Well, the authorities nabbed Mr. Aliev as he returned from the barber shop, based upon a court order issued in Vienna. Personally, with his millions, I would have asked for a house call. The puns that come to mind are endless: e.g., giving one's head for washing. . .
but on to the serious aspects of the Aliev case.
Many are saying that this scandalous affair puts paid to Kazakhstan's OSCE ambitions. This is a bit cultural-centric. Getting Mr. Aliev out of Austria and into Kazakhstan is going to require a lot of negotiating. The end result may have Kazakhstan divesting itself of OSCE ambitions almost as easily.
Extradition and Human Rights Law
Right now, Mr. Aliev is out on a bail of Euro 1 million (that's USD 1.3 million), but still faces the prospect of extradition. There are no existing extradition treaties between Kazakhstan and Austria, so extradition will probably be a laborious process. For one thing, Mr. Aliev and the six other staffers and associates named in the extradition request may not be extradited if Kazakhstan cannot guarantee a due process that meets European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)/EU standards of human rights law.
In The Soering Case (ECHR, 1989), the ECHR reviewed U.S. standards of jurisprudence, conditions of imprisonment, and the EU-outlawed use of capital punishment in its efforts to decide whether or not to extradite Jens Soering of Germany to the U.S. in a murder trial. The U.S. had to stipulate that it would not try Mr. Soering under charges conducive to death-penalty stipulation before Mr. Soering could be extradited.
The Einhorn Case, (around 2001) again between an EU state (France) and the US, sets a precedent against extradition after trials in absentia, which might limit Kazakhstan's legal recourse against Aliev. It is also another precedent that limits extradition when the custodial state perceives a lack of due process in the state requesting extradition.
One possibility: Legal coordination between Kazakhstan and EU could well result from this process, making Aliyev's charges less of a liability to EU-OSCE-Kazakhstan cooperation than an avenue toward it.
Another possibility: Based upon Soering, Kazakhstan may have to concede, just as the U.S. did, the scope of punishment available for Mr. Aliev (not capital punishment). This could be a concession that would be easy for Kazakhstan to give, or difficult, depending upon what charges and the range of punishments possible from those charges against Mr. Aliev.
Third possibility: If Austria does not release Mr. Aliev, it could be an enduring point of contention. In the absence of extradition treaties, a state has no obligation to return a prisoner when requested, especially if they consider it a political crime. This also has precedents:
In 2000, opposition leader and former Premier Akezhan Kazhegeldin was wanted for criminal charges. Kazakhstan's request to Italy for Mr. Kazhegeldin's extradition was not honored and he was freed. Eventually, Mr. Kazhegeldin went to Russia, where extradition treaties were in effect. He returned to Kazakhstan on his own recognizance.
Further reading:
Wikipedia on extradition
A model extradition treaty from the University of Michigan
Janis & Noyes, that legal tome: see Sourcenotes: general
Painting: Robert Cottingham at the Seavest Collection
