With all this attention being paid to Gaza Tunnels recently I’m printing here a June 2008 posting I wrote for a personal blog. It details how Washington approached the Gaza Tunnel issue in the past few years. It is my personal belief that Gaza Tunnels are a red herring, and that neither Israel, the US, nor Egypt is really concerned that serious weapons are getting through. The tunnels were mostly a response to deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Gaza and are not suited for heavy weapons trafficking. I understand from former colleagues that most of the heavy weapons are coming in from the sea. I suspect Israel wants these tunnels shut down because they undermine Israel's policy of blockading Gaza and making conditions so terrible that Gazans turn against Hamas. It was a failed strategy. Here is my post from last year:
Gaza Tunnels , What Washington Did
Background
• The illegal flow of arms to Hamas through tunnels underneath Gaza's border with Egypt is among the top issues that consume the day-to-day work of the Egypt portfolio in Washington. Others include:
– structuring support for NGOs in Egypt;
– resolving the accidental killing of an Egyptian sailor in the Suez Canal by the security force of a boat contracted to the U.S. military; and
– planning the next meeting (this issue takes top priority, always).
• Gaza Tunnels is a reactive policy issue. Washington doesn't particularly want to address it, but outside actors (Congress, Israel, Egypt) forces it to do so (democracy promotion would be a proactive policy issue).
Generating concern in Washington.
• Since Israel quit Gaza in August 2005, it has made Gaza Tunnels an issue in Washington. The initiative included:
– raising concerns in public and private since Israel quit Gaza in 2005;
– providing evidence that a problem of illegal arms smuggling exists; and
– lobbying Members of Congress.
• The turning point came when Congress voted to withhold $100M of Egypt's FY2008 economic and military aid if Secretary Rice couldn't certify Egyptian progress on:
– stopping smuggling in Gaza;
– increasing judicial independence; and
– curbing police abuses.
The Administration takes notice: The unprecedented move by Congress to withhold Egypt's money put the strategic relationship at risk. Senior leaders in the administration had been working on democratization (including judicial independence and police abuse) for some time, but not on Gaza Tunnels.
• Before the legislation:
– Senior American leaders urged senior Egyptian leaders to increase efforts at the border as a tertiary issue point during their bilateral meetings.
– Deputy Assistant Secretaries (three to five levels from the Secretary) delegated the issue to office directors who staffed it to desk officers.
– Junior policy staff held meetings with technical experts and provided weekly updates to their superiors.
– Technical teams surveyed the border and concluded that the Egyptians were making as honest an effort as they could (Egyptians are reluctant to use force against Palestinians, and not even the Israelis could block the tunnels when Israel controlled the border).
– The U.S. offered Egypt some technical expertise.
• After the legislation:
– Deputy Assistant Secretaries became the desk officers, traveling to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and the Gaza border.
– A U.S. Army Corps of Engineers team is now at the border aiding in the interdiction effort.
– Egypt has indicated that it will allocate approximately $25M of its $1.3B in military aid on border security equipment.
Endgame: On February 29, 2008, Deputy Secretary of Defense Negroponte signed a National Security Waiver releasing Egypt's $100M.
• While the State Department probably could have certified Egypt's progress on the tunnels, certifying progress on judicial independence and police reform would have been a stretch.
• A $100M rescission would have put the bilateral relationship at serious risk. With over 100,000 American troops active in the region, the U.S. cannot afford to alienate any Middle Eastern allies.
