With the aid of hindsight, we can now understand that the Russia-Georgia conflict over South Ossetia wasthe product of miscalculations and misperceptions on the part of both the Georgian and Russian leadership.
But to many the conflict reveals much about the current state of international affairs, and provides a base from which the US can calculate its future foreign policy toward Russia. Let's investigate some of these arguments.
First, an International Crisis Group report argues: “The Russia-Georgia conflict has transformed the contemporary geopolitical world, with large consequences for peace and security in Europe and beyond…
…Russia's disproportionate counter-attack, with movement of large forces into Abkhazia and deep into Georgia, accompanied by the widespread destruction of economic infrastructure, damage to the economy and disruption of communications and movement between different regions of the country, constitutes a dramatic shift in Russian-Western relations.
It has undermined regional stability and security; threatened energy corridors that are vital for Europe; made claims with respect to ethnic Russians and other minorities that could be used to destabilise other parts of the former Soviet Union, with Ukraine a potential target; and shown disregard for international law.”
The authors explain: “Russian actions reflected deeper factors, including pushback against the decade-long eastward expansion of the NATO alliance, anger over issues ranging from the independence of Kosovo to the placement of missile defence systems in Europe, an assertion of a concept of limited sovereignty for former Soviet states and a newfound confidence and aggressiveness in foreign affairs that is intimately linked with the personality and world view of Russia's predominant leader, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.”
The next few arguments focus on the future of US-Russia relations. Michael O’Hanlon, in a analysis writtenfor the Brookings Institution, the Washington-based think tank for which he works, wonders what “Western actions or policies should be modified in the future to avoid worsening the problem [of Russia's “bullying” of Georgia].”
He suggests that US foreign policy towards Russia shouldn't focus too much on the little stuff: “securing Russia's cooperation in opposing Iran's march toward a nuclear weapon, pressuring North Korea to give up its nuclear arsenal, and trying to keep the peace in South and Central Asia are top-level priorities. We make a mistake by needlessly picking fights over secondary things if that harms our ability to cooperate on truly crucial matters.”
In regards to the future of US-Russian relations O’Hanlon states:
“We are in a predicament. To continue down the path of likely NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine would risk causing even worse troubles with Russia over a second-tier geostrategic issue when we need Moscow's help in first-tier issues (not to mention the fact that were Georgia in NATO and then again attacked by Russia we would have a huge and dangerous predicament on our hands).
Yet we cannot capitulate to Russian bullying and deny Georgia and Ukraine membership out of fear, either.
In this situation, two principles should guide further U.S. action. First, we should avoid rushing to do anything. The best policy will avoid committing to major, enduring decisions on matters such as NATO membership, since it is time for tempers to cool and provocations to cease among Georgians and Russians.
Second, we need a new concept for expanding NATO. Perhaps it is time to consider Russian membership – not now, of course, and probably never with Mr. Putin or Mr. Medvedev in power, but someday. At least Russia might be offered the option, assuming it satisfies NATO membership criteria, even as we emphasize to Moscow's future leaders that they will have no veto over the possible membership of others.”
Third, Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations and a seasoned diplomat, gives the next President some advice on how to handle Russia come January in an article published in this week's Newsweek magazine.
“Russia may no longer be a superpower, but despite its declining population, it remains a major power, one in a position to influence the opening decades of the 21st century. Russia possesses approximately half the world's nuclear weapons, is the largest producer of natural gas and the second largest producer of oil, is a major exporter of modern arms, holds dollar reserves nearing $300 billion and, with its seat on the U.N. Security Council, is positioned to facilitate or frustrate a good deal of U.S. foreign policy…
…The Bush administration has said that so long as Russia occupies parts of Georgia there will be no return to “business as usual” in U.S.,Russian relations. This suggests a form of linkage, a policy from the cold war, where bilateral ties across the board are adversely affected because of disagreement over a particular issue, in this case Georgia. This is a questionable strategy for the United States at a time when so much else on our agenda involves Russia. Instead, U.S. policy ought to be for the two countries to cooperate where they can‚ and to disagree and compete within constraints where they must…The goal of U.S. foreign policy should be to get Russia to play by the rules, not try to circumvent them.”
Helena Cobban, with the Friends Committee on National Legislation (the Quaker lobby) in Washington, DC, follows Haas’ theme of cooperation with Russia in a piece she penned for the Christian Science Monitor. The piece focuses less on the post-conflict fall out, and more on the big picture.
Cobban argues: “Russia is back. China has emerged. Suddenly, the United States isn't the world's only superpower.
How will these three big powers interact in the years ahead, and what does that mean for all of humanity?
The global architecture that's emerging will be very different from the cold war. That was a contest between two big powers with clashing visions of how the whole world should be organized, and it centered on a very costly , and risky , nuclear arms race. The emerging framework will probably be anchored by the three large powers and by four others (Europe, Japan, India, and Brazil). And in today's more globalized world, raw military power has become much less important; economic and “soft” power, more so.
Here's the good news: The interests of the world's leading powers are deeply entwined. China and Japan hold large amounts of US debt; Russia supplies much of Europe's energy needs; markets, investments, and production systems criss-cross national boundaries.
This interdependence makes open warfare among them less likely. A war would be devastating for the whole system , especially for the US, whose military is stretched very thin and whose economy relies on overseas oil and loans.”
It seems, based on these analyses, that a least a little bit of clarity has emerged form the fog of war.
