Last week, more than 100 government leaders met in Wellington, New Zealand to discuss an international treaty banning cluster munitions (aka cluster bombs). This was the fourth meeting of states committed to eradicating these weapons (the first took place one year ago in Oslo, Norway, the second in Lima, Peru in May 2007, and the third in Vienna, Austria in December 2007).
Cluster bombs are either air-dropped or ground-launched and are designed to explode above the ground and release thousands of small bomblets. Many do not explode immediately, and can lie in fields or villages, where they later kill and maim people who come across them for years to come. My fellow blogger discussed the harmful effects of these bombs on the FPA Children blog.
At Wellington, 82 countries committed to participating in formal negotiations banning cluster bombs in Dublin, the next meeting in what has come to be known as the "Oslo process."
But the United States as not one of them. The US did not even send a delegation to
Wellington. Neither did China or Israel; along with India, Pakistan and
Israel all six countries produce and stockpile cluster bombs and oppose a ban on them.
The US' rationale for opposing the ban boils down to this: cluster bombs are effective, legitimate tools of war; the US believes their effectiveness can and will be improved upon; and there are treaties other than the Oslo Process in effect that will ensure they are used properly, anyway.
Researcher Dough Tuttle explains this position more thoroughly in a comprehensive analysis on US cluster munitions policy published by Center for Defense Information (CDI).
First, according to Tuttle, the United States argues that an international treaty banning cluster bombs damages the effectiveness of another, broader treaty, Protocol V of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which specifically addresses "explosive remnants of war" (ERW), of which cluster bombs are one subset. Just before the Wellington meeting the Department of State issued a White Paper outlining its policy on cluster munitions, which argues that "[c]luster munitions constitute a small portion of the total humanitarian threat presented by [ERW]." Instead, the White Paper argues, the U.S. supports the negotiation of a "new protocol to address the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions within the framework of the [CCW]."
Second, the United States argues that in certain military warfare situations, cluster bombs may be more effective and may cause less collateral damage then regular bombs. In January, Stephen Matthias, the Head of the US Delegation to the CCW meeting argued "cluster munitions are legitimate , and in some cases essential – weapons when employed properly and in accordance with existing international humanitarian law.'
Third, rather than ban them all together, the US would rather improve the reliability of newly manufactured cluster bombs. Tuttle notes that "The United States has an estimated 700 million to 1 billion submunitions in its stockpiles. Yet, despite the recognition of the potential humanitarian consequences associated with cluster munitions that do not meet this standard, the United States used cluster munitions extensively during the invasion of Iraq, including in urban areas."
Although a US delegation was not sent to the meeting in Wellington, there was an important American voice present. Jody Williams, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate for her work to ban landmines, organized a sit-in in Wellington to stimulate support for a ban on cluster bombs.
NPR broadcast a segment summarizing the Wellington meeting, including an account of Jodi's sit in. You can also watch Jodi in action in this You Tube clip capitulating day three of the meeting.
A network of civil society groups called Cluster Munition Coalition spearheaded NGO activism at the meeting. Rae McGrath, spokesperson for Handicap International said: “These weapons kill civilians – this is hypocrisy of the worst kind by countries that claim the moral high ground and yet trade away the lives of victims to serve the interests of the USA."
Leading up to Welington, it appears that the US policy's focus on the technical aspects did draw attention away from the US' conflicting interest in producing, stockpiling and continuing to deploy these weapons until Jodi Williams came to town.
