I’m going to quibble here with an article I really enjoyed and found useful. I hope you don't mind. I don't want to leave the impression that it was a bad article. It is one you should read, if you have the time.
And time is the most important thing here. The Carnegie Endowment has a long, 40-some page report on what the authors describe as “The New Middle East”. (link goes site with .pdf link) If, like me, you fancy staying at home one night and reading about the Middle East, this is for you.
Basically the authors postulate that we are entering a new era in the Middle East, albeit one with most of the older pathologies still in place. They identify three “clusters” of problems- the Iran/Iraq cluster, the Lebanon/Syria cluster, and (of course) the Israeli/Palestinian cluster. All of these are informed by and still affect each other, of course. They also get into issues of nuclear confrontation with Iran, and the idea of proliferation from Morocco to Riyadh. All of these are underlined by US policy throughout the Bush years, which has tended to make things far worse with what the authors describe variously as disinterest, unmet threats, and too much force. This to me sums things up nicely.
What I like about this approach is how they are able to make us see clearly the new era we are entering. It is hard to judge history while you are living in it, especially when things seem to happen so fast, and are so quickly analyzed, dissected and then discarded by news outlets, talking heads and (um) blogs. Our attention can whiplash from Syria to Baghdad to Sana’a in an instant; it is hard to make a cohesive outlook of the region. This article is instructive in making sense of these maddening and tumultuous times.
But, as I said, it is not without its flaws. I am going to bring up three: two specific to the discussion, one an aside that I think is deeply misguided. Both are indicative of larger problems when discussing the Middle East, so I think it is important.
The first specific one is their solutions, particularly regarding Iran. The authors do an excellent job of explaining why the nuclear issue is so difficult.
At the same time, the
United States needs to keep in mind that
Iran will never agree to anyarrangement in which it is expected to publicly retreat or admit defeat, nor can it be forcedto compromise through pressure alone. Besides the issue of saving face,
Iran's political elite‚ chiefly Ayatollah Khamenei‚ believe that compromise as a result of pressure projects weaknessand will only encourage the
United States to demand more.But not as good a job as explaining what needs to be done.
To be sure, engagement offers no guarantees of success. It is the Iranian government thatultimately must make a strategic decision to change its own policies. The best thing
Washingtoncan do is maintain dialogue with
Iran, simultaneously present it with two distinct pathsforward, and let it be known that when
Tehran is ready to rethink its policies and emerge fromisolation, there will be a partner in
Washington ready to welcome it.This is: true. But- not helpful. “Dialogue” is a great buzzword, signifying everything but containing nothing. There is no discussion of what can and can't be taken off the table. There are no words about inviolable lines in the sand for either party. I think this is kind of a cop-out, but it also might be because no one really knows what can bring Iran to the table, much less what needs to be on it.
Another flaw also has to do with Iran- the authors dismiss the idea of a rising Shi’ite Crescent, and do so with logic, reason, facts, and a fundamental blind spot.
But the formation of a Shi'i crescent is a far-fetched idea. Although there is a great deal of discontentamong Shi'a, particularly in the Gulf countries and, of course,
Lebanon, as already discussed,such discontent is not likely to translate into a grand regional alliance dominated by
Iran.And then they do a great and instructive job of pointing out the grievances Shi’a have in various countries. This is often over-looked but vitally important. Many countries, especially Saudi Arabia, have problems with oppressed Shi’ite communites. Many think Iran is looking to exploit this.
The authors shluff this off, but they do so in a way that is inaccurate. The idea of the Shi’ite Crescent they conjure up is one of unstoppable unity, a turbo-charged scimitar sweeping over the sand, lopping off heads like a bearded Queen of Hearts. In other words: a strawman. I don't think many see this as the case. I doubt even Bill Kristol, in his most fervid, quinine-induced psycho-sexual military fantasies, believes that would be the case.
What Iran cando is fund, arm and train militant groups of Shi’ites inside countries opposed to its regional dominance. Even if the groups are outside the mainstream Shi’ite community inside, say, Bahrain, they are able to cause trouble and keep Arab countries more concerned with internal affairs than with their giant neighbor to the East. Iran does not want chaos in the region, especially in Iraq, but wants to be the dominant force. Owning militia groups throughout the area is a good way to start. The problem with this kind of analysis is its either/or nature: either Iran wants its armies to march clear to Casablanca, or it is staying home. The authors don't exactly fall into this trap, but the strawman they set up helps to lead readers into this kind of thinking.
The final problem I have is one that is common to read, and isn't even a major point in the article (though it is repeated). It is basically one sentence.
The United States needs to recognize that terrorism is not the result of blind hatred of Western civilization, as the Bush administration insists, but rather an extreme response by a few to U.S. policies that most Arabs see as hostile.
Neither is actually the case here, and both are incredibly parochial ways to look at the issue. Yes: there is much hatred toward US policy in the region, and much of it justified. And yes: there is blind hatred. But the underlying dogma behind militant Islam existed long before the US became a global power, and before anyone could hate it blindly. Different policies, especially on the Israeli/Palestinian issues (though moreso on economic ones) would help to negate the pull that violence has on young, bored and desperate young men. But the ideology would still exist. It is easy, and justified, to label George Bush as a Manichean politician, but we also need to be careful not to react with the other extreme. Understanding the New Middle East is difficult enough without letting blind hatred toward those that don't understand it lead us to an equal level of confusion.
