Yesterday I participated in a conference on Turkish foreign policy held at the State University of New York’s Levin Institute for International Relations and Commerce in New York City. The event was co-sponsored by SUNY’s Office of International Programs (the office that also operates the innovative and wildly successful dual diploma program between SUNY and several Turkish universities – see more about it here) and the Transatlantic Academy and featured a who’s who in Turkish studies: Steven Cook from the Council on Foreign Relations, Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, David Cuthell of the Institute for Turkish Studies, Michael Oppenheimer of NYU, several Transatlantic Academy fellows (Ahmet Evin, Joshua Walker, Nathalie Tocci, Juliette Tolay and Kemal Kirisci) and SUNY scholars (Ilgu Ozler, Zehra Arat and Umut Uzer). The issues discussed included the role of Islam in Turkey’s new foreign policy (what about it is Islamic and/or new?), the status of EU accession and human rights in Turkey, and the Turkey’s new role in the Middle East. The conversation was lively and sometimes spirited – but always civil. But it was clear that under the AKP there have been great changes in Turkey’s foreign policy (in style and substance) and, at the same time, there have been rapid and dramatic changes in the region (to my mind the relative decline of Arab power is a key variable, leaving Israel, Iran and Turkey as the three central actors in the new Middle East). Turkey’s relations with Syria, Hamas, Iraq all present challenges and opportunities – but the stakes are especially high in its dealings with Iran. As U.S. policymakers move closer to serious sanctions against Iran, Turkey’s policy of engagement will become more of a concern in Washington. No one at the conference had a solution to that policy dilemma but it certainly bears greater attention as a litmus test of Washington’s tolerance of Turkey’s new regional role.
That new role also presents opportunities for the U.S. and the region. Until yesterday I was not aware of the extent to which Turkey is engaged in democracy promotion. Kirisci, Tocci and Walker from the Transatlantic Academy have written a report, A Neighborhood Rediscovered: Turkey’s Transatlantic Value in the Middle East, and among other things they note that TIKA (Turkey’s international development agency) “channeled almost $800 million in development aid to 98 countries, many of them in its neighborhood, a proportion of which was directed to projects on ‘good governance’ and ’empowering women.'” I would be interested to learn more about these efforts by Turkey how democracy promotion is seen to advance their interests. Given the events of the last decade the U.S. is not in a strong position to promote democracy in the region. Does it make sense, then, to more closely coordinate with countries like Turkey who might have a better chance of supporting democracy programs without getting into the hornet’s nest of U.S. foreign policy? Or, is it better to let Turkey carry out its development assistance without any interference from the U.S.? The latter is most likely the best course in this case. But it could well be that USAID should consider taking a secondary or even tertiary role on some development efforts in which other countries (or international organizations) are better positioned to achieve positive results. This happens in some cases with basket funding approaches. In the area of democracy promotion, with regional actors like Turkey supporting their own programs, less might be more for the U.S. It remains to be seen if Turkey’s relations with a variety of Arab states will continue to improve, but if so the regional development calculus will change accordingly.