Foreign Policy Blogs

The SCO's Georgia Problem

I did a quick summary of most of the major outcomes of the SCO's Dushanbe Summit on Monday, but I want to get a bit more into the affect of Russia's conflict in Georgia and all that has happened since diplomatically and strategically.  As we have read, the SCO's Dushanbe Declaration came out with a rather neutral sounding statement regarding the conflict, neither supporting Russia nor condemning them.  Russia was no doubt displeased with this, and though they spun the Declaration into a sign of support from China and their Central Asian neighbors, they had to start to question their level of isolation and the usefulness of the SCO in promoting their foreign policy and in confronting what they see as Western encroachments.

Mark N. Katz at Eurasianet and John J. Tkacik, Jr. at the Heritage Foundation each wrote analytical pieces discussing diplomatic and strategic moves after the Georgian conflict and its aftermath, mainly Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence, Katz of Russia and the Central Asian states and Tkacik Jr., China.  Katz argues that Russia came into a rather unfriendly environment at the last SCO summit, facing deteriorating relationships with many Central Asian states and recalcitrant China, eager to have the CA states look to it for leadership.  Though this takes too harsh a view of Russia's relations and influence in Central Asia, (as there was/is indeed great pressure on the CA states to move toward Russia's side in this conflict and Russia seemed to have successful visits to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan immediately after the summit), Katz's analysis rings true that China will use the SCO to move closer to the CA and have its states depend more on its resources, such as for infrastucture investments, and that Russia will start, though in many ways it already does, to lean more toward the Moscow dominated CSTO for regional cooperation.

There are a myriad of reasons why China never came right out and stated its support for Russia in the conflict, but John Tkacik does an excellent job shedding some light on their internal process by detailing their changing diplomatic positions from well before the conflict to today.  The main reason China would be wary about explicitly supporting such actions would protecting their secessionist's claims themselves, on Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang Province, and several Islands and waters of its coasts.  It would also go against China's ‘quiet rise’ where they let others talk the hits from the West.  Tkacik states two central motivations for what he sees in the end is China's implicit support of Russia's move into Georgia: 1. China considers American and NATO moves to bring Georgia into the network of Western security pacts as a threat to a close Chinese partner, Russia  2. China may want to preserve its own options for taking similar action beyond its own borders.  Now Tkacik is not implying China would use this method in Central Asia, but in the aforementioned regions.

So of course, how China and Russia handle and view this Georgian conflict has strong ramifications for the Central Asia states, who must always remain wary.  Do you think the Georgian conflict has strengthened Russia's hand in Central Asia?  Or do you think that they may have overplayed their hand and now their current isolation is pushing CA states toward the coffers of China?  Or are the CA authoritative leaders simply just relieved to see the Georgian Rose Revolution leaders punished and checked?  What did the Dushanbe Declaration's about the conflict signify about the group's future?  Chinese dominated?

 

Author

Patrick Frost

Patrick Frost recently graduated from New York University's Masters Program in Political Science - International Relations. His MA thesis analyzed the capabilities and objectives of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Central Asia and beyond and explored how these affected U.S. interests and policy.

Areas of Focus:
Eurasia, American Foreign Policy, Ideology, SCO