Foreign Policy Blogs

Counterterrorism's Collateral Damage

While 9/11 sits nearly seven years behind us, the consequences of new laws and unintended effects are still coming to light.  The public continues to debate the intricacies and politics of U.S. counterterrorism laws under the Patriot Act – from the ambiguity over what constitutes reasonable suspicion to whether electronic surveillance without a warrant is an acceptable policy of a democratic government. 

Last month, OMB Watch (a non-profit watchdog organization in Washington D.C.) and Grantmakers without Borders (a philanthropic network focused on social justice and international philanthropy) published a jointly-researched white paper, Collateral Damage: How the War on Terror Hurts Charities, Foundations, and the People They Serve .  The paper highlights the unintended consequences of counterterrorism laws on the U.S. non-profit sector and international philanthropy.  

1) In the wake of 9/11, counterterrorism laws have morphed to require only reasonable suspicion as the rationale for designating an organization as a supporter of terrorism.  Meaning organizations can have their property seized, they can have their finances frozen, and they can be put under electronic survelliance, if the Department of Treasury or Justice Departments find a reasonable suspicion of terrorist activity.  (For the legal minded:  Reasonable suspicion is more than a hunch, but considerably below preponderance of the evidence.  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. at 695; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235.) 

Not knowing an organization that has come under reasonable suspicion, I’m curious as how the determination is made.  Too many wire transfers?  A vague mission statement?  Dealings with particular countries, in particular areas? 

2) International philanthropy suffers because the U.S. sector must operate under this suspicion. When a natural disaster hits, international relief organizations, such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent, are some of the first to respond in local crisis area – with money, goods, and expertise.  Collateral Damage discusses that after the 2004 tsunami, there were U.S. organizations operating in areas of Sri Lanka which were controlled by the Tamil Tigers, whom the U.S. had designated terrorist organization.  Under the counterterrorism laws, these relief organizations were at risk of violating prohibitions against providing “material support” to terrorists – when they were creating displaced persons' camps and hospitals or providing food and water. 

Extensive infrastructure, strong financial backing, and large talent pools make the U.S. non-profit sector one of the best in the world – yet Collateral Damage made me (once again) ask the question of whether U.S. law allows the sector to exemplify the standard for international philanthropy.  The ability of counterterrorism laws to detract from a non-profit organization's mission is completely at odds with what the sector seeks to achieve – and with how international philanthropy operates.