal.

Q. How potential are Afghanistan‘s internal ethnic conflicts?

A. Besides the issue of religious extremism, ethnic unrest has historically remained a major challenge for Afghanistan. The Hazaras have been the most oppressed. The Tajiks are the second most important group followed by the Uzbeks. In each group there are sub-clans. For instance, the Pashtuns are sub-divided among the Durranis and the Ghilazais. The Durranis from Kandahar city have ruled Afghanistan for centuries and suppressed the Ghilzai Pashtuns without giving them access to power at local or national level.

Much of the Pashtun movement in 1990s drew support from the Ghilzai Pashtuns and appealed the groups that had been underprivileged. The Pashtun complexity is overlapped by the relationship between the Tajiks and the Durrani Pashtuns. The Tajiks have historically perceived themselves as oppressed who had no access to power in Kabul until 2001 when the government headed by a Durrani Pashtun, President Karzai, was dominated by northern Tajik commanders was formed. That balance of power changed in mid-2000s when more Pashtuns came into the government. Thus, the possibility of negotiations with the Taliban stirred ethnic tensions and raised questions as to who will gain power after 2014. Tensions will also rise about the number of commanders in the ANA and ANP as most of the commanders are non-Pashtuns from the north.

Q. Is there a post-2014 strategy on the cards to ensure uninterrupted funding for ANA, ANP, ALP?

A. This is part of the process of transition. Clearly, the bill for Afghan national security forces cannot be paid by the Afghan government. A transition strategy needs to be developed as how to generate revenue for Afghanistan so that it can pay for its security. It’s a long-term process. No matter how many troops the United States pulls out in 2014, no one is actually hopeful that the Afghan government will be capable of paying for its security afterwards. It is very much expected of the United States and the international community to continue to pay for Afghanistan’s national security. We do not know how much budget they will commit.

Q. Does Washington still view Karzai as ‘indispensable’ for Afghanistan?

A. That is one of the big questions surrounding Afghanistan. President Karzai had said that he does not intend to run for a third term. Also, the Afghan constitution bars a candidate from becoming the president for more than two terms.  Karzai may change his mind as elections near.  If he decides not to run then the field will be open for different candidates like Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Amrullah Saleh, Ashraf Ghani and others. But we do not know who the future candidates would be until Karzai makes a final decision.

Q. What are the prime concerns for 2014 presidential elections?

A. We need to worry how high ethnic tensions will get during the elections and to what extent the security forces will be capable of preventing the Taliban from spreading violence during the election process. We also have to wait and see how much consensus will be developed among the candidates about the future president?

Q. What trend do the killings of Ahmed Wali Karzai and Burhanuddin Rabbani indicate?

A. Both these killings illustrate the vulnerability of the Afghan elite and power-brokers. The motivation behind the killing of Ahmed Wali Karzai is still unclear. Majority of Afghans do not believe that the Taliban were behind his killing. On the other hand, in Rabbani’s case, it is clear that the Taliban ordered the killing but what remains inconclusive is whether it was the Haqqani Network or the Quetta Shura that killed him. Another question the Afghans are asking is whether Pakistan and the ISI authorised and directed that killing.

Wali’s killing has significantly undermined President Karzai’s support base in Kandahar and raised concerns about his safety. One lesson Karzai learned from these killings is that negotiations with Taliban will not go as easy as he had thought earlier.

Q. Why is it so difficult to keep Afghanistan’s neighbors away from interfering in its domestic affairs?

A. Outside forces have had a very detrimental effect on Afghanistan. One important source of outside influence is Pakistan which is paranoid about the possibility of being encircled by an India-friendly government in Afghanistan. The recent signing of the strategic agreement between Kabul and New Delhi surely did not assuage Pakistan’s fears.  Pakistan has always tried to cultivate actors to gain influence over Kabul. Pakistan has almost always done this with the exclusion of the northern groups and with the support of the Pashtuns. It is ironic because Pakistan’s own Pashtun population has historically received harsh treatment or neglect. Many Pashtuns, at the same time, strongly resent Pakistan’s cultivation of proxies inside Afghanistan because they view this as interference into Afghanistan’s affairs.

India has tried to cultivate its proxies and supported non-Pashtun groups. During the civil war of 1990s, Iran supported the Hazaras for ethnic and religious reasons.

Ironically, Russia was supporting the Northern Alliance although they had fought against the Soviets during the Cold War.

Today, we are seeing efforts to re-cultivate those proxies because we don’t know at this point if post-2014 Afghanistan will be stable.

Q. Who do you think is the right authority to address Pakistan‘s concerns in Afghanistan?

A. It would be easier to do so if we had only one actor in the region. For Pakistan, the relations with US means to get an assurance that India will negotiate over Kashmir while for India it is primarily linked to getting Pakistan ceasing cooperation with Islamic groups inside Kashmir. Thus, the problem will not be solved only through Pak-Afghan engagement. Kabul wants to cultivate India as a proxy in case its relationship with Pakistan worsens. The signing of the recent strategic agreement was precisely a move in frustration because of the Rabbani killing and the attack on the US embassy.

There was a time when India and Pakistan had nearly reached an agreement on Kashmir during Musharraf’s term but the Indian government was not capable of delivering. Later on, Musharraf lost his influence in Pakistan but it showed that India and Pakistan were both capable of resolving their problems without the major involvement of the United States or China.  There is much of a possibility for both the countries to move forward if they liberate themselves from the constrains of history.

If India-Pakistan issues are not resolved, Pakistan will continue to frustrate the US in Afghanistan by not taking action against the Haqqani Network which will further poison the relationship because US troops are getting killed as a result of the ISI-Haqqani nexus. If some more American soldiers are killed in Afghanistan with the support of Pakistan, the fallout would be huge. The US Congress has become extremely anti-Pakistan because it views Pakistan as complicit in terrorism against the United States.

Q. What do you think will happen if security situation worsens in Af-Pak after 2014?

A. I can imagine some very disastrous outcomes for Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States in the region. A post-2014 major civil war in Afghanistan will further destabilise Pakistan.  Some of the trends in Pakistan are extremely worrisome. It is a country where institutions are not capable of delivering to the public, be it education, energy or safety. The civilian government has abdicated responsibility to the military and the military has proven itself unable to address many of these issues. The level of militancy in South Punjab is very intense and the military does not feel it can do much about it. Pakistan has huge internal problems. If secessionist and militant movements gain momentum, then the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear program will also become worrisome. (Courtesy: Dawn.com)