Gian P. Gentile has a piece in the Christian Science Monitor this week arguing that the Russia/Georgia standoff of August 08 indicates the importance of maintaining a military with strong conventional warfare capabilities. A conventionally trained military can quickly adapt to a counterinsurgency environment, he says, but deemphasizing conventional preparations in favor of a focus on COIN makes an army vulnerable in a large-scale battle. And clearly, the example of Russia and Georgia show that conflicts of that nature will continue to take place. So, when the Department of Defense creates a rebuilding plan for the U.S. Army after Iraq and Afghanistan are finished, they should consider carefully the relative merits of a counterinsurgency focus as opposed to a conventional one. Sounds reasonable.
Gentile has written before, though, that COIN is limited in its efficacy without a functional government; he has also contested the idea that COIN really explains the success of the surge in Iraq at all. (Read the Abu Muqawama team's response to the latter here). So, while he may be correct that conventional threats still exist and the US should prepare accordingly, couching this argument in commentary on Russia and Georgia distracts from the fact that Gentile doesn't even think that highly of COIN doctrine in situations like Iraq. It's curious that he didn't even really allude to the complaints he's registered about COIN before when they would strengthen his argument here.
For a profile of Gentile, click here.
