Earlier this year, the RAND Corporation issued a study of the threat of “Islamist” insurgencies: “War by other Means – Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency.” The press release for the new study is also a summary of the main idea: “U.S. Lacks the Capability to Counter Insurgency in the Muslim World.” The language in the report is at times categorical, although that is hardly surprising given the sub-topic of the analysis: countering religious hatred and extreme violence. The authors contend that the U.S. will be “battling global-local Islamist insurgency for a long time with, at best, mixed results – if we do not reshape our strategy and acquire a complete and balanced set of capabilities.” (p.348). This requires not focusing on large-scale U.S. military action and not attempting to “wage and win a global religious conflict.” In contrast, the authors seem to be suggesting ‘competition’ for the Muslim populations of countries with inept governments. The crux of the problem (behind terrorism apparently) is “the sentiment and direction of Muslim populations.” (p.350) However, that still sounds like a global religious conflict in disguise. Other areas of the RAND report are more substantive and less ideological – particularly addressing the capabilities, which are required in order to counter global-local insurgency. For example, according to the press release, “the chances of defusing an insurgency are better than 90 percent when caught early.” This contrasts to success rates when the insurgency has had the time and chance to become an uprising.
