A few days before the “Somalia Conference 2013” held in London on May 7, a foreign journalist friend of mine sent me an e-mail asking what my thoughts were regarding the upcoming conference hosted by Prime Minister David Cameron. I replied: “My heart’s belief in miracles outweighed my mind’s interest in the pursuit of objective analysis.”

I am as optimistic as I was then, but hardly quixotic.

While the conference’s Final Communique outlines specific acknowledgements and directives that could have various effects on various actors, the most important messages were asserted in the implicit, or by way of omission.

The communique acknowledges improved conditions such as security sector, drastic reduction in the number of pirate attacks, receding famine, and the large number of the diaspora returning home. Likewise, it acknowledges challenges such as al-Shabaab’s hit-and-run campaign of terror and the fact that the provisional constitution is an incomplete document that fails to address some of the most serious issues of contention.

On the political front, the communique welcomes the Federal Government’s plans “to resolve outstanding constitutional issues, including the sharing of power, resources and revenues between the Federal Government and the regions.” It continues to state, “We welcomed the dialogue on the future structure of Somalia that has begun between the Federal Government and the regions. We welcomed progress on forming regional administrations and looked forward to the completion of that process. We encouraged the regions to work closely with the Federal Government to form a cohesive national polity consistent with the provisional constitution.”

The message seems clear; however, there is one thing missing — the term “federal state.” Though the concept is prominently established in the constitution, oddly it is replaced with terms such as “regions” and “regional administrations” in the communique. Throughout the communique the term is sidestepped seven times.

Was this the result of collective amnesia, or was it a deliberate action articulated in a carefully crafted language? If I were a betting person, I’d go with the latter.

As a newly rebranded coalition mandated by a new resolution, the international community has a new plan and initiative that will most likely to be much different than the discredited version outsourced to the hegemon of the Horn- Ethiopia. Hegemons tend to grant themselves the right to roam around freely and randomly exploit any ventures they deem expedient to their perceived unilateral self-interest.

Despite the fact the U.S. dual-track policy still has a de facto presence on the ground, this new language seems to have been injected to indicate rejection of the prevalent domestic clan-centric political order. Who can ignore the stubborn fact that, in current day Somalia, “federalism” means nothing other than legalized clan domination? The Alfa Clan, or the most armed, mainly gets the lion’s share and subjugates others while crying wolf.

The writing is on the wall: Somalis must renegotiate the form of government and indeed governance in a way that decentralizes power, leaves space to accommodate Somaliland, and brings the nation back together. The international community has been receiving earful of grievances from various clans, such as those from Sol, Sanaag, Ein and Awdal who inhabit Somaliland and say they are facing existentialist threat from the current arrangement, and, as such, are invoking their rights to stay in the union.

However mortifying this may be to some actors, reason should prevail. Staying the old course is a recipe for renewed civil war and perpetual instability. Somalia is too war-weary and too important to let it drift back into chaos again.

Contrary to the common perception, Somalia is perhaps the most important political theatre in the 21^st century as it is where geopolitics, geoeconomic and georeligious dynamics intersect and interplay. And it is where two old empires (British and Turkish) are positioning themselves for global influence. Meanwhile, the curtains are slowly opening to unveil the covert rivalry of civilizations, instead of the clichéd “clash.”

According to Jamal Osman of U.K. Channel 4, “Western nations are uneasy about the rapid growth of Turkish influence in Somalia, and the UK government’s initiative is seen as part of the West’s agenda to counter it.”

Whether or not this latest high profile conference would prove “a pivotal moment for Somalia” would depend on two particular factors. First, it depends on how soon the Somali leadership comes to understand that without reconciliation, improved security, public services and development cannot be sustained. Second, it would depend on how key international partners avoid the political temptation of zero-sum gains.

Competition of civilizations can be healthy so long as the key actors cooperate, collaborate and negotiate ways that would not take away from each other and the others. However, it’s no secret that the difference between pre-Erdogan (Turkish Prime Minister) and post-Erdogan visit of Somalia is day and night, and that Turkey has been quite humble about the life-changing provisions it has made available for the Somali people and nation.

At the end of the day, what tips the scale and wins the hearts and minds of people are the tangible direct services provided to them at their most dire moment. Everything else is considered a costly symbolism. “There are two kinds of people, those who do the work and those who take the credit;” said the late Indira Gandhi. “Try to be in the first group; there is less competition there,” she added. This, of course, is even more pertinent to the Somali government.

While improvement of security apparatus, finance system and rule of law are indeed issues of high priority, the federal government would have to provide substantive public services far beyond Mogadishu. More importantly, the government must strategically balance the ways, means and ends at its discretion to achieve its objective of secure, reconciled and cohesively functioning Somalia. That is what Somalis yearn for, and that is what the international community wishes to assist Somalia with.

There is a good rule taught in newsrooms early in one’s reporting life that goes along the lines of why one should listen to so-called crazy people. It is because, sometimes, they actually say the truth.

By dint of luck or perhaps true insight, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has stumbled into that equation. He warned that the U.S. support for Syrian rebels would result in another bastion of Al Qaeda terrorists – should the rebels somehow manage to win, of course.

“The West paid heavily for funding al Qaeda in its early stages in Afghanistan. Today it is supporting it in Syria, Libya and other places, and will pay a heavy price later in the heart of Europe and the United States,” he told al-Ikhbariya channel.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/17/uk-syria-conflict-assad-idUKBRE93G0ZP20130417

Not satisfied by making one cogent point, win, Assad then went on to suggest that the U.S. should switch sides and join with him since his government is the best hope for the Syrian people.  And then a few days later, he used chemical weapons on some of those Syrian people. How he thought that might aid is argument remains, well, more on the crazy than cogent side.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/middleeast/la-fg-us-syria-chemical-weapons-20130426,0,2526791.story

What is new is that the U.S. has increased its focus on aiding some elements of the Syrian opposition. Secretary of State John Kerry – showing his years of knowing the world and its players – continues to craft a plan to provide increased support to targeted entities.

Kerry, attending a conference in Turkey of the coalition and its 11 main foreign supporters, announced a doubling of non-lethal U.S. assistance to $123 million. Some of that reportedly will be supplies of night-vision equipment, armored vehicles, body armor and radios to the group’s military wing.

The NATO alliance also has deployed missile-defense batteries in neighboring Turkey to dissuade Assad from attacking Syrian rebel bases and refugee camps there. In addition, the U.S. decided to send 200 troops to Jordan in the coming weeks to boost defenses in the face of the worsening conflict in neighboring Syrian, a Jordanian cabinet minister said.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/17/uk-syria-crisis-jordan-usa-idUKBRE93G14920130417

Yet Assad’s point of sleeping with the wrong enemy still is a top concern. The U.S., France, Britain and others face a Hobson’s choice; they cannot support elements of the Syrian opposition that may have Al-Qaeda ties, which sadly have been the most successful fighting force taking on Assad.

That extremist force also makes Assad look prophetic – he once spoke of “ten Afghanistans” in Syria once outside elements and extremists enter the fight. The Assad regime will say it has been proven right, as will Russia, China and Hezbollah

In addition, it divides Syria’s political opposition even more. An Al Qaeda group on the battlefield creates a quandary for other rebel groups: Do they bed down with these well-organized extremists or continue the lonely fight?

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/syria-live/are-we-seeing-bashar-al-assads-second-wind/article11222855/

Under the “no good options” umbrella comes the chemical weapons moment.

U.S. intelligence has concluded “with some degree of varying confidence,” that the Syrian government has used sarin gas as a weapon, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said. President Obama has said the use of chemical weapons would be a “game-changer” in the U.S. position on intervening in the Syrian civil war, and the letter to Congress reiterates that the use or transfer of chemical weapons in Syria is a “red line for the United States.” However, the letter also hints that a broad U.S. response is not imminent.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-26/obama-s-syria-red-line-tested-by-chemical-weapons-report.html

Despite a lack of conclusive evidence, the U.S. intelligence assessments that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale intensified pressure on President Obama to give yet more help to rebels fighting Assad.  And that goes back to the Hobson’s choice.

“This is a case where there is nothing but bad options,” said Anthony Cordesman, an expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Randa Slim of the Middle East Institute said Obama must take some kind of action or risk large-scale regime chemical attacks on opposition enclaves that Assad’s forces appear to be carving out around Damascus, the city of Homs and the border with Lebanon.

If Obama doesn’t “do something now,” she said, “we will see Assad upping the ante and using CW (chemical warfare) on a larger scale.” She agreed that Obama’s choices are “between bad and worse.”

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/25/189715/obamas-options-to-curb-syria-range.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter#storylink=cpy

Cordesman warned that sending U.S. special forces into Syria to destroy the regime’s chemical weapons stocks before they could be stolen or used in major attacks is too risky and would likely end in disaster. “It’s a great movie, but that’s where it ends,” he said.

That’s not the movie anyone thinks will be made.

(Photo credit: MSNBC Media)

Say during a performance at the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland (Photograph: Virginia Mayo/AP)

An Istanbul Court found Fazıl Say (pronounced as Sai), an internationally-renowned Turkish pianist and composer, guilty over “insulting religious values” over messages Say posted in his Twitter last year. Condemned by European Union, Amnesty International, PEN and others, Say’s case came to a rather disturbing finale with the court sentencing him to a ten-month suspended sentence. Say won’t be jailed unless he is convicted of the same crime of insulting “religious values” within the five year period.

To give the reader a better idea on why Say received 10-month sentence, we must look into the tweets he posted back in April 2012. Say mocked the Muslim call to prayer by retweeting “the imam has recited the evening ezan in 20 seconds. What’s the rush? Lover? Raki?” and then cited (actually, retweeted someone else’s tweet) a poem that read, “Since you are promised drinks and beautiful women for doing good deeds, heaven sounds like a pub or a brothel.” The indictment against Say cited other retweeted messages such as “I am not sure if you have also realized it, but if there’s a louse, a lowlife, a thief or a fool, it’s always an Allahist. Is this a paradox?”

Although what Say’s messages are clear to the common reader, conservative twitter users found his tweets offensive. What followed was Say receiving death threats and hate messages – among the furious twitter users was Şamil Tayyar, a member of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), who tweeted “which brothel were you born Say?”

In a statement after the court’s ruling, Say said “I am sorry for the decision of the Court on behalf of both myself and my country. I am extremely disappointed with the restrictions on freedom of thought and expression. The fact that I have been charged with punishment despite being totally innocent is alarming not only on a personal level but in terms of freedom of expression and beliefs in Turkey”

Given the absurdity of the sentence Say received, there was immediate reaction against the court’s ruling. Turkish intellectuals including Elif Şafak, Ece Temelkuran and Atilla Dorsay (a veteran liberal arts activist and an acclaimed film critic, who got his share of Turkey’s democracy cocktail last week) as well as the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) tweeted messages in support of Say. There was also international reaction: European Union, PEN, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and Amnesty International issued statements voicing their concern over freedom of expression and thought in Turkey.

And, here is what the AKP had to say:

The first one to speak about the court’s ruling was the Culture and Tourism Minister Ömer Çelik, who said that although he does not want to see anyone to be involved with legal probes over what he or she has said, it was “a judicial decision here” and that “everyone is equal before the law.” Bekir Bozdağ, AKP’s current spokesperson, said “they don’t wish anyone to be punished over what they say, but nobody should have the freedom to insult the believers.” But it was Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement which summarizes how the AKP sees the Say case: “Don’t bother us with such issues,” the prime minister replied when asked about the Court’s decision.

Say’s case represents a rather disturbing trend in Turkey. In the last few years, a number of artists, columnists and activists have been prosecuted in similar cases, which has raised concerns about freedom of expression and thought in the country. Legal probes are not the only reason why fundamental freedoms in the country are under threat. Since it came to power, the AKP has made fundamental changes to the laws and regulations that define the functions of key government institutions and agencies. This has created a state apparatus that favors Sunni Islam. This new machinery seeks to protect (and often propagate for) the so-called Turkish-Muslim values, which is just another vague term invented by the conservatives. This redefinition of the relationship between the state and Islam is not only unconstitutional given that laïcité is ingrained in Turkey’s constitution; but has led to some very absurd practices. Last year, Turkey’s “Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTUK),” has fined Turkish broadcaster CNBC-e for airing an episode of The Simpsons (yes, The Simpsons) on the grounds that the cartoon was “making fun of God, encouraging the young people to exercise violence by showing murder as God’s orders and encouraging them to consume alcohol on New Year’s Eve night.” As its name suggests, RTUK is a Cold War-era TV and radio watchdog which the AKP cleverly redesigned to use it in its own discretion to intervene in the content shown on TV.

A closer look into Say’s case reveal that the court’s ruling lies in the Section Five of Turkish Criminal Code, which deals with “offenses against Public Peace”; a very vaguely defined section of the criminal law. Article 216 states that “any person who openly provokes a group of people belonging to different social class, religion, race, sect, or coming from another origin, to be rancorous or hostile against another group, is punished with imprisonment from one year to three years in case of such act causes risk from the aspect of public safety,” in addition to two other clauses which detail what constitutes an offense against public peace. As the Amnesty International’s reaction to the Say case underlines, Say’s case “highlights both the overly broad language of Turkey’s criminal law” and Turkey’s inclination to use the penal code to “to prosecute criticism of dominant beliefs and power structures.”

Furthermore, while Say received a 10-month suspended sentence over his tweets, others seem to fully enjoy the freedom of expressing hate and defamatory content. Pro-AKP dailies such as Yeni Akit, Star and Milat regularly publish content with hate speech and defamation against the government’s critics or any group that is not Sunni Muslim. Ironically, on the same day of the court’s ruling on the Say case, a pro-AKP Internet news website, habervaktim (one of many unofficial news websites associated with Yeni Akit), made a story on the “blood drinking, Quran-insulting, evil-worshiping conspirator freemasons,” in a text book case of insult, defamation and hate speech. Interested readers can click here to see how some in Turkey’s media enjoy freedom of defamation and hate speech while the government’s critics receive 10-month suspended prison sentences over retweeted messages.

A New Low for Turkey’s Democracy

It is clear what and who Say is criticizing in his messages – political Islam and Turkey’s new conservative ruling elite, which the public commonly calls as Allahists. Obviously, Say did not intend to criticize Islam or Muslims (which he should be free to do so if he wants); rather, his messages targeted the political movement that has come to dominate Turkey’s political and government life since early 2000s. This movement has an explicit dislike of liberal arts (and of critical intellectuals like Fazil Say), and it favors Sunni Islam to play a bigger role in social life and public affairs in Turkey. Therefore, in his tweets, Say has actually voiced common concerns of a growing minority in Turkey – people who identify themselves as secular citizens, rather than Sunni Muslims, who are very dissatisfied with the way the AKP is attempting to redefine the essence of the country and is telling them how they should live their lives.

The Say case will further complicate the relationship between the state and Islam. While the AKP does not seem to be concerned with this at the moment, the Case will definitely put more pressure on the AKP to address the growing concerns of secular people. It will surely strengthen the critics’ argument that the AKP is undermining Turkey’s secularism by favoring Sunni Islam to play a leading role in Turkey’s social and government life. Ironically, the Court’s ruling on Say’s tweets is in complete contradiction with what the AKP has been saying about democracy, freedom of expression and secularism abroad. Obviously, in an environment of government-run favoritism toward Islam at the expense of others, freedom of expression and thought will face serious limitations. In such an environment, it is kind of foolish to talk about whether secularism is undermined or not, or to expect the judiciary to function as an independent entity. There is enough historical evidence on how things can go wrong when a certain ideology or religion attempt to dominate cultural, social and government life in a country. Turkey’s development (both economic and human) depends solely on its ability to establish a functioning democracy and a tolerant government that does not favor any faith or religion which respects the rights and freedoms of all citizens.

SAUL LOEB/GETTY IMAGES

By Sarwar Kashmeri

It would be a mistake to view President Obama’s visit to Israel as just a fence-mending exercise. It is in fact part of a planned redesign of U.S. foreign policy that will change the face of American leadership around the world.

The redesign began with the appointment of John Kerry as Secretary of State and Chuck Hagel as Secretary of Defense. Both complement Vice President Joe Biden, and the president’s new chief of staff, Dennis McDonough. All of them, I believe, share a keen understanding of what it means to live in a world of seven billion interconnected people, in an age where the basic equation of geopolitics, that superpower equals ultimately getting one’s way, no longer holds.

The next stage of the redesign is now being rolled out with strategies to deal with today’s five key foreign policy issues: Syria, Iran, North Korea, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and the end game of the U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan. Each is a ticking time bomb loaded with unforeseen consequences for U.S. national interests around the world, for America’s fragile economic recovery, and for a military still recovering after a decade of non-stop wars.

None of these issues lends itself to an America-only resolution. All five require the support and active cooperation of Russia, China, Israel and Turkey. That is why the president has moved aggressively in the last two weeks to remove impediments to better relations with each of these countries.

Russia is Syria’s benefactor and also the key to unlocking an alternative route for the removal of U.S. military assets from Afghanistan. Although the Pakistani port of Karachi is the shortest route out of Afghanistan the United States cannot afford to predicate its military exit solely on the on-again, off-again goodwill of Pakistan.

American-Russian relations have suffered because of the U.S. plans to deploy an anti-missile system on the borders of Russia. To be set up in four phases through 2020, this battery of anti-missile weapons is being rolled out to protect Europeans from Iranian missiles. But the Russians have never seen it that way. They see it as an American attempt to weaken the deterrent effect of Russia’s long range nuclear arsenal. Although the Russians object to the entire anti-missile project it is the project’s fourth phase, in which sophisticated interceptors would be deployed in Poland and perhaps Romania, that is of particular concern to them.

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced last week that this phase will now be abandoned. There were technical and funding reasons that also contributed to the decision, but a major irritant to American-Russian relations is now off the table.

Relations with China, already tense, plummeted with the announcement two years ago of America’s “pivot to the East.” The Chinese interpret this phrase as a signal that the United States views China as a potential military competitor. The United States has tried to explain that the pivot is not really a pivot citing America’s century old presence in the Pacific and Asia. But to no avail.

To bridge this credibility gap with China the Obama Administration cited cuts to the Defense Department’s budget in announcing a study to review the “pivot” of U.S. forces to Asia. This buys time to try and fine tune the “pivot” to allay Chinese concerns

Finally, In spite of his very strong support for Israel, the president has been perceived as being wobbly in recognizing the uniqueness of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. These perceptions have now been put to rest by the president’s visit to Israel during which he delivered unequivocal statements like this one reported by CNN,

“You are not alone,” Obama said in both English and Hebrew, prompting a standing ovation when he declared that “those who adhere to the ideology of rejecting Israel’s right to exist might as well reject the earth beneath them and the sky above, because Israel is not going anywhere.”

President Obama’s visit has already borne fruit. Before Obama left the country Israel had apologized to Turkey for the 2010 killing by the Israeli military of Turkish citizens on the flotilla headed to Gaza to break the Israeli-imposed blockade. Within hours, the apology led to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey, two of America’s closest Middle-Eastern allies are again its partners in dealing with Syria and Iran.

I predict that a thaw in the Palestinian-Israeli relationship will be the next result from the Obama visit to Israel. Is this wishful thinking? Perhaps it is. But if I am correct in believing that both Israelis and Palestinians are finally convinced that nothing can shake the bond between the United States and Israel, reality will drive both sides to a bargain. To increase the odds of this thaw Vice President Biden, who accompanied the president to Israel, has stayed on to strengthen the initiatives launched by his boss.

If this be the first act of the McDonough-Biden-Kerry-Hagel foreign policy team’s debut, all I can say is bravo! Pedal to the metal gentleman, and God speed!

Sarwar Kashmeri is a fellow of the Foreign Policy Association. He is adjunct professor of Norwich College, and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center for International Relations. His most recent book was NATO 2.0: Reboot or Delete? You can find the original article at the Huffington Post, which was reposted with the author’s permission.

Anniversaries are dangerous days.  There is often a flash of attention, lots of words and supposedly deep thought and meaningful promises. Then the sun goes down, and life goes on as before. The world often notes an anniversary without real thought or determination on how to take the steps needed to make it meaningful.

As the second anniversary of the civil war in Syria passes, there continues a swirl of uncertainty with that nation and similarities to the sad disillusionment of past anniversaries elsewhere.

Among the items on Syria’s anniversary table: Military leaders of the Syrian rebel force denounce the new head of the civilian political opposition, Iraq continues to let Iranian flights to Syria pass overhead uninterrupted, reports of the one million refugee has crossed the border and of increased military aid to the rebels, new worries about chemical weapons, and Israel and Turkey making up with each other, which has longer term implications for Syria and the broader Middle East power dynamic.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/25/syria-qatari-influence-rebels-arab-league

Now, what will tomorrow bestow?

To frame that response, perhaps other March anniversaries may lend perspective. This same time period has brought the 10^th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, the 25^th anniversary of the chemical gassing of Kurds in Halabja, the 35^th anniversary of the United Nation’s ongoing mission in Lebanon and the 40^th anniversary of the U.S. troop exit from South Vietnam. What lessons have been learned from those anniversaries and, crucially, what knowledge has been applied other than March being an ominous month for anniversaries?

Sadly, very little.

The uprising started with anti-government protests on March 15, 2011, escalated as residents of Deraa took to the streets after troops arrested teenagers who scrawled anti-regime graffiti on a wall, then metastasized into a civil war with an estimated 70,000 people killed, according to the U.N. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said it is “deplorable” that people are getting used to the fact so many civilians are being killed each day in Syria. “These ongoing violations of international humanitarian law and of basic humanitarian principles by all sides must stop,” said Robert Mardini, who heads the Red Cross’ regional operations.

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/03/2013315112715330950.html

Good luck with that demand.

With the exception of Aleppo, which is divided between loyalists and insurgents, the government still maintains its hold on Syria’s largest cities. It has resorted increasingly to airstrikes, artillery barrages and surface-to-surface missile attacks to reach rebel-held areas where loyalist ground troops no longer operate.

Now, as the third year of the war begins, we see more of the stories that were written about the Bosnia conflict emerging from Syria – including such “down the road” stories as the U.N. warning about a lost generation of young people and how those crucial middle class skilled workers and thinkers are fleeing to seek lives elsewhere.

http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97736/Syria-s-brain-drain-another-twist-to-the-country-s-crisis

The son of a former colleague is doing a paper on genocide and recently asked me some questions about the genocide in Bosnia.  Among those posed: what did the world learn from Bosnia? The question pinpoints a key issue; the answer is realizing the crevice between learning and then applying that knowledge.

The world cannot always stop genocide, yet it can often take steps to mitigate in and sometime stop it. It chooses not to.

The Bosnia intervention lesson is clear: The bullies would continue until stopped and, like many bullies, they were not going to mess with someone stronger. While it was fun for them to humiliate and shoot at U.N. troops from some nations, when Canadians and British were involved, there was less of that. And when their fear – that a U.S. backed NATO mission would occur – came true, they backed down.

That lesson is specific to Bosnia in the 1990s and not easy transferable to Syria. Assad is fighting for his life, unlike the Bosnia Serbs who were fighting for power and greed. Careful specific steps are needed.

The Washington Post does not want caution. It predicts Syria will crack into pieces controlled by rival authorities, with fighting along sectarian lines and between extremist and moderate Sunnis, fighting will spread into Lebanon and Iraq, with the possible use of chemical or biological weapons. “The means to prevent this implosion are the same that could have stopped the ignition of the civil war: aggressive intervention by the United States and its allies to protect the opposition and civilians. This would not require ground troops, only more training and the supply of heavy weapons to the rebels, and airstrikes to eliminate the regime’s warplanes, missiles and, if necessary, chemical weapons. The recognition of an alternative government led by the civilian Syrian National Coalition would send the message to wavering regime supporters that it was time to defect and would help to isolate al-Qaeda before it is too late,” the Post opined.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-bloody-second-anniversary-of-syrias-civil-war/2013/03/14/e5c96dc4-8bf9-11e2-b63f-f53fb9f2fcb4_story.html

Yet those steps are already feeble as the Syrians themselves resort to bickering. Today in Syria, a common thread is optimism running low and anger increasing at the west.

Anniversaries in March. Beware those ides.

(Photo credit: Global Post)

Turkey’s poor press freedom record contradicts its main strategic goal to establish the country as a regional power and the leader of the Muslim world.

The state of press freedom in Turkey has recently been in the spotlight, particularly after Reporters Without Borders declared the country as “the world’s biggest prison for journalists” last December. While concerns about press freedom in Turkey are not new, a series of recent reports reveal a rather disturbing declining trend in the country’s press freedom. In the last two years, a number of advocacy groups and international organizations, including the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Reporters without Borders (RWB), Council of Europe (CoE), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have published reports highlighting the deteriorating press freedom in the country. Most recently, RWB’s Press Freedom Index 2013, placed Turkey in the 154^th place among the 179 countries included in the study, marking a new low for Turkey’s democracy.

While each of these organizations has different mandates and priorities, the reports provide thorough analysis of press freedom in the country. Some of the common themes highlighted by various organizations include: government interference in media affairs, the structure of the media sector, firing or harassment of columnists, growing practice of self-censorship, and prosecution, detention and imprisonment of journalists over criminal and terrorism-related charges. The growing use of defamatory content and hate speech can be added to this list.

Government Interference

One of the main obstacles before press freedom in Turkey is the government’s growing interference in media affairs. The members of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), and often Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself, regularly lash out at columnists and newspapers because of their critical stance. Often, the government publicly condemns or criticizes prominent columnists and calls on the people to protest by boycotting newspapers or by buying only pro-government dailies. In some cases, the government requests the chief editors to remove information or investigative pieces from websites. In others, it calls on the owners to fire or put pressure on critical columnists or commentators.

Prime Minister Erdoğan, for example, occasionally calls on media owners to watch out for their negative coverage of the government on the grounds that it distorts the AKP’s image and that it serves to destabilize the economy. According to CPJ, the prime minister has once called on the editors of major newspapers not to interview or cite sources linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Consequently, this environment of pressure leads to self-censorship, or in some cases, direct pressure on journalists. It is therefore not surprising that in the last two years alone, over ten prominent journalists – including Nuray Mert, Ece Temelkuran, Banu Güven, Yıldırım Türker and Ruşen Çakır –were either fired or had their columns terminated. The latest addition to the list is Ayşenur Arslan, a veteran journalist and a sound critic of the government. Arslan’s debate show, aired daily on CNNTurk, was abruptly cancelled on February 11. Filing libel suits against critical journalists and dailies is another common form of government pressure. Ironically, it is the pro-government media outlets that do not hesitate to carry out defamation and smear campaigns on a regular basis, often with hate and defamatory content, against critics. Even RWB and CPJ were recently targeted by two pro-government dailies, namely Star and Yeni Akit. While the staunchly pro-AKP Daily Star accused both advocacy groups of “being influenced by MLKP,” (Marxist-Leninist Communist Party, an armed group designated as a terrorist organization by Turkish authorities), Yeni Akit went even further and accused RWB of financing MLKP. Yeni Akit’s coverage of Turkish and global affairs has become particularly worrying for Turkey’s press environment. The ultraconservative daily regularly publishes defamatory and hate speech content, targeting Jews, Christians, Greeks, Armenians, Kurds, Alevis, the LGBT community and the government’s critics.

Government interference in media affairs is partly due to the structure of Turkey’s media market. According to the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), two media groups (Doğan Medya and Turkuvaz Medya, the latter being pro-government) dominate more than 80 percent of the market in the country. These groups not only have the largest advertising revenues, but also control the entire newspaper and magazine distribution sub-sector. A 2012 report by TESEV highlights that the continued inadequacy of legal barriers to cross-mergers, and the lack of regulation preventing media owners to participate in public tenders and invest in other sectors, has led to a concentrated and polarized media structure. TESEV’s report also reveals that it is the business ventures of the owners of the media groups (in other sectors and public tenders) that make them susceptible to government pressure and financially reliant on the government. As a result, public interest is sacrificed for the business interests of the media owners and for consolidating political power by the government while the media cannot perform its function as a watchdog.

Prosecution and Imprisonment of Journalists

Perhaps the most infamous aspect of press freedom in Turkey is the record-number of journalists in prison. Although there is no consensus on how many journalists are currently behind bars, estimates put the number somewhere between 75 and 100. The majority of these media workers are prosecuted with offences related to being a member of a terrorist organization, creating propaganda for terrorist organizations, or providing support to terrorism. Most imprisonments are related to a particular legal probe called the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) Case. According to the OSCE, 68 percent of cases are related to the Kurdish issue, followed by imprisonment in relation to the Ergenekon Case with 13 percent. The OSCE report also provides important insight into the legal framework that allows widespread prosecution of journalists: More than 90 percent of these journalists are charged under the Anti-Terror Law and/or under Turkish Criminal Code. Obviously, many face several trials and are often convicted for several offences. For example, the OSCE report mentions that there is one journalist who faces 150 different court cases. The high number of media workers imprisoned, detained or prosecuted in Turkey, as a recent CoE report underlines, has a “paralyzing effect on the country’s media environment.”

Despite Turkey’s progress in the early 2000s, serious limitations regarding the freedom of expression and press freedom remain in place. Government interference in media affairs seems to have reached alarming levels. In the absence of regulatory measures, the government and the media groups put political and business interests before the public good, preventing media from functioning as a watchdog. Furthermore, the excessive use of provisions of the country’s terror and criminal laws limits freedom of expression, causing widespread self-censorship, and in some cases allows for prosecution and imprisonment of journalists, reporters and publishers over terrorism-related charges. Yet, the AKP’s ambitious role for Turkey — leading the Middle East and Muslim world through Turkey’s soft power — is essentially linked to the degree it can maintain a strong democracy and ensure freedom of expression and press. The country’s place at the bottom of press freedom indexes damage Turkey’s reputation and contradicts the AKP’s objectives at home and globally. Therefore, for many, the government’s response to the press freedom crisis will be a critical test of the AKP’s commitment to democracy and fundamental freedoms.

This article was originally published by Fair Observer on March 08, 2013

Next month, March 2013, will mark the second anniversary of the Syrian uprising. This bloody conflict, as I have repeatedly written, has been characterized by the bombing of bread lines, town-wide massacres and burgeoning sectarian attacks. The enormity of the death toll, 70,000 and counting, should elicit shock to even the casual follower of international affairs.

Admittedly, the number is staggering, but when one considers the fact that the conflict is far from finished and that the rebels have yet to gain full control of even one major urban area, it will pale in comparison to the final death toll. This is not to mention that death tolls are highly unreliable, particularly in a conflict where on-the-ground reporting is difficult, if not impossible in some areas. The point of the matter is, to put it plainly, that too many Syrians have died and that the revolution in the heart of the Middle East has gone on for too long.

A stable and orderly transition may be impossible at this point, confessional hatreds too deep, the Syrian leadership implicit in Assad’s murderous rampage and a military which by all accounts has transformed into a militia; raping, pillaging and looting. The external Syria opposition has also compounded this issue, while acting as the face of the revolution for international television, individuals such as Moaz al-Khatib, the National Coalition President, have failed to bridge the divide between external organizations and fighting groups inside Syria.

At its current pace, the conflict, at minimum, will last until the end of this year, leaving more death and destruction in its wake. The international community, in particular the United States, can help resolve the Syrian conflict sooner rather than later. What is needed is concise and thought-out plan to arm vetted Syrian rebel groups, in addition to the “non-lethal” aid already supplied.

Last week’s testimony by outgoing Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta should be viewed with dismay. Panetta told the Senate Armed Service Committee that the Obama administration had scrapped plans to arm Syrian rebels, should be viewed with dismay. Under the plan, the United States, in coordination with an unnamed regional ally, would vet, train and supply rebel groups with the weaponry required for bringing the fight to Assad. While not explicitly stated, it is clear that this would include assault rifles, most probably AK-47 variants, heavy machine guns, typically of the truck-mounted and squad level varieties, anti-tank weaponry including the Russian-made Metis models, and less likely though possible, less advanced anti-air weaponry, with the SA-7 being a probable choice. Weapon systems capable of threatening the regime’s MiG fighter jets and helicopters have become a point of contention, with neighboring allies worried that they may fall into the hands of extremists and end up being used against the West or Western interests.

International Factors:

According to Panetta, three factors played into the administration’s decision not to adopt the plan put forward by now sacked CIA Director David Petraus, with the support of the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin E. Dempsey and himself. Each of these issues revolved around the possible dangerous repercussions that heavier involvement in the Syrian conflict would entail. Starting at the international level, it seems that the White House believed that further involvement could elicit a response from the Iranians either within the region or internationally. Having been involved in a variety of terrorist attacks since 1979, many international observers are pointing to Tehran for Hezbollah’s bombing of an Israeli tour bus in Bulgaria last July. Needless to say, it is not above the Islamic Republic to make its disapproval known through extra-political means.

Russia and China also factor into the administration’s decision making. With the failure of the much lauded “reset” with Moscow, a pullout from Afghanistan in the near future, and recent moves by Vladimir Putin aimed at discrediting Washington; the Obama administration is not looking to step on any Russian toes.

With China, the “peaceful rise” of the Asian dragon has been met by the American pivot to Asia. Tense land disputes and a rise in military spending by the Chinese have ensured that the United States will want to approach the South China Sea, one of the world’s most vital trade routes, with caution and through a framework of cooperation. By passing China on the Syrian issue could further sour relations and in combination with a slight against Russia could make American maneuvering on the world stage slightly more difficult.

While the three abovementioned issues are of great concern for the United States, it must be acknowledged that the repercussions from the Syrian conflict may cause greater long term complications for America. The Obama administration must approach the conflict with a more robust policy, while giving assurances to Beijing and Moscow and further isolating Iran.

Inside Syria and the Region:

According to the International Herald Tribune, senior U.S. officials told the newspaper that the veto was due to fears about risks associated with becoming more deeply involved in the conflict, including weapons falling into the wrong hands. This has been an issue both internally in Syria and in regards to spill over into the neighboring states of Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Jordan.

This has been a repetitive theme, one which I supported at the beginning of the revolution. Arming the rebels at that point would have put a minimally better armed rag-tag against the full force of the Syrian army, which at that point had held back its full force. The issue today is that Assad’s army, a de facto militia, has utilized every weapon in its arsenal and has devolved to targeting civilian infrastructure, hospitals and schools. Rebel groups centered around military defectors, although divided into various provincial military councils and brigades, now have top-down command structures. The first factor highlights the need for robust involvement by the West and its allies, the latter shows that potential Syrian partners have the professionalism required to handle and store weapons safely.

The professionalism of these groups and the ability to easily identify these units within Syria (thanks to YouTube, social media and on the ground intelligence) ensures that a fruitful relationship between the West and these groups are plausible. Vetting, training, arming and planning along the lines of the Petraeus plan would be relatively quick and easy process. Turkey and Jordan both boast strong intelligence services with a history of supporting non-state actors in prolonged conflict and would not want to see these arms fall in the wrong hands.

While the initial payoff for such a strategy would see rebel units stepping up the pressure on the Assad regime, the secondary result of arming secular, defector-led units is just as important. Fears over weapons falling into the wrong hands and spillover associated with radical groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra, are ever present in Washington’s decision making, and rightly so. That being said, these fears can be mitigated by Western action.

Containing the Radicals:

By bolstering the capacities of Western-friendly rebel units, particularly those under the auspices of civilian or military councils, the balance of power would shift in favor of moderate groups. Jabhat al-Nusra and its myriad of Salafist allies within the country, including the very capable Ahrar al-Sham force in Idlib governorate, have grown stronger after overcoming a variety of regime bases and airfields.

While moderate units have employed the same tactics, attacking regime soft points in rural and suburban areas, they have been unable to reap the spoils of war as concretely as Jabhat and its allies. Luckily, Jabhat has so far been unable to obtain anti-air missiles that could pose a threat to civilian airliners. The capabilities of jihadist groups should be replicated and exceed in providing weaponry to Syrian rebels in order to tip the balance of these fighting forces, helping to ensure that they become the arbiters of post-Assad Syria. Without a procurement plan the fall of Damascus could herald the birth of radical enclaves within the country and a tug-of-war between better armed jihadists and their moderate counterparts.

Containing Regional Spillover:

Assad’s survival plan has centered on pushing this internal conflict to Syria’s borders. The flow of refugees into neighboring countries has amounted to almost 800,000 and this is not to mention the nearly two million Syrians internally displaced.  Ill-equipped neighboring states, most notably Jordan and Lebanon, are seeing their internal stability weathered away by this reality. In addition, violent spillover in the latter country and Turkey has put the precarious balancing acts in both countries on edge.

If the Syrian conflict is to be further drawn out stability in all the surrounding countries will be affected creating a proverbial mushroom cloud of conflict and decay in the heart of the Middle East. Whether it is the Kurdish issue with Turkey, anti-regime protests in Jordan or the sectarian balance in Lebanon, the United States may have to pick up some or all of the pieces when this area of the world disintegrates. Providing training and weapons to the opposition will hasten the fall of Assad, ensure that spillover does not become a prolonged process and in turn save the territorial and political integrity of neighboring countries.

One note must be made though, one which has been largely absent from the discussion in Washington and other Western capitals. Those that call for the arming of Syria’s rebels must also, and vigorously, champion the allocation of funds and medical support to the neighboring countries that will see heightened inflows of refugees as a result. 

Copyright: BBC – http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21293598

On February 1, U.S. Embassy in Ankara – in a calm, residential and business neighborhood — was bombed. At the time of writing this, police statements indicate that it is believed to be a suicide attack and the attacker(s) detonated the bomb inside the security checkpoint bunker, killing at least one security guard. Growing up in the nice and pleasant middle-class neighborhood around the embassy, the attack was of particular shock to me.

Who attacked the embassy or what their motives were, will definitely be clear as the investigation continues, however the timing of the attack was of particular importance. Most specifically, CNN-Turk’s Nevsin Mengu has brought several important factors into consideration:

1. Earlier in the morning on February 1, Osama bin Laden’s son-in-law Suleiman M., was captured by a joint CIA – MIT (Turkish National Intelligence Agency). The police statement indicates that Suleiman M. had entered Turkey as a political asylum-seeker, with the final goal of traveling to Saudi Arabia to reunite with his wife.
2. Israeli airstrike on Syria – and the fact that Israel had contacted Washington before the strike – infuriated not only Syria, but also Iran and Russia. A preemptive Israeli airstrike is not new in the region, but the consent and knowledge of Washington at this political juncture is seen as a very serious act of indirect hostility by the Syria-Iran-Russia axis.
3. Turkey had requested NATO Patriot-missile protection on its Syrian border later in 2012 – NATO had responded positively and a number of Patriot missile sites were established with a group of American, German and Dutch military oversight mission. The final shipment of Patriot missiles and launcher system had arrived several days earlier and the full system went operational earlier on February 1.

***

One, or a combination of these factors have possibly caused the attack today – U.S.-Turkish relations have recovered significantly from its 2003-2008 “low” and both countries have been cooperating extensively in a number of very critical strategic policy issues. U.S. Embassy bombing in Ankara may be an indicator of how this cooperation is seen as a threat, as the attack probably sought to punish both Washington and Ankara.

“More than ever, foreign policy is economic policy. The world is competing for resources and global markets.”   John Kerry

Considering the positive trend of the past eighteen months, Somalia is en route to recovery, and, in due course, to re-engineer a better state from the ground up. The caveat being: in the long term, this could be another squandered opportunity as long as “doormat politics” shapes Somalia’s political landscape.

By doormat politics, I mean the combination of systematic self/foreign-inflicted aggressions and exploitations suffered by the nation and the subsequent desperation, hopelessness, chronic dependency and indignation.

From the cold war proxy geopolitical mortal games, to the iron fist of the military government, to the ruthless militias/warlordism of the civil war, to the moral menace of religious extremism, to the hostile intervention of neighboring countries and the paranoia-driven global war on terror, Somalia has been under the exploitative schemes and the brutal authority of various external and internal actors. By and large, throughout these periods, the nation was used either as a camouflage to advance clan-based exclusive rights or a gambit for zero-sum expedience.

Mutual Interest and Mutual Respect 

Today, Somalia is at the threshold of a new era; an era of bilateral relationships of mutual interest and respect. However counterintuitive it may seem, a new image of Somalia is gradually coming into formation.

Aside from its coveted long and strategic coast, Somalia is a country with untapped energy and other natural resources and massive rebuilding needs. Many recognize its potential lucrative emerging market.

And, as U.S., China, Europe and India continue their scramble in Africa for resources and food security, cultivating bilateral relationship with Somalia as a strategic gateway to sub-Saharan Africa becomes a geopolitical necessity. This, needless to say, provides Somalia an opportunity to expand its horizon and cultivate diverse friendships.

Recently, a number of old friends were compelled to emerge out of their diplomatic ambivalence since the Republic of Turkey has raised the bar and re-assumed its full diplomatic relationship with Somalia and opened its embassy in Mogadishu at a time when it was still being considered the most dangerous city in the world. Like China, Turkey has successfully been establishing good footing in Africa based on its method of engagement- soft power.

“What Africa needs is not pity, but fairness and opportunity.  Developing partnerships based on respect, equality and mutual interest will go a long way in overcoming the vicious circle of exploitation, poverty and underdevelopment in Africa” writes Turkish Columnist Ibrahim Kalin in Today’s Zaman.

Somali/U.S. Relations

On January 17^, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to reactivate the bilateral relationship between Somalia and United States. Though the State Department welcomed “the great strides toward stability Somalia has made over the past year”—an effort in which the U.S. played a key role—it made no commitment to change its Dual-Track Policy and globally dreaded “Drone Diplomacy.”  These are the two sides of a single counter-terrorism based policy toward Somalia that has been undermining the legitimacy of the very central government that US has officially recognized and established bilateral relationship with.

Sustainable bilateral relations between Somalia and the U.S. would remain a political mirage as long as the U.S. policy toward Somalia continues to be driven by counter-terrorism expediency and its diplomatic gestures are delivered by drone strikes! Pressure would soon be mounting against both nations as this policy is getting under intense scrutiny and is the subject of a new documentary called Dirty Wars that recently premiered at the Sundance Film Festival and is expected to hit the theaters in March.

“We cannot allow the extraordinary good we do to save and change lives to be eclipsed entirely by the role we have had to play since September 11th, a role that was thrust upon us,” said John Kerry,  the new Secretary of State. Whether or not these words would prove prophetic per the foreign policy of President Obama’s second term would remain to be seen.

Challenges and Opportunities of Economic Growth

Statehood is not sustainable without steady revenue and economic growth and this should not be a shock to a nation emerging out of the ruins of its bloody history and hampered by chronic poverty with roughly seventy percent of its youth being unemployed and nearly two million of its population being internally and externally displaced.

Somalia needs a fresh start. However, as this just resuscitated state is struggling to find its political, social, religious, and economic balance, bill collectors are lining up. Granted, there is nothing illegal about that. However, a few issues must be illuminated:

Even though it is still considered a “Pre-Decision-Point country”, Somalia is qualified for debt cancellation under the IMF/World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative.

It might even qualify to legitimately invoke “The Odious Debt Doctrine” (a precedent set by the U.S.) if and where it is necessary. The rationale driving this legal doctrine is that loans not made in good faith to non-democratic governments with questionable legitimacy that then use these monies against their public interests, or to oppress their citizens, or for embezzlement and other corrupt overtly corrupt motives, cannot be transferred to democratically elected governments that may succeed them. Regardless, there is a good chance that these international financial institutions would do what’s right.

That said, a more profoundly complex issue than dealing with these institutions is dealing with Hedge Funds profiteers who purchased some of Somalia’s old debts while the state was on its death bed, hence the name Vulture Funds. This would have to be won legally in the courts. Think Congo.

Processes and Sacrifices of Transformation

It behooves the current government to appoint a Debt Audit and Asset Recovery Commission that includes economists, international lawyers, members of the Parliament and civil societies.

Moreover, it should deliberately avoid any decision that would put this recovering state in a position to be held as ransom for generations to come. This includes aid monies that the state is chronically dependent on. After all, as the old adage goes: “He who pays the piper calls the tune.” Somalia now has too many pipers playing too many tunes, all at once; a classic political cacophony of a sort.

The good news is that the current government already has alternative ways of generating state revenues such taxation, postal services, licensing the telephone gateway, licensing banking, licensing commercial fishing, leasing agricultural lands, etc. in its priority.

The Somali people have resiliently rejected the permanency of failure. They have been responding with an overwhelming stream of repatriation and investments. By and large there is a popular march toward the light at the end of the tunnel. However, the process is not yet complete and hazardous pitfalls along the way still present detrimental challenges. So, the current momentum must be guided with vision, maintained with prudence, and guarded with vigilance. There are valuable lessons to be learned from the magically disappearing $ billions in South Sudan and Haiti. This indeed underscores, among other things, the importance of having in place effective policies of checks and balances, also the apparatus and the capacity to invest these funds into viable projects of critical nature.

Siamak Dehghanpour is an Iranian-American journalist and television personality. He is the host of the “OFOGH”, a news television talk show program on the Voice of America (VOA) television’s Persian News Network (PNN). OFOGH (Horizon) covers a wide range of issues in Iranian affairs as well as geopolitics of the Middle East.
Mr. Dehghanpour is also a Managing Editor of PNN.

Siamak Dehghanpour was born and raised in Tehran, Iran. After  finishing military service during the Iran-Iraq War, he attended the University of Arts in Tehran to obtain a B.A. and a M.A. in theater, TV, and film-making. He produced independent documentaries, some focusing on Iran’s religious minorities. In Iran, Mr. Dehghanpour, grandson of a well-known Iranian poet and journalist, owned a publishing business, and worked for numerous publications as a production manager, managing editor, and board member.

He joined VOA in June 2003 to launch “News and Views”, a Persian-language news show. Since then, he has conducted many interviews with high-level officials, congressional leaders, and foreign policy experts and analysts. Mr. Dehghanpour has extensively covered 2012, 2010, 2008, 2006, and 2004 US General and Mid-term Elections for VOAPNN. The “OFOGH” program has a massive following inside Iran as well as on the internet and is considered a flagship program of VOA PNN.

On the second anniversary of the OFOGH program, Mr. Dehghanpour sat down with Reza Akhlaghi of Foreign Policy Association to share his views on the current state of Iranian affairs.

_________________________________________________________________________

What, in your opinion, have been the key obstacles for Iranian intellectuals in becoming a force in nurturing democratic values in the Iranian society and in helping with the institutionalization of those values?

Many of the Iranian intellectuals during the last hundred years have had a tendency to be more secular and less religious because of their education. But the lower class and to some extent the middle class in society are still somewhat religious, despite the fact that the religious government after the revolution has done significant damage to the people’s faith. This trend has put them at odds with the core of society and at fight with the clerical establishment. The problem as I see it is that many Iranian intellectuals are still struggling when it comes to freedom of religion and the rights of minorities.

Over the last ten years, the government has done everything possible to root out civil society. They suppressed NGOs and tried to turn the clock back to the time before the intellectuals engaged with the “reform government” to empower NGOs. An entire generation of work is needed to institutionalize democratic values.

Today, it seems many in the opposition are united on a need for free and fair elections in Iran as a way to work toward democracy but as long as civil society is weak, there is no guarantee that the next government will be different. Having said that, Iranian intellectuals still can play a crucial role in educating and nurturing secular values because even in a democratic Iran we may still see the will of majority be forced upon minorities.

How would you assess the role of the Iranian Diaspora in impacting Iran’s internal socio-political dynamism?

So far, it’s been disappointing politically, but culturally it’s been effective. That’s why in the last couple of years you see writers, filmmakers, university professors, actors, economists, and entrepreneurs under intense pressure and intimidation not to be in contact with the Iranian Diaspora. The Iranian Diaspora has played a significant role in lobbying for Iranian activists inside Iran to receive prestigious awards and international recognition and have increased awareness about what is happening inside the country. But this has been more of a response to the internal pressure and not a coordinated action by the Diaspora to impact the internal socio-political dynamics of the country. On the political side, the Iranian Diaspora has the knowledge to help Iran but they have not translated their knowledge into a concerted action yet. There are serious trust issues. There is a debate between the opposition leaders who believe in one big umbrella or council, and others who believe that unifying the opposition is an impossible task given the sea of differences between the opposition over whether to change the regime by pressure and sanctions or to reform it through non-violent means. Regardless of who is right and who is wrong, the Iranian Intelligence Ministry conducted activities that have proven to be effective in damaging the trust between different factions in the Diaspora. Until there are fair and free elections in Iran, where we find out who has the most support in the country and how a future coalition government could look like, the partisan bickering will continue among the opposition outside the country.

Unless there will be another major uprising in Iran, it’s hard to see any serious move from the Iranian Diaspora to tune in their actions with the needs of the Iranian people.

OFOGH Program Logo

To what extent, in your opinion, the Iranian clergy has the potential to embrace democratic values and democratic change? Would a democratic Iran be necessarily against the interests of the Shiite clergy?

In Iran today there are so many young clerics who are either in jail or are oversees embracing democratic values at this moment. The Special Clergy Court has been an Inquisition type court system of the 21st century in Iran. But it is hard to believe that a huge number of clerics who are graduating out of the seminaries every year and are closely monitored by the government and financially dependent on it, can move away from the regime.

Having said that, there are many Grand Ayatollahs who either publicly stood against the Supreme Leader’s will, or were indifferent and unsupportive of the government. There is a growing concern among clerics that Qom could lose its traditional position and influential clerics to Najaf, if they feel that they are being intimidated. It is no secret that the government has been investing a lot in Najaf and Karbala and been closely monitoring Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s house.

Obviously, a future democratic Iran with no state religion could be a threat to the current influence of the Shiite clerical establishment, but this is hard to believe at this stage given the regional complexity of an aggressive Shiite Iran being surrounded by hostile Sunni states. There are also some clerics who believe that a weakened religious government actually would be a gift to the traditional clergy because it will put them back to their traditional position and bring back the respect they used to have within the society. But some say this is very unlikely because the genie is out the bottle.

How do you see the dynamics of the upcoming presidential elections shaping up given Iran’s heavily factionalized power structure?

Iran is diplomatically and economically challenged and needs to come out of this as fast as possible. The last seven and half years also have proved that a stubborn president could cause serious damage to the Supreme Leader’s untouchable position. Given the fact that none of the current candidates in the short lists of each faction offer great promises, and considering the Supreme Leader does not want another Ahmadinejad, it’s possible that we will see the power of the next president be shared with his vice president. A president who can save the regime’s face on foreign policy front and a strong VP who is equipped with economic skills to deal with the huge problems the country is facing. That setting could settle the fight between Ahmadinejad’s faction and the Resistance Front (Jebheye Paydari) on one side and with his opponents in Majlis, including Ali Larijani and Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf and the Supreme leader’s advisors like Ali Akbar Velayati on the other. They don’t seem to have a significant role for reformists like Mohammad Reza Aref to play.

In a post-Arab Spring Middle East, do you believe Turkey is better positioned to play a leading role in the region than Iran is? How do you see the tensions between Turkey and Syria play themselves out in the region?

For the time being, Turkey can play a better role but as time goes by Turkey will face internal and regional challenges that could cause the Turkish leadership to reconsider its new strategy. It’s hard to be serving NATO’s mission, having an eye on EU, supporting Hamas, uniting with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, cracking down on PKK and the Kurds, and violating basic human rights all at the same time for Erdogan’s government. Turkey’s policy is trade-driven and cannot tolerate chaos on its borders. Iran and Syria know that but whether NATO and EU, with their own economic troubles, can help Turkey remains to be seen. Can Turkey pursue other energy sources besides Iran? It’s hard to see that for the time being even with the help of Russians who have a huge stake in Syria.

What’s your take on the current economic sanctions against Iran? Have they been an effective tool in making the Iranian leadership re-calculate its foreign policy and security policies?

I guess for sanctions in general to be effective they need to be in place for a long time, which some say is meant to weaken the regime and not the people. History does not prove that sanctions result in regime change and dictatorships have shown that they will pay any price to circumvent sanctions and earn enough money to pursue their policies. But it’s notable that there is a serious debate between Ahmadinejad and Ali Larijani on the impact of sanctions and many believe that mismanagement has done more damage than sanctions. It’s also interesting that the nuclear negotiators are pushing for a removal of sanctions as a precondition for cooperation. If the sanctions are still “a piece of paper”, as some in Iran have suggested, then why so much emphasis on removing them? It’s no secret that sanctions have slowed down Iran’s nuclear activities, especially at the enrichment facilities. Is the world market ready to tighten up more on Iran’s oil and natural gas export? That’s the key question. So far the pressure has been to a point of harming the economy but not collapsing it. Some believe that the leadership in Iran wants to come out of this huge pressure with a face saving deal. Are they going to get what they want? We may find out in the next year or so.

Do you believe there are rivalries among factions in Iran to become the torch-bearer of re-establishing ties with the United States? With presidential elections on the horizon, how are those rivalries taking shape?

Obviously, no one more than Ahmadinejad has shown the readiness to open-up a venue for talks with the U.S. Today, many influential power players are talking about the need for US-Iran relations publicly. It’s hard to believe that the Supreme Leader wants this under these circumstances but the pressure on him is mounting as the pressure on his predecessor Ayatollah Khomeini forced him to drink the “poisoned chalice”.

Some in Iran argue that Tehran should take advantage of the apparent tension between President Barack Obama and the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and move towards Washington. With Senator John Kerry, who will take up the job of No.1 US diplomat held by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2013, there will be interesting developments to watch. Many still remember Senator Kerry’s participating in a 2007 Davos panel with then President Mohammad Khatami. Despite the fact that the Senator has not authored any major sanctions legislation against Iran during his chairmanship in the Foreign Relations Committee, he did vote in favor of all the sanctions bills. Will Tehran take advantage of this opportunity or wait for Senator Kerry’s move is unclear, but Washington has been steadily pursuing a two-track policy of pressure and diplomacy. What the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are going to do between the upcoming Israeli elections and Iran’s presidential elections will have a great impact on how Iran will be dealt with.

An Image of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad next to Lebanese flags during a state visit to Lebanon by the Iranian President

Co-Authored by Azadeh Pourzand and Reza Akhlaghi

The Region at A Glance

2012 was the year that the Middle East entered a period of turbo instability. This period accentuated itself in different parts of the region in different forms. Syria’s civil war reached a point of no-return-to-normalcy, ensuring only one outcome for Bashar Al-Assad’s government: eventual downfall. In Bahrain, continued unrest against a Saudi-propped corrupt Sunni elite has made the future of this island nation increasingly uncertain for much of 2013. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was exacerbated by increasing acts of violence on both sides. Intransigence on the part of Netanyahu to embrace diplomacy and adoption of blind militancy by Hamas against a powerful military ensured that there will be hardly any light at the end of the Israeli-Palestinian tunnel any time soon. Iraq experienced a new spate of bombings of mostly sectarian nature and the country moved closer to ethnic based politics as the Kurds in the north and the central government in Baghdad vied for the control of the oil-rich Kirkuk region, which promises to drag the country further into a period of instability. Moreover, with the break-up of Syria a distant possibility, the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey feel they have a new chance at an independent homeland.

Meanwhile in Turkey, a country led by once an annoyingly confident Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish leadership saw in 2012 key aspects of its grand foreign policy design disintegrate, thanks to the turmoil in Syria and the intransigency of Assad’s regime to cling to power coupled with resurgence of geopolitical rivalry with an economically bruised Iran over a post-Arab Spring Middle East. But what happened to Iran in 2012?

Iran at A Glance

For Iran, 2012 was a year of shift in political allegiances at home and regional transformations with no clear winner at this stage. The Iranian economy continued its downward spiral as a result of harsh economic sanctions coupled with lack of tangible progress in its nuclear dossier, which, in the waning days of 2012 made Iran observers and analysts hold their breath as to what 2013 has in store for the country. Iran held Majles (parliamentary) elections that led to the erosion of Ahmadinejad’s base in the legislative assembly. Heading to 2013, Iran is preparing for an important presidential election that has already energized its factions to jockey for influence to prop up their respective candidates. Regionally, as the U.S. and Iran continue to slug it out over dominance, the overarching issue for Iran in 2013 will be whether or not it can reach a comprehensive understanding with the Western powers over its nuclear program and subsequently extricate itself from the backbreaking sanctions. Another crucial issue for Iran is whether it will make changes to the direction of its foreign policy, particularly after the upcoming presidential election.

A New Security Environment: Syria Looming Large

Iran in 2012 saw the region’s continued plunge in instability with a mixed sense of optimism and uneasiness. Developments in Bahrain demonstrated the resolve of the country’s Shiite majority against the Sunni rule backed by the Saudis. For Iran, this still gives a flicker of hope for the rise of Shiite in Bahrain through democratic elections, whose outcome could tilt the balance of power to the detriment of the Saudis with the potential to impact the U.S. naval presence in the region.

Syria looms large in Iran in two key respects: regionally and internally. Regionally, Iran could very well see the departure of a strategic partner with the country facing prospects of territorial disintegration. Iran then could find itself with the huge task of carving out a new strategic position in war-ravaged Syria, and by extension, in the Levant. This could herald the resurgence of ethno-regional nationalism with Sunnis having the upper hand and the Hezbollah finding itself exposed to a new strategic environment.

Iran and Turkey are bound for greater rivalry in 2013, especially if sanctions against Iran continue with their biting force. In a post-Assad Syria Turkey almost certainly will be in a position to re-assert itself in the Levant, using its economic might and help the country in rebuilding its war-ravaged economy and forge close ties with the Sunnis, who will most likely make up the core of a future Syrian leadership.

Internally, the Iranian leadership would be worried about a potential boost Assad’s fall could provide for the aspirations of Iranians who are fed up with Iran’s international isolation, economic mismanagement, and an institutionalized culture of financial corruption. Moreover, the continuation of sanctions could further erode Iran’s ability to project power regionally and force its leadership to face an increasingly impoverished middle class and the prospects of domestic social unrest.

For Iran’s economy to gain any semblance of normalcy, therefore, it desperately needs sanctions lifted irrespective of how corrupt its economic management system is and how it is influenced by a notoriously factionalized domestic politics.

Human Rights

The human rights situation in Iran remained grim in 2012. The systematic violation of human rights against individuals and groups continued to be a serious problem.  Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, in his March report catalogued “allegations that produce a striking pattern of violations of fundamental human rights guaranteed under international law”.

In the face of Iran’s nuclear program and the subsequent tightening of sanctions against it, this year the international community paid notable attention to human rights violations and in particular to prominent cases of prisoners of conscious. Similarly, Iranian journalists, lawyers, student activists, civil society actors, youth, women, minorities, the LGBT community, juveniles and other vulnerable groups became subject to various forms of discrimination and persecution in 2012.

As recently as December of this year, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) condemned the government of Iran for “serious and ongoing human rights violations”.  UNGA member states that overwhelmingly voted against Iran’s violations of human rights, condemned such abuses as mass executions, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, intimidation, and a wide range of other tactics to suppress dissent. This resolution, offered by the Canadian Government and co-sponsored by 43 other states marked the 25^th resolution on the human rights situation in Iran that made it through the UNGA since 1985. In addition to warnings by the international community against human rights violations in Iran, civil society organizations also stepped up their criticism. For instance, in October 2012 the Sakhorov prize went to Nasrin Sotoudeh, an Iranian lawyer and human rights advocate who is currently in prison, and Jafar Panahi, an Iranian director whose films calls attention to the life of the poor in Iran.

However, mounting international pressure has not entirely translated into an overall improvement of human rights in Iran. Today, many remain imprisoned for reasons such as human rights advocacy and their political and religious beliefs. While the list of prisoners of conscious in Iran is long, a few cases have received attention from the International community. Some of today’s prominent political prisoners in Iran include Nasrin Sotoudeh who went on a long hunger strike to protest the ban to see her daughter; Abdollah Momeni, a student activist prisoner who was also banned from family visits; Bahareh Hedayat,  a student and women’s rights activist serving a 10-year sentence following her arrest during the Green Movement of 2009; Majid Tavakolli, a student leader and the winner of the Norwegian Student Peace Prize, who was arrested during the Green Movement; Zia nabavi, a student activist serving a 10-year sentence in a remote location with the vague charge of “enmity against God.

Moreover, difficult circumstances in detention have led to deteriorating health of political prisoners with cases of death in custody. For instance, 35-year-old Iranian blogger Sattar Beheshti who was arrested on October 30 by the cyber police for having criticized the government, died on November 6 after being subjected to alleged ill-treatment and/or torture.

In addition to individual cases of human rights violations, various religious and ethnic minorities and groups faced discrimination and persecution in 2012. According to a report on minorities by the United Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) released in October 2012, the most acute concerns facing all minority groups in Iran are arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and death sentence.  While expressing concern for ethnic minorities in Iran such as the Baluchis and the Kurds who face discrimination and persecution, the UNPO General Secretary, Marino Busdachin, highlighted increased violations of human rights against religious minorities such as the Baha’is, Christians, and Sufi Muslims, some of whom have been called “deviant and corrupt” by some officials.

Relations with the US

US-Iran relations became even more challenging in 2012.  In January 2012 the already tense relations worsened as Iran condemned an Iranian-American detainee, Amir Mirzaei Hekmati, to death on the charges of espionage for CIA. More importantly, the ongoing disputes over Iran’s nuclear program and the possibility of enriching uranium at higher grades further escalated. Ultimately, the disputes led to the US-led tightening of economic sanctions against Iran. Iran and its foreign policy played a central role in the U.S. presidential campaign of 2012. President Obama, with a second term mandate, is convinced that a tough sanctions regime will force Iran into negotiating with the US. However, the P5+1 talks in Istanbul, Baghdad, and Moscow did not lead to tangible results. There are already signs that Iranian officials will be more willing to negotiate and reach a settlement with the US and the West after Iran’s upcoming presidential elections in June 2013, which will mark Ahmadinejad’s eight-year-long presidency.

However, despite the US and European Union-led sanctions against Iran, some in the US Congress believe that they should increase the potency of sanctions. The Congress and the White House are currently in the process of finalizing new measures against Iran.

In addition to the above challenges, Iran and the US have experienced tensions over regional developments. For instance, in Syria, where Iran’s close ally Bashar al-Assad is struggling to hold on to power, the US supports the rebel groups that fight against Assad.  Moreover, Iran and Israel continue to openly bash each other as Iran does not compromise over its nuclear program and continues to fund and arm Hamas in Palestine while Israel considers Iran an existential threat.  The above developments collectively characterize the nature of U.S.—Iran tensions in 2012. Nevertheless, Iran and the US also share common interests in the region, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, where geopolitical instability harms national interests of both countries. With the departure of American forces from Afghanistan in 2014 and the preparations that will start in 2013, Iran and the US are likely to step up collaborative measures in the region; even if behind closed doors.

Reform and the Fate of Iranian Reformists

The word “reform” and “reformist” have taken on complex evolutions in contemporary Iran. Originally used to refer to President Khatami and his supporters and policies in the 1990s and early 2000s, the term has become broadly inclusive of supporters of the Green Movement in 2009 as well as others who demand gradual or drastic reforms in Iran’s political structure. Today, with the leaders of the Green Movement still under house arrest and continued repression and marginalization of their allies, it has become a challenge to describe who is classified as a reformist in Iran’s political scene.

In 2012 the rhetoric of the Islamic Republic became even more aggressive against reformists and the Green Movement. With Iran facing mounting economic hardships and at the same time drawing closer to next year’s presidential elections, the Iranian leadership has stepped up its crack down on any sign of opposition especially coming from the reform camp.

Meanwhile, despite sporadic grassroots attempts by Green supporters to keep the movement alive, the Green Movement has grown weaker due to regime’s effective repression methods. And with the marginalization of reformists from the official political discourse and in state media, it is unlikely to see approved presidential nominees with a reformist agenda. Still some reformists are rumored to have backed a conservative candidate known for his close ties with reformists.

At thirty-nine years old, Selahattin Demirtas is the Chairman of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in Turkish parliament. He has held this position since January 2010 and was first elected to parliament in 2007 as the MP for the Kurdish majority city of Diyarbakir, after which he joined the now-defunct Democratic Society Party (DTP). After the DTP was dissolved, he joined the BDP and rose to his present rank. A controversial figure, Demirtas was sentenced to ten months in prison for alleged links to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) after suggesting that the Turkish government talk to imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. He has been extremely outspoken regarding the inclusion of Ocalan in political negotiations and the creation of some sort of autonomy for Turkey’s Kurdish population. During 2011 he became a leader of the BDP’s civil disobedience campaign, particularly during Kurdish street protests. He holds a degree in law from Ankara University and is married with two children.

Before and after World War One treaties that were signed were profound in the creation of geography in that area and Kurdistan for that matter; which was divided into four (areas). British policy was determinant and a fundamental reason for dividing Kurdistan in four. Unfortunately during the time that these agreements were taking place, and Kurdistan was divided, Kurds were not able to unify and this has consequently resulted in the situation today. This had led to Kurds being unable to take advantage of the past century, and they pay a great price for that.

(Do you see the events of the Arab Spring as an opportunity for the Kurdish people in the region?)

Of course, there was a Kurdish Spring before the Arab Spring, which has been going on for thirty years. Kurds have been struggling to gain their rights, so these developments with the Arab Spring in conjunction with Syria, provides a great opportunity for Kurds.

2.      At the same event you stated that the Kurdish struggle is past the stage of proving that the Kurdish people exist. You continue on to say that the focus has now moved towards what status the Kurdish people will have on their land. How do you see this struggle unfolding?

Of course, the notion that whether Kurds exist or not has been passed, we have lost a great amount of time struggling to prove that Kurds exist in Turkey in the past few decades. So, the claims the were made by these occupying powers, saying that Kurds are Turks, this stage has been passed and we have moved on to the next stage.

We are at the stage to discuss how these people that exist in this area should be governed. Our political party’s proposed solution to resolve this governing issue is to respect the territorial integrity of the countries in which Kurds reside, namely: Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. We proposed a federal system or an autonomous solution to end this matter. It is impossible to forecast or predict which type of political solution will be achieved in this part of the world; but one thing is (not) clear though, whether or not Kurds will go towards independence or choose a federal or an autonomous system. (The thing that is apparent) today, is that Kurds will not continue to remain under this status quo of non-existent people; it is clear that Kurds would like to be a recognized self-governed people.

It is safe to say that along with Arab, Persian and Turkish co-existence in that part of the world we will be able to talk about the existence of the sovereignty of the Kurdish people co-existing with them.

(How do you feel a federal or autonomous system would affect the Kurdish people in Istanbul?)

We don’t want an autonomous system based on ethnicity; in reality we propose a provincial system in Turkey. These provincial entities under the umbrella of the federal government and one single constitution, each would have a provincial legislative body and constitution to govern themselves. A solution of this sort and the constitutions created in this sense would be able to protect the cultural and linguistic rights of the Kurds in Istanbul as well. It is possible to solve this issue, as long as you believe in the values of the democratic system and justice, with this mind set it will be possible to draft all other legislative components to ensure that the rights of everyone are respected. I have to add that previously I have made reference to the system proposed in Turkey with the current system in Canada.

3.      You have been critical of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP)approach to the Kurdish question, stating explicitly that the AKP is excluding the Kurdish voice in these deliberations. Your thoughts on this issue?

The AKP have put forward a couple steps in this area until 2007, we do not deny this. However, they did not make the profound changes necessary to resolve this matter. They made small steps and wanted the Kurds to be satisfied. After 2007 they changed their policy towards Kurds completely. After 2010 the Prime Minister (Recep Tayyip Erdogan) declared that there is no more Kurdish question in Turkey, there is only a terrorist question. At this point he became more negative in this sense. Beginning from that time, the AKP’s policy towards our political party has been difficult and they attack us on every front. Of course we criticize the AKP for this policy.

4.      In September 2010 you were arrested by the Turkish government for suspected links to the PKK. Why do you believe you were arrested?

You perhaps have the wrong information, I have never been arrested. I have been a member of parliament since 2007 and I have immunity. However, I have been given a ten month prison term, but have never been taken into custody for that matter. It was because of a speech that I gave. However, it has been postponed for five years.

(So, you believe you were targeted because of this speech?)

Yes in that speech I proposed to the government that they should negotiate with Mr. Ocalan to resolve the Kurdish conflict. So, it has been perceived as that. First of all I called him Mr. Ocalan, not just by his name, but mister. This was one of the charges laid against me. Secondly, I told the government that they have to talk to Mr. Ocalan to resolve the Kurdish conflict. For these two things I have been given a ten month sentence. This is considered a terrorist act in Turkey, if you are an individual who does this you are seen as a person who collaborates with terrorist and promotes terrorism. In the past ten years there has been 200,000 charges laid on people who have done the same as me. I have 80 charges on me and I have the least in my political party. These charges have only been charged against me while I have been a member of parliament. Before, when I was a human rights lawyer, I had charges laid against me and active cases, totaling up to 250, some of them have been dropped, but many stay active. Many are waiting until I lose my immunity. Therefore, we consider these charges to be baseless, against my people and myself, they are politically motivated. During the administration of the current government, in past three years, there have been thousands of cases against members in my party.

(When you were first elected to parliament in 2007 you were a representative of the now defunct Democratic Society Party (DTP), which was dissolved by the Constitutional Court at the end of 2009 due to supposed links to the PKK. Why do you feel that the DTP was dissolved, was it for the same issues as you just discussed?)

We have always said that we don’t have organic links to the PKK, we say this not because we are afraid (of the government), but because this is a fact. We are a different entity. The PKK is a different organization; it is a military organization that is based in the Qandil Mountains. They have a different decision making system and different leadership. Our political party is a legal party, with a headquarters in Ankara, with a different decision making body. We have a different leadership, there is no link between these decision making bodies. However, the people that sympathize with us are the same people who sympathize with the PKK.

5.      The BDP was involved in crucial negotiations with the Turkish government to end a 68 day hunger strike by 700 Kurdish inmates and prominent Kurdish politicians. Can you tell our readers the reason why the hunger strike took place and about BDP’s role in resolving this issue?

Those people who went on a hungry strike had two basic demands. The first was the use of the Kurdish language in the public sphere, including in education and in defence of their cases in the court of law. The second was that the solitary confinement placed on Ocalan be lifted and that conditions be set to allow him to negotiate with the government regarding the Kurdish conflict.

We have talked with the government on these two basic demands, to end the conflict. Something became clear during this process, that the policies of the AKP government towards these two basic demands are wrong and not complete. The whole word has watched, unless these two basic demands are meet the Kurdish conflict will not be resolved any time soon. This also put the government in a difficult position and it is under pressure now and understands that it has to go forward with some sort of solution.

From this perspective, when we look at the hungry strikes they may have been a very risky move, however the result has been profound and it has achieved some success.

(Do you think that this highlights the need for a Kurdish party in Turkish parliament?)

In the current situation we do not have the right to be in Turkish parliament with our own identity. When we take the oath for parliament we take it on the great Turkish people. We hope that everyone will exist with their identity within the parliament, whether Turkish, Kurds, Armenian or Alevi.

(Putting aside the identity issue in parliament, do you think the practical ability of the BDP in parliament to act as a moderate voice on the Kurdish issue in Turkey in beneficial, as highlighted by the hunger strikes?)

Of course, although there is great pressure put on us, our existence in the Turkish parliament is important. We believe that we should remain in there and be a voice for the Kurdish people.

6.      Is there anything else you would like to add for our readers? Also, when are you going to come out with a music album? (Mr. Demirtas has a video here, playing a traditional instrument and singing.)

I want to thank your readers and I hope that whoever reads this interview will look at this topic objectively and understand this matter more thoroughly. I hope that when we are able to resolve all of these issues that I may be involved in music, probably not with an album, but maybe as a street performer.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is getting increasingly closer with Egyptian Premier Mohammed Morsi.

Over the decades the opportunistic Turkey has dictated its Middle Eastern relations based on shifts in the regional balance of power. In the early 1990s up until around 2006, Turkey was finely enmeshed in Western sentiments and policies. But beginning in 2006 it recognized a leadership vacuum in the Middle East and began attempting to fill it, resulting in more Islamist policies and a gravitation towards alignment with the Arab/Muslim countries. Things picked up even more so after the Arab uprisings began. That was not surprising. It should have even been expected. However, I suggested in an article a few months ago that based on its shortsighted and failed foreign policy in Syria, its diplomatic history, and in spite of its trending Islamism, Turkey might seek to renew its relations with Israel and again warm up to the U.S. But I fear that suggestion will prove incorrect.

Over the last week Egypt, with Turkish support, has been trying to broker a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, though unsuccessfully.  In theory this would appear to be a perfect opportunity for Turkey to take the lead, and possibly reclaim its diplomatic and regional dominance; something it lost with the escalation of the Syrian civil war. This scenario is definitely within the realm of possibility given Turkey’s historical strict adherence to opportunism and the regional balance of power, which given Egypt’s economic woes and anti-democratic political trends is again in flux.

There would be serious obstacles, to be sure. Turkey’s influence with Hamas has declined since Egypt’s rise, and its relationship with Israel has significantly eroded the last few years. Both parties may also be wary of undercutting Egypt as Hamas has its roots from the Muslim Brotherhood, now dominating Egypt, and Israel doesn’t want to endanger the peace treaty. But it’s the Middle East and anything can happen.

Turkey, however, has remained static even in the face of Egypt’s failings. A few days ago Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan quickly dismissed the suggestion by Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç that perhaps Turkey and Israel hold bilateral talks to end the escalating crisis in Gaza, despite the rift between the two nations. Erdogan has unabashedly blamed Israel for the current crisis with Hamas, even labeling it a “terrorist state” which will “pay the price for Gazans’ tears.” So while there are reports that Turkey is trying to play mediator, it seems that any halt in violence will come from international pressures on the warring sides, not Turkish diplomacy.

Erodgan also just finished a two day tour in Egypt, where he was visibly and passionately trying to increase ties with Egypt’s ruling Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), its leader Mohammed Morsi, and by extension the Muslim Brotherhood. He brought with him a delegation of 12 ministers — the largest in the history of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Perhaps the Prime Minister is trying to help Egypt’s transition to democracy, but that is questionable. Some political pundits, including Mohamed Abdel Kader of the Cairo-based Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, have criticized him for aligning too closely with Morsi and the FJP.  They point out that he has also largely neglectedthe rest of Egypt’s political parties.

With all this, one can’t help but feel that Turkey’s ruling party is breaking with history, instead choosing to further its Islamist agenda. If I were the leader of a Western nation, I would be very concerned.

Photo: The Arabian Gazette

Portrait of Mehmed II by Venetian artist Gentile Bellini (Source: Wikimedia)

The possible Balkanization of Syria is an increasingly likely prospect – at least for the short-term – and could provide a historic counterpoint in the Middle East to what the West did to carve up the region almost a century ago.

With the Ottoman Empire defeated after World War I, the triumphant Allies sought to ensure their version of stability in the Middle East by eviscerating the Ottoman Empire, creating Iraq, Syria and Jordan and renaming Persia. They promised the Kurds a homeland, then broke their promise. In were the British, French and Arabs – out were the Turks and Kurds.

Now, with Syria in freefall and Iraq festering with  its own internal battles, those two groups that were out a century ago could—if crafty and prgamatic – drive a new map of the region.

Turkey is best positioned to take pro-active steps. It has the economic stability and often the political independence to set its own agenda. Plus it has a real need for economic and political allies in the region and geographic buffer zones against extremists.

Turkey has already taken a tough stand against Syrian  It has requested – and received – intelligence sharing with the United States (much like it received earlier in its efforts against the PKK rebels).  Its demand for no-fly zones is being taken seriously and contingency plans are being developed to secure Syria’s stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, at Turkey’s urging.

Their long time enemies  the Kurds, may become a partner – either in a pragmatic marriage or as collaborative, cautious cohabitants. In one of the most crazy possibilities, the Iraqi Kurds may find they need Turkish military protection if the now deadly divisions in Iraq become even worse.  Those divisions are already spilling over into Syria.

Some Iraqis are now supporting their Sunni tribal kin in Syria. Others openly support Free Syrian Army rebels with arms when border controls allowed. Iraqi officials and arms dealers acknowledge the intensifying conflict has already spurred demand in weapons markets in Iraq.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/31/syria-crisis-iraq-idUSL5E8LOEM320121031

Adding to the confusion, an intelligence report cited by Reuters last month said that Iraq has been allowing Iran to funnel “personnel and tens of tons of weapons” through Iraqi airspace and into Syria “on almost a daily basis.” And according to The New York Times, buses carrying pilgrims to a Shiite shrine in Syria are reported to have also carried weapons, supplies and fighters to aid the Assad regime.

And of course, the Iraqi Kurds continue to support their Kurdish cousin in Syria. Kurdish self-defense forces from Syria are now receiving training from Peshmerga forces in Iraqi Kurdistan. The borders of the two Kurdish regions align (as does the one with Turkish Kurds). The dream of an independent Kurdish state seems to be more realistic than ever. And that may include the very unspoken words of a Greater Kurdistan.

Ironically Turkey – who has gone to war with Iraqi Kurds and has cracked down on its own Turkish Kurds – may be the one that provides birth to such a confederation.

Syria’s Kurds have already turned to Turkey for support as a balancing force against Arab nationalism, a lesson they would fast learn from the Iraqi Kurds, who have made Turkey their protector against Baghdad since 2010.

This presents Turkey with a crucial choice. It has traditionally been hostile to an independent Kurdish state or entity anywhere in the region, lest its own Kurdish population make similar demands. But its calculus could be changed by the prospect of chronically unstable Sunni Arab neighbors, and the need to counter Iran’s Shiite axis — currently stretching from Baghdad to the Assad regime to Hezbollah in Lebanon

Furthermore, as in Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkish infrastructure companies would be among the prime beneficiaries of investment in Syria’s Kurdish region post-Assad, winning major contracts, as they did in Iraqi Kurdistan after Saddam. Turkish companies have practically built Iraqi Kurdistan, paving its roads, designing its airports, drilling for its oil, and constructing its urban communities — not to mention being the necessary outlet for Iraqi Kurdistan’s energy resources. Similarly, it is a necessary trade partner for any landlocked entity emerging in the post-Assad aftermath. Turkey’s competitive advantage in Iraq, as an advanced economy that lies next door, will be its advantage also in post-Assad Syria.

It will be hard for Turkey to build a strong relationship with the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds when Turkish Kurds loathe their central government. As it aims for influence in Syria and Iraq, Ankara has to make peace with its Kurdish community. There will not be autonomy, but more democracy may be the path. Turkey is debating whether to write its first civilian constitution; that is the roadmap.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/10/why-syrias-fragmentation-is-turkeys-opportunity/263890/#

Today the lavish, feel-good Turkish epic “Conquest 1453”  — the tale of the taking of Constantinople by the 21-year-old Sultan Mehmet II — has become the highest-grossing film in Turkey’s history, Its cultural triumphalism has been magnified at home and primed Turks to restore their past glory.

That moment truly may have arrived.

That perfect moment of the triumph of the people happened again in Syria.  The rebels captured another border crossing between Syria and Turkey, lowering the Syrian flag and raising their own banner.  It is a symbolic moment of victory – and in a bloody civil war abundant with various factions and no real positive endgame in view, a moment like this is often a zenith of smiles.

“Welcome to Syria,” one said to NPR’s Kelly McEvers as they pulled up barbed wire to permit her to cross the border. You could hear the joy in the Arabic and English, a temporary portal, a shift, a lean toward a change or – at least in the eyes of some – a step toward democracy.

For the media, aid workers, diplomats and others who find a need to enter Syria, control of a border crossing by a friendly rebel faction will make their lives easier for the moment. It adds to the sheen of geographic progress the rebels seem to make as a new week joins those past weeks already bloodied in the Syrian conflict.

http://www.npr.org/2012/09/28/161934799/syrian-rebels-secure-another-crossing-with-turkey

Much like a flag or an international airport, control of a border crossing offers a group symbolic trapping of “statehood” that is important to any band of fighters.   Think of the glee on the face of Yasser Arafat when the Dahaniya Airport was given full international status in 1988 even though Palestine was not a recognized nation. It made it real to him and his troops – and provoked ire in others.

Likewise, during the Bosnian war, such border crossings were given to the Bosnian Serbs by the Yugoslavs to suggest legitimacy to their breakaway fiefdom. In their case, it also made it easier to tighten access to the region, which of course border crossings also can influence. That is another lesson to heed.

So they matter.

Capturing such border crossings provides a strategic and logistical boost to the opposition, allowing them to ferry supplies into Syria and carve out an area of control, which is key as the rebels try to tip the balance in the civil war.

In the north, the rebels are in control of the borders and they are granting travelers entry visas just like any legitimate government. Now they must govern, a first big test. Their grip extends to the borders of Aleppo. They also try to strangle the regime internally by cutting oil supply lines. They are not attacking the fuel sources, such as electricity stations or refineries, but the pipelines.

http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2012/09/04/235951.html

This gives a new element to the conflict. In a sense, the rebels no longer have their backs against the wall; they now have a door to come and go.  A border crossing, a flag, good relations (for the moment) with the press and others, and solid land to stand upon.

News reports say leaders of the rebel Free Syrian Army planned to move their command center from Turkey to Syria with the aim of uniting rebels and speeding up the fall of President Bashar Assad’s regime. It helps having solid land to stand upon.

Rebels still have to rely on Turkey as a rear base for supplies and reinforcements. In the past few months, rebels have captured wide swaths of Syrian territory bordering Turkey, along with three border crossings, allowing them to ferry supplies and people into Syria.

Yet now is the latest irony. Pushed back from the border, Syria has responded with more shelling and what seems to be a determination to provoke Turkey into a wider conflict.  Now that border crossings are being lost to the rebels, the Syrians are using shells to disrupt the cross-border activity.

That has resulted in Turkish villages hit by shells and Turkish civilians killed. Turkey has little tolerance for this and Syria may have done what its allies Russia and China have been able to block: NATO acting.

The Turks have been returning and Turkey’s parliament approved a bill that would allow cross border military operations there. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has warned Damascus not to test Turkey’s patience.

So at the border, all seems to be going the way of the west and pro-democracy hopes. The sheen of “welcome to Syria” still sounds good. In time, the fondness for the press and the west will also soon change.   It almost always does.

In Libya and Egypt, the forces of change have brought no nods to free speech or expression or need to be cordial to U.S. style democratic values.

“We expect from others, as they expect from us, that they respect our cultural specifics and religious references and not seek to impose concepts or cultures that are unacceptable to us,” Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi told the United Nations at the body’s opening sessions last month.

“Insults against the prophet of Islam, Muhammad, are not acceptable,” said Morsi, whose political roots lie in the Muslim Brotherhood. “We will not allow anyone to do this by word or by deed.”

In an interview with The Washington Post, Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi sounded a similar note, saying freedom of speech does not constitute freedom to defame religious beliefs. “It should not be understood that freedom of expression is freedom attacking our faith.”

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/egypt-yemen-challenge-some-us-ideas/2012/09/29/2bb61282-098d-11e2-858a-5311df86ab04_story.html

Democracy blooms well and happy at newly free border crossings.  A little further down the road, however, watch out for those checkpoints.

(Photo: Anatolia/AFP/Getty)