Afghan's culture and societal battles are of utmost important in the overall fight for the country's future, but the Afghan and NATO armies are still the key-holders to success on all fronts. Their ability to stand up or stand down against the Taliban and other insurgent forces will be a crucial determining factor as the outcome of this conflict. Hudson Institute scholar Richard Weitz discusses what he calls a growing ‘war weariness’ with Afghan, European, and American troops in Afghanistan and with this combined with a Karzai government that has already shown it is willing to negotiate with insurgents, negotiated talks of a pull out may not be as far away as we think.
NATO forces reiterated their support for the Afghan effort last month in Bucharest, but Weitz sees some cracks. He does not provide much evidence or sources, but he claims that many of the foreign actors in the conflict ‘are willing to scale back reconstruction objectives in order to end the fighting, declare victory, and leave.’ What is of true value in his piece is his breakdown of possible negotiated settlements with the Karzai government/NATO forces and the Taliban and their related insurgents. He opines that Karzai desires a more stable political footing before the upcoming elections and an agreement with certain Taliban sects/members could strengthen his influence throughout the country and chances of reelection.
Weitz also compares the possible Afghan negotiations with the insurgents to Pakistan's own talks and agreements with their across the border North Waziristan Provinces. The Pakistan model does not provide one with much hope as those regions have continually provided the Taliban reprieve and a launching pad for attacks with in Afghanistan, plain and simple they have not pacified the population and brought it under stable control. Also important, is the fact that the Taliban have already been autonomous in one city in southern Afghanistan, Musa Qala, and they ruled it with their usual extreme and totalitarian ways of pre-2001.
The situation in Afghanistan is not going great for any party involved, and I know that someday there will need to be comprises made on all sides, but to me, the US/NATO did not go into Afghanistan just to leave back in the hands of a group that made its populace miserable for years.
Weitz finishes his article arguing that NATO still appears ready to be there for the long haul and its progress on a land based transit hub into the country proves this. There are new reports that a railway to transport non-military goods across Russia and many Central Asian states, which would save NATO millions of dollars because airlifting is so expensive, is looking close to becoming a reality. The report even cites a source who asserts that if all goes well, NATO will ask if it can send military goods on the rails.
Why would Russia and the Central Asian states allow NATO to use their land? One is transit fees and all cargo on these trains will be taxable. Number two is the security umbrella that NATO would provide for fighting the Taliban and other Islamic insurgents in the region. These forces may find their way out of Afghanistan and into Central Asia is NATO is unsuccessful in the efforts there. Drug trafficking is also an area where NATO can provide policing assistance. For Russia, by allowing this transit, it provides them leverage in other NATO endeavors such as the missile defense system in Czech and Poland, NATO expansion, and the opportunity to let the US/NATO fight the insurgents in the CA while Russia gains back some of its lost great power status. Of course, I don't see how this doesn't undermine the influence and seeming effectiveness of the Russia-dominated CSTO, CIS, and even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.