The Foreign Policy Association has asked the blog team to write year-end summaries and even provided a nice little template for us to follow. So, without further ado:

Summary of the Past Year

What an extraordinary year 2011 has turned out to be. The U.S. appears to have successfully navigated a year of extreme turbulence in international affairs, a year filled with both triumph and tragedy and a few surprises along the way.

In the triumph category we surely have to count the raid by U.S. special forces to capture and kill Osama bin Laden at his hideout in Pakistan in early May. The raid represented the culmination of a massive manhunt over two administrations to bring the mastermind of 9/11 to justice. There was no ticker-tape parade for the members of the secretive U.S. Navy SEAL Team Six credited with that raid, but they know they enjoy thanks of a grateful nation. The raid inside the borders of erstwhile ally Pakistan to target bin Laden’s apparently secure haven located a mere 800 yards from their national military academy (their West Point) and 60 miles north of the capital of Islamabad generated tensions on both sides and it would be no understatement to say that the alliance has never fully recovered. Still, there are few who would way that it wasn’t worth it.

In the tragedy category I have to note the famine in the Horn of Africa as well as the historic earthquake in Japan. In both cases, the U.S. actively provided support and aid that saved lives and provided both a visible and practical symbol of the U.S. role in the world. As this year ends the tragedy of those events is compounded by calls to greatly reduce U.S. foreign aid, making it doubtful that the U.S. will be able to respond as quickly to such disasters in the future.

As for surprises, I’m surprised that the U.S. role in the Libyan campaign went as well as it did.  And, I have to admit that I’m surprised that the withdrawal from Iraq is going as well as it is, although, as this report notes, attacks on U.S. forces are expected to increase in the final days of the U.S. withdrawal. Although U.S. troops will be coming home from Iraq, many of them will ultimately be deployed to Afghanistan, where the U.S. goes into 2012 with a new strategy and a new determination to ramp up to wrap up that war.

Most Unexpected Event – Back to Africa
In October the media breathlessly reported that the U.S. dispatched 100 advisers (mostly special forces) to help in the fight against the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa and aid efforts to kill or capture its leader, Joseph Kony. Many commentators seemed surprised at this turn of events. From the media reports one would assume that this was a dangerous and reckless expansion of the U.S. military presence into Africa and represented a new front in the war against terrorism. The reality was, of course, far different. At the end of 2008 the Foreign Policy Association asked the blog team to write a year-in-review post just like this one in which they considered several questions, including the following: What was the most under-reported event of the year? For the U.S. Role blog I noted the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command. Having lived in Africa years ago in a period in which the U.S. presence was waning, I viewed the new military command as a welcome sign that the U.S. once again appreciated the strategic importance of the continent. Since that time the U.S. has stepped up joint operations with local military groups, sending special forces advisers, funding intelligence sharing and training, and deploying drones as well as millions of dollars in military aid to combat al-Shabab, an al-Qaida-linked group in Somalia, and AQIM – an al-Qaida group that operates in the west and north of Africa. The “new” U.S. military presence in Africa was a surprise only to those who were not paying attention.

Person of the Year – Steve Jobs
Now, keep in mind that this blog is devoted to the U.S. role in the world and is not exclusively focused on diplomacy or defense. I’m providing this caveat so you won’t be too shocked as I nominate Steve Jobs as Person of the Year. I think a good case could be made (as I tried to do here) that Jobs symbolized the American Dream to the world at-large in a non-political manner that even those determinedly anti-American could appreciate. His death was a global event (as attested to by the throngs of well-wishers who gathered at Apple stores all over the world), that reminded people that in America the estranged son of a Syrian immigrant could, through hard work and determined focus, change the world and earn billions of dollars in the process.

Forecast for 2012
As the new year dawns the U.S. will set about the urgent task of repairing relations with Pakistan, a vital partner in the war in Afghanistan. Is it too late? Pakistan needs the U.S. as much as we need them and despite the great distrust that exists between us, self-interest should be enough to keep relations cooperative enough to continue the war next door in Afghanistan. I think the real story in 2012 will be the how well the U.S. can balance a rising China with our many Pacific allies that depend on the U.S. to maintain their security. I’m not one of those convinced that our relationship with China need necessarily become adversarial, we have many mutual interests, but China has long demonstrated a difficulty in understanding a country like ours in which their are multiple centers of power, and this lends itself to misperception and miscalculation. I would not be surprised if the year sees little progress in the Middle East peace talks (linked as they are to the Arab Spring), the effort to isolate Iran (Russia and China are certain to veto further sanctions even as Iran does a pretty good job isolating itself), and foreign policy initiatives in general because of the upcoming U.S. presidential election. And finally, as Europe continues to struggle with their debt crisis, I’m looking forward to next year’s G8 Summit in Chicago as an opportunity for the U.S. to demonstrate leadership at a time of global economic uncertainty.

A widely respected expert on South Asia, Ambassador Schaffer spoke exclusively with Dawn.com about Pakistan’s negotiating style with the United States.

Q. The United State and Pakistan have had three ‘marriages’ and two ‘divorces’. Are the interests that lead to an eventful marriage and factors which caused divorce always the same or do they keep changing with every new partnership?

A. The immediate impetus for the three marriages came from factors external to Pakistan such as the Cold War and Afghanistan. What caused the two divorces is different.

The first divorce came in 1965 during the Pakistan-India war when Pakistan used US-supplied weapons which Washington had warned were not supposed to be used against each other.

Pakistan’s nuclear program caused the second divorce. In the 1980s, the US restored a large aid program to Pakistan, but to get the aid through Congress, it also had to pass the Pressler Amendment. In 1990s, the US could no longer certify that Pakistan possessed a nuclear explosive device because of which its assistance had to be cut-off.

In both cases, divorce was the culmination of Pakistan’s unwillingness to accept US terms and conditions.

Q. What would you describe as the striking findings of your study about Pakistan’s negotiating style with the United States?

A. There are three big influences on Pakistan’s negating style with the United States. The first is Pakistan’s view of its place in the world with India as the perpetual enemy and the US as an unfaithful ally. The second is the supreme importance of personal connections in the Pakistani culture. The third influence is the complicated structure of the government and complex relationship between the military, civil administration and the bureaucracy.

Pakistan tries to put the United States on a guilt trip and has been remarkably successful in doing that.

Q. The United States has historically personalised rather than institutionalise relations with Pakistan. How much has that benefitted both the countries?

A. Both the sides have personalised the relationship. Without some degree of personalisation you are not going to get anywhere with a Pakistani leader. But by allowing the personal relationship to substitute for an institutional one, the United States makes itself vulnerable to the guilt trip.

Q. Do you see a dichotomy between the objectives of a US-Pakistan strategic alliance and expectations of both the countries from each other?

A. Yes. This is the real challenge of US-Pakistan relationship. The assumption during all three alliances was that our strategic interests were the same. In fact, they had some points in common, but were not the same. The key to these differences in each case has been India.

For Pakistanis, India is the long-term existential threat. For the United States, India is not an enemy. In Afghanistan, Pakistan’s prime objective is to minimize Indian influence but the US goal is to minimise the al Qaeda influence. These are not the same.

Q. How much is the growing US-India alliance going to influence US-Pakistan ties?

A. I have no doubt that the US-India relationship makes a lot of Pakistanis uncomfortable. They see this as inconsistent with US-Pakistan relationship. If you had a real economic revival in Pakistan at rates comparable with India, you would see the balance of Pakistan’s interests changing in such a way that the US-India relationship would seem less threatening to Pakistan.

Q. Why has the United States rephrased the term “Indo-Pak” and categorised Pakistan into the newly coined term “Af-Pak”?

A. I hate the term Af-Pak. It sounds demeaning in Pakistan. The term and the bureaucratic structure are the products of the decision by President Obama and Secretary Clinton to bring in Richard Holbrooke as the envoy.

Richard Holbrooke was a man of enormous talent. I think the term was his because he meant you can’t only talk about Afghanistan and forget Pakistan. He was trying to convey the message that Afghanistan was sitting next door to Pakistan.

There was a lot of speculation whether Ambassador Holbrooke’s mandate should include India. From the American point of view, the decision not to include India was correct, because a special envoy whose chief responsibility is Pakistan cannot effectively broker with India.

Q. Why is the United States reluctant to play the role of a mediator between India and Pakistan on Kashmir dispute?

A. The US believes that without the strong support of both India and Pakistan no such effort could succeed. India hates the idea of third-party intervention. The US has urged both countries to work things out directly on their various problems, including Kashmir.

Q. In your book, you mention the element of lies in diplomatic relations. Do both the countries lie to each other? What have been the biggest historic lies told to each other?

A. In American court rooms when you are sworn in as a witness, you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth or nothing but the truth. “Nothing but the truth” is the easiest standard to meet while “the whole truth” is the hardest standard to meet. Neither of the governments has met the standard of telling the whole truth. We have, on a number of occasions, withheld things from one and other.

Sometimes, Pakistan has also fallen short of the standard of “nothing but the truth.” For example, when President Musharraf came to the United States and was asked about Daniel Pearl, he said he was “sure” that Pearl was alive. Afterwards, it became clear that Daniel Pearl was already dead and it seemed likely that Musharraf actually knew this. He may have considered that as the right thing to do in protecting Pakistan’s security interests.

We need to understand the impact lies have on both sides. An American official who believes he has been lied to takes this as a real insult to his intelligence and friendship with the other side.

Having lived in Pakistan, I would say it is almost impossible that no one in the army knew that Osama bin Laden was living in Abbottabad.

Q. Are there any phases in the US-Pakistan relation where you find Pakistan successfully influencing American policies?

A. Yes. Pakistan achieved some of its objectives by applying American cultural traits. One instance is Pakistan’s success in 1999 in obtaining a refund of the money it had paid for F-16 aircraft. The Pakistani diplomats based their argument to the United States on the concept of fairness —- which is very important in US culture— and hired a lawyer to file a lawsuit against the US government. Everyone accuses the Americans of being overly legalistic but this time the Pakistanis turned the tables. They used their understanding of US procedure and culture to obtain a result that was very important.

Q. Which US government in the history would you rate as the most Pakistan-friendly?

A. There are a lot of governments which have done really important things for Pakistan. The whole China connection for President Richard Nixon was something that fit in his strategic framework. George W. Bush initiated the big aid program for Pakistan which was carried over by the Obama administration.

Q. What do you think are the causes of growing anti-Americanism in Pakistan?

A. Some anti-Americanism is the inevitable byproduct of the United States being the most powerful country in the world, which makes it a magnet for discontent. Anti-Americanism has become much stronger now because there is a widespread perception in the Islamic world and particularly in Pakistan that the Muslims are being treated with injustice by the west in general and the United States in particular.
This is intensified by the message that is being put out not just by the Islamic militant groups and right-wing parties but also by the government of Pakistan suggesting that Pakistan’s present troubles are entirely the fault of the United States. I don’t agree with that statement. I think frankly no country can blame its entire troubles on anybody else.

If enough important people in Pakistan pointing fingers at the United States for its domestic troubles then it becomes easier to believe that than to search for the roots of homegrown problems.

Q. Pakistanis complain that the Americans do not sufficiently acknowledge and appreciate their contributions in the war on terror.

A. The Americans value Pakistan’s contributions but they also feel betrayed by some of the moves Pakistan is making particular by continuing the relationship with insurgent groups in Afghanistan which are killing American soldiers. Both sides have some reasons to complain that the other side is not respecting their sensitivities. In order to achieve an American policy that is in some sense more responsive to Pakistan’s need, you also need a Pakistani policy that is more responsive to US needs.

Q. Will Pakistan and the US be able to avoid a third divorce this time?

A. I hope so. We have always tried to develop a strategic relationship in which the Americans and Pakistanis know that they are both together for long term. That is desirable but not feasible at the moment. A lot of damage has been done since the beginning of 2011. The fallout from the Raymond Davis case and the aftereffects of the bin Laden raid have left the army feeling embarrassed and the Americans feel betrayed. This is not a good recipe for both the sides embracing each other. What we need now is to have some smaller, more specific successes, and build on those. Perhaps the recent arrest of Al-Mauritani will be a good beginning. (Courtesy: Dawn.com)

A veteran diplomat, Ms Wendy Chamberlin was serving as the US ambassador to Pakistan when terrorist struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. A former High Commissioner of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Chamberlin is currently the president of Middle East Institute, a prestigious think-tank based in Washington DC. In an exclusive interview with Dawn.com, Ms. Chamberlin talks about the ups and downs of the Pak-US relationship and the war in Afghanistan.

Editor’s Note: This interview was conducted before the United States’ decision to withhold $800 million aid to the Pakistani military.

Q: Prior to 9/11 attacks, President General Pervez Musharraf was very unpopular with the United States. Post 9/11, he suddenly became Washington’s favorite man in South Asia. At that time, you were serving as the US Ambassador to Pakistan. How did the new relationship with Musharraf develop?

A: I had my first contact with Musharraf over a dinner weeks before 9/11. That summer, there was a terrible drought in Pakistan and a famine was developing in Afghanistan because the Taliban were preventing the United Nations from distributing food. The civil

war and the drought prevented food from reaching the Afghan people. Hungry people (from Afghanistan) were beginning to come into Pakistan and the Pakistanis would threaten to push them back across the border. So, I went to see the situation in a holding camp in the summer of 2001. I felt that Musharraf was a man who always wanted the best for his people.

Q: What were the first contacts like with Musharraf soon after 9/11?

A: I called on him. I was under instructions to ask him to give up support to the Taliban and join the United States with the determination to root out, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and those who support it. Thus, we started the conversation on how we could work together. The goal ahead was what Pakistan could do for us and vice versa. That year, we kept our promises to Pakistan. We lifted the Pressler sanctions and provided $600 million in immediate grant assistance that subsequently qualified Pakistan for World Bank loans, which otherwise Islamabad could not qualify for. Heads of different governments and states visited Pakistan for rest of the year. We agreed to help in the return of Afghan refugees.

Q: Did the dealings at that point take place with a harsh and threatening tone? Musharraf eventually revealed that the United States had warned to bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age if Islamabad did not cooperate in the War against terror?

A: That tone and conversation never occurred with Musharraf. I was not there but I think it occurred with the ISI chief General Mahmud [Ahmed] when he was in Washington DC after 9/11.

Q: Did the US government, at that point, imagine that the strike against Taliban, who had provided shelter to al Qaeda, would transform into a full-fledged war which continues even after ten years?

A: No one ever wants to go to war. However, we did realise (and you would be crazy not to realise) that societies change very slowly. Development is a process that lasts for several decades.

The truth is that Afghanistan has developed enormously since the beginning of the war on terror. No one is starving in Afghanistan today as they were in the August of 2001. Food is abundant, roads, schools and hospitals are built. Millions of children are going to school today in a country where only a few boys attended school. Many good things have happened in Afghanistan. The Afghan army is being trained.

This is not the end, rather only the beginning. The situation in Afghanistan is on right enough of a good direction. Now, we can withdraw our troops. Why should we stay in Afghanistan now?

Q: Do you think the war in Iraq diverted attention from Afghanistan?

A: Yes, it did. Personally, I did not support the war in Iraq. It diverted our attention from Afghanistan until President Barrack Obama got elected and brought our focus again on Afghanistan.

Q: Why did the Americans ditch Musharraf?

A: I don’t think we ditched Musharraf. I, like many Americans, still consider him a personal friend. In fact he has many close friends here. He is welcomed here. We had a reception for him at the Middle East Institute. It was the people of Pakistan who voted against Musharraf, not the Americans. The Americans pushed for democratic elections in Pakistan. But we did not push at all for Musharraf or his party’s (Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam) defeat.

Q: Ten years after the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, what would you consider the major successes gained in the Afghan war?

A: Well, people tend to forget what a sorry state Afghanistan was prior to the war. Our analysts judged that by the beginning of 2002, six million Afghans would be caught in the midst of a famine. Today, Afghanistan has had two elections, although not fully meeting the international standards, a government and its own health and education systems. There is international trade taking place inside Afghanistan. It is a country that has risen from the rubble and we should take all these changes as our biggest collective achievement in Afghanistan.

Q: In an article in Newsweek Pakistan, you had proposed the resolution of the controversy over drone strikes in Pakistan “in a way that recognises both Pakistan’s sovereignty and the national-security threat that extremists operating in northern Pakistan pose to the US and NATO”. Can you elaborate on your suggestion?

A: I support military, police and judicial actions that protect civilians. If and when the drones protect civilians against the people who bring violence to them, then it is an instrument of national security. What I would like to see is the forces of national security as the ones that protect the people of a nation.

President Obama has an obligation to protect his citizens and he is doing so. While, running for the presidential race, Obama had promised to his nation that he would do whatever it took to protect the American people against al Qaeda terrorism. The president kept his promise after his election by dismantling and weakening al Qaeda through drone strikes. He said he would do it and he did it. There was no surprise about his actions, including the killing of Osama bin Laden. In the same way, the Pakistani security forces are responsible for protecting the Pakistani people.

Q: Although the United States has historically granted assistance to Pakistani military and the military rulers, you belong to the breed of American diplomats who staunchly advocate civilian assistance for Pakistan. Why do you particularly demand civil assistance for Pakistan?

A: I think the American government must give balanced assistance in Pakistan. The civilian institutions in Pakistan are under-funded. The health care system and education sector are equally under-funded not only in terms of money but also in terms of knowledge, capacity and technology. The United States should be a part of any assistance that goes to the people of Pakistan to build public institutions.

I believe the American assistance should go to the most destitute and the weakest. My thoughts are always evolving. I think the best way to make use of the American assistance is to create jobs because if you have many businesses, people become employed and they can build their own lives. I am looking for entrepreneurship programs and enterprise funds, for example, that encourage Pakistani middle class instead of the truly wealthy and the military. I would like to see the American funds going in that direction to benefit the ordinary people of Pakistan.

Q: You have called for a “compact relationship” between the United States and Pakistan. What is that supposed to mean?

A: In 2001, the understanding the United States reached with Pakistan while starting a new epoch of cooperation was based on the promise that Pakistan would reverse its policy with regard to the Taliban and al Qaeda extremists. In return, we agreed to lift the sanctions, provide aid and restore military-to-military relationships. Pakistan asked for certain things such as not to deploy [international] troops on the ground. We agreed to this term hoping that Pakistan would not support al Qaeda and Taliban.

Over the years, that trust has been broken and it has been replaced with mistrust for which both the sides are a little guilty of violating that understanding. So, we need to seriously talk about it again.

Q: What do you think both the countries should talk about?

A: We need to reach a clear understanding. We [Americans] are not stupid. We know what is going on [with regard to the support provided to Islamic militant groups].

Q: But the Pakistanis argue that there is no change in America’s policy towards them. President Obama, they complain, is pursuing the same policies initiated by President George Bush vis-à-vis Pakistan by coaxing the latter to “do more”. Many say Washington’s unchanged attitude has compelled Pakistan to become a rebel ally in the war against terror.

A: That is not true. The policy has changed a great deal. For example, during President Bush’s time, Pakistan did not have a Kerry-Lugar Bill nor did it have a civilian aid programme. President Obama has been much more aggressive than President Bush in defending the American interests.

Q: Today, if you were the US ambassador to Pakistan again, what would you do to gain support for the controversial Kerry-Lugar Bill?

A: I would do what our Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, does. He was given eight billion dollars to improve the American education system. Instead of sitting in Washington DC and designing a plan and telling the school systems what to do, he put out a notice saying that he has eight billion dollars and he will spend it on the communities and schools that come up with the best ideas and plans how to spend this money. He called his strategy “Race to top”.

Likewise, I would go to Pakistan with the civilian aid saying that we know you need this aid. You need curriculum reforms so that your schools will lead to jobs. You need a better health system so that your children do not die before reaching the age of five. You need reliable and sustainable energy so that your factories continue production without any interruptions so that you sell your goods abroad.

We share the same objectives but we are not going to tell you how to do it. You should tell us how we can help you. We will partner with local (Pakistani) money on projects that you think are worthwhile or your design to accomplish the goals that we collectively wish to achieve.

Malik Siraj Akbar, a Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow based in Washington DC, is a visiting journalist at the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), a project of the Center for Public Integrity.

Sixty-eight year old Bob Woodward, an associate editor at the Washington Post, is considered one of America’s most informed investigative journalists. In 1972, his disclosure and consistent reporting with Carl Bernstein of the Watergate Scandal led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon.

Woodward, a Pulitzer Prize winning author of 12 bestselling non-fictions, published his book Obama’s Wars in 2010 which focuses on the war in Afghanistan and the internal debates in Washington, Islamabad and Kabul about the war.

In an exclusive interview with Dawn.com, Bob Woodward talks about the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan in the midst of America’s gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Q: Washington has now confirmed contacts with Taliban for brokering peace in Afghanistan. Had the Americans already contemplated embarking upon a negotiation process with the Taliban or is this a decision made as a last resort because mere military action has not worked?

A: Oh yes, that is the way you end a conflict, isn’t it? In my book, Obama’s War, the Americans say that they won’t defeat the Taliban but will make them a part of the fabric of Afghanistan. A political settlement eventually has to be the end of the conflict.

Q: What is the feeling like in the Obama administration as it prepares to pull out of Afghanistan? Is there a sense of achievement or is it marked with a feeling of regret for not achieving the objectives set earlier in 2001?

A: It is, as the phrase goes, fragile and reversible.

Q: Does that mean al Qaeda will regroup and reemerge in Afghanistan in the future?

A: No, I don’t think so. They will be crazy to return with the deployments and the capabilities the US has in Afghanistan. In my book, I talk of CIA’s 300-man army in Afghanistan, the Counter Terrorism Pursuit Teams (CTPTs). If the United States had these CTPTs prior to 9/11, it would have perhaps easily driven bin Laden and al Qaeda out of Afghanistan in spite of the protection provided to them by the then ruling Taliban regime.

My assessment maybe wrong as it is based on an “if-question” but the point is you don’t necessarily need a lot of force to keep al Qaeda out of Afghanistan.

Q: In your book, there is a continued fear of another 9/11-like attack on the United States? Do you think that is a genuine concern?

A: Yes, it is.

Q: And you also argue that the Afghan war has actually shifted to Pakistan. How much as the war trickled down to Pakistan?

A: In my book, I quote President Obama saying that the “poison” (war) is in Pakistan. The killing of Osama bin Laden inside Pakistan is the proof of that. The Pakistani military and the intelligence officials continued to say that that bin Laden and al Qaeda leaders were not in Pakistan. It was their official position.

Q: So how upset is Washington with Pakistan after the killing of bin Laden on the Pakistani soil?

A: The US is very upset with Pakistan but it is one of those things that both the countries can’t do much about because they need each other. I think both the countries are being very naïve. They are thinking that when they are working together then there will be a total overlap of national interest. This does not happen in international politics. They have to live with this reality.

Q: Do the Americans hold the Pakistani intelligence services responsible for harbouring bin Laden?

A: Yes that is right. It is already known but what has not been established yet is who at what level collaborated with al Qaeda. People in the US government have said that there is no evidence which can substantiate that Pakistan’s top leadership, President Zardari, army chief Kayani and ISI head Shuja Pasha, directly knew that bin Laden was hiding in Pakistan.

Q: Is Washington worried about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear program?

A: Oh yes. That is a real worry. But that is one of those realities that everyone has been able to live with so far.

Q: In your book, you term the Quetta Shura as the central pillar of Taliban, which manages operations and appoints commanders. How significant is the Quetta Shura?

A: The Quetta Shura is definitely a serious issue because it’s the top leadership of the Taliban. It is a part of the potential negotiation. The US has stepped up its efforts in Pakistan. The Quetta Shura is real.

Q: Who are the Americans more comfortable talking to, Asif Zardari or General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani?

A: The United States realises that Kayani has the real power in Pakistan. Obama is trying to talk to Kayani about the importance of having a civilian leadership and a democratic government. I am sure Kayani buys that argument.

Q: Is Kayani as popular with Washington as Musharraf?

A: [Laughs] No. Certainly not. Kayani does not have the political ambition that Musharraf had. At least people in the US think he does not want to become the president of Pakistan.

Q: With the announcement of the US roadmap for pull-out from Afghanistan, there is a growing fear of desertion in Pakistan similar to what the Americans did after the end of the Cold War. Is the history going to repeat itself?

A: That is what a lot of people in the United States are trying to avoid because they are aware of the history. During the relationships between the countries, there come times when people get excited about good things happening and they become upset with bad things occurring. At times, countries lie to each other. You have to totally learn to deal with that. The future is going to be a test for both the countries. I don’t think bad things won’t happen but there should be accommodation for both the countries for each other.

Q: Does the United States differentiate between al Qaeda and Taliban or are all of them seen from the same lens?

A: I don’t think the American people can differentiate between the two. The Taliban are not held in the US in high regard because of their extremist practices and they killed a lot of American soldiers. However, the Taliban have not attacked the United States successfully yet although they tried to do so with the failed attempt by Faisal Shahzad at Time Square.

Q: Will diplomatic relations between Pakistan and the US further worsen in the future?

A: Their relationship is precarious but I don’t think it is going to fall apart.

Q: What is the best way for the United States to engage Pakistan after it leaves Afghanistan?

A: If you read between the lines, everyone seems to be talking about withdrawing by 2014. The United States military, on the other hand, still wants to leave 15, 000 to 25, 000 troops in Afghanistan though this decision has still not been worked out. Everyone knows the perils of a total withdrawal.

Q: To what extent has the Raymond Davis episode and then bin Laden’s killing damaged cooperation between the CIA and the ISI?

A: The current relationship is based more on verification rather than trust. Both the secret services have similar goals in certain areas and dissimilar goals and interests elsewhere. In Obama’s Wars, I say Pakistan is a “powder keg” whose ingredients are political instability, weak civilian control, a powerful army and a strong intelligence system which still has a strategy of cooperating with the US on the one hand and supporting the extremist groups on the other hand. The other ingredients of the Pakistani powder keg include its nuclear program; position between Afghanistan and unresolved problems with India.

Malik Siraj Akbar, a Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow based in Washington DC, is a visiting journalist at the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) of the Center for Public Integrity (CPI).

Dr. Stephen Philip Cohen, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Washington DC, is a respected authority on the Pakistani army and the country’s politics. His book The Pakistan Army was published in 1998 and was translated into Urdu and Chinese. In 2004, he published another book The Idea of Pakistan. In an exclusive interview with Dawn.com, Dr. Cohen speaks about the Pakistan-US relationship and the future of South Asia after the Osama bin Laden crisis.

Q: Who do the Americans hold responsible for harbouring Osama bin Laden: The Pakistani civilian government or the army?

A: The US military respects the Pakistan army for its professionalism but they are angry with the Pakistani military for playing both sides against the middle. They are aware that if you’re an American soldier and the Afghan Taliban who are shooting at you are actually the ones being supported and trained in Pakistan. So, there is real anger with the Pakistan army over this double game. I can understand why they are playing this double game as the Taliban are an asset for Pakistan but the Americans do not like this. There is also deep resentment over some of the policies the army has imposed on the civilian government.

Q: How old is the history of collaboration in the Pakistan army with the Islamic radicals?

A: It dates back to the Bangladesh separatist movement when the army recruited people for al Badar and its death squads. It became more systematic during Zia’s government both in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Now, it is a full-fledged strategic alliance for the Pakistan military.

Q: The Pakistanis complain that dictatorship and Islamic radicalisation were actually gifted to them by the United States. What has compelled the US to support military rulers in Pakistan?

A: The US has needed Pakistan for strategic purposes. Our policies have done as much harm to Pakistan as they have helped the country. We could have supported them but put more pressure to liberalise and democratise the society. The Bush administration made a strategic mistake by supporting Pervez Musharraf and excluding the other politicians. We should have supported Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif. The US did support a deal between Musharraf and Bhutto but excluded Sharif. We should have come out and said publicly that we support all the legitimate politicians in Pakistan.

Q: Do you think the Pakistan army can ever overcome its obsession with India? How can the US help both the countries resolve this conflict?

A: I am writing a book about the India-Pakistan rivalry and calling it the “hundred-year old war”. My prediction is that the India-Pakistan conflict, which includes Kashmir besides many other problems, will last for one hundred years or even more.

I am very pessimistic about a solution between the two countries. They should cooperate over trade, for instance. Kashmir will eventually find its way. The United States should have only a silent role which should be limited to providing ideas and suggestions as we often do in the Middle East peace process.

Q: Does Osama bin Laden’s killing formally end the war on terror?

A: I don’t know if it was a murder or not but maybe it was an extrajudicial killing. Yet, it does not bring the war on terror to an end. Al Qaeda is a large global movement and it will continue to operate. It has diminished not only in terms of its organisational capability but also in terms of its symbolism. There will be major terrorist attacks on Pakistan, United States, India and other countries.

The notion of having a global Khalifat, where the whole world is united under one Khalifa is fanciful. That was not popular in Pakistan some years back. The anti-Americanism popular in Pakistan is based on the misunderstanding of American policies and some of the things that we have done in the past.

Q: Is it anti-Americanism or anti-Indianism that motivates radical elements in the Pakistan army?

A: I don’t have evidence of Pakistan army as radical in the extreme sense. However, it has become more anti-American. Some sections of the army are more anti-American than they are anti-India. The obsession with India, on the other hand, is weakening Pakistan rather than strengthening it. Pakistan has a huge list of reforms that it should have made.

In a talk at Quetta’s Staff College, I said Pakistan should take a lesson from South Korea and Japan which had their own way of taking revenge through economic productivity. Pakistan should struggle to beat India in the software industry, modern agriculture and exports.

Pakistan has had natural advantages over India in many areas but it has failed to capitalise on those advantages. I do not know if it is too late to reverse that process but if Pakistan continues to make India the center of its foreign policy, the country will go nowhere.

Q: There is a lot of resentment inside Pakistan over the drone strikes which many view as a violation of the country’s sovereignty. Can anti-Americanism subside if these attacks stop?

A: We know from the WikiLeaks that the Pakistanis themselves are helping us with the targets. It’s astonishing that the Pakistan government has not said this publicly. The government is too much of a coward to openly admit that some of the drone strikes have killed the enemies of Pakistan. If the Pakistani army and police had taken action against the terrorists, the drone strikes would probably not take place. Every state in the world has an obligation not to allow its territory to be used for terrorist attacks on other states. Pakistan has allowed groups to operate from its territory to launch attacks against the US, Afghanistan and of course India.

Q: How serious is the crisis in Pakistan and how can the world help Pakistan overcome this?

A: There are two things requiring attention: The State of Pakistan, which is mostly bureaucratic, and the idea of Pakistan. The United States can help the State of Pakistan in many ways by developing its organisational and budgetary procedures but we can’t do much about the idea of Pakistan.  Pakistanis themselves have to discuss and debate what it means to be a Pakistani. If being anti-India is being a Pakistani then you are taking the crisis deeper but if you are looking for a modern Islamic state that rest of the world should look upon then that is a different definition of Pakistan.

Q: Do you think the Pakistan army will eventually move with another coup?

A: I don’t see a coup coming in Pakistan. There is this joke in America that when Obama got elected, some newspapers wrote: “Black man gets worst job in the US”. Who wants to be the president of Pakistan? Zardari is doing a mediocre job. I doubt if General Kayani can do a better job as the president.  Pakistan is currently pressed and embarrassed with many issues. Another military coup will simply make things worse for that country.

Q: How do you predict the scenario once the US withdraws from Afghanistan?

A: The US will stay in Afghanistan to a limited degree to make sure that al Qaeda does not show up again. A significant development program is going on in Afghanistan which is more effective than our development work in Pakistan. There is no economic and strategic interest for the US in Afghanistan. It is important because it is having a contaminating effect on Pakistan.

Q: How serious is the tug of war between Pakistan and India to gain political and economic influence in Afghanistan?

A: The good news I have heard is that both the countries are going to talk about Afghanistan. If both the countries can work on an agreement as to what role they should play in Afghanistan to help the Afghan people then that will be a role model for the United States and Iran. The four countries — United States, Pakistan, Iran and India — are critical for the future of Afghanistan. They should agree to have a non-aligned democratic, but certainly not a radicalised, Afghanistan. I am optimistic that the Indians and Pakistanis will work together in Afghanistan.

Q: The right-wing opposition leaders are suggesting that Pakistan should stop getting aid from the United States. Is that going to help Pakistan attain more prosperity and self-reliance?

A: Pakistan should develop its own strategy to develop its industry and agriculture. It has to work out with India on the agreements over Indus waters and also work among its provinces. I want to see a business-like transactional relationship between the United States and Pakistan. The Pakistanis should tell the US what and why they need assistance in certain areas. Once we commit our aid, the US should work as if we are under a contract and if the Pakistanis perform effectively, we should provide them further aid on time.

Malik Siraj Akbar, a Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow based in Washington DC, is a visiting journalist at the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) of the Center for Public Integrity (CPI).

Link to the original interview

President Obama & CIA Director Leon Panetta

9/11 changed the face of US hegemony and after 10 years of what began as a sweeping War on Terror, that face changes again tonight as America prevails proud, resilient and rejuvenated. President Obama’s address confirms Osama bin Laden has been killed and his body is in U.S. custody.

Special forces brought bin Laden to justice and our President thanked those who served us in the military, in counterterrorism and intelligence officials who had been watching the compound and gathering actionable intelligence that ultimately took out enemy number one in a firefight.

It’s a proud day for America, but questions already abound regarding relations with Pakistan: “Osama bin Laden was not in a cave, he was in a city in Pakistan” as one analyst on ABC news reported which had Christian Amanpour then raise the question “whose been protecting him?”

But before entirely implicating Pakistan for harboring the worlds most wanted man, it’s important to recall Obama’s increased intelligence operations in Pakistan since he took office. As the war shifted to Pakistan, so did ISI CIA collaborative operations. With closer collaboration came butting of heads where U.S. intelligence speculated if Pakistani intelligence was doing enough and such rifts peaked last week when Admiral Mike Mullen voiced harsh criticism of the ISI.

But the President’s comments and ongoing reporting indicates that today’s victory that comes after 10 long years of war, struggle and sacrifice, was a joint operation with Pakistan. GEO News in Pakistan confirms most of the information we’re hearing here, save some reporting that 1 American helicopter was shot down. Nonetheless, Peter Bergen on CNN says Elite Black Ops and Paramilitary CIA who were the likely heroes, operated with cooperation of the Pakistani government. Yet this success does not negate or allow us to ignore the concern of who, or at worst, what elements of the Pakistani government knew of Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts.

Today prompts us to reassess and revamp relations with Pakistan, who once again has proven itself as an effective ally at wartime. This victory is an opportunity to foster a fresh relationship that can be something more than transactional and more transparent. Skepticism of one another in both states is beyond a misalignment of interests, it’s a misalignment of conceptions of one another. Perceptions matter and it is no secret that anti Americanism can be formidable fuel to our enemies abroad. U.S. Intelligence amidst constant rhetoric of “Blowback” is redeemed today; the Intelligence agencies are heroes to Americans everywhere, and in this instance, even for Pakistani’s who suffered tremendously since 9/11. With an ever crippling economy, and a seemingly endless barrage of violent onslaughts from Al Qaeda suicide bombers in the past 10 years, Pakistani’s along with American’s should rejoice at today’s victory while policymakers in both countries take time to capitalize on this game changer and move forward anew.

Step 1, halt the drones.

A friend came over yesterday evening and we watched CNN coverage of Libya (more like CNN spotlight on “Crazy Gadaffi”). The ongoing commentary although humorous at times, spurred thoughts pertinent to combating terrorists in Pakistan. At one point Wolf Blitzer had the former House Intelligence Committee Chair in the Situation Room and commented:

“Is Gadaffi on drugs, there’s always been something off with him. He must be on drugs”.

The Congressman responded “You know, two out of three times I met him, he was rational and completely in his senses. That third time though you could tell something was off”. (this is paraphrased)

Hilarious. Hilarious  because this comedy was not the least bit intentional, it was prime time news. CNN went hours today with repeated images of Gadaffi in overwhelmingly monotone attire: this dreadful toasted camel tone, from head to toe. My friend and I laughed at the video clips and talked about a recent article in Vanity Fair entitled “Dictator Chic” depicting what was clearly portrayed as catastrophic fashion choices over the years. We laughed at a notion of giving Gaddafi a makeover as a means of American Intervention, and as students of International Relations/Security Studies that was all the segue required to transform our down time into a serious debate on contemptible characters in international politics who manage to command the worlds attention for decades on end.

My friend (who is sure to be an expert on Iran who we’ll see on CNN one day) commented

“It’s funny there are similar protests in Iran right now with crackdown on protestors but Ahmadinejad still publically calls for other dictators to hear peoples requests”.

I said, “Yeah, guess Gadaffi makes Ahmadinejad look reasonable”.

We laughed, but got quiet for a second afterwards in serious thought.

She asked “So…..Gadaffi, or bin Laden….whose more irrational?”

I didn’t pause to reflect and immediately reacted “Bin Laden. He calls for establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Bin Laden is operating from a premise of ideology rather than rationality”

We looked at each other for a half a second, before I realized two things: One rationality and ideology need not be mutually exclusive in all situations, and secondly: if rationality in International Relations is understood (in a super simplistic nutshell) as a cost benefit analysis determinate of behavior, then my initial thought is incorrect.

I realized this and retracted, “Wait. Bin Laden has very real political objectives. He wants U.S. troops withdrawn from Saudi Arabia & and an overthrow of the current Saudi regime. And whether we find that objective absurd or not, they are, according to his calculations attainable political objectives that he thinks are worth the costs he invests in terrorism”.

She was of my initial mindset and countered “No. I think he initially started off that way but has since called for overthrow of all Arab regimes and is so angry at what the west has done in the Muslim World that he would not have Al Qaeda stop targeting America for all that its done over the years”

I responded “So the four biggest grievances Bin Laden has regarding the West in the Muslim World are troops in Saudi and Afghanistan being the top two. Next on his list is our military presence in Palestine and Iraq. Let’s assume all four of these, which he finds are legitimate grievances, are miraculously altered in his favor, I don’t think he would then continue to attack American targets”

She smiled, and said “Solving those four eh? Now that’s hopeful!”

We laughed and I continued, “Because if we can agree that Bin Laden sincerely believes both that these objectives are legitimate grievances and his tactics can be effective, then he’s acting rationally. And if those grievances get solved, why would he bear the costs of investing in terrorism afterwards? It requires, money, organization and is very high risk. He would have to begin from scratch in rallying a support base with new objectives. Because he would no longer have reason to wage what he thinks is “jihad” if there were nothing to gain from it”.

She stopped for a moment, then thought about it aloud “So, then Osama Bin Laden does act rationally”

It was a disturbing sort of conclusion we both very hesitantly came to. Because it’s immediately easier to assume our enemy is an irrational mad man, (a la the images of Gadaffi on CNN) than understand, recognize and deal with the root causes of their actions. Which has led me to expand focus from solely military forms counterterrorism in my studies. When the crux of the issue is one of grievances over U.S. troop presence in the so-called “Muslim World”, an amplified U.S. presence in response is increasingly seen as counter productive. It’s among the main reasons our initial target of obliterating the Taliban in Afghanistan at the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom has shifted instead to finding ways of negotiating with the group.

Although the United States policy of non negotiation with terrorists on the grounds that concessions reinforce and empower terrorist activity is reasonable, an over reliance on military means simply has not been sufficiently effective into our 10^th year of engagement in Afghanistan, and as a dire result, now in Pakistan.

Pakistan is a prime example of how negotiations in tandem with diplomacy supported by military coercion is key to combating terrorism today. Spillover of Al Qaeda and radical militarization of Taliban among other terrorist groups has proliferated in direct correlation with our military operation in Afghanistan since 2001. Bridget Nacos of Columbia University in her work“Counterterrorism Strategies: Do We need Bombs over Bridges” describes a main reason for this:

“As the Iraq war demonstrated, massive military force can result in a recruiting bonanza for terrorists. And as ground and air operations against Al Qaeda and Taliban figures in Pakistan’s tribal region showed, such strikes can trigger further waves of Terrorist attacks”

Where does that leave us? The aforementioned point of negotiations with the Taliban is a fair starting point. No matter how unpalatable and in stark counter to international norms on human rights the Taliban seem, they were not engaging directly in terrorist activity prior to Bush’s “War on Terror”. The Taliban’s objectives were intrastate, domestic ideological goals of imposing their radical, warped brand of Islam on Afghani’s. In fact, Fawaz Gerges, scholar and author of “The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global”  explains while allowing Al Qaeda to operate in Afghanistan, the Taliban was actually at odds with them over their ambitions to wage attacks against American targets, or the “far enemy” if you will.

So, negotiation with groups by attempting to understand their grievances rather than ideology is key. Negotiations attack the support base of terrorist groups, whereas military means have shown to radicalize them in recent years. Groups whose ideologies, and constructed identities are repellent to us, may still be brought back into the fold of non-violence and retreat back into not targeting the United States. This is important because these very groups have aligned with terrorist organizations and made the past few years for our troops the deadliest ever and with General Patreus predicting an even worse situation for 2011, new strategies are essential.

Understanding that terrorism carried out by Al Qaeda is not entirely irrational, but rather calculated, orchestrated and heavily invested in to achieve what they feel are legitimate political grievances is critical in counterterrorism, especially efforts aimed at the spillover and expansion of attackers. An accurate assessment of not only the enemy but also potential sympathizers and supporters in Afghanistan and Pakistan requires immediate and preventative measures. Nacos suggests robust diplomacy through traditional channels, and engaging media and general public. It’s a fair argument, and given the deteriorating situation, her recommendations are very worthy of consideration.

Holbrooke, whose forceful style earned him nicknames such as “The Bulldozer” and “Raging Bull,” was admitted to the hospital on Friday after becoming ill at the State Department. Keeping up to this reputation Holbrooke fought for his life for four days and three nights. In Hillary Clinton’s words, “His doctors marveled at his strength and his willpower, but to his friends, that was just Richard being Richard.”

Earlier Monday, Secretary Hillary Clinton, who along with her husband Bill, visited Holbrooke at the George Washington University Hospital and remarked afterwards, “Richard Holbrooke served the country he loved for nearly half a century, representing the United States in far-flung war zones and high-level peace talks, always with distinctive brilliance and unmatched determination.

But the United States was not the only country that he loved. His latest preferred country was Pakistan. His staff members believe that not just US that lost a brilliant diplomat, but that Pakistan lost a sincere friend in the person of Richard Holbrooke. He took his work as a Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan so seriously that he spend most of his time traveling to these countries. He stayed nearly month in Afghanistan when was assigned this job by President Obama in 2009.

The former US ambassador to the UN was widely considered “one of the most talented diplomats of his generation,” as Obama said in January last year. Just yesterday President Obama called him “toughest son of a gun.” It was this reputation that won him both friends and foes. There was no middle ground for him.

With his body size, imposing intellect and inquisitive looks, one could never guess if he was about to hug you or punch you. Only a little smile would give you a hint of his mood. At least that’s how I felt the first time I made his acquaintance. I distinctly remember that we met at an official State Department function last year after his nomination. Earlier that day a television reporter was killed in an attack in Pakistan. Holbrooke was like a star working the room, ditching some, greeting others depending on his frankness with them. I was pretty sure that he couldn’t understand my name properly, but just as he heard the word Pakistan, he expressed his condolences of the death of the reporter with me.

He later developed a friendly relationship with journalists from South Asia. Usually after meetings he would share notes with the crew on ‘what books to read” and their significance. Holbrooke was the high ranked official who was available almost anytime you need him. No protocol required, as he had seen all and of course enjoyed all.

“Mr. Ambassador”, as he preferred to be called, was poised to be secretary of State if Al Gore, Senator John Kerry or Hillary Clinton had won the presidency. Holbrooke had good relations with his three bosses: the Secretary of State, the Vice President and the President. There were speculations in the beginning, when rearrangement of the South and Central Asia bureau at State department occurred to accommodate his new portfolio, that Secretary of State and Special Envoy could have a clash on policies or staff, but no such issue surfaced.

As a special envoy, Holbrooke’s influence was perhaps most directly felt at the State department. He was not shy about telling staffers that his authority was derived directly from his relationship with Clinton and Obama, according to people who have worked with him.  Although clearly “Clinton’s man” at State, Holbrooke understood better than most the importance of putting country first, putting aside the bitterness and personal racor of the 2008 campaign to serve a president whose candidacy he had not supported during the primaries.

Holbrooke appeared to be one of those intelligent and experienced diplomats who knew his job way before he took it up. In a thank you speech right after his announcement as Special Representative he said, “In putting Afghanistan and Pakistan together under one envoy, we should underscore that we fully respect the fact that Pakistan has its own history, its own traditions, and it is far more than the turbulent areas on its western border.”

As a young Foreign Service officer in the early 1960s, Holbrooke served in Vietnam. Later, under President Jimmy Carter, he became the then-youngest assistant secretary of state in history, responsible for Asia policy, at age 35. Under the Clinton administration he registered his talent, he helped put an end to the genocidal war in Bosnia in 1995, while serving as assistant secretary of state for European affairs. His reward was becoming UN ambassador during President Bill Clinton’s second term.

As special rep. Holbrooke emerged as one of the most powerful forces in the Obama administration’s foreign policy team. He had developed official as well as friendly relationships with the leaders from South Asia. His vision and understanding of the region can be gauged from this declarative statement he made last year: while expressing worry about an expanded Taliban hold over western Pakistan, he said that “You can’t send troops into Pakistan. That’s a red line.” In different meetings, whether with Pakistani diplomats, politicians, or with White House officials and military personnel, Holbrooke had been seen defending Pakistan.

Probably a reason that according to his family members, his last words to his Pakistani doctor were, “you have got to stop this war in Afghanistan.” He battled for Pakistan in Washington, he was Pakistan’s true friend.

Earlier today, law enforcement authorities arrested yet another terrorist in the making – a naturalized American of Pakistani origin, Farooque Ahmed for trying to help coordinate bombing at Washington’s Metro System, also known as the subway system. Once again, fortunately, this nut’s plot was never a serious threat, but for his part, Farooque Ahmed did everything in his power to hurt, harm and devastate whatever he could.

Shame on him and shame on everyone who knowingly supported his sickening plot to target innocent civilians, really, shame on them.

Given what Muslims in general, but in this case, Pakistanis in particular have tried to do to attack America; it truly is amazing that so far, the Americans have been superbly generous, amazingly tolerant and insanely forgiving towards Muslims within the United States. But, can this relax attitude towards Muslims going to remain decent given all these repeated attempts to harm America? Only time will tell, but common sense points towards justified anger emerging within this country in the very near future, if Muslims, and Pakistanis (not all Pakistanis) don’t give up their violent and wicked dreams of attacking America.

I personally have had the misfortune to come across people, who didn’t believe that Al-Qaeeda existed, or worse, that Osama and his cronies are behind any effort, including the horrific tragedy of 9/11, to harm America, but naively, I dismissed them as loonies. However, it seems that it is a mistake, in fact, a horrible blunder to not take anyone seriously who speaks of Osama admiringly and who believes that every foiled terrorist attack is actually a ‘conspiracy concocted by the CIA’.  

I suspect that this misguided man Farooque Ahmed, too is going to justify his behavior by complaining that Muslims are being attacked for their religion, and that there is a conspiracy against Islam. And, even though he was living in America, he still got plenty of material not only on the Internet, but also in the mosques that he and his family visited. And, it makes me really sad, because Farooque had every opportunity to study in detail that Muslims are hurting because of their own failures and their misfortunes have nothing to do with America, honestly. Worse yet, he could have helped his Muslim brother and sisters by dispelling this notion of ‘Muslims are being attacked for being Muslims’ but instead, he opted to go down the wrong path, and now, thankfully, he is in custody, and fortunately, his vicious dreams will never materialize.

However, for me, his arrest is not the end of the struggle to beat hate mongers, because for me, it represents just one chapter that came to light and I believe that there are many more people within the United State who think and agree with the ideology that inspired Farooque Ahmed to engage in terrorist activities.

I believe that it is time for Muslims, and of course, Pakistanis in America to seriously entertain the notion that political Islam is not the way to move forward. Muslims and Pakistanis must decide whether they are loyal to America or not and if not, believe me, nobody wants to keep them in the United States forcefully. These people, whether it is Faisal Shazad and Farooque Ahmed and numerous others like them to move to another country that welcomes their ideology of hate.

In America, we reject this appalling idea of carrying out revolting attacks in the name of religious fight.

Thankfully, in America, there is no room for religious hate and we all, regardless of our background support the efforts to defeat nihilists.

However, nothing could be more tragic than today’s Pakistan

Let us be clear about Pakistan and judging from the evidence, it seems unlikely that the country will ever be a success story. Everything about Pakistan suggests failure, misery and more failure and misery. No question, people will continue to believe that ‘things will improve’, but I hate to be the guy to break this to the believers – not going to happen, sorry.

What I have come to believe is that Pakistan is a textbook example of classical failure as a state. Right from the start when Pakistan came into being, the country was shaky, poor, and unprepared. To make matters worse, it has always been one problem after another and with each passing day, month, year or a decade, the overall situation has continued to deteriorate through out the country.

Yes, it is true that the love of Pakistan will continue to prevent people within the country to deny that the country has not been a success story. For varying reasons, people will maintain that ‘if only this changes or that power leaves us alone’, Pakistan will be fine. Different ethnic, religious and political groups divided along ideological and territorial lines will advance strong, but naïve reasons for defending Pakistan in spite of daily suicide bombings, beheadings, stoning, growing poverty, frightening population explosion, and so on so forth. And, those who question Pakistan’s overall physiological, political, and economical health would still be considered ‘traitors, foreign agents and enemies of Pakistan’ but this bullying by the misguided must not stop those who argue for a different course.

Nations (Pakistanis still have to forge a national bond to become a nation) don’t succeed or fail in a day or two. It takes generations to become successful and it takes miraculous harmony and exceptional commitment to keep the progress alive and the society to thrive, something that has not happened in Pakistan.  Unless people in Pakistan from all walks of life fully understand that emotional rants, hyper charged rhetoric, insane conspiracy theories, and the desire to ‘conquer’ everything and everyone else is not the way to make Pakistan a success story, things are not change or improve, period.  

For Pakistanis, the first goal must be to become realistic and accept ground realities, even if it makes them question everything they have been told about Pakistan’s history and its future. Loyalty to Pakistan does not, and it should not mean accepting the narrative put forward by the judiciary, jihadists, and judges and yes, even generals. On the contrary, country’s love makes it a patriotic duty to not be conned by shady judges, crooked journalists, and dishonest politicians.  Nope, people of Pakistan will have to decide, independently, about what is good for them and what is good for their country.

According to the New York Times, Pakistan’s military is maneuvering to remove the current government. This, according to the paper, is because of corruption and lack of proper response to the flood.

What is missing from the report is that once this government is gone, angels and superheroes are going to takeover and they will change everything wrong with Pakistan, overnight.

The world has seen this before, but I suspect that people in Pakistan like this game of throwing out democratic governments and bringing in old, tried, and tired hands with this hope that somehow, magically, things will change and yes, improve, even though, history begs to differ.

No point in repeating that the current government has been perpetually dealt with crisis right after Musharaff and his cronies left the country without any food, water and money. What Musharaff and his gang did leave behind were multiple disasters in the shape of terrorism, charged up lawyers movement, and uncountable other problems that the current government is still trying to solve.

If Pakistan is viewed as a society without the deranged and delusional support of Pakistan’s contemporary electronic media, it is still not a bad place. However, because of the consistent poisonous war against the left leaning and progressive government of Pakistan People’s Party waged by the jihadists, so called-journalists and judges with the not so subtle help from the army, the country seems like a hell hole.

Ironically, the current champions of freedom of press have jailed journalists while they were in Power. Ask Najam Sethi, Husain Haqani (to name a few) about the experience. Even worse, the same people who claim to be in love with ‘independent judiciary’ are also responsible for organizing the one and only attack on judiciary. Just ask Sajad Ali Shah about it.

As awful as it sounds, it seems likely that the Zardari and Gillani will be shown the door, but it is going to be a supremely sad day for Pakistan’s public and for its future. Gone are the days when an elected government was overthrown, especially when it represented people from smaller provinces, and people took it quietly. Not any more.

Equally terrible is the prospect of ordinary Pakistanis suffering because of this upcoming ‘revolution’. And those, who are inviting a revolution, must not forget what happened in China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba when ordinary people gave up their rights for buying into the hideous notion of a better future. Better life after a revolution remains an unfulfilled dream, and an empty promise. It has never anywhere in the world, and it is not going to happen in Pakistan either. It will only make life more miserable for ordinary citizens and it will tremendously help the hard core hyper nationalists dying to dominate the society.

So, here is a message from insanity to the generals in Pakistan. “Go ahead, remove the government, and make my day.” 

]]> http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/09/28/a-message-from-insanity/feed/ 0 http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/09/28/obama%e2%80%99s-wars-%e2%80%93-not-planning-to-fail-but-failing-to-plan/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=obama%25e2%2580%2599s-wars-%25e2%2580%2593-not-planning-to-fail-but-failing-to-plan http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/09/28/obama%e2%80%99s-wars-%e2%80%93-not-planning-to-fail-but-failing-to-plan/#comments Tue, 28 Sep 2010 05:04:18 +0000 Zainab Jeewanjee http://pakistan.foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=2281

Shifting the Focus to Pakistan

“Obama’s Wars” released today already has the attentive public abuzz with tidbits of explosive revelations disclosing divergences at the top levels of government; nothing short of that we’ve come to expect from a Bob Woodward work. While McChrystal’s abrupt departure earlier this year had already exposed wrangling between our executive branch and military personnel, Woodward’s book is set to make public the reality of Obama’s campaign promise in setting Pakistan squarely at center stage in our War on Terror.

“we need to make clear to people that the cancer is in Pakistan”

The book will illustrate Obama’s aim to wind down the war; elucidating his always meticulous refrain from using “Victory” in reference to Afghanistan.  Woodward reports however, that he is determined that no success can come without targeting Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan.

According to the Washington Post, the book recounts a top secret meeting with Obama’s then Director of national Intelligence, Mike McConnell who specifically warned that Pakistan is not be trusted as a partner in our Afghanistan engagement.

It’s thus no wonder “quagmire” is used to describe the task at hand. Because regardless of how much the President wants to cut back in Afghanistan, the very strong reluctance stems from potentially risking American interests and leaving the aforementioned “cancer” in Pakistan. So deepening, or as the President might prefer, “shifting” the focus requires a new, more Pakistan focused agenda.

Looking at his National Security Strategy laid out in May 2010, we do find Pakistan is a top concern. Amidst steadfast commitment to liberalist principles calling to defeat terrorism with multilateralism, in adherence with international law and a sensitive awareness to growing interdependence in an increasingly globalized system, the document reads our security objective as such:

“to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qa’ida and its affiliates through a comprehensive strategy that denies them safe haven, strengthens front-line partners, secures our homeland, pursues justice through durable legal approaches, and counters a bankrupt agenda of extremist and murder with an agenda of hope and opportunity. The frontline of this fight is Afghanistan and Pakistan”

Naming Pakistan alongside Afghanistan underscores the President’s shifting focus. The policy refers to Pakistan as the “epicenter of violent extremism” and warns “danger from this region will only grow if it’s security slides backward”.

Throughout the document, we see such warnings used interchangeably for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Perhaps an indication of how policymakers and journalists use sweeping generalizations such as “Af-Pak” for two countries still far from understood. However the National Security Policy makes no mistake in interchanging recommendations. Clearly spelling out that “denying Al Qa-da the Ability to Threaten the American People, our Allies, Our partners and our Interests Overseas” is our main objective, it specifically spells out how to achieve this in Afghanistan through:

-       Continued work with the United Nations and Afghan Government

-       Improving accountable and affective governance

-       Assistance on supporting the President of Afghanistan

-       Supporting ministries, governors and local leaders who have demonstrated measured progress in combating corruption

-       Targeting our aid to Agriculture and human rights

-       Military and International Security Assistance Forces partnering with Afghanistan to target the insurgency

-       Timetable laid out: transition to Afghan responsibility. July 2011 reducing troops.

This describes the first two parts of the three pronged approach spelled out in the National Security Strategy. The third prong refers to Pakistan and is relatively vague. It restates the objective of “strengthening Pakistan’s capacity to target violent extremists with continued assistance in those efforts” without laying out how this can occur. With Afghanistan, there is reference to the United Nations, specific levels of government and ISAF forces collaborating as a means to acheiving the objective to combat and provide security from violent extremists. No such specificities are spelled out in reference to Pakistan. Rather, the document vaguely describes an approach that is meant to

“strengthen Pakistan’s democracy…provide “assistance responsive to the needs of the Pakistani people and sustain a long term partnership committed to…deepening cooperation in a broad range of areas …in the years to come”

That is not a strategy. There is not a linking of means to an end. There is no specific timetable or reference to benchmarks for the end objective, nor quantifiable measurements for success. Further, Pakistan has not been able to cement it’s democracy let alone sufficiently respond to the needs of its population in 60+ years, making our intentions to do so implausible. In regards to “long term, deepening cooperation” amidst the staunch multilateral rhetoric, the document does not once refer to Pakistan as among the “partners” it seeks to engage in reaching our objectives. It references “fostering a relationship” but partnership is nowhere to be seen.

So, if the President has his way, we will wind down Afghanistan and likely shift focus to Pakistan. I hope by then there exists a more clearly laid out and practical approach to achieving our objectives and securing our interests there. Otherwise, without sufficient planning, the quagmire just deepens.

Surprisingly, this has worked superbly.

On top of everything else bad for the county, the electronic media imploded on the scene in recent years and the entire right wing, pro-Taliban, anti progress, anti rationality, anti Western, anti Women nationalists got an ideal platform for spewing non stop venom. This nauseating propaganda against pretty much everything has totally destroyed rationality in Pakistan and helped hate become the main argument against common sense.

Too bad for Pakistan, because it is not a good way to collaborate or co exists in the world.

Pakistan has not been able to do anything positive on its own and nothing has been planned, programmed or executed to put Pakistan on a peaceful path. And, it is not an unreasonable conclusion that there is nothing in Pakistan’s history that suggests that the nation is serious about anything, but -prepare yourself- jihad.

Therefore, it is no surprise that today, the world is literally ‘sick & tired’ of Pakistan. The Western governments are exhausted by perpetual crisis in Pakistan and the non stop aid demands that come out of these tragedies engulfing Pakistan, day after day, government after government.

So, naturally, when floods destroyed about 25 to 30 percent of Pakistan, it took forever for anyone to gear up, yet again, to help Pakistan. Because of Pakistan’s inability to help itself, or, accept some responsibility for the complete failure of everything across the board, there was no appetite for helping Pakistan on this scale.

After a very slow and terribly late start, a lot has been done, but whatever has been done is not enough. There are people who are doing everything they can to raise funds, collect food, medicines but what is needed is a commitment, serious, long term, generous commitment from the world to help the poor people who were destabilized by this horrific tragedy.

Fortunately for Pakistan, a friend in Maryland, who is a medical doctor, has been working, e-mailing, calling, and visiting everyone who would listen to bring attention to the flood victims. And, based on the evidence that I have seen, this selfless doctor was the first one to correctly point out that the flood in Pakistan has done more damaged than the Haitian earth quake and Indonesian Tsunami combined. Thankfully, there is awareness about the flood damage, but the time is running out as the gap between rich and poor in Pakistan is frighteningly increasing and this would lead to a catastrophe.

Also, the problem of flooding is going to end sooner or later and once the water is gone, a very difficult and problematic scenario is going to challenge not only Pakistan, but also the world.

Not only is Pakistan’s agricultural sector been totally annihilated by the floods, but the entire infrastructure for about 30 to 35 of the country has been ruined beyond repair. So, first, Pakistan needs money today to urgently help the flood victims find shelter, food, medicines, and later rehabilitate them, but also rebuild everything that was obliterated in three provinces from scratch. This is going to need a lot of money and this is where the world commitment to peace, prosperity and above all, to humanity will come into play.

If Pakistan is quickly helped, then, the risk of the Taliban winning hearts and minds of desperate people is extremely low. However, if the money or the aid does not flow towards the needy, it is very likely that the Taliban and other negative forces will jump to fill the vacuum and in the process, hand a permanent defeat to the civilized world.

Pakistani Tennis Star Asiam Qureshi Calls for Peace at U.S. Open 2010

It’s my first week in Denver where I’ll be attending graduate school the next two years and I’m soaking in how kind this city is. It is the most laid back, genuine U.S. City I’ve experienced. The sincerity with which people prod “No, where are you really from?” when I initially respond “California”, is priceless. I feel like a novelty here. At an Eid Celebration last night, even a local of Pakistani descent pointed out “Wow, the guys are going to flip over you. There are no ethnic girls in Denver”.

“Ethnic”? I’ll take it; I realize I’m getting a pass for being a Californian female. Because in light of increasingly disheartening news from Pakistan, be it about floods, match fixing in cricket, and mostly terrorism plaguing the country since 9/11, Pakistani’s have captured the American state of mind in a less than appealing way. Once indecipherable on a world map for most Americans, Pakistan emerged as our stalwart ally in victory after 40+ years of Cold War. Yet as we turn to Islamabad again to fight a War on Terror, we possess a deep skepticism of Pakistani intentions.

Pakistan is rampantly associated with concepts of Terrorism, Extremism, Al Qaeda, Taliban, Corruption and disaster as D.C. and Islamabad are ever more understood as reluctant partners. Plus post thwarting the Faisal Shahzad situation , expert indications that homegrown terrorism poses the biggest threat to the United States, stabbing of a cab driver of Pakistani descentand Amnesty International’s recent report that hate crimes against Muslims is on an alarming rise, being Pakistani seems like an uphill battle in America. So on an individual level, Pakistani’s and Americans may be feeling the same skepticism that governments harbor for one another in bilateral relations. But this week the world was abuzz when Pakistani tennis player Asiam-ul-Haq Qureshi with irresistible sincerity exclaimed:

Since September 11, every time I come to the States or western countries I feel people have the wrong impression about Pakistan as a terrorist nation. I just wanted to declare that we are very friendly, loving and caring people, and we want peace in this world as much as Americans and the rest of the world wants.

There are extremists in every religion, but just because of them you cannot judge the whole country as a terrorist nation. I just wanted to get this message across as a Pakistani

In plain terms Qureshi clarified that his country is a mostly moderate nation where people expect the same peace and security desired by all people. He reminded us of Pakistan’s humanity, directly countering the “transactional” ties that progressively complicate our understanding of Pakistan. Fareed Zakaria might agree. In a recent piece, he eloquently concurred:

Across the Muslim world, militant Islam’s appeal has plunged. In the half of the Muslim world that holds elections, parties that are in any way associated with Islamic jihad tend to fare miserably, even in Pakistan.

In his article “We’re Safer Than We Think” Zakaria points out that Muslims in Pakistan and beyond are if anything, less safe from terrorism than we are as they suffer the brunt of radical Islam’s consequences.

Over the last few years, imams and Muslim leaders across the world have been denouncing suicide bombings, terrorism, and Al Qaeda with regularity….The fatal problem with these kinds of attacks is that they kill ordinary civilians—not U.S. soldiers or diplomats—and turn the local population against Islamic radicals.

With more thorough detail, Zakaria’s is saying exactly what Qureshi did; Pakistan is not a country of terrorists. So next time I get asked where I am “really” from, I might just say “I’m from Asiam Qureshi’s country”. ]]> http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/09/12/asiam-qureshis-country/feed/ 0