The discrepancy invites speculation. Instead of cautious deduction, STRATFOR takes a bolder approach—“almost 90 percent of the guns seized in Mexico in 2008 were not traced back to the United States.” (Emphasis original) Into the chasm of the unknown STRATFOR insinuates more than even loose methodological honesty can permit. Eighty-seven percent of arms used by narco villains in Mexico may not come from America, but given the sampling data available and the stiff prohibitions against owning most types of guns in Mexico (Mexico gun laws are routinely described as “among the most prohibitive in the world” in major media reports), it seems only logical that a vast number of arms—almost surely the majority—used to perpetrate drug violence in Mexico come from America.
STRATFOR, to be fair, has a larger point in mind. Weapons fueling drug-related violence in Mexico come from a variety of places, and therefore one should weigh the multitude of factors that animate drug violence and stop pinning the blame on the U.S. In a broad sense the intelligence firm has a point: endogenous factors mix with international forces to produce drug-related violence in Mexico, as was the case in Colombia, and elsewhere. Yet the international dimensions that STRATFOR highlights include the use of high-powered weapons in Mexico that is commercially unavailable in the U.S. Perhaps the guns come from corrupt military and police in Guatemala? STRATFOR thinks that is a likely prospect.
But do Mexican narcos really need to go to Guatemala to find venal military and law enforcement types ready to sell a .60 calibre for three times the retail price? Could the Zetas not just get their arms from corrupt police forces in Mexico? After all, the rash of firings that President Calderón has ordered in recent years makes it clear that the local beat may be playing both sides.
Another problem might stem from arms made in third-party countries that are easily available in the U.S. For example, on January 31, 2008, a 21-year-old walked into a Phoenix gun shop and bought six Romanian made AK-47s (imported into the U.S. as WASR-10s in order to comport with U.S. law as “sporting weapons”). A recent report by the Center for Public Integrity follows the story through:
Four months later, one of the same guns that Galloway [the 21-year-old] signed for surfaced in a safe house used by the Beltrán Leyva drug cartel in northwest Mexico. The discovery followed a deadly shootout between federal agents and drug dealers in Culiacán, the capital of the Pacific state of Sinaloa. Eight police officers were killed.
Before getting caught up on the chain of culpability in this one anecdote, it is probably best to consider the broader effect of high-powered arms imported into the U.S., only to be smuggled south. According to In Sight, a collaborative investigative project involving the American University School of Communication, PBS’ FRONTLINE and the Romanian Centre for Investigative Journalism, since 2006 more than 500 Romanian AKs were recovered in Mexico after being purchased in the United States. Referring to the four-year span ending in 2010, the Romanian AK is most often recovered and traced weapon in Mexico’s drug war. (See this study (.pdf) by the Violence Policy Center for a more detailed breakdown of arms seized in Mexico from 2006-2009.)
Answering questions about Mexico’s drug syndicates, and enacting policy to combat them, will involve imprecision. However, suspending rationality just to add another layer of complexity to the problem isn’t going to help. The United States is a huge source of arms that amp the violence in Mexico. No one can definitively prove this is true, but I’m 90% sure of it.