The 50-member Pak-Afghan "jirgagai" or mini-jirga has concluded its session in Islamabad on Tuesday with a call to initiate peace talks with the Taliban, "including all who are involved in the conflict situation". Two committees have been formed, one to ensure that the resolution of the "jirgagai" is implemented, and the other to actually engage the Taliban in negotiations. The Afghan side, represented by former foreign minister Mr Abdullah Abdullah, has clearly changed its mind. It once used to denounce all efforts for peace talks with the militants made by Pakistan.
The Americans too have changed their mind. The ISAF-NATO commanders used to complain that "peace deals" made by Pakistan in Waziristan tended to intensify the cross-border attacks by the Taliban. According to reports, the White House and senior military officials are in favour of talks "to help reverse the downward spiral in Afghanistan and Pakistan". But the Afghan Taliban's spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid has called the call for dialogue "worthless" as long as "foreign troops are in our country". So, are the proposed peace talks foredoomed?
The Afghan Taliban are in certain areas of Pakistan but their staying power is also derived from the Pakistani Taliban who stand somewhere between the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda, showing sympathy for both. The Pakistani Taliban have already expressed their desire to engage in talks with the Pakistani authorities while consistently maintaining their claim to strike across the Durand Line at the "occupation forces". But after the so-far successful military operations in the Tribal Areas by the Pakistan army, the militants have been "softened" to some extent. Will talks with them help?
Talks between the Pakistani authorities and the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) will definitely help but the time for them may not have come just yet. Pakistan's stance, taken at a joint session of the parliament in Islamabad, is that priority would be given to negotiations but these will be held only with those who decide to throw down their weapons (sic!) and agree to abide by the Constitution of Pakistan. Statements made by the Taliban "spokesmen" ‚ Afghan or Pakistani ‚ don't mean much because they are mainly aimed at maintaining internal morale. There are always spaces within a movement where nuances of reconciliation exist amid assertions of challenge.
Therefore, there can be no quarrel with the resolution of the "jirgagai" that a committee should proceed to explore the possibilities of a dialogue with the Taliban. There is no doubt that on the Pakistani side at least there are negotiators with friendly access to the militants who can at least inform us about the possibilities of a "middle course" between the mutually exclusive positions of the two sides whereby violence can cease and reconstruction can start in the affected areas. If the Afghan side doesn't have such negotiators, Pakistan can help by posing as the mediator. But is this all there is to the sudden change of mind on dealing with the Taliban?
It all began with the British military and diplomatic officials "thinking aloud" about the war in Afghanistan. But now strategists in Washington are suggesting "a way out" of Afghanistan to the coming administration. They think that Afghanistan has lapsed into another Great Game with India and Pakistan fighting their perennial proxy war through pawns deployed there to deceive the United States and its allies. Behind these two local fighters there is a whole array of regional players who will interfere in Afghanistan to retain their areas of influence. If the current scenario is allowed to unfold, Pakistan's hope that its tribal conflict would be relocated to Afghanistan, as in the 1990s, could be a pipe-dream.
Iran, Russia , China and India have an interest in the new order in Afghanistan. On the power chessboard, the moves are motivated by two factors: the rise of the Taliban at the expense of the nationalities of the Northern Alliance will not be acceptable; equally unacceptable would be the dominance of America in the region if it wins against the Taliban. This leads one to realise that the "external" factors in the war in Pakistan's Tribal Areas are actually pursuing the goal of keeping America out of the region. Together with circumventing the Americans, the aim is to arrive at an agreed "regional" solution to the question of who rules Afghanistan.
A regional approach agreed by the neighbours of Afghanistan, based fundamentally on a normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan, is being recommended. This will no doubt help as Pakistan is increasingly becoming aware of the stakes of India and other states in the conflict it faces in the Tribal Areas. The trouble inside Pakistan stems from the concerns the regional powers have for the shape of things to come inside Afghanistan. These concerns can be met through a "contact group" sounding out the regional and adjacent states on a collective approach to the problem of Afghanistan. *
