I have recently read an opinion piece by Fehim Tastekin, a Turkish Caucasus expert, who regularly writes for the Turkish daily Radikal. I found the article very important, so I translated it to the attention of FPA Blogs followers:
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http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1073865&Yazar=FEHIM-TASTEKIN&Date=30.12.2011&CategoryID=100
Amidst its growing engagement in the Middle East and the Arab Spring, as well as its resurrecting Kurdish insurgency problem, Turkey installed the NATO Missile Defense Shield in September 2011. Many observers interpreted Turkey’s decision as a move against Iran, as a response to its expanding nuclear and missile capabilities, while Turkish officials indicated that the installment of this missile shield in Turkey was agreed upon much earlier and has nothing to do with Iran. The purpose of the missile shield also exposed differences within NATO countries. For example, French President Sarkozy had claimed “We call a cat, a cat; today’s threat is Iran”, while Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan said “We also call a cat, a cat, but we haven’t specified a threat like [Iran]”. Hillary Clinton too had commented on the matter by “The shield is not directed against Russia; in fact it has to do with Iran”.
Russia wasn’t convinced however; Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov indicated “words fly, military technic is permanent; we want written guarantees”. To follow up, Russia’s decision to re-direct Kaliningrad missiles to European capitals increased the interpretations of a ‘new Cold War’. Yet, some observers indicate that Russia’s Kaliningrad move is not a mere reaction, but a part of a more profound thinking. According to Nevazisimaya Gazeta, Kremlin was informed of a U.S.-backed Israeli air raid against Iranian nuclear facilities and argued “… there will soon be a surprise raid. Iran will retaliate and the war will spread out. If Iran is invaded, Russia will not sit idly and will certainly send military aid.” Indeed, Russia Minister of Defense supported this perception, explicitly warning the United States in a Reuters interview that “an attack against Iran would be a wrong decision”.
Though more troublesome perhaps, is that Russia’s mistrust towards NATO’s missile shield was not confined to words. Soon after the installment of the missile shield, Russia made the following moves:
– Complete and urgent modernization of the 102nd Military base in Armenia
– Units close to Yerevan were deployed to Gumru, closer to the Turkish border
– Military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were put under alarm on December 1, 2011
– Some ships from Russia’s Black Sea fleet were re-deployed closer to the Georgian territorial waters.
– Missile command base at Dagestan was ordered to be ready for battle
– Guided missile frigates in the Khazar fleet were re-deployed to Mahackale and Kaspiysk.
– Alexander-E missiles were sent to the Krasnodar base, their range covering the NATO missile shield in Malatya
– Kuznetsov aircraft carrier was sent to Tartus, which is interpreted as a dual move against a possible military intervention to Iran and Syria
Russia also considers the possibility of an Azeri military move towards Karabakh to reclaim that territory lost to Armenia. When Russia extended its use of Armenia’s Gumru base, it also signed an agreement to protect Armenia against external attacks. Additionally, Russia is worried about its military presence in Armenia because of Georgia’s annulment of the treaty that enabled Russian troops to use Georgian territory to be transferred further south. The necessity to bolster Russian military presence in Armenia may lead Russia to force its way through Georgia. Meanwhile, Russia also needs to guarantee its use of the Gebele radar installation in Azerbaijan whose lease ends in 2012. Azerbaijan raised the cost of the installation from 7 million to 100 million US dollars per annum, while hints at the possibility of negotiating the cost in exchange for Russian support for its territorial demands over Karabakh.
Russia also considered Gebele radar installation as a test case for American intentions. When the Bush administration considered the installation of the radar site in Poland in 2007, Russia suggested that two countries should use Gebele radar base (with 6000 kilometer range extending from the Indian Ocean to North Africa) together. Bush government’s refusal was interpreted by Russia as a sign of American expansionism, as the Gebele radar base is more than sufficient to act as an early warning system against Iran. Together with the installation of the NATO missile defense shield in Turkey, Russia no longer believes that this is intended as protection against Iran.
On the other hand, NATO shield was an interesting move on the part of the Turkish government. It successfully silenced those who interpret Turkish foreign policy as ‘moving away from the West’ and also those who criticize Turkey for deteriorating relations with Israel as well as those who question Turkey’s commitment to its partnership with the United States. It allowed Turkish diplomats to argue “see, we are protecting Israel at the expense of deteriorating our relations with Iran and Russia”.
[end of article]
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All this makes me think that Turkey might be returning back to its ‘lone wolf’ foreign policy and siege mentality:
The problem is, just as Assad’s suppression methods and Turkey’s belligerent stance against him had caused the collapse of Turkey’s ‘zero problems policy’ in the south, NATO missile shield not only caused the collapse of this doctrine vis-à-vis Iran, but also vis-à-vis Russia and by extension, the Caucasus. Systemic constraints are pushing Turkey back to its pre-2002, traditional foreign policy understanding and a return back to its Cold War role: covering NATO’s southern flank. What makes Turkey’s new role ‘updated’ is that the Middle East is more active and more relevant to American interests than it was through the Cold War and therefore, Turkey may be the bridgehead of a new and more difficult dual-containment policy against Shia and Russian influence.
The new Cold War v2.0 is more complex and difficult for Turkey, which requires quicker balancing and more intricate set of interdependencies. At a time when Turkey’s domestic Kurdish problem is intensifying, simultaneously countering Russian AND Iranian influence at such proximity is a heavy burden for any country. Following months will create more visible cross-regional entrenchments and the United States must find a way to re-assert its relevance and weight in the wider region, certainly for Turkey, for any strategy of containment to succeed – if there still is such a strategy.