Jeffrey Azarva at the American Enterprise Institute argues today that as Egyptian President Husni Mubarak continues to block democratic reform a new U.S. administration would do well to “send Mubarak and the one-in-three Arabs he rules the message that U.S. aid cannot be taken for granted.”
Since the early 1980s the United States has provided Egypt with close to $2B annually, including $1.3B in military aid, as reward for maintaining peace with Israel. While economic assistance has decreased over time, military aid has not. In a paper for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy last week, former U.S. state department official Scott Carpenter correctly pointed out that the economic aid is used as a shield for the military aid, which is more valuable to Egypt. U.S. administrations have either endorsed or not blocked Congress from cutting and conditioning economic aid, but drew the line at any cuts on the military side, which could put such military benefits as quick transits through the Suez Canal or overflight privileges for U.S. aircraft at risk.
But as some members of Congress and officials in the U.S. administration grew more frustrated at Egypt's slow pace of democratic reform, many began urging the use of military aid as leverage. Their detractors, like Jon Alterman at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argued that linking aid money to democratization would likely prove counterproductive. The debate peaked this past year when Congress conditioned $200M of its FY2008 foreign aid to Egypt on political reform and increased efforts to block smuggling between Gaza and Egypt. Secretary Rice had the final word. She waived the conditions on grounds of national security and Egypt got its money.
Azarva's article raises the important question of how best to influence Egypt. He seems to come down squarely on the stick side: The United States encouraged Egypt to enact democratic reforms. Egypt did not do so. The United States should punish Egypt.
In the American context of business relationships this theory makes sense. Performers are compensated and underperformers are docked. But Egypt sees itself as an equal partner to the United States in stature if not in practice, and any attempt by the United States to punish Egypt will likely bring a backlash. According to Egyptian decision makers, one of the biggest mistakes of the Bush Administration was its heavy-handed approach. Rather than discussing issues of reform quietly with the Egyptian government, administration officials preferred to speak publicly about what Egypt must do to change. These proclamations gave encouragement to democracy advocates inside Egypt, but the greatest challenge to these democracy advocates are repressive government policies, not a lack of resolve. At the political level Egyptian officials seem exasperated and insulted at the presumption of their American counterparts. I have been told in my research meetings on the U.S.-Egypt relationship that another dramatic move by the U.S. to punish Egypt will result in Egypt looking elsewhere for strategic relationships. This could be an empty threat, but a resurgent Russia and an active China could provide Egypt with options beyond the United States.
Rather than immediately continuing a policy of negative incentives, a new U.S. administration might do better to meet with their Egyptian counterparts, listen to their concerns, and then chart a new course to promote democratic reform.
