News? What news?
Kazakhstan had elections this Saturday after a short campaign season. President Nazarbaev's Nur-Otan party won over 80% of the legislative seats, and handily. The OSCE sent observers, who again found the elections to be ‘not free and not fair’.
The observers noted that ballot-boxes were allegedly stuffed; that the short election season put Kazakhstan's minority party at a disadvantage, that votes were counted non-transparently; and that protests have to be within the law that Nur-Otan government will continue to set.
End of story? Well, not exactly.
Though OSCE observers describe an electoral reality, it focusses on domestic doings and omits a lot of international context. In some ways, the tone–“business as usual”– is correct. In other ways, it makes this pesky business sound like something that only happens in Kazakhstan to Kazakhstanis. It allows other OSCE states to justify nixing Kazakhstan's OSCE ambitions, which are very real and which look like burnt toast at the moment. But as long as we take this as business as usual, we’re missing a point of view which the Kazakhstanis could justifiably hold. And it may be past time for Kazakhstan to tell its own story in the sacred halls of the OSCE Secretariat. But first, some background.
Election background:
Recent constitutional changes increased the number of seats and allowed for more minority representation. The new constitution was supposed to help Kazakhstan conform more closely to OSCE democratization guidelines.
With every constitutional re-write, the opportunity for change cuts both ways. The amendments for legislative reform were also accompanied by a less-democratic change, a one-person-only abrogation of term limits in the executive branch. Though the term between elections remains the same (it has been extended constitutionally before), and Mr. Nazarbaev must run, the exception allows President Nazarbaev to run for office as many times as he feels necessary or desirable.
Unfortunately, this term-unlimit left Kazakhstan in less conformity to OSCE democratization guidelines than before. It also precipitated a fall-out within the Nazarbaev family which has become the Rakhat-gate scandal. The scandal has focussed attention upon a. various non-transparent financial arrangements, particularly with banks, and media organizations; b. various kinds of criminal impunity for high-ranking members of Mr. Nazarbaev's close-knit cadre, and c. (although few people are discussing this) the relationship of European non-transparency to Kazakhstani non-transparency.
Rakhat-gate:
As soon as Mr. Aliev made his disappointment public about the extension of Mr. Nazarbaev's ability to run for office, it focussed attention upon the two men. Though much is admirable about Mr. Nazarbaev, his son-in-law has never been portrayed as an admirable person in the media, with rumors of personal vendettas against others backed up by threats and violence, unfinished and/or unrealized power plays against Mr. Nazarbaev, and a distressing lack of subtlety in all of his dealings with the world. But since he was kept on by Mr. Nazarbaev in various powerful positions, there was a suggestion of approval and impunity. Eventually, this lack of finesse finally became too large to contain in context of the Nurbank scandal, where bank executives were killed and property transferred in a way which could not be hidden or excused.
In the fallout, the divorce between Nazarbaev and Aliev (much more important than the divorce between Darigha Nazarbaeva and Aliev), there were more non-transparent property transfers: first, at Nurbank, and second, of the Nazarbaeva-Aliev media empire. The results were published, but they came so fast that no one understood how they were transferred and with what compensation.
Certainly Nurbank's property settlements had to be changed if force was used, for instance, in transferring the real property assets of the bank. Maybe asset transfers should have taken place in the legal sphere. Yet many of Nurbank's ‘internal changes’ are no different than what occurs in Western enterprises who have ‘management shakeups.’ Likewise, some broadcasting outlets were closed for legitimate violations of broadcast permits, yet they had not been closed down earlier. And when they re-opened, it was under new management: management shakeup or opaque deal? Where does one draw the line? For Kazakhstan, the family connections blur the distinction between the governmental and the private sector, the internal and the external. Can we say this is untrue of other, more powerful or self-righteous OSCE states?
European de facto collusion:
Transparency in all of the crimes associated with the Nurbank scandal and Rakhat-gate could have been furthered on the European end under two conditions: first, Austria could be more public about their own investigation of scandals allegedly associated with Mr. Aliev, and second, Austrian courts could have extradited Mr. Aliev for trial. They could have sought, as European Courts did in the U.S. with the Soering Case, that Aliev be not tried under sentence of death, but instead, life in prison. But this did not occur: therefore Mr. Aliev will never have to testify or have his dealings revealed in a legitimate court. If you were Kazakhstani, you could well argue that governmental/business transparency would have been achieved by trying Mr. Aliev–and which would also have put paid to the idea of family impunity. Therefore, continued opacity and impunity have been guaranteed by Austria: not Kazakhstan. Yet it is Kazakhstan whom we commonly view as non-transparent.
Summing it up: bad habits all around
In many ways, it's difficult to blame Kazakhstan for their seamless backing of Mr. Nazarbaev as perpetually-running president of Kazakhstan. His executive skills are masterly, and most of his policies have worked really well. He's done a great job in stimulating economic benefit within the country, and has managed to extend Kazakhstan's bilateral relations past the Central Asian region. His leadership creates stability within the country, and he has reached out past his borders to facilitate stability within the Central Asian region. He is a diplomatic genius, who is able to remain flexible in a region where every great power wants absolute, uncompromising loyalty. In most democratic countries, voters cast their ballots with the economy in mind, unless they are afraid of looming security threats. Why should Kazakhstan be any different?
Yet on the other hand, if Kazakhstanis are so satisfied, there's no need to have irregularities in elections. Nur-Otan didn't need 86% majority to form a credible, majority government.
Yet I suspect there are some calculations in here that we have all missed because of a habitual stance of over-righteousness. It's good to remember that the aphorism that absolute power corrupts absolutely was not invented for post-Soviet states, but for all situations of power, from the family on up to international governance structures. Some of the conflict over Kazakhstan's leadership of the OSCE is self-serving, and it is this self-serving aspect which has escalated the conflict to come over Kazakhstan's OSCE leadership bid. And if the more-powerful states come across to Kazakhstan as judges and jury, I think they can expect to hit Kazakhstan in its identity and in its vanity, two really bad places to inflict injury. In the occurence of electoral manipulation, leadership changes in large companies, and ‘heirs apparent’, such responses are not only injurious, but often somewhat hypocritical. Yes, Kazakhstan should have free and fair elections. They should have more transparency. Their journalists should be able to write reasoned editorials from all sides of the spectrum. Mr. Nazarbaev should loosen up the reins of power. And the OSCE, and particularly the Western media that reports international community concerns should come up with a better public dialogue than habitual, unthinking pomposity — but I fear they won't.
Further reading:
BBC on the OSCE — noting, as you will, that only Warsaw Pact and Former Soviet states are listed — uh-huh. But you can't blame all this on the BBC when we all do it, now can you?
You can read more on Rakhat-gate from previous posts.